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ABSTRACT

WE – FOR THE OTHER:
SOLIDARITY AS AN ENACTMENT OF ETHICAL-EMPATHETIC SUBJECTIVITY
(AN ANALYSIS OF THE PHILOSPHICAL PROJECTS OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS
AND EDITH STEIN, AND THE CONCEPT OF SOLIDARITY)

By
Karen M. Kolano
December 2011

Dissertation supervised by Marie L. Baird, Ph.D.
What does it mean to be a human person? How do we enact our humanity? These
are the questions that run like a thread throughout this project. Eschewing Hamlet’s
famous question – To be or not to be? – this dissertation situates itself within the
postmodern context, exploring the work of Emmanuel Levinas and his ethical
presentation of the human person. Here we find the human person not concerned with his
or her own state of being, but rather turning toward the other in ethical responsibility.
However, Levinas’ work presents us with a peculiar problem – this ethical encounter
does not take place in the “real time” of justice, politics, work, and play. It is an
anarchical encounter taking place in an immemorial past of which we can only sense a
trace. Thus, to render his work accessible to our daily lives, I place Levinas’ thought in
dialogue with Edith Stein’s understanding of the concept of empathy. I argue that the
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empathetic encounter with the other person is a turn to the other that avoids the reductive
tendencies found in the ontological traditions of the West. This encounter allows and
even demands that we enact our humanity from within the type of ethical context which
Levinas insists makes us human. Furthermore, it is in this ethical-empathetic encounter
with the other that one can be in relationship with God. We will see how this turn to the
other is prayer, hence relationship with God, and lived spirituality. In conclusion, I argue
that solidarity with others, especially with those who suffer and particularly with those
who suffer from injustice, is the natural outcome of this ethical-empathetic enactment of
the human person. Here we refer to the writings of Pope John Paul II, philosophertheologian Józef Tischner, and the tradition of Latin American Liberation Theology to
explore the concept of solidarity within the Catholic social justice tradition.

v

That’s the deal. That’s what you were saying without saying it right out. When we know
there are people in need, right now, in the same breath as what we are breathing, we
cannot look away. It is not abstract. We have to go. That is humanity. The whole thing
relies on it. Human beings do not look away.
Sarah Blake
The Postmistress

vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Several thank you’s are in order. It is often said how it takes a village to raise a
child, few know the vast network of support it takes to raise a doctor!...
First I would like to thank Dr. Marie Baird, my dissertation director. Not only did
you provide excellent guidance through this long and sometimes maddening process, but
you were a true source of encouragement and support along the way. Little did you know
when I first walked into your undergraduate Faith and Atheism course in the Spring
semester of 1995… just how hard it would be to get rid of me! This has been an amazing
and wonderful journey of discovery and growth. You have opened my mind to
conceptual (and non-conceptual) vistas I never imagined possible. Thank you so much
for all you have done and continue to do!
Thank you also to my readers, Dr. Aimee Light and Dr. Anna Scheid. It has been
a great encouragement to have such strong women as role models in my chosen field of
study. Special thanks to Dr. William Thompson-Uberuaga who first planted the seed in
my mind to pursue a career in theology. That seed certainly took root and has at last
blossomed into the work presented here. Thank you to Dr. Michael Slusser, then chair of
the department, for admitting me into the program and offering me the teaching
assistantship that made this endeavor financially possible in the first place. Thank you to
Dr. George Worgul, our current chair, for continuing to offer me the opportunity to teach
as an adjunct in the department. It was great fun being your graduate assistant all those
years ago! To doctors Maureen O’Brien and Jim Bailey – thank you for always
welcoming me into your offices whenever I came calling. Thank you to all the faculty,

vii

part-time faculty, and staff for many years of fascinating classes, assistance, advice, and
encouragement along the way.
A note of thanks must also be offered to my fellow Ph.D. students, those who
have taken this academic journey along with me. From first semester Latin and Marion to
comps and dissertations (one chapter at a time) – your camaraderie has been invaluable!
To those who disembarked before me – Michelle, Mike, and Gabriel – thank you for
showing me the ropes and allowing me to journey a space with you. For those still sailing
– Emily, Diane, Kevin, Cathy, Mary Beth, Denis, and Ian – stay strong and see this
journey through.
A depth of gratitude is also owed to my family and friends – those who have
journey with me the longest. There are too many people to name in this small space, but a
few must be mentioned. Elisa, Kristin, Babette – your friendship is something I truly
cherish, it has helped to keep me sane throughout this endeavor! Alex – you are my
guardian angel of last minute computer issues. Kristen, my wonderful sister – it is often
said how little sisters look up to their big sisters. What is often left unsaid is how much
those big sisters need their little sisters too, how the belief those little sisters have in their
big sisters gives them the very courage they need to forge the path ahead. Thank you for
being the best little sister a big sister could ever hope to have! Mom and dad, my first and
longest cheerleaders – you have given me life, you have given me love, you have given
me dreams and hopes and the crazy belief that I can always succeed. On days when I was
“fine” and “not fine”, you were always there for me. I can never thank you enough and
only hope that I will always make you proud. And Tom, my darling husband – I love you
deeply. It was you who said that fateful day, “I think you should go back and get your

viii

Ph.D.” Little did we know the trials and sacrifices that would entail, but also the joys and
the discoveries. I couldn’t have done this without you! From back rubs after hours
hunched over research, to computer assistance, and always a shoulder to lean on – thank
you for being my life’s companion. There is no one else I would rather go through life
with than you.

ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT.……...………………………………………………………………………

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENT……..……………………………………………………………

vii

INTRODUCTION.……………...…………………………………………………………
A Brief Description of Husserlian Phenomenology.……………………………

xii
xix

CHAPTER ONE
Situating Levinas: From Modernity to Postmodernity – the “climate” from which we
must flee....…………………………………………………………...................................
Introduction……………………………………………….……………………
Part I – From Modernity to Postmodernity.………………………………......
Part II – Levinas’ Critique of Husserlian Phenomenology and Heideggerian
Ontology....…………………………………………………………...

1
1
2
25

CHAPTER TWO
Emmanuel Levinas: Subjectivity through Selflessness – Ethics as First Philosophy……..
Introduction………………………………………………………………….....
The “Waves” of Levinas’ Thought: Key Concepts and Themes…………….....

92
92
94

CHAPTER THREE
Edith Stein: Selfhood through Intersubjectivity – Empathy as the Act of Personhood…...
Introduction……………………………………………………………………
The Structure of the Human Person in the Thought of Edith Stein ….………..

169
169
172

CHAPTER FOUR
Levinas and Stein in Dialogue: Stein’s Empathy as a Real-Time Analogue for Levinas’
Ethical Relationship……………………...…………………………………......................
Introduction.……………………………………………………………………
Part I – Preparation…………………………………………………………….
Part II – Enactment: Empathy as a “bridge” into the time of the 3 rd Party..…...

235
235
240
254

x

CHAPTER FIVE
We – for the Other: Solidarity as a Fundamental Principle within the Catholic
Tradition……….….……………………………………………………………………….
Introduction.……………………………………………………………………
A Preliminary Concern: Why Solidarity?....……………………………………
Solidarity as the Response of the Ethical-Empathetic Encounter with the
Other…………...……………………………………………………….
“We – for the Other” .………………………………………………………......
An Encyclical on Solidarity…………..………………………………………...

286
286
289
295
324
339

CHAPTER SIX
Ethical-Empathy as a Philosophical Framework for Christian Solidarity in the
Liberation Tradition……………………………………………………………………….
Introduction…….……………………………………………………………….
Why Liberation Theology?.…….……………………………………………….
Solidarity and the Preferential Option for the Poor...…………………………...
Spirituality: Solidarity as Enacted Spirituality........…………………………….
The Church of the Poor as an embodiment of the We – for the Other...………..
Conclusion….…………………………………………………………………...
Postscript..………………………………………………………………………

350
350
356
365
385
404
412
414

BIBLIOGRAPHY.………………………………………………………………...……

416

xi

1

INTRODUCTION

To be or not to be? Hamlet‟s timeless question has been hailed for centuries as the
human question. It is the question of existence, of the meaning of life, and in particular
the meaning of human life. What does it mean to be? What, specifically, does it mean to
be human? However, for one man in particular to be or not to be is most emphatically not
the question.1 For Emmanuel Levinas the true question that should lie at the heart of
every human soul is how to be. That is, “what matters for Levinas is not so much the
question of meaning in life, but the question of ethics”.2 Indeed, the basic theme of
Levinas‟ philosophical project is the overthrowing of Western philosophy‟s insistence on
ontology as first philosophy and the establishment of ethics as first philosophy, “where
ethics is understood as a relation of infinite responsibility to the other person”. 3 What is
significant is that Levinas‟ very disregard for the ontological and metaphysical questions,
and his insistence on ethics and the ethical encounter with the other that he calls the faceto-face4 and which takes place before any self-interested establishment of subjectivity,
1

See Emmanuel Levinas, "Nonintentional Consciousness," in Entre Nous:
Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1998), 132. He states: “To be or not to be is probably not the
question par excellence.”
2

Terry A. Veling, "In the Name of Who? Levinas and the Other Side of
Theology," Pacifica 12 (October 1999): 281.
3

Simon Critchley, "Introduction," in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, ed.
Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
6. This point is also made in the preface to Ethics as First Philosophy, ed. Adriaan T.
Peperzak, ix-xiii. New York: Routledge, 1995, xi.
4

Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo,
trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 77.
xii

allows him to answer the very question of the meaning of human life but in a radically
new way. For Levinas, our humanity, that is true human subjectivity or authentic human
life, begins not in our “being” but in the intimacy of the face-to-face ethical relationship
with the other person. Human subjectivity is not something we are or have but something
we enact.
Subjectivity is not for itself; it is, once again, initially for another…. In principle
the I does not pull itself out of its “first person”; it supports the world.
Constituting itself in the very movement wherein being responsible for the other
devolves on it, subjectivity goes to the point of substitution for the Other. It
assumes the condition – or the uncondition – of hostage. Subjectivity as such is
initially hostage; it answers to the point of expiating for others. 5
For Levinas, the only time “being” comes into question is when it is questioned;
is when I question my right to be.6 As Pascal proclaims, it is “my place in the sun” that
began “the usurpation of the whole world”. 7 Or as Levinas claims, it is the insistence on
being that has plagued Western Philosophy almost since its inception that is, in part,
responsible for the vast amounts of human suffering and violence in the world. 8 And so,
in a world that is continually suffering under the manifestations of inhuman behavior 9,

5

Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 96 and 99-100.

6

Ibid, 121.

7

Ibid.

8

This view is poignantly expressed in Levinas‟ preface to Totality and Infinity:
An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1969), 21-30. Here he shows how “the visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in
the concept of totality, which dominates Western philosophy”, 21. See also his essays
“The I and the Totality” and “The Philosophical Determination of the Idea of Culture” in
Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 13-38 and 179-187, respectively.
9

One need only mention the names of Auschwitz, Dachau, Cambodia, My Lai,
Rwanda, Darfur, 9/11, Abu Ghraib, etc. with no apparent end in sight. It is interesting to
xiii

ethically questioning our human “being-ness” seems blatantly pertinent and a dire
necessity to human life on earth today. However, Levinas‟ work presents us with a
peculiar problem – this ethical encounter does not take place in the “real time” of justice
(or injustice), politics, work, and play. It is an anarchical encounter taking place in an
immemorial past of which we can only sense a trace. Thus, to render his work accessible
to our daily lives, I place Levinas‟ thought in dialogue with Edith Stein‟s understanding
of the concept of empathy. I argue that the empathetic encounter with the other person is
a turn to the other that avoids the reductive tendencies found in the ontological traditions
of the West. This encounter allows and even demands that we enact our humanity from
within the type of ethical context which Levinas insists makes us human. This
dissertation is a participation in this ethical questioning of the enactment and meaning of
human life.
The thesis of this dissertation can be stated simply. This project will be an
analysis of the ethical-empathetic concept of the human person established through a
dialogue between the philosophical projects of Emmanuel Levinas and Edith Stein. This
understanding of human subjectivity will then be offered as the philosophical framework
for the concept of solidarity as it functions within the Catholic social justice tradition, and
specifically as within the tradition of Liberation Theology. As such, this thesis can be
broken down into two main parts. The first part, chapters one through four, presents the
work of Emmanuel Levinas and Edith Stein, both of whom focus on the enactment and

note that we refer to such situations as exhibiting “inhuman” behavior thus underlining
the point that it is when we eschew the ethical relationship with the other we in fact lose
our humanity.
xiv

meaning of the human person as necessarily intersubjective and thus ethical. These two
philosophers of intersubjectivity will then be placed into dialogue. The second part of this
study turns to the concept of solidarity. As noted, I limit my analysis to the Roman
Catholic tradition and specifically to the presence of solidarity in Latin American
Liberation Theology.
Chapters one and two concentrate on Emmanuel Levinas. Chapter one sets the
stage for the presentation of Levinas‟ work. There we briefly explore the evolution of
postmodernity out of the modern traditions of the West. We will see how the turn to the
subject was rejected in favor of the turn to the other, how metaphysics was overturned in
favor of ethics. It will be show how Levinas, with his own emphasis on alterity and ethics
and his critique of the modern traditions of the West, is clearly situated in this tradition.
We will focus on Levinas‟ critique of both Husserlian phenomenology, the tradition out
of which his own project grew, and Martin Heidegger, who may be seen as Levinas‟
arch-nemesis.
Chapter two offers a general overview of Levinas‟ philosophical project. Having
witnessed Levinas‟ attempt to flee the generally metaphysical and ontological traditions
of Western philosophy that approach the other from the totalizing and intentional
perspective of the egoist self in chapter one, we will then explore Levinas‟ thinking of the
other, the self, and the encounter between them as “otherwise than being” or “beyond
essence”.10 It is in the ethical encounter that the other as radically and irreducibly other is

10

This is of course the title of his second major text, Otherwise than Being or
Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998).
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approached. It is in this ethical response of the self to the other, the “one-for-the-other”,11
that the self is enacted both as a subject and as specifically human. We will explore
certain key concepts such as the saying and the said, time, the trace, substitution, and
Levinas‟ understanding of the human-divine relationship. It will be shown how, for
Levinas, the point of absolute subjection to the other is the point at which one both
achieves the mark of being a human person and witnesses to God.
Chapter three turns to the work of Edith Stein. Here we present her intersubjective
understanding of the human person. To be a human person necessarily means to be in
relation with others. For Stein, the human encounter as truly human can only take place
through empathizing with the other. Empathy allows us to encounter the other person as a
subject in his or her own right and not as an object of our intentional gaze. What is more,
it is, in part, through empathizing with the other that I myself achieve the mark of human
subjectivity. Thus there is an empathetic enactment of the human person as a human
person per se. We will also explore how this empathetic approach to human personhood
colors her understanding of human community. We conclude this chapter reflecting upon
Stein‟s understanding of God and the human-divine relation. As will be seen, empathy is
not only necessary in our encounters with human others, but is key to the human-divine
encounter as well.
Chapter four places Levinas and Stein in dialogue. First it will be shown how the
thought of these two philosophers, whose lives ultimately followed two very different
paths, bears a certain affinity. I will argue how Stein‟s empathetic enactment of the
11

See Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 136-140. As we will see Levinas often
referred to the ethical constitution of human subjectivity as the "one-for-the-other".
xvi

human person is not only complementary to Levinas‟ ethical subjectivity, but also allows
this ethical subjectivity to be enacted in the realm of the said, the time of justice when
those who are incomparable must be weighed against one another. This chapter will end,
as did the previous two chapters, with a reflection on God and the human-divine
relationship. It will be argued that the relationship with God is made possible only
through the ethical-empathetic encounter with the human other. Indeed, it is the very
commandment of God that we turn to the other in ethical responsibility.
Chapter five presents the concept of solidarity as a natural response to the ethicalempathetic encounter with human others. We will limit our reflection on solidarity to its
presence in the Roman Catholic social justice tradition. Thus we find it fitting to refer to
the writings of Pope John Paul II both in his days prior to becoming the Roman Pontiff
and during his papacy. As will be seen, solidarity is a key aspect in the late pope‟s
understanding of the human person. The writings of Józef Tischner, philosopher,
theologian, and John Paul II‟s compatriot, will add to our analysis of solidarity. It was
Józef Tischner who defined solidarity as we – for the other. Quite plainly, to be we – for
the other is a manifestation of the ethical-empathetic enactment of the human person.
Furthermore, it will be shown how solidarity is not only key to the enactment of the
human person, but also crucial to what it means to be in relationship with God,
specifically to be a Christian, and to the identity and mission of the church.
Chapter six concludes this dissertation with a reflection on the presence of
solidarity within Latin American Liberation Theology. The spirit of solidarity breathes
throughout the writings of Liberation Theology. According to this tradition, one cannot
believe in God and ignore the human voices crying out for help. One can only follow
xvii

Christ by turning to the suffering other in need. Solidarity with those who suffer is a
human virtue, thus it is also a Christian virtue. To be in solidarity with others is to
witness to God, to pray to God, to worship God. Solidarity with others is the natural
response of the ethically enacted person who empathetically encounters these others. It is,
according to Liberation Theology, the only way to be in relationship with God.

To conclude this introduction, I will offer a brief description of phenomenology
as conceived of by Edmund Husserl, the father of phenomenology. This description will
proceed thematically. That is, I will highlight certain key themes and concepts of
phenomenology as opposed to tracing the development of phenomenology historically, a
complex and often meandering path that is beyond the scope of this work. As
phenomenology took on a life of its own and developed in numerous directions according
to the interests of those who applied this philosophical method (and often in ways that
Husserl considered a betrayal12), I offer here only the key themes and concepts of
Husserl‟s particular vision of phenomenology that relate to this thesis of this dissertation.
This description is important to this study for it sets the stage upon which Stein‟s work
was founded and ultimately took its own route, and against which Levinas offers his own
unique philosophical project, often in ways radically opposed to many of Husserl‟s key
concepts and themes. After considering the impetus behind Husserl‟s quest for a new

12

Dermot Moran, "Editor's Introduction," in The Phenomenology Reader, ed.
Dermot Moran and Timothy Mooney (London: Routledge, 2002).
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philosophical method, his “science of science”,13 four concepts and themes will be
presented. These are: intentionality, intuition and presence, overcoming the subject-object
divide, and the issue of intersubjectivity and encountering foreign egos.

A Brief Description of Husserlian Phenomenology
From phenomenology‟s formal introduction in the first edition of the Logical
Investigations to such late writings as the Crisis of European Sciences, Husserl‟s writings
stand in opposition to the claims of psychologism and to the naturalistic tendencies of
modern science. Psychologism is a form of reductionism. 14 It “reduces the universal
being of thought to the factual, conscious processes of thinking”. 15 In this way the
distinction between what we think, the content of our thought, and the process of thought
itself is lost. Psychologism ultimately reduces “logic, truth, verification, evidence, and
reasoning [to] empirical activities of our psyche”. 16 A classic example of this confusion is
the Law of Non-Contradiction which states that “we cannot posit a proposition [it is
raining] and its negation [it is not raining] as both true at the same time”.17 However, “the
Law of Non-Contradiction states solely that a proposition and its negation cannot both be

13

Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London: Routledge, 2000),

60.
14

Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 114.
15

Klaus Held, "Husserl's Phenomenological Method," in The New Husserl: A
Critical Reader, ed. Donn Welton (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 12.
16

Sokolowski, 114.

17

Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, 104.
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true, and makes no reference to what is actually, subjectively thinkable”. 18 In other
words, while it may be impossible for it to be both raining and not raining outside my
window, that does not mean I cannot think those thoughts together at the same time.
Husserl thus rejects pshychologism as relativistic and subjective. He states:
“Psychologism in all its subvarieties and individual elaborations is in fact the same as
relativism,…. it accepts relativism as its ineluctable fate.”19
In a similar way, Husserl criticizes modern science for being naively naturalistic
and reductively empirical, as is found in his The Crisis of European Sciences.20
According to Husserl, modern science suffers from a “rigorous positivism”: it accepts
“nothing that cannot show itself as empirical evidence, quantifiable data”. 21 In this way it
falls prey to “the fallacy of „naturalism‟” which is “a taking of the real to be equivalent to
„nature‟, and nature to be solely what can be grasped as an object of empirical
experience, of measureable sense experience”. 22 That is, “the exact sciences totalize the
standard of experiential or empirical „objectivity‟” and limit reality to only the “real qua

18

Ibid.

19

Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations: Volume I, trans. J.N Findlay
(Amherst: Humanity Books, 2000), 145.
20

Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).
Hereafter cited as Crisis.
21

Richard A. Cohen, Foreword to the Second Edition to The Theory of Intuition
in Husserl's Phenomenology, by Emmanuel Levinas (Evanston: Northwest University
Press, 1995), xiii.
22

Ibid., xv.
xx

sensed”. 23 The result is, according to Husserl, that “merely fact-minded sciences make
merely fact-minded people”.24 Another definition claims that naturalism “is the view that
every phenomenon ultimately is encompassed within and explained by the laws of nature;
everything real belongs to physical nature or is reducible to it”.25 As science sets itself up
as a totality with no alternatives, what is lost is the realm of value, purpose, and
meaning. 26 This “prejudice” of science – “that reality is only that which can be known
objectively” – “substitutes for the whole of reality a part of reality”.27 Thus Husserl
questions:
But can the world, and human existence in it, truthfully have a meaning if the
sciences recognize as true only what is objectively established in this fashion, and
if history has nothing more to teach us than that all the shapes of the spiritual
world, all the conditions of life, ideals, norms upon which man relies, form and
dissolve themselves like fleeting waves, that it always was and ever will be so,
that again and again reason must turn into nonsense, and well-being into misery?
Can we console ourselves with that?28
In this way Husserl claims that Europe and the science upon which it is founded are in a
crisis due to the failure of and a misguided use of rationalism:
In order to be able to comprehend the disarray of the present “crisis”, we had to
work out the concept of Europe as the historical teleology of the infinite goals of
reason; we had to show how the European “world” was born out of ideas of
reason, i.e., out of the spirit of philosophy. The “crisis” could then become
distinguishable as the apparent failure of rationalism. The reason for the failure
23

Ibid., xv and xvi

24

Husserl, Crisis, 6.

25

Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, 142

26

Cohen, xiii.

27

Ibid., xv.

28

Husserl, Crisis, 6-7.
xxi

of a rational culture, however, as we said, lies not in the essence of rationalism
itself but solely in its being rendered superficial, in its entanglement in
“naturalism” and “objectivism”. 29
His answer to this crisis is threefold:
(1) One must not desert or denigrate science, rigorous science, since science alone
is the bearer of sound knowledge, universal truth. (2) To know the real
scientifically, in its universal truth, one must begin at the beginning, getting to
“the things themselves” without the interference of prejudices, without any
presuppositions whatsoever. (3) Knowledge of the real can only be
presuppositionless, science can only be pure, if it is based on intuition rather than
experience. True science is phenomenological not experiential. 30
This concise summary offers in almost creedal form Husserl‟s view of phenomenology.
And so, rejecting psychologism and finding the underlying perspective of modern
science to be inadequate, Husserl claimed that “consciousness [is] the condition of all
experience, indeed it [constitutes] the world”. 31 He felt that modern science had forgotten
its foundation in consciousness. That all knowledge and experience is rooted in
consciousness is perhaps the bedrock upon which all of Husserl‟s work is laid.
In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all science, all
rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood
from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed
naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the
reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not
that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense… but rather that the
world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The
world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. 32

29

Ibid., 299, emphasis original.

30

Cohen, xiv.

31

Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, 61.

32

Ibid., 143-144, emphasis original. We will return to this notion of the “natural
outlook” below.
xxii

Thus, in the name of science, Husserl wanted to create “a science of the essential
structures of pure consciousness with its own distinctive method”. 33 This science would
become known as phenomenology. According to Husserl phenomenology would be a
“theory of science, a „science of science‟, a rigorous clarification of what essentially
belongs to systematic knowledge as such”. 34 Furthermore, since “reason, as knowing,
determines what is”, Husserl considered his phenomenology as “first philosophy”. 35 And
so phenomenology, as conceived of by Husserl, was meant “to give an absolutely secure
philosophical foundation to the natural sciences” through “a stringent reflection on what
science does not normally question: the role of the perceiving consciousness in the
constitution of the perceived world”. 36 That is, the “cure” for a science limited to the real
qua sensed is “to extend reality to phenomena, to meanings rather than to objects
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alone,… to phenomena qua meant”.37 This is precisely the realm of consciousness, upon
which the exact sciences are built. According to Husserl:
In phenomenology all rational problems have their place, and thus also those that
traditionally are in some special sense or other philosophically significant… In its
universal relatedness-back-to-itself, phenomenology recognizes its particular
function within a possible life of mankind at the transcendental level… It
recognizes itself as a function of the all-embracing reflective meditation of
(transcendental) humanity, [a self-examination] in the service of an all-inclusive
praxis of reason….38
Although many definitions and conceptions of phenomenology exist, it is perhaps best
defined as:
…a radical, anti-traditional style of philosophizing, which emphasizes the attempt
to get to the truth of matters, to describe phenomena, in the broadest sense as
whatever appears in the manner in which it appears, that is as it manifests itself to
consciousness, to the experiencer.39
With that in mind, we turn now to the selected concepts and themes of Husserl‟s
phenomenology that relate to the topic of this dissertation. We begin with this
foundational issue of consciousness.

Intentionality – Consciousness of…
As with all great thinkers, Husserl was influenced by those who had gone before
him. Nowhere is this more evident than in phenomenology‟s emphasis on the realm and
role of consciousness. Here we see the influence of Descartes. Descartes‟ argument and
method by which he discovered the cogito are quite well known. For Descartes the only
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thing which I cannot doubt is the fact that I am in doubt. That is, “I cannot deny the
stream of my thoughts” which led him to conclude that “[my] conscious experience is
given in an absolute manner”.40 Husserl agrees with Descartes on this point and upholds
that “every mental process is given and can be viewed as it is. It is „absolutely given‟”. 41
According to Husserl, “this givenness, which rules out any meaningful doubt, consists of
a simply immediate „seeing‟ and apprehending of the intended object itself as it is, and it
constitutes the precise concept of evidence understood as immediate evidence”. 42 In this
way, these thoughts are “absolute and clear givenness, self-givenness in the absolute
sense”.43 We will return to this concept of givenness in the section on intuition, below.
For now, it is enough to say that the realm and role of consciousness is the sine qua non
of phenomenology. It is that which holds the entire phenomenological project together.
What is considered one of Husserl‟s most significant achievements or discoveries
is the structure of consciousness, that is, intentionality. 44 “Universally it belongs to the
essence of every actional cogito to be consciousness of something.”45 Consciousness is
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always directed toward something, 46 whether it is an object or a thought or a sensation or
even the self – to be conscious is to be conscious of something, even of something quite
imaginary or absent to us.47 Here we find a further clarification of Husserl‟s concept of
phenomenology:
While it is true, then, that phenomenology turns to consciousness, it is proposing
above all to be a science of consciousness based on elucidating the intentional
structures of acts and their correlative objects, what Husserl called the noeticnoematic structure of consciousness. 48
Phenomenology is not only a method used to discover the essential truth about
phenomena, it is also a way to analyze the very structure of consciousness itself which
apprehends such phenomenal truths. Thus there is the noetic side of the analysis: that
which pertains to “the intentional acts by which we intend things”; and there are the
noemata: “any object of intentionality, any objective correlate, but considered from the
phenomenological attitude, considered just as experienced”. 49 That is, according to
Husserl, there is a distinction “between the object as it is intended, and the object…
which is intended”. 50 It is crucial to understand that, for Husserl, noesis and noema go
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hand in hand – you cannot have one without the other.51 Therefore, what Husserl has
accomplished here through his recognition of the intentional aspect of consciousness is a
breakdown of the subject-object divide. We will return to this topic below, but first we
must turn to another structural feature of consciousness that is essential to
phenomenology, intuition.

Intuition, the Principle of Principles, and Presence
As we have seen consciousness is intentional, it is always consciousness of
something. But the question arises: if consciousness is intending something, how does
that something come to be perceived by the consciousness? Husserl‟s answer is intuition.
Intuition brings the intended phenomenon to presence or understanding. Ultimately, the
things that will be considered by the phenomenological method are only those
phenomena that are given to intuition or consciousness. “„Givenness‟ sums up the view
that all experience is experience to someone, according to a particular manner of
experiencing”. 52 Husserl expresses this by stating that phenomena are given to intentional
consciousness, that is, the noemata are given to intentional consciousness which
apprehends them through intuition, the noetic side of the equation, and in this way the
phenomena are known by consciousness and given meaning. Intentionality and intuition
are such key aspects of consciousness that human persons – those particular beings who
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have achieved consciousness – can be seen as “datives of disclosure, as those to whom
things appear”. 53
This brings us to Husserl‟s principle of all principles:
that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that
everything originarily (so to speak in its “personal” actuality) offered to us in
“intuition” is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only
within the limits in which it is presented there.54
Implied within this principle are Husserl‟s notions of presence and evidence – key
components to understanding intuition. When phenomena give themselves or present
themselves to consciousness only as they are in themselves, or as such, this is evidence.
“Evidence, according to Husserl, is the presence of the thing in itself in the original”.55
He states: “Evidence is, in an extremely broad sense, an „experiencing‟ of something that
is, and is thus; it is precisely a mental seeing of something itself.” 56 Now we must keep in
mind that it is still possible to intend something in its absence (to remember my
grandmother who had died). However, as an intuition it is unfulfilled or empty. Whereas,
when the intended phenomena is here before me (the computer upon which I am typing),
the intuition is fulfilled by the evidence given. 57 In this way, for Husserl, “evidence is the
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experience of truth, the instantiation of truth itself in the judgment”. 58 He makes this
connection between evidence as primordial givenness and truth quite clear:
Truth is an Idea, whose particular case is an actual experience in the inwardly
evident judgment. The inwardly evident judgment is, however, an experience of
primal givenness…. The experience of the agreement between meaning and what
is itself present, meant, between the actual sense of an assertion and the self-given
state of affairs, is inward evidence: the Idea of this agreement is truth, whose
ideality is also its objectivity. 59
In this way, Husserl devises as “a first methodological principle” that:
I, as someone beginning philosophically, since I am striving toward the
presumptive end, genuine science, must neither make nor go on accepting any
judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence, from “experiences”
in which the state of affairs and affair-complexes in question are present to me as
“they themselves”.60
When the phenomena present themselves to the intending consciousness in the manner
appropriate to them, with full bodily evidence, I know and understand them through this
fulfilled intuition – “there is a fulfillment of my meaning expectation in the fullest
possible sense appropriate for that kind of experience”. 61 However, it is important to note
that Husserl also recognized that “the presence of a sense object… will always be
imperfect, that is, subject to a succession of intuitions that are only partial and that
therefore might affect the quality of the evidence”. 62 Despite this partiality, Husserl
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argues that even though we may need a multitude of intuitions to perceive the full
identity of the object, one can yet “grasp the being of the entity… and not just the
individual properties”. 63 Husserl calls this grasp of being a categorial intuition, “an
intuition that something is the case”.64 For example, I can see that the car is blue, this is
the being of the entity, while „blueness‟ is simply an individual property of that entity.
When such a state of affairs has been recognized by consciousness, the categorial
intuition can be said to articulate “the way things are presented to us; we bring to light the
relationships that exist in things in the world”, that is, we articulate “the way things
disclose themselves” to us.65 Once a categorial intention has been made, the phenomenon
under consideration is then referred to as a categorial object.66 For Husserl, the most
adequate and easily comprehensible form of intuition is found in our daily acts of
perception.67
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Overcoming the Subject-Object Divide
Husserl‟s discovery of the two structural features of consciousness, intentionality
and intuition, in turn led to the dissolution of the subject-object divide. For his
predecessors (particularly Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke), consciousness is locked up in
itself and can only be aware of its own mental impressions. It is trapped in an
“„egocentric predicament‟ [where] all we can really be sure of at the start is our own
conscious existence and the states of that consciousness.”68 We have already noted
Husserl‟s indebtedness to Descartes for the absoluteness of consciousness, however here
the two men part ways. When considering the question: “how does objectivity get
constituted in and for consciousness?” 69 Husserl answers with intentional consciousness
and intuition. Thus for Husserl, “subjectivity must be understood as inextricably involved
in the process of constituting objectivity”. There is not objectivity and subjectivity but
only “objectivity-for-subjectivity”. 70 Husserl states:
Conscious processes are also called intentional; but then the word intentionality
signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness:
to be consciousness of something; as a cogito, to bear within itself its cogitatum.71
Returning briefly to Husserl‟s critique of modern science, we noted Husserl felt
that science had lost sight of the fact that knowledge is rooted in consciousness and
conscious processes. Modern science has kept a strict divide between subjectivity and
objectivity whereas Husserl saw that objectivity can only be founded upon subjectivity
68
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due to the intentional-intuitional structure of consciousness. According to Husserl the
naturalist or scientific approach overlooks the crucial role of subjectivity. Thus he
declares the need for “a radical inquiry back into subjectivity” which alone “can make
objective truth comprehensible and arrive at the ultimate ontic meaning of the world”. 72
Through this emphasis on subjectivity, Husserl begins to close the gap between the
subject and the object which is a common feature of the naturalist or scientific approach.
For Husserl, subjectivity and objectivity are united in lived experience. “Lived
experience is the experience of consciousness, and within consciousness, the world is
given as my lived experience”.73 In Husserlian phenomenology the domain of the
subjective and the objective unite to achieve knowledge of the world.
Anything belonging to the world, any spatiotemporal being, exists for me – that is
to say, is accepted by me – in that I experience it, perceive it, remember it, think
of it somehow, judge about it, value it, desire it, or the like. Descartes, as we
know, indicated all that by the name cogito. The world is for me absolutely
nothing else but the world existing for and accepted by me in such a conscious
cogito. It gets its whole sense, universal and specific, and it acceptance as
existing, exclusively from such cogitationes. In these my whole world-life goes
on, including my scientifically inquiring and grounding life. By my living, by my
experiencing, thinking, valuing, and acting, I can enter no world other than the
one that gets its sense and acceptance or status in and from me, myself. 74
In this way Husserl‟s phenomenology brought an end to the subject-object divide.
[Phenomenology] focuses on the manner objects are constituted in and for
subjects. It focuses on the structure and qualities of objects and situations as they
are experienced by the subject. What Husserl calls the paradox or mystery of
subjectivity – as the site of appearance of objectivity – is its theme.75
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Intersubjectivity and the Foreign Ego
Finally we come to the topic that is of particular interest to the remainder of this
work – the issue of intersubjectivity and the recognition of foreign egos. According to
Husserl, phenomenology is an “egology”. 76 That is, phenomenology is “the study of the
ego and its „self experience‟”.77 This designation becomes quite important when it comes
to the encounter with and reflection upon other persons. According to Husserl, one of the
first things that must take place in a phenomenological reflection is to distinguish
“between „me myself‟ with my life, my appearances, my acquired certainties of being,
my abiding interests, etc., and others with their lives, their appearances, etc.”78 In this
way, Husserl admits that phenomenology “begins accordingly as a pure egology and as a
science that apparently condemns us to a solipsism, albeit a transcendental solipsism”. 79
Now Husserl believes that this “transcendental solipsism is only a subordinate stage
philosophically” and that ultimately it “leads over to a phenomenology of transcendental
intersubjectivity and, by means of this, to a universal transcendental philosophy”. 80
However, there is just one catch, for Husserl himself declares that:
As yet it is quite impossible to foresee how, for me in the attitude of reduction,
other egos – not as mere worldly phenomena but as other transcendental egos –
76
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can become positable as existing and thus become equally legitimate themes of a
phenomenological egology.81
That is, do other human subjects, other intentional egos who are both self-conscious and
conscious of the surrounding life-world, exist as such? I can perceive myself as a
constituting ego, but can I ever experience others as such? Can I know, beyond doubt,
that other egos (like myself) exist? Husserl states “the problem of „others‟” thus:
To understand how my transcendental ego, the primitive basis for everything that
I accept as existent, can constitute within himself another transcendental ego, and
then too an open plurality of such egos – “other” egos, absolutely inaccessible to
my ego in their original being, and yet cognizable (for me) as existing and as
being thus and so.82
There are two ways in which our experience of others comes into play in
phenomenology. First, the other ego is indirectly perceived when I realize that the world
in which I live and the objects I perceive therein are not there simply for me, but are there
for others as well, are held in common.83 “Our natural life is a life in community, living in
a world of shared objects, shared environment, shared language, shared meanings”. 84 We
have spoken already of how phenomena are given perspectivally and require a succession
of intuitions. Returning to our example of the cube, to perceive the cube in its fullness I
must walk around it, turn it over, see it from all its various perspectives. That is, “this one
intuition, in which this one thing is given to me, contains a multitude of manners of
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givenness which Husserl calls „adumbrations‟”.85 However, I must also recognize that
others can perceive the cube as well and with multiple perspectival adumbrations of their
own. Most importantly, their intuitions of the cube are not only different from mine but
they can never be “mine” in the same way that they are “theirs”. There is more to the
cube than I could ever perceive on my own. “The identity of the thing is there not only
for me but also for others, and therefore it is a deeper and richer identity for me”. 86
Husserl states:
I experience other minds in a unique manner. Not only do I experience them as
spatial presentations psychologically interlaced with the realm of nature, but I also
experience them as experiencing this selfsame world which I experience…. I
experience the world not as my own private world, but as an intersubjective
world, one that is given to all human beings and which contains objects accessible
to all. 87
However, although Husserl is always keen to admit this communal aspect of the intuition
of phenomena, especially so as to avoid phenomenology being negatively seen as a
“transcendental solipsism;”88 there is yet a tension here. While the intersubjective aspect
of the world cannot be denied, for Husserl the personal ego, the self, remains first and
foremost. Indeed, intersubjectivity is possible “only because I, as ego, can make sense of
these directions, encouragements, pointings, and so on. Nothing comes from outside into

85

Held, “Husserl‟s Phenomenology of the Life-World”, 37-38, emphasis original.

86

Sokolowski, 32. See also Held, “Husserl‟s Phenomenology of the Life-World”,

48-49.
87

Edmund Husserl, The Paris Lectures, trans. Peter Koestenbaum (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 34.
88

See Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, 241-242.
xxxv

the ego; rather everything outside is what it is already within the inside”.89 Husserl
makes this point in numerous places throughout his work:
Neither a world nor any other existent of any conceivable sort comes “from
outdoors” into my ego, my life of consciousness. 90
Imperturbably I must hold fast to the insight that every sense that any existent
whatever has or can have for me – in respect of its “what” and its “it exists and
actually is” – is a sense in and arising from my intentional life, becoming clarified
and uncovered for me in consequence of my life‟s constitutive syntheses, in
systems of harmonious verification.91
Transcendence is an immanent mode of being, that is, one that constitutes itself
within the ego. Every conceivable meaning, every thinkable being – regardless of
whether it is immanent or transcendent – falls within the realm of transcendental
subjectivity. The idea of something outside of this realm is a contradiction:
transcendental subjectivity is the universal and absolute concretion. To conceive
of the universe of true being as being something outside of the universe of
possible consciousness, of possible knowledge, and of possible evidence… is
sheer nonsense. 92
And so while on the one hand Husserl claims that “I experience the world… as an
intersubjective world, actually there for everyone, accessible in respect of its Objects to
everyone”, 93 on the other hand he upholds that “the world with all its realities, including
my human real being, is a universe of constituted transcendencies – constituted in mental
processes and abilities of my ego…; accordingly, this constituted world is preceded by
my ego; as the ultimately constitutive subjectivity”.94 That is, “the world is contintually
89
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there for us; but in the first place it is there for me”.95 In this way Husserl speaks of his
method as a “transcendental and phenomenological monadology”.96 This tension is also
found in the second approach to our experience of others.
The second way in which the other ego is encountered is through direct
perception of the other, that is, through “our direct experience of others as other minds,
other embodiments of consciousness…[,] as like ourselves, as datives of disclosure, who
can reciprocate our recognition and see us as like themselves”. 97 As opposed to indirectly
experiencing the other as someone else to whom the world is given, I can also directly
encounter the other as the intended phenomenon of my consciousness. However, the act
of directly perceiving the other is, in a certain way, still “indirect” in the sense that, for
Husserl, one can never directly experience the foreign ego as such. Husserl conceives of
the concrete ego as, borrowing from Leibniz, a monad.98 He explains the nature of this
monadic ego thus:
As ego, I have a surrounding world, which is continually “existing for me”; and,
in it, objects as “existing for me”…. This, my activity of positing and explicating
being, sets up a habituality of my Ego, by virtue of which the object, as having its
manifold determinations, is mine abidingly…. I exist for myself and am
continually given to myself, by experiential evidence, as “I myself”.99
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However, Husserl notes, along with Leibniz, “that within the monad which is given to me
apodictically and originally are the reflections of alien monads”. 100 This awareness of
alien monads happens by way of a “peculiar kind of epoché”, or “reduction to my
transcendental sphere of peculiar ownness”. 101 That is, “as Ego in the transcendental
attitude I attempt first of all to delimit… what is peculiarly my own”102 – what makes me
specifically me. What is discovered is not only a world of objects, or things, that are
distinct from me, but also the existence of other constituting egos. However this
awareness is, for Husserl, always already wrapped up in my own self-perception.
In this pre-eminent intentionality there becomes constituted for me the new
existence-sense that goes beyond my monadic very-ownness; there becomes
constituted an ego, not as “I myself”, but mirrored in my own Ego, in my monad.
The second ego, however, is not simply there and strictly presented; rather is he
constituted as “alter ego” – the ego indicated as one moment by this expression
being I myself in my ownness. The “Other”, according to his own constituted
sense, points to me myself; the other is a “mirroring” of my own self and yet not a
mirroring proper, an analogue of my own self and yet again not an analogue in the
usual sense. 103
And so I realize that my sphere of ownness does not extend to other persons, they
have realms of ownness that are not directly, or originally, accessible to me. Thus there
are certain “gaps” or a certain “emptiness” in my experience of the other because I cannot
directly experience their ego. The consciousness of the other is necessarily hidden to me,
unavailable to my direct experience. I cannot experience the other‟s thoughts and
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sensations directly, as my own. 104 The constitution of the world for the other is
inaccessible to me. This is important for, as Husserl points out, “if what belongs to the
other‟s own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own
essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same”. 105 The perception of
the other ego thus relies on the aspect of corporeality, empathy106, and Husserl‟s notion of
association – “something reminds me of something” – or “pairing”. 107 In Husserl‟s own
words:
[T]he problem is stated at first as a special one, namely… that of the “therenessfor-me” of others; and accordingly as the theme of a transcendental theory of
experiencing someone else, a transcendental theory of so-called “empathy”. 108
However, I know myself to be an ego and I have a body. In fact, my body expresses or
manifests my ego to the world. When I perceive the other, I recognize the other as
possessing a body like mine. Just as my body can manifest my ego, so I assume that the
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other body indicates something similar. By way of association I thus assume that the
other who possesses a body like mine must also be an ego like me.109 Thus, “we have a
direct experience of the other as another body, and only an appresentation, or indirect
assimilation, of the other as another ego like me. 110
Since, in this Nature and this world, my animate organism is the only body that is
or can be constituted originally as an animate organism (a functioning organ), the
body over there, which is nevertheless apprehended as an animate organism, must
have derived this sense by an apperceptive transfer from my animate organism,
and done so in a manner that excludes an actually direct, and hence primordial,
showing of the predicates belonging to an animate organism specifically, a
showing of them in perception proper. It is clear from the very beginning that
only a similarity connecting, within my primordial sphere, that body over there
with my body can serve as the motivational basis for the “analogizing”
apprehension of that body as another animate organism. 111
As we can see, the concepts of “here” and “there” are also important in the
perception of the foreign ego. My body is “here”, the other body is “there”. I can imagine
myself over “there” where the other body is located and imagine that I have the same
bearing and appearance as that body “there”. “When I experience another person, I
apperceive them as having the kind of experiences I would have if I was over there. On
the basis of these kinds of „pairing‟ experiences I experience the other as another body
like myself”.112 Thus:
[my perception of the other] reminds me of my own living-bodily behavior
through its demeanor. It is only through fantasy that the possibility arises for me
to recognize a being similar to myself behind the demeanor of that body…. In this
109
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way, the ego in that body there is transformed for me from a simple, fictive
modification of my self into a real “other”, a “foreign” ego, that is, into a being
similar to me, into whom I may think myself in my understanding, with whom I
may “empathize”, but with whom I am not identical. 113
I realize that my body “here” will never be that body “there”. The other body can never
be or become my body. In this way, the other is encountered as “„other‟ because their
existence in the world is bound to the absolute Here of each individual‟s living-body, and
because these living-bodies… can never occupy the same There at the same time”. 114 But
it is the act of association or analogy that allows me to constitute the other as possessing
an ego like me. That body “there” is like my body “here” therefore just as I possess an
ego, the other too must have an ego of their own like mine. In the end, the other can only
be recognized as being another subject (that is, as a foreign ego) through a reductive
comparison to my own ego or self. As Husserl himself stated, “the other is a „mirroring‟
of my own self”.115
Thus, in the realm of intersubjectivity Husserl reveals that his conception of
phenomenology truly is an “egology” or a “monadology”, not in the sense that it is an
innocent (unprejudiced) study of the ego as such, but rather that it is a biased analysis
from the perspective of one‟s own ego as the constituting center of all phenomena. In the
realm of the intersubjective constitution of the world, Husserl “always grounds it on the
subjective”. 116 As we noted above, for Husserl “the world is continually there for us, but
113
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in the first place it is there for me”.117 What is more and as we have shown, “Husserl sees
the ground for understanding the mental life of the other as lying in one‟s own selfunderstanding”. 118 For Husserl “the other then is a phenomenological modification of
myself…grasped only „within my ownness‟”.119 Husserl sums up his position on this
matter quite plainly:
The character of the existent “other” had its basis in this kind of verifiable
accessibility of what is not originally accessible. Whatever can become presented,
and evidently verified, originally – is something I am; or else it belongs to me as
peculiarly my own. Whatever, by virtue thereof, is experienced in that founded
manner which characterizes a primordially unfulfillable experience – an
experience that does not give itself originally but that consistently verifies
something indicated – is “other”. It is therefore conceivable only as an analogue
of something included in my peculiar ownness. Because of its sense-constitution
it occurs necessarily as an “intentional modification” of that Ego of mine which
is the first to be Objectivated, or as an intentional modification of my primordial
“world”: the Other as phenomenologically a “modification” of myself (which, for
its part, gets this character of being “my” self by virtue of the contrastive pairing
that necessarily takes place). It is clear that, with the other Ego, there is
appresented, in an analogizing modification, everything that belongs to his
concretion: first, his primordial world, and then his fully concrete ego. In other
words, another monad becomes constituted appresentatively in mine. 120
From the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology, the other is considered as a
phenomenon for analysis just like any other object of my perception. 121 Through
phenomenological analysis the other is seen as a noema, a correlate to my ego‟s noetic
act. The other is thus constituted and given sense and meaning in and through my
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consciousness. As we will see in chapter one, Levinas will criticize Husserl for both these
views and ultimately reject Husserlian phenomenology as a totalizing system which
reduces the other to the realm of the self and contemplates the other as a mere object. We
turn now to chapter one.
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CHAPTER ONE
Situating Levinas:
From Modernity to Postmodernity – the “climate” from which we must flee

Introduction
This chapter focuses on situating the philosophical project of Emmanuel Levinas.
We will consider the philosophical “climate” which both inspired his thought and from
which he departed so as to develop his own philosophical voice. As such, the chapter will
be divided into two main sections. First we will focus on how Levinas‟ project
participates in that amorphous trend in philosophy known as the postmodern. It will be
shown how Levinas‟ work exemplifies such postmodern themes as the critique of
Western thought, the rejection of all totalizing forms of thought, the critique of Cartesian
subjectivity, the attempt to think difference as such and the turn to the other, the unique
role of language, the focus on ethics, etc. In the second section of this chapter we will
attend to Levinas‟ rejection of Husserlian phenomenology as a return to the totalizing
“thought of the Same” which is “a stupefaction, a petrification or a laziness” that
ultimately exhibits violence toward the Other.1 In this section we will also examine
Levinas‟ critique of Heidegger, through whom he interprets Husserl as the “heir” and
“logical successor” to the Phenomenological tradition.2 Heidegger‟s focus on Being to
the exclusion of the Other will come under particular attack. Indeed, in Levinas‟ critique
1
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1993), 16-17.
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of Husserl and Heidegger can be summarized his negative view of Western philosophy in
general as a “totality” that does violence to the Other.3

Part I – From Modernity to Postmodernity
With his earliest writings dating from the late 1920s, Levinas‟ corpus extends
over six decades. 4 Although many concepts and themes can be found in their incipient
forms in his earliest writings, Levinas‟ most important and mature works all date after the
Second World War.5 A watershed event for all of the Western world, the tumultuous
events of the 1930s and 1940s remained an influential fixture for the rest of his life. 6
Indeed, Levinas along with the rest of the Western world emerged from the carnage of
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See for example in Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on
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development of Levinas‟ thought.
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the Second World War to find a world changed and an intellectual atmosphere on the
brink of a crisis. As the world strove to put itself back together again, the standard modes
of thought, political theory, and the presuppositions of Western culture and art in general
were questioned, criticized, and often rejected as outmoded and problematic.
Whatever can be said about philosophy and its reflections on human existence,
meaning, political order, ethics, etc., before the Holocaust, what must be said after
the Holocaust is that not only were all of the West‟s philosophical, ethical and
religious teachings and reflections unable to prevent Auschwitz, but they also may
have provided a certain legitimation to the devaluation and desecration of human
life.7
Due to this obvious failure of Western thought, it was held by many that a new path must
be forged away from the beliefs and truths of the past. Indeed, these beliefs and truths,
held dear for many centuries, were perhaps not, in fact, an accurate understanding of
reality at all. Thus, although there is much debate over exactly when the phrase was
coined and when the phenomenon began, by the 1970s and 1980s postmodernism came to
be fully recognized.8 Levinas‟ writings also participate in this phenomenon, echoing
many of the key themes and concerns of postmodernism. However, before we turn our
gaze directly upon Levinas‟ place within the postmodern, it is important to briefly discuss
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this intellectual, political, and cultural trend that indeed defies description. 9 Indeed, it
should be noted that there is no formal agreement on precisely what postmodernism is –
nor, perhaps, should there be as precious to the postmodern seems to be an eschewing of
all that smacks of the universalizing thought of modernism. Yet there are certain common
themes and concerns which we will address. One last caveat, the postmodern influence
can be found in numerous arenas: philosophy, linguistic theory, politics, theater, art,
literature, architecture, music, social theory, etc. For the purposes of this work, we will
only focus on those aspects that relate most directly to the realm of philosophy. Also, we
will selectively highlight those trends that can be found in Levinas‟ work which, in its
own way, participates in the postmodern movement.

From Modernity…
And so what is postmodernism? How are we to understand the meaning of this
„post-‟? Does it simply mean “after” as in a time period proceeding from the modern era?
If somehow following upon the modern era, is it in continuity with modernism or does it
represent a radical break with the precepts of modernism? 10 For Jean-François Lyotard,
one of the most well-known voices of postmodern thought, the postmodern is
9
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“undoubtedly part of the modern”. 11 However, it is “that which inhabits and disrupts
modernity”.12 This of course leads one to question what is modernity? Certain words and
concepts immediately jump to mind which characterize the modern era: reason, the
subject, objectivity, realism, science, industrialization, progress or development, etc.
Many names and famous personages also jump to mind. Here we will mention only two:
Réné Descartes and Isaac Newton. Very succinctly, the modern world can be viewed as
“Newton‟s mechanistic universe populated by Descartes‟ autonomous, rational
substance”.13 According to Newton and the scientists of his time, the world was seen as a
vast and well-oiled machine, working quite smoothly according to certain laws and
principles. What is more, this world was understood as objectively available to the human
subject and able to be mastered by human reason. According to Descartes, the human
being is a “thinking substance” and the human person is an “autonomous rational
subject”.14 In this way, for the modern person human reason was seen as “the final arbiter
of truth”.15 And so the modern outlook can be understood as based upon two
assumptions. The first assumption is that “the universe is an orderly realm governed by
the laws of nature;” the second assumption is that human reason has the “ability to gain
cognition of the foundational order of the whole universe”. 16 The result of these two
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assumptions was the quest for universal knowledge of the world that came to mark the
modern era. This rather bold quest was considered to be quite attainable especially in
light of another assumption.
Enlightenment theorists assumed that a correspondence between the structure of
the world and the structure of the human mind enables the mind to discern the
structure inherent in the external world.17
According to the modern view, the mind was seen as a pure and unbiased prism,
able to accurately reflect the reality of the universe. This view is known as the
correspondence theory of truth. “Operating on objectivist assumptions, the realist defines
truth as the correspondence between our assertions and the objective world about which
they are made.”18 Thus it is raining outside and my mind recognizes this and articulates
the thought „it is raining‟. Or I feel myself firmly rooted to the earth and my mind
comprehends and articulates the concept of „gravity‟. These thoughts are understood to
accurately correspond to the reality of the world and to truthfully articulate it. Indeed,
“most of us assume that the human mind is capable of more or less accurately mirroring
this external, nonhuman reality; most of us also assume that language, as a product of the
human mind, provides an adequate means of declaring to ourselves and to others what the
world is like”. 19 As we will see, not only is this realist, objectivist view of the world
called into question by postmodernism, but this view of language is also rejected.
However the modern mind, working with the two anchoring poles of the autonomous
human mind and the objectively knowable world and the assumptions associated with
17
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them, embraced “the drive to clarity, the turn to the subject, the concern with method,
[and] the belief in sameness” – for if the world is objectively knowable, true knowledge
will be the same for all people everywhere.20 According to the realist, objectivist view
there is “a simple one-to-one relationship… between the bits of language we use to
describe the world and the bits of the world we seek to know”.21 This trend toward
universal knowledge was even extended to the human person. Over one hundred years
after Descartes declared cogito ergo sum, Immanuel Kant developed a universal concept
of human nature.22 With Descartes the autonomous thinking self takes center stage, with
Kant the thinking self is universalized. According to Kant, at their core all humans are
understood to be essentially the same – autonomous rational subjects. In this way, the
individual mind can come to know not only itself, but every other self. 23 In the
introduction we noted how Husserl rejected the ability to directly know the other person
as such; however, as we will see, the postmodern era will reject this modern
universalizing view of the human person to a much more radical degree than Husserl. But
in the modern era we find the autonomous individual subject enthroned, crowned with
reason and living in the palace of science.
What is more, all the knowledge that was gained about the universe and the
scientific and technological progress made at this time was optimistically understood as
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working for the good of all humanity. That is, knowledge of the universe necessarily
implied progress and the emancipation of the human race. 24 This aspect of the modern era
needs to be brought to light in this brief explanation for, as we will see, it comes under
harsh criticism under the scrutiny of the postmodern, especially as much of its
development took place in the wake of the horrors of World War II. But for the modern
person there was a utopian optimism toward the capacity of the human mind to not only
come to a comprehensive understanding of the universe, but to use this knowledge for the
good of all humankind. In this way the history of the world was seen as progressive and
emancipatory. 25 However, ultimately for the modern person this quest for knowledge,
even if its positive consequences were for the benefit of all, was seen as a private affair.
The modern era is marked by a distinctly “radical individualism” where “the knowing
process is fundamentally a relationship between the autonomous knowing self and the
world waiting to be known through the creative power of the active mind”. 26 Such
individualism will be seen as almost laughable under the critical eye of postmodernism.
One last aspect of the modern era must be mentioned for in it we find, perhaps,
the very spirit of modernism. Speaking now in more philosophical terms, this is the
concept of metaphysics. “The modern is the culmination of a metaphysical tradition”
which emphasizes “foundations and causes”. 27 The modern mind‟s quest for absolute
comprehensive knowledge of the world belies a view that all being is objectively,
24
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exhaustively knowable thus objectively, exhaustively systematizable. Metaphysics is this
“attempt at a systematized understanding of what „is‟ – metaphysics aims to uncover the
ultimate nature of reality”.28 In the history of philosophy Aristotle is generally credited
with the emphasis on metaphysics that came to characterize all of Western philosophy
into the modern era. Aristotle is also credited for granting metaphysics the prized place of
“first philosophy”, that is, metaphysics deals with those aspects of philosophy that are
most essential and primary. 29 The concerns of metaphysics can be shown to relate
directly to the two poles of modernism:
Metaphysics as it emerges in modernity relates to the priority of epistemology,
that is, to dependence on the thinking subject and its capacity to found knowledge
of what is. Being becomes being-known. 30
Thus the metaphysical tradition adheres to the two assumptions of the world (all that „is‟)
as objectifiable and knowable and the rational subject as capable of knowing this world.
We have already seen how Husserl claimed the primary place of first philosophy for
phenomenology, it being foundational not only for philosophy but also for all fields of
natural science. As such, Husserl‟s project concerns itself with metaphysical issues. As
we will see, the modern emphasis on metaphysics will receive harsh criticism from and
ultimately be rejected by postmodernism. Husserl‟s phenomenology too will be called
into question, in part, for its metaphysical tendencies. This said, let us now turn our
attention to the postmodern critique and rejection of modernism.
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… to Postmodernity
If modernity is marked by the turn to the subject, metaphysics and the quest for
universal knowledge, and sameness; postmodernity is thus marked by the turn to the
other, the rejection of metaphysics, the impossibility of universal knowledge, and
difference. With such characteristics, it has been stated that there are two key tasks
undertaken by the philosophical field of postmodernism: first, to overcome metaphysics
“as conceived in modernity as the correlation of Being and reasoning”; and second, “the
thinking of difference”. 31 As we will see, Levinas certainly takes these two tasks to heart.
We recall that Jean-François Lyotard declared the postmodern to be “that which inhabits
and disrupts modernity”. 32 In a longer passage Lyotard comments that:
The postmodern would be that which in the modern invokes the unpresentable in
presentation itself, that which refuses the consolation of correct forms, refuses the
consensus of taste permitting a common experience of nostalgia for the
impossible, and inquires into new presentations – not to take pleasure in them, but
to better produce the feeling that there is something unpresentable. 33
As we have seen the modern quest for universal knowledge relies on the belief that the
world is objectifiable thus knowable. However, this claim relies upon an even deeper
assumption that the true nature and essence of the world is revealed to the mind capable
of grasping it. According to the modern tradition, the world is present to us in its fullness,
all we need do is seek out and grasp that which can be known (which is everything).
However, this belief falls under heavy criticism for perhaps the world is not objectively
knowable and perhaps the mind cannot comprehend the world in its fullness. Indeed,
31
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perhaps there is as much absence in the world as there is presence and perhaps the mind
is not the pure, unbiased prism it was once thought to be…. And so the critique of
modernism begins.
It was noted above how the spirit of modernism can be found in metaphysics. For
a definition of this philosophical tradition we offered that metaphysics is the “attempt at a
systematized understanding of what „is‟ – metaphysics aims to uncover the ultimate
nature of reality”. 34 If the metaphysical tradition is the bedrock of the modern era, then
Friedrich Nietzsche can perhaps be upheld as its first true antagonist. 35 Working at the
end of the nineteenth century, Nietzsche is famous (or infamous, depending on what
circles one frequents) for announcing both the “death of God” and the “will to power”.
Indeed, Nietzsche called into question just about all that modernism held dear: realism,
objectivism, the autonomous rational subject, the neutrality of reason and the mind‟s
ability to thus achieve absolute truth, etc. For Nietzsche metaphysics “fails because the
framework for ultimate reality that it provides can be shown to be nothing more than a
construction, a construction in which we have heavily invested”. 36 Nietzsche attacks the
modern view of truth as a correspondence between reality as objectively “out there” and
the mind‟s capacity to mirror or correspond to that reality. Nietzsche boldly claims that
truth is but an illusion created by humans. 37 This is due in great part to his understanding
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of language. For Nietzsche language is not the articulation of truth and knowledge but a
purely human construct.38 What is more, humans not only construct language, but
construct “reality” for themselves through this language. Thus as “„truth‟ [is but] a
function of the language we employ… truth [therefore] „exists‟ only within specific
linguistic concepts”.39 In this way Nietzsche came to be known as a nihilist for he
claimed that the human subject has no access to reality as such. Nietzsche adamantly
upheld that “reality” is nothing more than a “perspectival appearance” created by human
persons.40 Thus:
To a metaphysical cosmos ordered by truth, the real, and a reasoned moral
framework, Nietzsche brings the chaos of judgement and perspective, chaos that
at times threatens to be overwhelming, given the vitriolic style with which it
emerges in his work.41
However, even Nietzsche, the nihilistic antagonist of metaphysics, is unable to
fully depart from modernism. He is criticized, particularly by Heidegger, for maintaining
the modern trait of an overarching or fundamental value that orders reality: the will to
power.42 As such, Heidegger interprets the will to power as belying a certain type of
metaphysics. Postmodern thought, however, wishes to do away with any and all ties to
metaphysics, even one as radical as Nietzsche‟s. Be that as it may, Nietzsche was
certainly instrumental in the burgeoning attack on the modern metaphysical tradition that
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blossomed into postmodernism in the mid to late twentieth century. This cursory glance
hardly does justice to one of the most influential and controversial figures within the
history of philosophy. However, for the purpose of this work, it suffices to point to his
radical critique of modernism as crucial to the development of postmodernism and thus
influential of the environment in which Levinas developed his own philosophical project.
[Nietzsche] attacked philosophical conceptions of the subject, representation,
causality, truth, value, and system, replacing Western philosophy with a
perspectivist orientation for which there are no facts, only interpretations, and no
objective truths, only the constructs of various individuals or groups…. He
insisted that all language was metaphorical and that the subject was only a
product of language and thought.43
We have claimed that the modern tradition can be marked by two poles: that of
the autonomous knowing subject and that of the knowable world. The project of
modernity can thus be understood as the subject‟s quest for knowledge of the world for
the betterment of humanity. Such knowledge or truth is achieved when the thoughts of
the mind correspond to or mirror the objective reality that is “out there”. In this way
universal knowledge can be attained by all rational subjects. However, the postmodern
tradition points out that “the quest for certainty and foundation is not innocent”. 44 Indeed,
as hinted at above, the two poles of the modern are perhaps not as firm as once believed.
Postmodernism thus marks an end of the objectivist and realist outlook that adheres to the
correspondence theory of truth.
Epistemologically, postmodernists refuse the modern belief that we have
unmediated access to reality. All postmodernists reject the metaphor of the mind
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as a mirror of nature, the object as a neutral datum, and the subject as an aloof
observer of the world.45
If the modern era was marked by faith in human reason and the belief that reason could
achieve certainty about how the world actually is, the postmodern is marked by the exact
opposite belief. With the unbiased, knowing human subject and the objective world as
knowable called into question, one finds that “the basic attitude of postmodernists [is] a
scepticism about the claims of any kind of overall, totalizing explanation”. 46 This is
because it is determined that the “mind is constitutive not reflective of reality”. 47 Not
only would Nietzsche agree with this point, but we have already come across this idea in
our introductory comments on Husserl with his discovery of the intentional
consciousness and his overcoming of the subject-object divide. As ground-breaking as
this discovery of intentionality was however, postmodernism goes even a step further
than Herr Husserl who yet upholds the transcendental ego as capable of discovering the
true essence of phenomena.48 For the postmodern mind, all is contextual and thus all
requires interpretation. There is no certain and absolute knowledge that can be
universally discovered and accepted by all people. As opposed to the correspondence
theory of truth, postmodernism argues “that we do not simply encounter a world that is
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„out there‟ but rather that we construct the world using concepts we bring to it”.49 This
approach to reality is due in part to the radically new understanding of language as
developed by structuralism and then sublimated by poststructuralism. 50 Although well
beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is sufficient to note that, thanks to the work of
such giants as Ferdinand de Saussure and Ludwig Wittgenstein, language is no longer
considered to articulate the truth of reality but is rather an arbitrary cultural phenomenon.
Language is both a human construct and that which shapes the human person and their
approach to “reality”. 51 One common emphasis of the postmodern era is that the human
subject is socially and culturally constructed, a product of the time and place in which the
subject lives. All “reality” is thus contextual and requires interpretation which means
there can be no absolute truth or meaning – at least none that can be discovered by the
contextual, perspectival subject that the human person necessarily is.
Reason, truth, systematic knowledge, foundations, representation, universality,
totality, macroperspectives, coherence, consensus, the “rational unified subject” – such
are the words and concepts that correspond to modernism. Perspectival, relativism,
linguistics, interpretation, microtheory, multiplicity, plurality, fragmentation,
indeterminacy, contextuality, the other – these are the concepts that apply to
postmodernism. 52 Postmodernism thus rejects the modern “search for a foundation of
49
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knowledge, for its universalizing and totalizing claims, for its hubris to supply apodictic
truth, and for its allegedly fallacious rationalism”. 53 In this way, “postmodern theory
abandons the rational and unified subject postulated by much modern theory in favour of
a socially and linguistically decentered and fragmented subject”.54 Such was the
intellectual atmosphere and an all too brief sampling of the concepts and ideas being
debated and developed at the time when Levinas was fashioning his own philosophical
project. In the following section we will comment briefly on Levinas‟ place among these
developing philosophical trends. As we will see, Levinas too exhibits many of the
“common” postmodern traits we have been discussing here, though focused in his own
unique way via the lens of ethical responsibility.

Levinas and the Postmodern
In his text The Will to Power, Nietzsche re-envisioned the task of the philosopher
from the “traditional aspiration to knowledge” to that of engaging in “experimental
critique in which all truths hitherto would be considered types of „errors‟”.55 That is,
according to Nietzsche, the task of philosophy is to question philosophy itself and all the
truths it has claimed to discern. From our comments above, one can easily agree that this
was a task embraced by what became known as the Postmodern philosophers. Levinas
too can be seen to participate in this critique of philosophy. Now it is true that in his texts
53
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up to and including Totality and Infinity Levinas still used the language of metaphysics. 56
For this he was roundly critiqued. 57 However, by the time of Otherwise than Being
Levinas was doing all in his power to abandon the metaphysical language of Totality and
Infinity.58 Indeed, as with other postmodern thinkers, Levinas exhibits a real skepticism
toward traditional philosophy for its reduction of alterity to the comprehensive vision of
the autonomous self. Levinas‟ ethical philosophy is a skeptical critique of the “totalizing
propensity” of Western philosophy. 59 His philosophy
calls into question the freedom of the exercise of ontology [thus leading] beyond
theory and ontology: critique does not reduce the other to the same as does
ontology, but calls into question the exercise of the same…. We name this calling
into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. 60
What is more, the meaning Levinas ascribes to language assists him in this critique of
philosophy. We will discuss this in much greater detail in our following section below
and in chapter two. For now we will state that language, for Levinas, is always already
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ethical because it is a response to the Other.61 Language is the turn to the Other par
excellence. And in responding to the Other, my spontaneous autonomy is called into
question. Thus “language is already skepticism”. 62 And so it is fair to say that, while
Levinas might have resorted to metaphysical language in certain of his works, he was
certainly participating in the postmodern critique of the metaphysical tradition of
modernity that prioritizes the autonomous subject.
Indeed, where Levinas can, perhaps, most be seen to participate in the postmodern
tradition is in his critique of Western philosophy as a totalizing “egology”. 63 Throughout
his work Levinas notes the domination of Western thought by the concept of totality
which is most clearly manifested in how “Western philosophy has most often been an
ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral
term that ensures the comprehension of being”. 64 The concepts, for Levinas, that most
clearly represent this Western, ontological thought and philosophy are consciousness,
61
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intentionality, representation, identification, comprehension, knowledge, and above all,
being. 65 These are words common in Husserlian phenomenology which Levinas sees as
“faithful to the essential teachings of European civilization both in its themes and its
treatment of them”.66 Indeed, Levinas considers Husserl, and even more so Heidegger,
whom he views as the “heir” and “future” of phenomenology,67 to be two of the best
(modern) representatives of this totalizing philosophical tradition. We will look more
closely at Levinas‟ assessment specifically of Husserl and Heidegger in the following
section. For now, we will focus briefly on Levinas‟ critique of Western philosophy in
general.
Western philosophy and culture are, for Levinas, an egocentric comprehending of
the universe where all is grasped by the intentional consciousness of a subject who
reduces all to its comprehending totality. As such, Western thought is an “egology”. It is
manifested in “a universe centered around an ego that not only functions as subject of the
„cogito,‟ but also as the center and end of the world and the course of all its meaning”. 68
Since the time of Socrates, Levinas notes that the primacy of the self (or as Levinas terms
it “the same”) has dominated Western civilization.69 This self is a free being who
65
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“receives nothing from the Other” but instead neutralizes the Other into a theme or object
so as to identify and comprehend the Other in the totalizing sphere of the same. 70 As we
will see, Levinas is quite opposed to the autonomous subject of modernity. “Against the
primacy of freedom, upheld by modern philosophy, [Levinas] insists on the alterity of my
own responsibility from which I cannot escape.”71 However it is interesting to note that,
as opposed to many Postmodern thinkers, Levinas does not entirely do away with
subjectivity but rather rethinks it along ethical lines. 72 Levinas‟ master-work, Totality and
Infinity, is in part a defense of subjectivity.
This book then does present itself as a defense of subjectivity, but it will
apprehend the subjectivity not at the level of its purely egoist protestation against
totality, nor in its anguish before death, but as founded in the idea of infinity. 73
This brings us to two key concepts in Levinas‟ philosophy, totality and infinity,
which can be seen in relation to the concerns of postmodernity. For Levinas “totality”
represents Western culture as an “egology” and Western philosophy as its theoretical
counterpart. It is the realm of the intentional consciousness or ego. It is the realm of the
constituting subject that reduces all to its comprehending gaze, the realm of “the Same”.
“Infinity”, on the other hand, designates the realm of the Other and alterity that is
irreducible to the realm of the Same. We will address these concepts in much greater
detail in chapter two. For now, let it suffice to say that Levinas‟ work is a critique of the
totalizing aspect of Western culture and philosophy and an affirmation of “the
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philosophical primacy of the idea of infinity”. 74 In Levinas‟ work we see the turn to the
Other par excellence that features so prolifically in postmodern texts. This turn to the
Other is found in Levinas‟ insistence that ethics is first philosophy. 75 It is giving the
priority of place to the Other and subjecting the autonomous self of modernity to the
infinite responsibility of the ethical relationship. As seen in the quote above, while
Levinas may be defending subjectivity, it is not the autonomous subjectivity of
modernity, but an ethically sublimated subjectivity enacted in responsibility for the
Other. In this way, Levinas‟ philosophical project can be seen to break up the
homogeneity of Western thought.
Perhaps one of the best texts within Levinas‟ corpus that addresses this issue of
the nature of Western philosophy is his 1957 essay “Philosophy and the Idea of
Infinity”. 76 In this essay one can clearly see “how Levinas‟s works sprang from a
profound meditation on the very roots of Western philosophy; it also indicates the path by
which his thought separates itself from the Husserlian and Heideggerian versions of
phenomenology” – a point to which we will return below. 77 We will also see how
Levinas reveals Western philosophy to be the realm of totality due to its quest for
knowledge that reduces all otherness to that which can be comprehended by the
74
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autonomous subject. Almost as if echoing Nietzsche‟s disparaging claim that traditionally
philosophy aspires to gain knowledge, Levinas states in the opening line of his essay:
“Every philosophy seeks truth.”78 This quest however can proceed in one of two ways:
either the way of heteronomy (concern for and thus a movement toward what is beyond
the self which is a true “experience” or relationship with what is other than the self) or
the way of autonomy (“free adherence to a proposition” by the investigator who
preserves his or her nature and thus “[remains] the same despite the unknown lands into
which thought seemed to lead”).79 If the quest for truth adheres to the way of autonomy
then “philosophy would thus be tantamount to the conquest of being by man over the
course of history”. 80 A choice must then be made for which path the quest for truth will
take. Levinas states:
The choice of Western philosophy has most often been on the side of freedom and
the same…. Thus Western thought very often seemed to exclude the transcendent,
encompass every other in the same, and proclaim the philosophical birthright of
autonomy. 81
However, one might ask why is the quest for truth a “conquest of being”? That is,
what is the link between truth and being? Throughout Levinas‟ works, he aims to show
how in the tradition of the West, truth and being, or knowledge and existence, are
inseparable. For Levinas, “To understand being is to exist”. 82
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The whole of man is ontology…. It is not because there is man that there is truth.
It is because being in general is inseparable from its disclosedness; it is because
there is truth, or, if you like, it is because being is intelligible, that there is
humanity. 83
To be, to exist (according to the tradition of Western philosophy) is to manifest oneself –
this is truth. To seek the truth is to understand the being (existence) of things. This is the
task and goal of philosophy. “Thus, the analysis of existence… is nothing but the
description of the essence of truth, of the condition of the very intelligibility of being.” 84
To seek the truth specifically by way of autonomy (the way of the West), is for the
subject, free and unhindered by any other, to seek to understand the being of things under
the penetrating gaze of its all-encompassing vision. “Freedom will triumph when the
soul‟s monologue will have reached universality, will have encompassed the totality of
being.”85 Western philosophy is thus an “egology” because the quest for truth consists of
knowledge of being by way of conquest, domination, and possession – to know the truth
is to possess it, free and unhindered. It is to neuter, dissolve, and domesticate what is
other than the self. 86 “To know amounts to grasping being out of nothing or reducing it to
nothing, removing from it its alterity.” 87 It is the reduction of the other to the same. What
is particularly damning is how this theoretical reflection on truth and being at the level of
philosophy is manifested in an attitude of egocentrism that is fundamental in Western
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civilization and realized in a particular way of life: “Objectification, material enjoyment,
and the privilege accorded to seeing, manipulation, planning, and exploitation”. 88 It is not
only to reduce the other to the same, but to murder the other.89
On the level of philosophy, such a world expresses itself in a systematic vision
according to which the universe appears as a totality of beings unfolding their
features, essences, and relationships before a panoramic cogito as wide as the
horizon of that totality. 90
Against this situation, the totalizing, egological tradition of the West, Levinas
offers an alternative that is the “turn to the other” so well documented in the postmodern
tradition. It is, for Levinas, the turn to the other par excellence; it is the ethical
relationship. In this relationship, the-one-for-the-other,
[a] new situation is created; consciousness‟s presence to itself acquires a different
modality, its positions collapse. To put it just in formal terms, the same does not
find again its priority over the other, it does not rest peaceably on itself, is no
longer the principle. 91
Levinas will spend the rest of his career reflecting upon this relationship of transcendence
that exceeds all thought and all Being. It is the quest for truth by way of heteronomy or
experience – the relationship with what is beyond the self and irreducible to the self, the
social relationship. 92 Ethics. However, before we can proceed to reflect upon Levinas‟
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philosophical project itself, to explain its main thesis of ethics as first philosophy and the
themes contained therein, we need first to consider how Husserl‟s phenomenology and
Heidegger‟s ontology fit into this overall critique of Western philosophy in general. For,
as stated above, Levinas‟ philosophy can be seen, in part, as offering an alternative to the
thought of these two former masters.

Part II – Levinas’ Critique of Husserlian Phenomenology
and Heideggerian Ontology
Levinas was first known as “a historian of philosophy, or analyst of other
philosophers,” specifically of Husserl and Heidegger.93 However, in time Levinas
developed his own unique philosophical voice and project. “De l‟évasion”, an essay
published in 1935, and his book Existents to Existence (De l‟existence á l‟existant),
published in 1947, are considered the first works in which Levinas‟ own voice rings
out.94 While the influences (both positive and negative) behind Levinas‟ philosophical
project are numerous and varied, 95 we will focus here on Levinas‟ indebtedness to and
differentiation from Husserl and Heidegger. As we will see, Levinas, perhaps due more to
historical situatedness, is noted for reading and critiquing Husserl through the lens of
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Heidegger‟s influence, and especially that of Heidegger‟s ground-breaking text, Being
and Time.96 This critique includes the problem of Husserl‟s intellectualism or prioritizing
of theory such that his phenomenology is ultimately ahistorical. However, as Levinas‟
own philosophical project began to take shape and flourish, he also raised concerns over
Husserl‟s method that were specific to his own direction of thought. As for Heidegger, he
is well noted as Levinas‟ arch-nemesis. 97 Indeed, it is claimed that Levinas‟ entire
philosophical project is an attempt to offer an (ethical) alternative to Heidegger‟s
thought.98 Numerous texts and articles have been written on this theme of Levinas‟
critique of his famous predecessors. Representing this study in full is not the concern of
the work here, however, it is important to note Levinas‟ critical relationship to Husserl‟s
phenomenological tradition and Heidegger‟s ontological project as they were key in the
development of Levinas‟ own thought. Thus we will focus on a few key points of
Levinas‟ critique here before moving on to a presentation of the major themes of
Levinas‟ own work in the following chapter.
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We noted above how Levinas‟ philosophical project can be seen to offer an
alternative to that of Heidegger. Indeed, “Levinas‟s philosophy is a constant arguing
against and an interpreting otherwise than Heidegger so as to propose alternative
interpretations and to construct an alternative philosophy, an ethical philosophy”. 99
However, Heidegger was also once considered, by Levinas, to be the “true heir and
rightful successor to Husserl” and that “the future of phenomenology [was seen to lie] in
the interpretation of Being as it is opened up by Heidegger”. 100 Thus we must first
consider Levinas‟ evaluation of Husserlian phenomenology before turning to his even
louder critique of Heidegger.101 What must be kept in mind though, is that Levinas‟
critique of both Husserl and Heidegger can be situated within his overall critique of
Western philosophy, or European thought, in general. As we stated above, for Levinas
the history of Western philosophy is dominated by the concept of totality. 102 For Levinas,
“[Western] philosophy is an egology”. 103 Husserl, as we have said, is seen to continue
this tradition. Levinas clearly states in the opening sentence of “The Work of Edmund
Husserl” (one of his most well-known texts on the founder of phenomenology), “Edmund
99
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Husserl‟s work, as revolutionary in its content as in its influence, nonetheless appears
faithful to the essential teachings of European civilization both in its themes and its
treatment of them”.104 Levinas claims that Husserl‟s phenomenological method “remains
faithful to the ontic model of truth” that, in Levinas‟ opinion, had failed. 105 Husserl is
seen to participate in the same totalizing tradition for which Hegel is famous (or in
Levinas‟ case, infamous):
The first person present, in the cogito which was recognized by Hegel and Husserl
as being fundamental to modern philosophy, vouchsafes knowledge its congenital
aggregative urge and its self-sufficiency, prefiguring the systematic unity of
consciousness and the integration into the system – into the present, or the
synchrony, or the timelessness of the system – of all that is other. 106
Heidegger is likewise seen to participate in and represent the Western tradition in all its
ontological glory. 107 In his essay “Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite”, Levinas
affirms this view when he states:
…let us first observe that this supremacy of the same over the other seems to be
integrally maintained in the philosophy of Heidegger… When Heidegger traces
the way of access to each real singularity [a particular being] through Being,… he
is not destroying, but summing up a whole current of Western philosophy. 108
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As we noted above, one of the main goals of Levinas‟ philosophical project was
to overthrow the totalizing Western tradition of ontology that prioritizes the Same over
the Other, or Being over ethics. One could say it is a question of priority. 109 What in the
end is most important to philosophy, to humanity? What is the best lens through which to
understand the meaning of the universe we live in, ourselves, and the others with whom
we live amongst? What best allows us to view reality as such and without any
preconceived biases? What, in the end, deserves the name of first philosophy? Is it
through the lens of the intentional consciousness thus placing phenomenology first, as
Husserl himself contended? Or was Heidegger correct in his elevation of Being and
ontology to the place of first philosophy? Levinas will answer “no” to both options (and
in the end it is really only one option as phenomenology is, for Levinas, ultimately within
the ontological tradition – we will return to this point below) and instead offers his own
candidate: the Other and ethics as first philosophy. And so, with Husserl and Heidegger
seen as key representatives of this tradition (and as former masters whom he once
upheld), Levinas focuses much of this critique on these two men and their philosophical
thought. We will now look briefly at some of the key criticisms that Levinas raises
against Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian ontology.
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See Manning, 8 and 88-102. He envisions the argument between Levinas and
Heidegger as over the question of priority. Which has the primacy of place: ontology
(Being) or ethics? Heidegger answers for the former while Levinas most emphatically
upholds the latter. As he states in Totality and Infinity, 304, "Morality is not a branch of
philosophy but first philosophy."
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Levinas‟ Critique of Husserlian Phenomenology
Levinas‟ relationship to Husserl and his phenomenological method is far from
straightforward. While critical of the founder of phenomenology almost from the
outset,110 Levinas also describes himself throughout his career as a phenomenologist and
professes to be in some way faithful to the phenomenological tradition. He notes in the
preface to his early work, Time and the Other, that his concerns there are basically
phenomenological. 111 While in many ways arguing against Husserl‟s method, Levinas
notes in the German preface to Totality and Infinity that this, his first major work, “wants
to be and feels itself to be of phenomenological inspiration”. 112 Many commentators on
Levinas‟ work agree with this estimation. 113 In a different preface to the same text
Levinas states quite clearly how the concepts he is dealing with “owe everything to the
phenomenological method”.114 In his other ground-breaking work, Otherwise than Being
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or Beyond Essence, Levinas again states “Our analyses claim to be in the spirit of
Husserlian philosophy, whose letter has been the recall in our epoch of the permanent
phenomenology, restored to its rank of being a method for all philosophy”. 115 In a radio
interview of 1981 Levinas reminisces that “it was with Husserl that [he] discovered the
concrete meaning of the very possibility of „working in philosophy‟”. 116 And even as late
as 1982 and 1983, Levinas continues to insist that he is doing phenomenology: “I have
attempted a „phenomenology‟ of sociality starting from the face of the other person.” 117
However, while these statements cannot be denied, it has also been noted how in many
ways Levinas is in fact “striking out along new lines to formulate a general position
which is opposed to Husserl‟s transcendental idealism”. 118 We noted above how Levinas
acknowledges his carrying on in the spirit of Husserl in his major work, Otherwise than
Being or Beyond Essence; however only a few sentences following that proclamation
Levinas also states how his work “ventures beyond phenomenology”.119 In the end, while
it is obvious that Levinas is indeed indebted to Husserl and his phenomenological
method,120 Levinas ultimately finds it insufficient. Thus Levinas critiques Husserl for
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what he considers to be certain inadequacies in Husserl‟s thinking, but he also
manipulates Husserl‟s phenomenological method, turning it on itself (or perhaps even
against itself) to work for the ends Levinas desires. 121 He proclaims that “it is necessary
to think the Husserlian formulas beyond their formulations”. 122 Let us now take a closer
look at these criticisms before we then turn to Levinas‟ unique transformation of
Husserl‟s method.
In 1930 Levinas published his dissertation, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl‟s
Phenomenology. As noted above, Husserl was obviously deeply influential in the
development of Levinas‟ own thought. While it is mostly an explication of Husserlian
phenomenology, 123 in the conclusion to his dissertation, Levinas offers one of his first
concentrated criticisms of Husserl. 124 Thus we can consider “Levinas‟ first attempt to
confront Husserl‟s thought [as] also his first attempt to confront his own thought”. 125 In
sum, Levinas criticizes Husserl for “theoreticism, intellectualism and overlooking the
Columbia University Press, 1998), 123. Here he states: “Doubtless is it Husserl who is at
the origin of my writings.”
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existential density and historical embeddedness of lived experience”. 126 Already we see
here the influence of Martin Heidegger, as Levinas himself admits. “In conformity with
our goal [the study and presentation of Husserl‟s philosophy], we shall not fear to take
into account problems raised by other philosophers, by students of Husserl, and, in
particular, by Martin Heidegger.”127 The problem, for Levinas, seems to stem from how
Husserl‟s method unfolds. As we noted in the introduction to this dissertation, Husserl
understood phenomenology to be a study of the structure of consciousness as such and
how things in the world are presented to and so understood by this consciousness, for
consciousness is necessarily “consciousness of…”, that is, intentionality. However, to
gain access to the intentional consciousness that perceives phenomena as they are in
themselves one must perform the phenomenological reduction, or epoché, which removes
(brackets out) the biased “natural attitude” of everyday life. 128 Levinas states:
“Philosophy [for Husserl] begins with the reduction. This is an act in which we consider
life in all its concreteness but no longer live it.”129 That is, the reduction only allows for a
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theoretical approach to life and the phenomena encountered therein. Levinas had noted
earlier in his dissertation this potential problem with Husserl‟s reduction. He notes that:
for Husserl, intuition is a theoretical act, and that inasmuch as other acts can reach
being they must… be based on a representation… We must, therefore, observe
that, for Husserl, being is correlative to theoretical intuitive life, to the evidence of
an objectifying act. This is why the Husserlian concept of intuition is tainted with
intellectualism and is possibly too narrow. None of Husserl‟s attempts to
introduce into the constitution of being categories which do not come from
theoretical life succeeds in suppressing the primacy or the universality of the
theoretical attitude.130
The purpose of the reduction is to “neutralize” life as it is lived, human life as
participating in the world and thus approaching the world with preconceptions and
biases. 131 Husserl saw that the “natural attitude” had to be put aside (bracketed) so one
could indeed “get back to the things themselves” – the phenomena that present
themselves to the intentional consciousness that intuitively perceives them. 132 However,
Levinas felt that this only “undermines the historicity of consciousness and gives
intuition an intellectualist character”.133 Indeed, Levinas felt that for Husserl “the
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superhistorical attitude of theory supports… all our conscious life.” 134 However, as
opposed to this theoretical and ahistorical approach to life, Levinas offers that:
It is in life [as lived] that we must search for the origin of reality… This life has a
historical character… Moreover, this historicity is not a secondary property of
man as if man existed first and then became temporal and historical. Historicity
and temporality form the very substantiality of man‟s substance.135
In a later work, Levinas notes how “Husserl describes theoretical knowledge in its most
accomplished forms – objectifying and thematizing knowledge – as fulfilling the
intention – empty intentionality fulfilling itself”. 136 But, as the quote above reveals,
Levinas disagrees with Husserl that the reduction to the level of theoretical life gives us
true access to life as lived and the objects encountered therein. As we will see below,
Levinas will come to question if the structure of intentionality (accessed by way of the
reduction) is in fact the best way to approach things in the world; if it really enables us to
get back to the things themselves.137 Already we see him leaning toward his definitive
answer: “no”.
It has been noted how Levinas‟ critique of Husserl has a particularly Heideggerian
flavor to it.138 As if to make that connection explicit, Levinas immediately notes after his
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call in favor of the historicity of consciousness how this historically situated
understanding of consciousness “occupies a very important place in the thought of
someone like Heidegger”. 139 Indeed, Levinas leaves one, ending his dissertation with a
leading question, 140 with the feeling that “he intends to philosophize beyond Husserl‟s
transcendental phenomenology toward and after the manner of the phenomenological
ontology of Heidegger”.141 As we will see, Heidegger‟s ontological project is certainly
historically situated with his understanding of Dasein as being-in-the-world. Against
Husserl‟s preference for an ahistorical, theoretical consciousness, Levinas does here
agree with Heidegger that life should be approached by philosophy as it is lived, that is,
in all of its historical situatedness (although he will ultimately find Heidegger‟s
conception of Dasein just as inadequate as Husserl‟s intentional consciousness).
In a later essay, “The Work of Edmund Husserl”, Levinas continues to uphold his
assessment of Husserl‟s phenomenology as overly theoretical and ahistorical. This is
again, for Levinas, due to Husserl‟s concept of intentionality as the preeminent character
of consciousness and thus of phenomenology as the analysis of the structure of

earliest written work, Levinas is reading Husserl through the powerful lens of
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consciousness. “Phenomenology is intentionality.” 142 As we know, Husserl emphasizes
that consciousness is “consciousness of something”. 143 What is more, intentionality “is
essentially the act of bestowing a meaning (the Sinngebung)” which indicates that the
intentionality of consciousness is involved in identifying phenomena, which is to
represent them to the intentional consciousness. 144 To think is to identify the being of
things. However, as we know, for Husserl the only way to truly know a thing for what it
is (as it appears to consciousness) is through the phenomenological reduction which
suspends the “thesis of existence of objects” 145 Levinas states:
The consciousness of which phenomenology supplies the analysis is in no way
engaged in reality, or compromised by things or by history. It is not man‟s
psychological consciousness, but unreal, pure, transcendental consciousness. 146
This pure, transcendental consciousness is, for Husserl, free. The phenomenological
reduction liberates one from the “narrowness” of the natural attitude.147 Thus
intentionality “becomes in Husserl the very liberation of man vis-à-vis the world.
Sinngebung, the fact of thinking and bestowing a meaning, intellection, is not an
involvement like any other; it is freedom”. 148 This is nowhere made more clear, perhaps,
142
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than in Husserl‟s positing of the subject as a “monad”. For Husserl, “thought is an
absolute autonomy” for the subject is answerable only to itself and is thus absolute and
self-sufficient.149 Levinas notes how for Husserl, “in its inner recesses, the subject can
account for the universe”.150 Thus:
There is in me a possibility of solitude, despite my actual sociality and the world‟s
presence for me. Precisely as a thought, I am a monad, an always possible monad
in an always possible remove from my involvements. I am always in the process
of going toward the whole in which I am, for I am always outside, entrenched in
my thought.151
Levinas concludes that “Husserl‟s phenomenology is, in the final analysis, a philosophy
of freedom, a freedom that is accomplished as, and defined by, consciousness”. 152 But
this is specifically for Husserl an intentional consciousness and “intentionality…
characterizes a monad”. 153 Far from viewing Husserl‟s assessment positively, Levinas
sees Husserl‟s intentional consciousness as living in a monadic universe where solipsism
is a very real possibility. 154
Human consciousness would be a perfect modality: the consciousness of an ego
identical in its I think, aiming at and embracing, or perceiving, all alterity under
its thematizing gaze. This aiming of thought is called intentionality. 155
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Levinas contrasts this monadic subject who is alone in the world, for he or she is
constituting the world with his or her intentional gaze, with Heidegger‟s much more
historically situated subject who is:
neither free nor absolute; [who] is no longer entirely answerable for itself. It is
dominated and overwhelmed by history, by its origin, about which it can do
nothing, since it is thrown into the world and this abandonment marks all its
projects and powers.156
Although Levinas will ultimately come to reject Heidegger for also envisioning the
subject as a solitary ego, alone in the world; at this point, the picture of the world and the
subject within it as offered by Heidegger is much more favorable to Levinas than
Husserl‟s solitary ego locked in its monadic universe. For in the end, can this solitary ego
even encounter other subjects? Or, under the penetrating gaze of the intentional
consciousness, are all others reduced to phenomena, objects for the consciousness to
perceive, identify, and possess? As Levinas warned, solipsism has true potential here.
Levinas alludes to this problem of intersubjectivity as early as his dissertation for it seems
to him that Husserl‟s phenomenological method with its reduction to the theoretical realm
(thus leaving the concrete world behind) will have great difficulty encountering other
persons. This is, for Levinas, the truly tragic consequence of Husserlian phenomenology.
Concrete life is not the solipsist‟s life of a consciousness closed upon itself.
Concrete being is not what exists for only one consciousness. In the very idea of
concrete being is contained the idea of an intersubjective world. If we limit
ourselves to describing the constitution of objects in an individual consciousness,
in an ego, we will never reach objects as they are in concrete life but will reach
only an abstraction. The reduction to an ego, the egological reduction, can be only
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a first step toward phenomenology. We must also discover “others” and the
intersubjective world. 157
Although Levinas then goes on to claim that “the intersubjective reduction and all the
problems that arise from it have much preoccupied Husserl,” 158 he ultimately will find
Husserl‟s treatment of the other person as far from adequate for in the end the other
person remains for Husserl a phenomenological object – a noema of the corresponding
noetic act of the subject‟s constituting ego.159 We noted earlier in our explanation of
Husserl‟s phenomenology how the transcendental ego cannot account for other subjects
but can only assume they exist via analogy to itself. Is this not the very picture of a
monadic ego gathering all otherness into itself and reducing it to itself?
The assimilatory activity of transcendental constitution, in which disparate data of
consciousness are brought to synthetic unity via categorical schematization, is
presented in [Levinas‟ work] as the epitome of the ontological reduction of the
other to the same.160
We will return to this point when we consider how Levinas rethinks Husserl‟s reduction
and intentionality so as to be able to account for alterity and the other person. However,
first we would like to present one additional criticism Levinas offers against Husserl – his
concept of time.
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For Husserl, temporality is understood as essential to the very structure and
existence of consciousness. For Husserl, “even before time is related to objects, it already
characterizes transcendental consciousness itself in its effective accomplishment”. 161
While temporality is part of the essence of phenomena that give themselves to
consciousness over a period of time; it is more specifically because phenomena are given
to an intentional consciousness that has temporality as its own self-constitutive structure
that time relates to objects at all. Husserl envisions the temporality of the consciousness
as in a permanent “flux” of the past, present, and future.162 Husserl also gives priority of
place to the present, the precise moment in which objects are given to consciousness,
though they are always linked to their past and future moments of givenness. Thus
“consciousness of the present is always intertwined with consciousness of the past and of
the future”;163 but the past and the future are always related to the present via retention
and protention.164 For Husserl, we could say, time is also a matter of the monadic self,
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recalling and anticipating all things in the present and into the presence of its own
intentional consciousness.165
Levinas finds this all quite objectionable. His critique of Husserl‟s conception of
time can be summed up in three points.166 First, as with intentionality, Levinas finds
Husserl‟s view of time to be overly theoretical and thus ahistorical. This is also a
criticism he borrows from Heidegger. Second, Husserl‟s conception of the future as
protention does not allow him to “take sufficient account of novelty, unpredictability and
impossibility”. 167 This is due to how the consciousness conceives of the future as merely
“the fulfillment of a preceding anticipatory intention, which means that the new is never
truly new”. 168 Third, Husserl‟s conception of the past as retention is also unable to do
justice to alterity. As with the future, the past is, for Husserl, always able to be
“recuperated” or “retained” in the present moment of my consciousness. Again, there is
no place for alterity which, for Levinas, “has to do with temporal distance, interruption
and loss”.169
We can try to summarize the three objections expressed by Levinas – the
appropriation of the presence of things and person, the subjective possibilization
of the present and the future, and the recuperation of the past – by citing the
following sentence from Otherwise than Being: „A subject would then be a power
165
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for re-presentation in the quasi-active sense of the word: it would draw up the
temporal disparity into a present, into a simultaneousness‟ (OB 133). 170
Levinas will spend a great deal of time developing and explaining his unique conception
of time as always already and only that which comes from the Other – a conception of
time that stands in direct opposition to that of Husserl and Heidegger. We will look
briefly at Heidegger‟s understanding of time below. We will also more thoroughly reflect
upon Levinas‟ alternate conception of time there and again, briefly, in chapter two. For
now, suffice it to say that, for Levinas, Husserl‟s internal time-consciousness that reduces
all to the present and presence of my intentional consciousness must
rest on a prior sociality with the Other where the interlocutors are distinct… This
sociality is irreducible to the immanence of representation, is other than the
sociality that would be reduced to the knowledge one can acquire about the Other
as a known object, and would already support the immanence of an ego having an
experience of the world. 171
In his foreword to The Theory of Intuition in Husserl‟s Phenomenology, Richard
Cohen suggests that “certain insights” can be seen in this early text by Levinas that point
to the future development of his thought.172 Two in particular catch his attention: the
pluralism of phenomenological analyses and the problem of breaking with naïveté. From
Husserl‟s phenomenology “Levinas learns to account for a variety of levels of meaning in
a variety of ways, without reducing one to another”. 173 However, for Husserl this
plurality of ways of analyzing phenomena all return to the constituting ego for “intuition
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is the final evidential court of appeal for all meaning”. 174 This will ultimately be
insufficient for Levinas because it does not truly appreciate any other approach to
phenomena. He will critically question Husserl:
Is intentionality always based on a representation...? Or: Is intentionality the only
mode of the “gift of meaning?” Is the meaningful always correlative to a
thematization and a representation?... 175
Levinas will, of course, answer in the negative – which brings us to Cohen‟s second
point. Husserl proposes the need to bracket or break away from the naïveté of the natural
attitude. He does this, as we know, by means of the reduction. However the problem for
Levinas (as for many others) is that Husserl never bothers to explain the motivation
behind the reduction. It is (or at least seems to be) “entirely unmotivated” such that
“nothing in the natural attitude leads to or produces a break with the realist naïveté which
is the essence of the natural attitude”.176 Levinas states the problem in this way in the
conclusion to his dissertation:
But by virtue of the primacy of theory, Husserl does not wonder how this
“neutralization” of our life, which nevertheless is still an act of our life, has its
foundation in life. How does man in the naïve attitude, immersed in the world, the
“born dogmatic,” suddenly become aware of his naïveté? Is there here an act of
freedom which is metaphysically important for the essence of our life?... [T]he
freedom in question here… is the freedom of theory. 177
So not only does Husserl fail to show what motivates the move toward the reduction, this
failure only furthers Levinas‟ estimation of Husserl‟s overly theoretical approach:
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Consequently, despite the revolutionary character of the phenomenological
reduction, the revolution which it accomplishes is, in Husserl‟s philosophy,
possible only to the extent that the natural attitude is theoretical. The historical
role of the reduction and the meaning of its appearance at a certain moment of
existence are, for him, not even a problem. 178
And so the question remains as to what does in fact motivate the break with the naïveté of
the natural attitude?179 As we will see below, the answer for Heidegger is death,
specifically, my own death. Levinas will reject both Husserl and Heidegger, proposing
instead that it is “the encounter with the alterity of the other person” that “effects an
irretrievable break from naïve immersion within the world”. 180 It is this encounter with
alterity that also inspires Levinas to rearticulate Husserl‟s notion of intentionality and the
reduction.
We noted above how Levinas always saw himself as working within the
phenomenological tradition but yet felt the necessity “to think the Husserlian formulas
beyond their formulations”.181 That is, Levinas‟ treatment of the method created by
Husserl “is a case of expanding the scope of phenomenology and reconsidering the very
nature of phenomenality”.182 This expansion is of course by way of the ethical
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relationship with the other which, we will see, cannot be approached as a mere
phenomenon if the other‟s alterity is to be respected and remain intact. Jean-Luc Marion,
a former student of Levinas, offers three innovations that Levinas‟ ethical lens brings to
the phenomenological method.183 “First, the parallelisms between noema and noesis,
between meaning and signification, or between intention and fulfillment suffer an
exception.”184 As discussed in the introduction, for Husserl noema (the objects presenting
themselves to consciousness) go hand in hand with their corresponding noesis (the
intentional act of consciousness that perceives them) – you cannot have one without the
other. There is a “parallelism” between them. Phenomena are given to the intentional
consciousness, that is, the noema are given to the intentional consciousness which
apprehends them through intuition, the noetic side of the equation, and in this way the
phenomena are known by the consciousness and given meaning. However, Levinas
claims that the Other is precisely that which eludes consciousness, is not a phenomenon
but an “enigma”; and the relationship enacted with this Other, the ethical relationship that
Levinas refers to as a “saying”, cannot be reduced to intentionality (which is meaninggiving, the Sinngebung).185 Thus “against the Husserlian parallelism, signification (as
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signifyingness) is imposed before and therefore without intuitive fulfillment, without
noema, without meaning.”186 Second, and directly resulting from the first point, “the
intentional structure loses its primacy”. 187 As we will see, Levinas will emphatically
claim that “alterity occurs as a divergency and a past which no memory could resurrect as
a present”.188 The Other, who is alterity and, as such, an enigma, is beyond all cognition
because the Other is “already too old for the game of cognition, because it does not lend
itself to the contemporaneousness that constitutes the force of the time tied in the present,
because it imposes a completely different version of time”. 189 What is more, the ethical
relation also comes from a time preceding that of intentional consciousness.
“Responsibility is anterior to all the logical deliberation summoned by reasoned
decision.… In the ethical anteriority of responsibility, for-the-other, in its priority over
deliberation, there is a past irreducible to a presence that it must have been.”190 Because
the time of the Other and ethical responsibility are irreducible to the time of
intentionality, intentionality, so claims Levinas, no longer holds primacy of place. Third,
because the ethical relationship with the Other is prior to intentionality, it does not
therefore require the evidence of a phenomenon given to the intentional consciousness,
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but rather requires “the sincerity of the I”.191 Sincerity, according to Levinas, “is not an
attribute of saying; it is saying that realizes sincerity”. 192 In saying, the ethical
relationship, the self (the I) manifests itself as sincere toward the other – not trying to
comprehend or possess or reduce the other to the self, but respecting the alterity of the
other and subjecting oneself to the responsibility it bears for the other even before its
intentional consciousness comes to bear upon the world. Sincerity is “the
accomplishment of the straightforward relation between my open face… to another
face”. 193 As such, sincerity for Levinas liberates us from and destroys the terms of the
ontological difference.194 This is a far cry from the phenomenological method as
envisioned by Husserl.
It is perhaps nowhere more evident how Levinas moves beyond Husserl than in
Levinas‟ reformulation of the concept of intentionality and the technique of the reduction.
Levinas calls into question the “dominant conception of the received philosophy,
according to which thought is fundamentally knowing, that is to say, intentionality”. 195
He believes that intentionality must be “saved from Husserl” but also “deployed against

191

Marion, "A Note Concerning the Ontological Indifference", 318, italicized in
the original.
192

Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 143.

193

Marion, "A Note Concerning the Ontological Indifference", 318, emphasis

original.
194

Ibid.

195

Levinas, "From the One to the Other", 140.
48

him”.196 Levinas makes it quite clear that, for him, “intentionality, where thought remains
an adequation with the object, does not define consciousness at its fundamental level,”
but rather that “all knowing qua intentionality already presupposes the idea of infinity,
which is preeminently non-adequation”.197 This is because, as we will more fully explain
below, for Levinas consciousness, time, the very subjectivity of the I, comes not through
intentional consciousness but in the encounter with the Other who is not a phenomenon
but an enigma. As we saw above, Levinas‟ reworking of phenomenology breaks down
the parallelism or adequation between the noema and the noesis, between the object
(specifically here, the Other) and the intentional consciousness (or simply, the self). This
is because the Other is not a phenomenon but an enigma who overwhelms the
consciousness.
The Other is not an object but a distance revealed in the non-adequation between
my idea of the Other and the Other itself…. The Other exceeds what I say of him
or her as the disengagement of every form of representation I may have in place
to comprehend him or her….. An enigma comes to pass as the overwhelming of
consciousness, the taking of consciousness by surprise. The Other surprises and
interrupts consciousness because it does not conform to what was expected… 198
In this way, Levinas shows that, far from being the source and foundation of all
knowledge and understanding, “the cogito is not the secure foundation it was first made
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out to be” because there is something that exceeds its all-encompassing grasp.199 And so,
if intentionality cannot account for the Other, Levinas proposes that perhaps
“nonintentionality” can. Levinas questions whether “beneath the gaze of reflective
[intentional] consciousness understood as self-consciousness, the nonintentional gaze,
lived contrapuntally to the intentional, retains and renders up its true meaning”. 200 But
how does he come to discern this nonintentional consciousness beneath and prior to the
intentional conscious? Husserl actually points the way for Levinas.
In two articles from 1959, “The Ruin of Representation” and “Intentionality and
Metaphysics”,201 Levinas proposes that “the transcendental movement Husserl discovers
in intentionality, concealed by the naïve vision of the object, accomplishes metaphysical,
ontologically irreducible, original or ultimate relations”. 202 The transcendental movement
of intentionality is the fact that, through intentionality, consciousness is not simply aware
of objects, but aware of objects that are beyond or transcendent to it. 203 The phenomena
consciousness encounters are not “made up” within the consciousness and projected
outward into a fabricated world, rather, as Husserl insists, they are quite “real”. Levinas
focuses on this transcendental aspect of intentionality so as to manipulate his use of it to
his own ends. While it is true that “intentionality means that all consciousness is
199
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consciousness of something,” Levinas insists “above all that every object calls forth and
as it were gives rise to the consciousness through which its being shines and, in doing so,
appears”.204 That is, Levinas focuses not on the intentional consciousness, as Husserl
does, but instead on that which calls consciousness forth – the things, events, people, etc.
which are beyond, or transcendent to, consciousness. Eventually, Levinas will focus in on
the face of the Other as that which, par excellence, exceeds and overwhelms
consciousness. However that is many steps later. At this point, in his struggle to break
away from Husserl, Levinas takes a first step through sensibility where “the sensible is
given immediately, before being sought”. That is: “Before thinking or perceiving objects,
the subject is steeped in it.”205 Levinas locates this pre-intentional (pre-theoretical)
consciousness at the level of the body because for Husserl (and it would seem that at this
point, Levinas agrees with him) “the whole of the sensible is essentially kinaesthetic” and
“kinaestheses are the sensations of the body‟s movement”. 206 Thus there is a preintentional, incarnate sensibility. However, although Husserl does acknowledge this preintentional level of consciousness, Levinas finds that still for Husserl “the idea of
intentionality dominates all of his analyses of sensibility”. 207 While Husserl insists on
giving priority of place to the theoretical, intentional consciousness; Levinas here finds
the possibility to move beyond Husserl by moving beneath or deeper than intentionality
to a pre-theoretical, incarnational level founded upon sensibility. Levinas states: “This
204

Ibid., 119, emphasis original.

205

Levinas, "Intentionality and Metaphysics", 124, emphasis mine.

206

Ibid., 125.

207

Ibid.
51

phenomenology of kinaesthetic sensibility brings out intentions that are not at all
objectifying, and reference points that do not function as objects.”208 He then concludes:
But this new way of understanding the body presupposes that the ultimate event
in consciousness is not produced as a sort of an objectifying intentionality, and
that other forms of transcendence toward being (or of truth) are produced without
being interpretable in terms of the logic of objects. 209
And so Levinas has found a way, through Husserl, to move beyond or deeper than
Husserl. What is more, it is here, in the breakdown of intentionality, that Levinas finds an
opening to the possibility of ethics.
To put an end to the conception that thought and the subject-object relation are
coextensive, is to offer a glimpse of a relationship with the other that is neither an
intolerable limitation of the thinker; nor a simple absorption of this other into an
ego, in the form of a content. Where all Sinngebung was the work of a sovereign
ego, the other could in fact only be absorbed in a representation. But in a
phenomenology where the activity of totalizing and totalitarian representation is
already exceeded in its own intention, where representation already finds itself
placed within horizons that it somehow had not willed, but with which it cannot
dispense, an ethical Sinngebung becomes possible, that is, a Sinngebung
essentially respectful of the Other.210
This move to ethics is given as a tantalizing hint at the end of “The Ruin of
Represention”, alluding to what will come in the development of Levinas‟ thought. 211 In
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two later essays, both published in 1983, “Nonintentional Consciousness” and “From the
One to the Other: Transcendence and Time”, Levinas returns to this notion of a preintentional (nonintentional) consciousness, giving it a specifically ethical thrust. As we
know, Levinas calls into question whether intentionality truly is the fundamental structure
of consciousness. And as we have seen, Levinas also questions if the structure of
intentionality itself must always be based on representation and thematization, if thought
is “devoted from the start to adequation and truth”. 212 Even beyond sensibility, Levinas
notices a curious aspect of consciousness in that, while it is directly aware of sensations
and objects in the world, it is also indirectly aware of itself and its own mental
activities. 213 However, as indirect awareness, this form of consciousness has no
intentional aim; it is thus “nonintentional”. 214 Intentional consciousness is directly aimed
at phenomena whose self-given presence fulfills the intentional aim; whereas
nonintentional consciousness of the self is:
without any voluntary aim; nonintentional consciousness exercising itself as
knowledge, unbeknownst to itself, of the active self that represents world and
objects to itself…. A consciousness of consciousness, “indirect” and implicit,
without initiative, proceeding from a nonintending I.215
What is more, as with the intentionality of sensation which Levinas locates “beneath”
intentional consciousness; this indirect consciousness is found “beneath” or prior to the
“Levinas‟s Critique of Husserl”, 89-93, where he too comments on Levinas‟ use of
sensibility as opposed to intentionality in the encounter with the other person.
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direct consciousness of intentionality. In this way Levinas calls the intentional
consciousness active while this indirect, nonintentional consciousness is passive, “beingwithout-having-chosen-to-be”.216 Levinas goes a step further and indicates that at the
level of intentional consciousness we find our conscience, or “knowledge of self”; while
at the level of nonintentional consciousness we find our “bad conscience”:
without intentions, without aims, without the protective mask of the character
contemplating himself in the mirror of the world, self-assured and affirming
himself. Without name, position, or titles. A presence that fears presence, stripped
bare of all attributes. A nakedness that is not that of unveiling or the exposure of
truth.217
This bad conscience, which is passive and timid, puts the intentional consciousness
(conscience) into question, but it also puts it to the question – “having to answer for its
right to be”.218 Finding inspiration in Pascal, Levinas notes how the self becomes hateful
to itself when it realizes that “my „being in the world‟ or my „place in the sun‟ [is] „the
beginning and the prototype of the usurpation of the whole earth‟”. 219 Levinas sees in the
bad conscience that is prior to the “good conscience”, which is consciousness and
preservation of self, a questioning of this very self-assertion, an accusation against itself
216

Levinas, “Nonintentional Consciousness", 128-129.

217

Ibid., 129.

218

Ibid., 130. See also Levinas, “From the One to the Other”, 144, italicized in the
original: “Here is being as bad conscience, in this questioning; being-put-in-question, but
also put to the question, having to answer – the birth of language in responsibility; having
to speak, having to say I, being in the first person. Being precisely myself; but,
henceforth, in the assertion of its being as myself, having to answer for its right to be.”
We see here not only the crumbling of the intentional consciousness and intentionality in
general; but also Levinas‟ claim that language and subjectivity itself are founded upon
the encounter with the other and the ethical relation. We will consider these themes more
fully below.
219

Ibid.
54

for its very existence. This is due to nothing in myself per se but due to the encounter
with and recognition of the other person whose “place in the sun” my very being usurps.
The other comes close to me (proximity) and is encountered in the face.220 When I
perceive the face of the other person I hear “a demand made of me from the depths of an
absolute solitude; a demand addressed to me or an order issued, a putting in question of
my presence and my responsibility”. 221 Struck by this realization, I become afraid. But I
am not in any way afraid for myself, rather I fear for the other person. Specifically, I fear
for their death.222 Morality is thus awakened in this fear for the other person‟s death.
Death signifies in the concreteness of what for me is the impossibility of
abandoning the other to his aloneness, in the prohibition addressed to me of that
abandonment. Its meaning begins in the inter-human. Death signifies primordially
in the very proximity of the other man or in sociality.223
And so, no longer concerned for myself, my bad conscience reveals “an ethical
disturbance of being, beyond its good conscience of being „with respect to that being
itself‟”.224 What is more, this is what, for Levinas, makes us truly human: “the return to
the interiority of nonintentional consciousness, to bad conscience, to its possibility of
fearing injustice more than death, of preferring injustice undergone to injustice
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committed, and what justifies being to what guarantees it”. 225 Levinas concludes: “To be
or not to be is probably not the question par excellence.”226 Thus has Levinas shown that
intentionality is not only not the foundational structure of consciousness, but beneath and
deeper than intentionality is a nonintentional consciousness that manifests itself as a “bad
conscience”, questioning the very existence of the self in the name of ethical
responsibility for the other.
We now must ask, if the realm of the intentional consciousness is reached via the
phenomenological, or egological reduction; how does one come to the realm of the
nonintentional consciousness, which Levinas actually states is a “reduced
consciousness”?227 Levinas had claimed in his dissertation that “the reduction to an ego,
the egological reduction, can be only a first step toward phenomenology. We must also
discover “others” and the intersubjective world”. 228 And so Levinas proposes an
“intersubjective reduction”.229 While admitting that “this is no longer Husserl” for whom
the reduction “remained to the last a passage from a less perfect to a more perfect
knowledge,”230 that is on the level of “knowledge of being and the Same”, 231 Levinas
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sees in the concept of the reduction the possibility for something much more profound. In
what Levinas coins “the intersubjective reduction”, “the subjectivity of the subject shows
itself in the traumatism of wakefulness”. 232 A wakefulness that is traumatic to the subject
because it is an awakening to the realization that “my place in the world” is a usurpation
of the place for the other, is in fact injustice. It is a traumatizing awakening, like a slap in
the face, to the fact that the self-centered picture of reality painted by the intentional
consciousness is far from adequate and is quite possibly terroristic. In this traumatic
awakening:
[t]he explication of the meaning that an I other than me has for me – primordial
me – describes the way in which the Other Person tears me away from my
hypostasis, from the here, at the heart of being or the center of the world in which,
privileged, and in this sense primordial, I place myself. But the ultimate meaning
of my “mineness” is revealed in this tearing away. In conferring the meaning of
“I” to the other,… the here and there come to be inverted into one another…. I
see myself from the other‟s vantage point; I expose myself to the other person; I
have things to account for.233
If Husserl conceived the reduction as the means of breaking away from the naïveté of the
natural attitude so to “get back to the things themselves” as they present themselves to
consciousness; Levinas rather sees Husserl‟s reduction as unable to grasp life in all its
reality for life is that which is lived; it is not theoretical but historical. And so if we are to
truly “get back to the things themselves” we must break with the naïve attitude that
232
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believes the self occupies the sovereign place of centrality and priority in the universe. 234
A true epoché suspends the sovereignty of the self. It is “a suspension of its [the
subject‟s] ideal priority, with its negation of all otherness through murder or through
encompassing and totalizing thought”.235 It is in this “laying aside by the self of its
sovereignty [that] ethics signifies”. 236 And so the intersubjective reduction is, for the self,
the trauma of sobering up and awakening to one‟s responsibility for the Other, that is,
ethics. The reduction is, as Husserl envisioned it, the way to free oneself from the natural
attitude; but here, through Levinas‟ reworking of these concepts, the “natural attitude” is
that which conceives of the self as sovereign and “freedom” is actually liberation from
the self so as to serve the Other. And so what the reduction enables is not knowledge of
things but responsibility for the Other.
[T]he Intersubjective Reduction describes the astonishing or traumatizing…
possibility of a sobering up in which the I, facing the Other, is freed from itself,
and awakens from dogmatic slumber. The Reduction, repeating as it were the
disturbance of the Same by the Other who is not absorbed into the Same…
describes the awakening, beyond knowledge, to an insomnia or watchfulness… of
which knowledge is but one modality…. It is the psychism of responsibility for
the other…237
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Marion sums up Levinas‟ reconstitution of the reduction in two points. 238 First,
the reduction for Levinas is not, as for Husserl, to the realm of theory and knowledge, but
to the realm of ethics, “to the one-for-the-other of responsibility… the reduction to
restlessness”. 239 Second, the “referential pole” to which the reduction refers is not the
autonomous I of intentional consciousness but rather “the subject subjected to a
subjection, subordinated to the call which summons it to expose itself”. 240 It is a subject
who does not say “I” at all, but rather says “me” as in “me voici” (here I am). That is,
“the subject remains a subject only by subjection; in no way by domination; the
nominative I yields to the accusative me”.241 And so Levinas rethinks both the structure
of intentionality and the technique of the reduction showing both his indebtedness to
Husserl but also the necessity he feels to move beyond Husserl so to account for alterity,
the other person, intersubjectivity, and ethics.
There is but one last brief comment we would like to offer by way of a bridge
from Levinas‟ critique of Husserl to that of Heidegger. We have of course commented on
how, at least in his first encounter, Levinas saw Heidegger as the true heir to Husserl and
Heidegger‟s work as the future of phenomenology. And we know that, in the end,
Levinas rejected Heidegger‟s ontological project as a continuation of the Western
philosophical project Levinas finds so inadequate. However, there is a further link that is
worth mentioning between Husserl‟s phenomenology and Heidegger‟s ontology that is
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realized in a point of critique that Levinas‟ raises against them. For Levinas, Husserl‟s
phenomenological project participates in the ontological project of the West which finds
its culmination in Heidegger. For Levinas, Husserl‟s phenomenology is just as
ontological as Heidegger‟s project. As early as his dissertation, which was of course
influenced by Heidegger‟s interpretation of Husserl, Levinas endeavors to show how
Husserl‟s phenomenology is actually a “full-fledged ontology”. 242 It can be argued that
this assessment of Husserl is due, in part to Levinas‟ reading of Husserl through
Heidegger, but perhaps it is also a fair assessment from the perspective of what Husserl
himself claims phenomenology allows us to do. We have already discussed how the
traditional task of (Western) philosophy is presented by Levinas as the quest for the truth
of the being of things. Husserl claims that phenomenology is the method alone which
gives us access to these things as they are in themselves – is this not an ontological
claim? To perceive things is to perceive the being of things. Levinas states that the
questions raised by phenomenology concern, in fact, “the meaning of the very existence
of being”. 243 What is more, consciousness itself is seen as a mode of being and as that
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which “carries in itself the guarantee of its being”. 244 And so, it would seem, “Husserl‟s
phenomenology is at its heart actually an ontology, a study of Being”. 245 Levinas states:
The thesis of the ontological value inherent to subjectivity and to its intrinsic
meaning constitutes the true basis of all Husserl‟s thought. To be is to be
experienced or to have a meaning in life. The phenomenological reduction has no
other goal than to present us with our genuine self, although it presents it only to a
purely contemplative and theoretical sight which considers life but is distinct from
it.246
We are by now well aware of Levinas‟ critique that Husserl is too theoretical and that
thus “Husserlian phenomenology can reveal only a truncated version of human being,
one that focuses on the relation of cognition between human being and the world that it
constitutes in consciousness at the expense of all other ways in which this relation may
manifest itself”.247 However, phenomenology is still (at least in Levinas‟ estimation), at
heart, an explanation of the meaning of being, albeit not the fullness of being, but only a
theoretical version of it. This is where Heidegger enters the picture, picking up at the
point where Husserl ends, considering life as it is actually lived, in its historical
situatedness.248 Levinas states: “Only Heidegger dares to face this problem
deliberately”. 249 Heidegger can thus be seen as developing Husserl‟s phenomenology
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“along existential pathways”.250 “Things are what they are, and they are in the way that
they are, in terms of their phenomenological significance.” 251 Indeed, this is yet another
way to point out how phenomenology can be understood as ontology. However for
Heidegger, as opposed to Husserl, “consciousness does not constitute Being but is simply
the means Being has to reveal itself”.252 Rather than limiting himself to the issue of
consciousness, Heidegger addressed the “question of the meaning of Being” itself in all
its fullness. 253 At least at first Levinas applauded this endeavor. However in the end, as
with Husserl‟s phenomenology and perhaps even more so, Heidegger‟s ontology had to
be sublimated by ethics. To return to our original point, if in the end Heidegger‟s
ontology is “weighed in the scales and found wanting”, so too is Husserl‟s
phenomenology and, here, for the very same reason – both of their philosophical projects
are ontologies. We turn now to Levinas‟ critique of Heidegger.

Levinas‟ Critique of Heideggerian Ontology
If Levinas‟s relationship with Husserl is not direct and clear-cut, his relationship
with Heidegger might be even more complex. We noted above how in many ways
Levinas is “striking out along new lines to formulate a general position which is opposed
to Husserl‟s transcendental idealism” but he is also and perhaps even more so forging
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new paths in opposition “to Heidegger‟s hermeneutic philosophy of Being”.254 Indeed,
“Levinas‟s philosophy is a constant arguing against and an interpreting otherwise than
Heidegger so as to propose alternative interpretations and to construct an alternative
philosophy, an ethical philosophy”. 255 A point by point elucidation of Levinas‟
philosophy in relationship to Heidegger‟s philosophy is beyond the scope of this work,
thus we will consider only a few key areas and themes where Levinas diverges from and
in response to Heidegger.
As noted above, one of Levinas‟ key criticisms against Husserl, á la Heidegger, is
how overly theoretical and ahistorical his phenomenology is. At least at first, as we
know,256 Levinas found in Heidegger‟s existential development of Husserl‟s
phenomenology a way to approach life as it is truly lived, in the world. 257 From
Heidegger Levinas gained an appreciation of the “verbality” of Being – that being
(existence) is not a substantive, but a verb, an event.258 And this event of being happens
precisely in the world. This is exactly how Heidegger conceives of Dasein – as „Beingin-the-world‟.259 Dasein is that being for whom its Being is a concern for it, and its
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Being, its existence, is an event that happens in a world into which it always and already
„thrown‟. Concern, or care (Sorge), for its own Being marks the structure of Dasein
because this world into which it is thrown contains things and others that Dasein always
considers in relation to itself – as to how they may affect Dasein or be used by Dasein for
its own self-actualization. In this way, we see that Dasein is also characterized by
potentiality.
Dasein is an existential project, a project charged with immense possibilities.
“Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence – in terms of a
possibility of itself… and comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost
possibility”….260
Here is where we easily see Heidegger‟s acquaintance with phenomenology.
Dasein assigns meaning to things. Objects encountered within the world are
interpreted in terms of possibility, but in terms of possibility for Dasein. Dasein is
the centripetal point of significance, and the world is a referential totality which
beings from, and returns to, Dasein. In short, the Heideggerian environment is
instrumentalised. 261
Just as with Husserl‟s intentional consciousness, Dasein gives meaning to things. This
brings us to Heidegger‟s designation of the „present-at-hand‟ (Vorhandenheit) vs. the
„ready-to-hand‟ (Zuhandenheit).262 Let us elaborate with an example. 263 Hiking through
the woods I come across a fallen branch. As merely an object lying there which I observe,
it is „present-to-hand‟, “simply there”. However, when I realize that it is the perfect shape
and size for me to use as a walking stick, it becomes “available” to me, „ready-to-hand‟,
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as something “useful” and (this is the crucial part) its meaning changes. “In relation to
me, it acquires significance and possibilities…. It acquires another significance in view of
my concerns...”264 Phenomenologically, the stick is never just a stick. “It is what it is
because of the meaning-structure in which it is situated, a meaning structure which I
assign.”265 This is of course similar to Husserl‟s view of the intentional consciousness as
that which constitutes the world. And, as with Husserl, for Heidegger the referential point
is not the world but the self, Dasein.
In other words, things are what they are in terms of their significance for Dasein
and its possibilities. Thus is it that the task „towards-which‟ the [stick] is directed
[helping me hike], and „for-the-sake-of-which‟ it is used [so to get through the
woods more easily] is ultimately „for-the-sake-of‟ Dasein, whose concern is for its
own Being. Thus does Heideggerian phenomenology have ontological intent. 266
Now of course Dasein is not the only being (not the only Dasein) in the world.
Heidegger recognizes that being-in-the-world also necessarily means „being-with‟
(Mitsein) others.267 The world we live in is one we share with others – a „with-world‟
(Mitwelt). However, and this is an interesting point that Levinas will find problematic,
while „being-with-others‟ is considered by Heidegger as an “a priori existential category
of Dasein,” it does not require that any others actually exist.268 That is, even if there are
no others, Dasein still exists as „being-with‟ but in this case these others are experienced
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as “missing”. 269 Another curious aspect of Heidegger‟s understanding of Dasein‟s
interaction with others brings in the notions of authenticity and inauthenticity.270
Depending on how Dasein actualizes the potentiality of itself and depending on
how it relates to others, Dasein exists either authentically or inauthentically. Authentic
existence is directly related to Heidegger‟s concept of „mineness‟ (Jemeinigkeit). My
existence is always and only my own, I possess and “own” it. I can say „I‟ because my
Being is my own and not „yours‟. But I can also say „I‟ because I have been given my
Being to own as my own. That is, Heidegger conceives of Being as generously bestowing
itself so that beings may come into existence. He does this by thinking of Being through
the expression es gibt – it gives (itself). 271 Dasein realizes and owns this beingness as its
very own. When I live in and from this realization of „mineness‟, I am living
authentically. “Being authentic is a kind of potential-to-be-whole: humans have the urge
to get their lives together, to collect themselves, to gather themselves into wholeness.” 272
However in Heidegger‟s estimation, rather than living authentic lives, most of the time
we live inauthentically. When we live inauthentically, our lives are characterized by a
neutral „mood‟ of „everydayness‟. “In this everyday mood, we are not really ourselves at
all, we are simply the same as everyone else; we are in the state of „das Man‟ or „the
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one‟, „anyone‟.”273 If Dasein allows itself to get lost or sucked into this anonymous
collective, it understands itself and lives its life as defined for it by others. 274 What is so
tragic for Heidegger about this inauthentic life is that “Dasein‟s lostness in the they
constitutes its fallenness; Dasein has lost its hold upon itself and its own possibilities and
potential for its own authenticity”.275 The only way to amend this problem, this
„fallenness‟, is for Dasein to withdraw from the they, from others who cloud and distort
Dasein‟s self-comprehension. This withdrawal can be understood as a form of
individualization.
Thus, Dasein achieves itself or actualizes itself… by retrieving itself from its
lostness in the they by resolutely individualizing itself, which enables Dasein to
actualize its authentic possibilities… Dasein can retrieve itself from its fallenness
and come to comprehend itself truly only within “the solitude of authentic
existence.”276
And so, for Heidegger, life with others is plagued with the potential of inauthenticity.
Dasein can live authentically with others, but then “sociality is completely found in the
solitary subject”.277 Dasein must actualize its own life authentically, that is as a radical
and solitary individualization, and maintain this separateness even when in relation with
others. And so Heidegger analyses the social relation, as with everything in his
philosophical framework, from the referential point of Dasein. The social relation can
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either help or hinder Dasein “in its solitary task of actualizing its own possibilities”. 278
Dasein‟s concern here is, as always, for itself and its own potential for being. Levinas
will of course raise quite the „red flag‟ over this conception of the social relation, as we
will see. For Heidegger, it is a matter of choice – „to be‟ authentically or not.279 For
Heidegger the better choice is of course the former, which is a life of radical
individualization.
Dasein‟s self-concern is nowhere more evident than in Heidegger‟s interpretation
of death.280 It is also here where the notion of authenticity achieves its most profound
level. „Mineness‟ comes into play here too. We are finite creatures. We are all going to
die. In this way our Being is actually a „being-toward-death‟. For Heidegger, my death is
my own. No one can die for me and I cannot experience another person‟s death. Now, if I
approach death in an inauthentic way (living from the interpretation of the they), death
will really not concern me very much. Either it isn‟t a concern because it is someone
else‟s death, or my death isn‟t much to bother about because it is so far in the future. 281
However, if one approaches death in an authentic way a proper understanding of death
and even of one‟s self becomes possible. Four things become evident in the authentic
approach to death.282 First, death is indeed appreciated as one‟s own death, as „mine‟. It is
one of the many potentialities in the project of my Being. I accept it as truly my own.
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Second, and as a direct consequence of owning my own death, Dasein also comes to
appreciate and own itself as „Being-toward-death‟. Naturally a little anxiety might ensue
as one faces up to the true potential of one‟s own death. Anxiety is an important theme
for Heidegger.
[Anxiety is] a structural possibility of our existence which brings us face to face
with the problematic nature of our lives and the meaning we attach to living.
Anxiety is distinctive in its world-disclosing possibilities…. Anxiety shows up
precisely the way in which we are free to choose and take hold of ourselves. 283
That is, when Dasein accepts (faces up to) death as its own, appreciates it as „mine‟, what
opens up before Dasein are all the possibilities of its Being that it can realize as its
own.284 It may seem paradoxical, but for Heidegger, the acceptance of my ultimate
demise is not a resignation toward that over which I have no power. Rather, acceptance
of my eventual impotence actually confers upon me a profound power – the power to
embrace and (eventually) actualize all the potentiality of my being. Thus is death the
“possibility of impossibility”.
[F]or Heidegger the sense of my imminent possible impotence is a power and
indeed constitutive of all my existence qua potentiality-for-being. It brings me
forth unto all the potentiality-for-being that I am [and] it is the very basis of all the
power in me, indeed of my life qua power.285
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Third, this ownership of its own death allows Dasein to truly individualize itself and
embrace its Being authentically. The possibilities for being that Dasein becomes aware of
via acceptance of its own death are possibilities for its own being.
Death reveals to authentic Dasein its identity as a separate and unique
individual…. Death individualizes Dasein by calling it back from its lostness in
the they to realize itself as a solitary being. 286
Fourth, Dasein realizes that not only is death its own possibility, it is its most certain
possibility. Dasein will die. Now indeed is Dasein living life authentically, standing
alone to face the inevitable actualization of its potential for death, steadfastly bearing
itself toward that which truly individualizes it. It is this acceptance of one‟s death that,
par excellence, breaks with the everyday attitude of „das Man‟ and allows one to truly
live authentically. This is Heidegger‟s answer to what motivates the turn away from our
naïve realism and allows the philosophical project to emerge – the answer that Husserl
failed to provide for the reduction. 287
Heidegger‟s notion of death, the “possibility of impossibility”, leads us into his
understanding of time. Death is not only that which individuates me and opens up my
potential for being, death is also that which opens up the horizon of the future. Death is a
potentiality that will be actualized some day in the future. The possibilities that death
opens up to Dasein are also future possibilities.
Death reveals to authentic Dasein its own identity as a temporal being, as a being
thrown into time and projected ecstatically toward the future. Thus, for
Heidegger, it is death that bestows a future upon authentic Dasein, and it is death
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that reveals the very essence not only of the future, and, consequently of time
itself, but also of Dasein as Being-toward-death.288
Thus for Heidegger, the future is that which comes from Dasein‟s authentic acceptance of
itself. The future is enacted from the self. It is also that toward which Dasein is constantly
moving or projecting itself as its potentialities are actualized. “Time marches on” for
Dasein because Dasein chooses to enact its own future. The past and the present are
likewise understood from the perspective of Dasein.
The past, like the future, is understood in and through Dasein. 289 The past is
always Dasein‟s past, which it can appropriate for itself (if it is living authentically) or
not. Because the event of Dasein‟s existence is in a constant flow of becoming,
movement toward the future, the past is linked to the future. If Dasein is authentic, it can
see in its past future possibilities that were never enacted in the past.290
The present is, for Heidegger, also always already connected to the future.291 The
event of Being is manifested as a constant movement outward or forward toward another
moment. Being is never static or stationary, it is constantly pulsing forward. Existence
(which is temporal) is an “ecstacy”. 292 Dasein, as possessing Being, is thus always
moving toward the future. Each present moment in Dasein‟s existence is but a moment
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flowing into a future moment in a never-ending temporal flow (that is, until its
potentiality for death is at last actualized).
And so temporality for Heidegger comes from and is accomplished by Dasein.
The structure of Dasein is intrinsically temporal – the unfolding of the event of its Being
is a temporal event. Thus “Dasein always conceives of Being in terms of and through
time”. 293 Time is the horizon upon which Being is manifested – the Being of Dasein.
Therefore, not only is Dasein the referential pole of the world, bestowing meaning as it
pleases; authentic Dasein is that very being which moves the world forward, enacting the
temporal flow as it accepts its own „being-toward-death‟ and grasps at the potentiality of
its own Being. For Heidegger, Being and time are inseparable, thus temporality is
conceived of ontologically.
Levinas could not disagree more with Heidegger! Famous is Levinas‟ claim in the
beginning of Existence and Existents regarding his desire to flee from his former master‟s
ontological thought.
If at the beginning our reflections are in large measure inspired by the philosophy
of Martin Heidegger, where we find the concept of ontology and of the
relationship which man sustains with Being, they are also governed by a profound
need to leave the climate of that philosophy, and by the conviction that we cannot
leave it for a philosophy that would be pre-Heideggerian.294
But if Levinas cannot return to what came before Heidegger, then he must forge ahead on
his own into new territory and unchartered waters.295 Of course he does this by proposing
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and then exploring ethics as first philosophy. Exploring the key themes and concepts of
Levinas‟ ethical philosophy is the task of our next chapter, keeping in mind that what
Levinas writes is not only in refutation of the Western philosophical tradition in general,
but also specifically a point by point critique of Heidegger. For now, we will conclude
this chapter by considering some of the general criticisms that Levinas raises against
Heidegger.
Michael Purcell proposes three related criticisms that can summarize Levinas‟
stance against Heidegger.296 First, Levinas finds fault with Heidegger‟s privileging of
ontology. Levinas published a key essay in 1940 entitled “Is Ontology Fundamental?”
Although Levinas first sought a way out of Heidegger‟s thought with his lengthy essay
“On Escape” (De l‟évasion) in 1935 and Totality and Infinity (1961) is considered the
culmination of his refutation of Heidegger, Levinas‟ “anti-Being and Time,”297 this
smaller essay offers a succinct view of Levinas‟ disregard for Heidegger‟s privileging of
ontology.298 After first addressing how the whole of the Western Philosophical project, to

Descartes. That being said, Levinas' ethical philosophical project does indeed present a
unique and heretofore unheard of understanding of reality and the human person as
understood from the perspective of the Other and the ethical relationship.
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include Heidegger, is an ontology, 299 Levinas questions this primacy of ontology on the
basis of language.
No meaningful language can argue in favor of a divorce between language and
reason. But we may legitimately wonder whether reason, posited as the possibility
of meaningful language, necessarily precedes it – whether language is not based
on a relationship that is prior to understanding, and that constitutes reason.300
For Levinas, language is always first and foremost about communication – something is
said by someone to someone else – language is about speaking to others.301 Western
philosophy, according to Levinas, has forgotten this very important fact and Heidegger
has especially. For Heidegger, first we must understand the other (their Being) and only
then can we communicate with them. However Levinas states: “The other is not first an
object of understanding and then an interlocutor…. To understand a person is already to
speak to him…. Speech delineates an original language.”302 For Heidegger,
communication is merely a question of participation. Speaking is “reduced to the
universality and fundamental sameness of all human beings who recognize one another as
participants in a common culture or ethos”.303 That is, because we are all beings-in-theworld, there is a commonality between us. What is important for Heidegger is not that in
speaking two people encounter one another, face to face, but that these interlocutors
participate in the same ground of Being which instills a common understanding between
299
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them. For Heidegger there is, thus, “nothing radically new” in communicating with
another or in that other with whom I am communicating. 304 What is important for
Heidegger is not to say something to someone but to understand the other, the being of
who they are which is merely a participation in the universal horizon of Being.
Thus the understanding of a being consists in going beyond that being… and
perceiving it upon the horizon of being. Which is to say that, in Heidegger,… to
understand the particular being is already to place oneself beyond the particular.
To understand is to relate to the particular, which alone exists, through
knowledge, which is always knowledge of the universal. 305
Also, keep in mind that, as we saw above, for Heidegger, Dasein is the “meaningbestower” upon what he or she encounters in the world. The world encountered by
Dasein “is a world which is already predetermined by Dasein‟s understanding… of that
world”.306 This includes the other person with whom I am communicating, thus the
encounter with the other is, for Heidegger, about comprehension and meaning-bestowal
just as it is when Dasein encounters any thing in the world. But for Levinas, the other is
not simply a thing like any other thing encountered in the world. The other “does not
affect us by means of a concept” thus “the relationship with the other is… not
ontology”.307 When I speak to another “I have overlooked the universal being he
incarnates in order to confine myself to the particular being he is”. 308 For Levinas,
communication is not about participation in a common source of Being that is manifested
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and comprehended, rather, it is about this particular person, here, now, to whom I address
myself and who appears before me as a face. 309 Levinas states:
It is primarily a matter of our finding a vantage point from which man ceases to
concern us in terms of the horizon of being, i.e., ceases to offer himself to our
powers. The being as such (and not as an incarnation of universal being) can only
be in a relation in which he is invoked. That being is man, and it is as a neighbor
that man is accessible: as a face.310
Levinas rejects Heidegger‟s understanding of the other in terms of Being and ontology
for he sees it as devolving into “techniques that absorb [the articulation of the event of
being] and that... pervert man”. 311 Rather, he offers that the other person is that which
defies comprehension, defies my possession of him or her, defies confinement within the
horizon of Being. For Levinas, Dasein does not simply encounter a world where the
things (and people) in it are merely useful to Dasein (ready-to-hand).312 Rather Dasein
encounters a world in which other people exist who both resist and transcend the meaning
and purposes Dasein would try to impose upon them. Levinas indicates this resistance of
the other to the stifling fixation upon the horizon of Being through the concept of murder.
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The face signifies otherwise. In it, the infinite resistance of a being to our power is
affirmed precisely in opposition to the will to murder that it defies, because, being
completely naked – and the nakedness of the face is not a figure of speech – it
means by itself…. I set the signifying of the face in opposition to understanding
and meaning grasped on the basis of the horizon [of Being].313
The other “signifies” by itself – it does not need any meaning bestowed upon it by
Dasein. Indeed, such a bestowal would “murder” the other, reducing him or her to
Dasein‟s grasp, enslaving him or her to a mere thing useful to Dasein.314 As we will see
in our next chapter, Levinas will further develop this notion of language into “the saying”
which is ethical responsibility. In it are contained such notions as election, accusation,
persecution, substitution, obsession, and the hostage.
The second criticism raised by Purcell is that, due to Heidegger‟s privileging of
ontology, Levinas finds that his work actually has an ethical deficit. 315 Levinas takes
great offence to this. As we discussed in point one above, Heidegger‟s emphasis on
ontology means that he approaches the other from the stance of pragmatic
comprehension. The other is comprehended and given meaning by Dasein, especially in
ways that make the other useful to Dasein. While Levinas emphasizes that the other can
“signify” by itself, “Heidegger‟s understanding of existence and of understanding does
not permit another human being… to present him/herself as he or she is”. 316 The other is
instead reduced to something grasped and understood by Dasein. This is not ethics or
responsibility, this is violence. And so this ethical deficit found in Heidegger‟s ontology
313
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provokes Levinas to counter it with “a fundamental ethics of responsibility” that is prior
to comprehension and deeper than the horizon of Being. 317
For Levinas, Heidegger‟s analysis cannot account for the excess of the other
person who ethically interrupts ontology, and thereby displaces ontology as
fundamental. [While] Heidegger correctly argued that phenomenology cannot
pass over the significance of the world;… in making ontology fundamental, he
does not simply bypass but paradoxically passes over the other person whose
significance is other than that projected by understanding. The other person
interrupts the „circuit of understanding and reality‟. Ethics, not ontology, is
fundamental.318
While Heidegger may remain for Levinas one of the most important philosophers in
history,319 in the end his work is “structurally deficient and phenomenologically
inadequate”.320 This is most apparent to Levinas in Heidegger‟s treatment of the other
person and the intersubjective relationship. And so the ontological “climate of
Heidegger‟s thought” must be left behind for that which offers a more complete, or
perhaps it would be better to say, more profound picture of reality which is that of a
world where I encounter others who cannot be reduced to my violent, all-encompassing
gaze. Levinas‟ philosophy describes a world where others are not there for the benefit of
Dasein, for Dasein‟s actualizing potential, but where Dasein is there for others. It is this
meaning of for, contesting and reversing the Heideggerian for-Dasein, that Levinas
articulates in his proposal of ethics as first philosophy. 321 Heidegger emphasizes the care
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Dasein has for itself. Levinas will emphasize the responsibility we must have for others.
Dasein must be replaced with „me voici‟ – here I am – the subjected subject.
For Heidegger, the subject is designated by Dasein, the being whose Being is of
concern to it. For Levinas, being a subject means being there for others. “The word I
means here I am, answering for everything and for everyone.”322 That is, “the subject
remains a subject only by subjection; in no way by domination; the nominative I yields to
the accusative me”.323 We noted above how Levinas offers this notion of a subjected I to
counter Husserl‟s intentional consciousness. Here, against Heidegger, it is used to counter
self-centered Dasein who is only concerned for itself. When speaking of this notion of the
self as an accused and subjected I who responds to the other, Levinas likes to quote a line
from Dostoyevsky‟s Brother‟s Karamazov: “Each of us is guilty before everyone for
everyone, and I more than the others”. 324 This perfectly sums up the attitude of the ethical
self who stands before the other, accused and responsible. We can sum up the difference
between Dasein and the here I am by considering the different focus each one has:
Dasein is exposed to Being, here I am is exposed to the Other; inversely, Dasein
neglects the originary access to the Other, while here I am accomplishes this
access by passing outside Being. 325
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In Levinas‟ estimation, Heidegger‟s Dasein is always and only for-itself, thus it is
unethical, as is the entirety of Heidegger‟s work. This is made quite clear in the different
emphases Heidegger and Levinas place on death. As we have seen, for Heidegger,
Dasein is most authentically itself when it has embraced death not only as its own death,
but as that which makes Dasein‟s existence full of possibilities, “the possibility of
impossibility”. For Heidegger, death is my death and so I am ultimately concerned for my
life. For Levinas, on the other hand, acceptance of my death does not awaken me to my
potentialities. Death is not the “possibility of impossibility” but rather the “impossibility
of possibility”. Death for Levinas is where:
the subject seems to reach the limit of the possible in suffering. It finds itself
enchained, overwhelmed, and in some way passive. Death is in this sense the limit
of idealism. 326
As opposed to Heidegger‟s positive view that Dasein can embrace and „own‟ its own
death, thus enacting the authentic possibilities of its life; for Levinas, death is a mystery
that comes to me from beyond me. 327 Death is wholly other than me, irreducible alterity
that I cannot master. Indeed, “death announces an event over which the subject is not
master, an event in relation to which the subject is no longer a subject”. 328 Rather than a
possibility for actualization, death is what undoes me – it is the impossibility of my
possibilities. What is more, death signifies most profoundly not as my death but as the
death of the other. According to Levinas, the other‟s death is more important than my
own and in the face of the other‟s death I realize the profundity of being-for-the-other,
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the depth of my responsibility for the other realized as a “devotion to the other” even unto
death.329 Levinas complains that there is no room for such sacrifice in Heidegger‟s work
and so it is ethically deficient.330 Levinas offers an ethical alternative to Dasein‟s beingfor-itself that, in his estimation, actually precedes Dasein‟s self-interest – “a disinterested humanity”:
The priority of the other over the I, by which the human being-there is chosen and
unique, is precisely the latter‟s response to the nakedness of the face and its
mortality. It is there that the concern for the other‟s death is realized, and that
“dying for him” “dying his death” takes priority over “authentic” death. Not a
post-mortem life, but the excessiveness of sacrifice, holiness in charity and
mercy. 331
Lastly, Purcell notes the critique Levinas raises against Heidegger‟s view of the
significance of the world. 332 We discussed above how, for Heidegger, Dasein is not just a
being-in-the-world; but that being in the world constitutes a form of „fallenness‟. Unless
Dasein separates itself from the anonymity of „das Man‟ and individualizes itself against
all these others (and especially through embracing its own death), Dasein will continue to
live a „fallen‟, inauthentic life. Authenticity, as Levinas reads Heidegger, thus requires a
“dissolution of all relations with the other”. 333 However Levinas finds our existence here,
in the world “essentially, and not as a result of a fall or a degradation” 334, but rather as
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something much more positive and profound. “[W]e are in the world,” Levinas boldly
states in Totality and Infinity.335 What is more, being in this world is not the temptation to
inauthenticity, but the very “place” where we are enabled to transcend ourselves in the
encounter with the Other who calls us to our true humanity, enacted in ethical
responsibility. 336 Rather than requiring the dissolution of our relations with the other,
authentic human life for Levinas is the “surpassing of the conatus essendi of life – an
opening of the human through the living being:… the human, that,… would awaken in
the guise of responsibility for the other man”. 337
Robert Manning also offers a summary of criticisms raised by Levinas against
Heidegger.338 He highlights five points of contention that he derives from a key passage
in Levinas‟ Totality and Infinity.339 The points are as follows. First, Heidegger prioritizes
Being over particular beings thus raising ontology to the level of first philosophy.
Second, Heidegger follows in the Western tradition by prioritizing knowledge,
specifically of Being. He thus “gives priority to the subject‟s understanding of the other‟s
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being over the subject‟s obligations toward the other”. 340 Third, Heidegger “neutralizes
the alterity of the other” by having the other “always comprehended with the always
already established boundaries of Being,” that is, against the horizon of Being. 341 Fourth,
thematization and conceptualization are ways in which one gains knowledge of the other
thus making Heidegger‟s ontology a “philosophy of power, wherein the subject
dominates and controls the other”.342 Fifth, because it is a philosophy of power, ontology
as first philosophy “insulates and protects itself from the other‟s capacity to criticize and
to challenge it”.343 This means that “Heideggerian ontology „leads inevitably‟ to the
tyranny and injustice of the state”.344
The first three points are similar to those raised by Purcell, addressed above. The
last two points bring us to a more personal aspect of Levinas‟ rejection of Heidegger. It is
well known that Heidegger joined the Nazi party in 1933. Also infamous is Heidegger‟s
address, also of 1933 and only a few weeks after his enacted membership, upon his
appointment as rector of Freiburg University where he loudly praised not only the Nazi
party and Hitler himself, but advocated their ideology.345 Heidegger‟s actions of 1933
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were devastating to Levinas346 and colored his interpretation of the inadequacy and even
danger of Heidegger‟s philosophy that has little to no regard for the Other. The question
of course is whether or not there is in fact something inherent in Heidegger‟s philosophy
that allowed him to place his allegiance with the Nazi party in 1933. 347 Certainly it didn‟t
prevent him! Indeed if Heidegger is, as Levinas portrays him, a key representative of the
Western philosophical tradition in general, the entire tradition becomes somewhat
suspect. As we noted at the beginning of this chapter:
Whatever can be said about philosophy and its reflections on human existence,
meaning, political order, ethics, etc., before the Holocaust, what must be said after
the Holocaust is that not only were all of the West‟s philosophical, ethical and
religious teachings and reflections unable to prevent Auschwitz, but they also may
have provided a certain legitimation to the devaluation and desecration of human
life.348
It is not our task here to consider the Western tradition in its entirety, however for
Levinas certainly Heidegger‟s complicity with the Nazi party was never viewed as
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merely “extrinsic or irrelevant to his thought”.349 As late as 1989 Levinas still wondered
about Heidegger‟s magnum opus, Sein und Zeit, if “we can ever be assured… that there
was never any echo of Evil in it?” 350 If it is true, as Levinas claims, that his “life was
dominated by the memory of the Nazi horror, then [one can appreciate] his philosophical
life [as] animated by the question of how a philosopher as undeniably brilliant as
Heidegger could have become a Nazi, for however short a time”. 351
We will now return briefly to Levinas‟ critique of Heidegger as summarized by
Manning‟s five points. As we have seen, Heidegger does indeed insist upon ontology as
first philosophy and focus on the acquisition of knowledge, particularly knowledge of
Being, as the focus of philosophy. This focus does indeed cause him to consider others
within and against the horizon of Being, thus reducing their alterity to more of the same
within an encompassing whole. The problem with this, as far as Levinas is concerned, is
that Heidegger‟s philosophy ends up being a philosophy of power and dominion over the
other. When enacted in the realm of the political, the results are tyranny and injustice.
The problem, it seems, stems from the different ways Heidegger and Levinas understand
the concept of truth. Levinas insists that “the meaning of metaphysical truth” is “respect
349
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for being”. 352 Truth for Levinas is ethics. However Heidegger also proclaims the need to
respect being. For Heidegger truth is found in the comprehension of being but to know
being one must allow being to manifest itself as it truly is. Heidegger‟s respect for Being
is thus “the passive letting be of Being”. 353 However, and this is what Levinas finds
problematic, this “passive letting be of Being” is for Heidegger but a “component in the
process of comprehending Being”.354 That is, Heidegger considers the respect for Being
as only a part of, thus secondary to, the more important task of the comprehension of
Being; whereas for Levinas respect for Being is truth and thus must come before any
understanding of Being. Heidegger thus “subordinates ethics to ontology”. 355 Indeed, one
could even claim that Heidegger‟s passive letting be of Being is not so much a passive act
as actually a demand for Being to come to presence before Dasein so that it might
comprehend Being.356 For Levinas, such respect as Dasein shows for Being is not
sufficiently respectful because Dasein‟s desire for knowledge always outweighs its
responsibility for the other. Thus “Dasein will always be in danger of thinking that its
own comprehension of the Other is more important than its relation with the Other”.357
What is more, if knowledge of Being holds priority of place for Dasein then anything
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which it cannot comprehend is relegated to secondary status. In this way “the Other is
always reduced to the same when it is comprehended by Dasein, reduced to that which
Dasein can comprehend”. 358 For Levinas what is most important is not necessarily to
know the other but to truly respect and protect the other. “To really be truth, thought must
abdicate its place of primacy and subordinate itself to ethics, which means that it must
allow itself to be directed by the highest truth, namely the Good”.359 However, when
philosophy is not directed by the Good, when ethics is not first philosophy, the Other is
always in danger of being manipulated and controlled by Dasein who knows the other.
Such is the case with Heidegger.
Heidegger‟s ontology may respect Being, but since its respect for being is at the
service of comprehending being, even its respect for being is not only
insufficiently respectful, but it is also unethical and potentially violent.360
As we have already discussed above, the fact of 1933, at least for Levinas, would seem to
confirm this rather tragically.
The view that different phenomenological descriptions result in different moral
prescriptions can be of help here. 361 Levinas and Heidegger have two different starting
points: for Heidegger it is a “pre-understanding of Being” whereas for Levinas it is “a
relationship that both distinguishes between and connects „the Other‟ (i.e., the human
Other) and me”.362 Due to these different points of departure, the end result is also vastly
358
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different between Heidegger and Levinas. For Heidegger the result is the Other
thematized “as merely a coconstituting moment of the Dasein that is always mine” thus
the Other‟s particularity is reduced “to the status of an instance or moment” within the
totality of the I.363 This is not only problematic for Levinas, but constitutes a false picture
of reality. As we saw above, Levinas considers the fact that we are beings-in-the-world as
the situation of always already greeting the other when I encounter him or her before I
ever come to know anything about him or her.364 “Before all exteriorizations of the will
and before any possibility of recognition, agreement, or convention, another‟s factual
existence requires me to admit him into my dwelling and world…” 365 This is why for
Levinas, “„Being-(responsible)-for-the-Other‟ is the basic definition of „me‟.” 366 And so
with his different phenomenological description of the Other, for Heidegger, both the
Other and the intersubjective relationship between humans plays “no decisive role within
the development of his thinking”. 367 For Levinas, on the other hand, the Other and the
ethical relationship hold the place of priority. Levinas of course believes that he is correct
and Heidegger quite inaccurate, in fact, dangerously so. And this is why Levinas does not
want to merely criticize Heidegger, but even more importantly, he wants “to convince us
that it is not knowledge of Being but ethics that is most essential, that ethics alone merits
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the status of first philosophy”. 368 If Levinas fails to convince us of this very important
fact, the consequences are dire. Indeed, the consequences were already made manifest
during the 1930s and 40s. And so Levinas‟ view of Heidegger‟s philosophy and the
dangerous consequences it houses within can thus be summed up:
For Levinas, Heidegger‟s philosophy is the clear expression of a paganism
that ignores the essential demands of morality and does not resist Nazi
ruthlessness but rather is prone to collaborating with and even promoting it.…
To this end Levinas reads and criticizes Heidegger‟s philosophy as the expression
of a view which is not true to the ethical phenomena as they present themselves,
since it submits them to a certain ontological schema…. According to Levinas,
the very suspension or epoche of the ethical, the seemingly neutral decision to
postpone philosophical ethics until the foundational questions of philosophy have
been treated, testifies to a false understanding of reality.369
And this is why, beginning with his essay, “De l‟évasion”, in 1935, Levinas proclaimed
the need to escape from Being which, on a philosophical level, is the need to escape from
the ontological thought of Martin Heidegger. 370 Indeed, the question for Levinas became
how to philosophize after the horrors of the Holocaust, the horrors of Auschwitz, which
Heidegger‟s philosophy, as brilliant as it may be, not only failed to prevent or even
address but might even be held accountable for somehow legitimizing. 371 And so Levinas
leaves us with a choice: either anonymous Being or the individual being, either
dominance and reduction of the Other through comprehension of being or respect for and
368
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protection of the Other, either the primacy of ontology or ethics as first philosophy,
either Martin Heidegger or Emmanuel Levinas.372
To conclude this chapter, we offer a juxtaposition of Heidegger and Levinas. 373
For Heidegger the other person is not considered in their unique particularity but is
merely one of many while for Levinas the other is approached in their unique
particularity. Because for Heidegger the other person is considered as merely part of the
anonymous crowd („das Man‟), the other is knowable; whereas for Levinas the unique
particularity of the other makes them absolutely unknowable, incomprehensible, beyond
my grasp and my comprehending gaze. If the other is knowable, then Heidegger‟s other
is neither challenging nor traumatizing. For Levinas the other of course is that very
traumatizing event that disturbs and disrupts my being and questions “my place in the
sun”. Thus for Heidegger what is most important is not to encounter the other in their
incomprehensible alterity that disrupts my very being, but is the quest for ontological
truth. Others are not primary for Heidegger, Being is. For Levinas, on the other hand, the
other comes before me from an immemorial past that will never be (my) present and
obliges me far into the future, even beyond my own death. Thus for Levinas the other not
only comes before me but before Being itself. The other holds the position of priority
over me and ethics is first before ontology. In this way for Levinas, and as opposed to
Heidegger, the problem with philosophy is not that it has forgotten Being, but that it has
forgotten the Other.374 And so Levinas‟ assessment of Heidegger‟s philosophy is that it
372
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offers an inadequate and ultimately false account of reality because it fails to take proper
account of the Other and the ethical relation underpinning all our knowledge and being.
Levinas himself states that the first question – “the question par excellence or the
question of philosophy” – is not “„why being rather than nothing?‟, but how being
justifies itself‟”.375 Levinas states:
The real question is, can we speak of an absolute commandment after Auschwitz?
Can we speak of morality after the failure of morality? 376
In the next chapter we will attempt to show how Levinas answers these questions by
presenting the key concepts and themes of Levinas‟ philosophical project, the “waves” of
Levinas‟ thought.377
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CHAPTER TWO
Emmanuel Levinas:
Subjectivity through Selflessness – Ethics as First Philosophy

Introduction
In our previous chapter we saw how Levinas‟ work is situated within the general
postmodern critique of modernity and specifically how he focuses his arguments against
Husserl and Heidegger, whom he regarded as the quintessential models of the Western
philosophical tradition. This chapter focuses more directly on Levinas‟ philosophical
project itself. Although a variety of routes are possible, this presentation of Levinas‟
work will proceed thematically, thus offering the reader a general overview of his
thought. Such key concepts as Levinas‟ understanding of “ethics” and why it must be
first philosophy, the idea of the Infinite, alterity and the Other, the face, the saying vs. the
said, diachronous time vs. synchronous time, the trace, subjectivity as enacted in ethical
responsibility, substitution, the coming of the third party, and God will be covered.
However, it must be noted that proceeding thematically presents its own unique
challenges. Being somewhat “allergic” to thematization, 1 Levinas‟ thought defies neat
categorization. This is illustrated by the famous metaphor for Levinas‟ thought with
which we ended our previous chapter. Levinas‟ thought has been likened to waves on the
1

See for example, Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on
Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 301,
where he states: "Thematization does not exhaust the meaning of the relationship with
exteriority." See also, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 11, where he comments on how the
ethical subject "can not thematize or comprehend". Furthermore, "the [ethical] saying
overflows the very being it thematizes", Otherwise than Being, 18. These ideas will be
made clearer in our presentation of Levinas' thought below.
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beach – incessant, overlapping, advancing and yet receding, shifting and uncontainable.
Levinas‟ thought resists simple categorization and definition. This is due in great part to
the task he set himself: analyzing precisely that which eludes and overwhelms all thought
and consciousness – the alterity of the other, the subjectivity enacted in the encounter
with this other, and the ethical relationship between the self and the other. It is, as one
author states, “an effort at translating incommensurables”.2 If Levinas‟ task is that
substantial, so much more challenging is the exposition of his thought. Questions arise as
to how to categorize Levinas‟ dense concepts and in which order to present them. For
example, should one start with the separated subject from whom the ethical relationship
proceeds, or rather must we begin with the other whose coming enacts the self in his or
her ethical subjectivity? There is no simple answer to this conundrum. 3 Indeed, the terms
only have meaning in relationship to one another thus to split them into separate and
neatly defined categories is, to use Levinas‟ own word, a “betrayal”.4 However, for the
sake of an attempted (if somewhat superficial) clarity, certain categories have been
erected and the concepts that seem most relevant to those specific categories placed
therein. Needless to say certain concepts will be discussed in more than one category due
to the interrelatedness of Levinas‟ thought. In the end, we echo Levinas‟ own warning
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placed at the end of his preface to Totality and Infinity that whatever has been said here
must ultimately be unsaid. 5

The “Waves” of Levinas’ Thought: Key Concepts and Themes
We closed the preceding chapter making a distinction between Heidegger and
Levinas. For Heidegger the problem with philosophy is that it has forgotten Being
whereas for Levinas the problem, not only with philosophy but with the entirety of the
Western tradition, is the forgetting of the Other. Thus for Levinas the question of
philosophy, indeed the question par excellence, is not the question “why is there
something – aka: being – rather than nothing?” but how does being justify itself? His
endeavor to answer this question led him on a remarkable journey that began with his
attempted escape from Being in 1935 with the publication of his essay On Escape and
brought him all the way to the very enucleation of subjectivity6 in the substitution of the
hostage in 1974 with the publication of Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (and the
publications following thereafter). We turn now to certain key concepts and themes of
Levinas‟ ethical philosophy, revealing his radical rethinking of human personhood and
the very meaning of what it is to be “human”.
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See Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 30.
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See Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 49, emphasis mine, where he speaks of the
passivity of the subject‟s exposure to the other as “a fission of the nucleus opening the
bottom of its punctual nuclearity”. See also Emmanuel Levinas, God, Death, and Time,
trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 223, emphasis mine: “The
referral to the other is an awakening to nearness, which is responsibility for the neighbor to
the point of substitution, which is the enucleation of the transcendental subject.”
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Ethics as First Philosophy – a radical vision of ethical-subjectivity-as-enucleated
What perhaps must first be addressed when considering Levinas‟ ethical
philosophy is what precisely he means by ethics and why he proposes that it is, indeed
must be, first philosophy. Levinas officially proclaimed the primacy of ethics in 1961
when he published Totality and Infinity. “Morality [ethics] is not a branch of philosophy,
but first philosophy.”7 Indeed, he states there that establishing the “primacy of the ethical,
that is, of the relationship of man to man… a primacy of an irreducible structure upon
which all the other structures rest…, is one of the objectives of the present work”.8
Several years later, Levinas continued to insist on this special role for ethics, even
blatantly entitling an essay “Ethics as First Philosophy”. 9 He concluded this work stating
that the very dimension of the human is found in ethics as the encounter with the other
who puts my very being into question.
In this question [the question of my right to be which is already my responsibility
for the death of the Other, interrupting the carefree spontaneity of my naïve
perseverance] being and life are awakened to the human dimension. This is the
question of the meaning of being: not the ontology of the understanding of that
extraordinary verb, but the ethics of its justice.10
For Levinas, “ethics as first philosophy” can be seen as an underlying thesis running
throughout his work since the publication of Totality and Infinity. Beginning with his
desire to escape from the stranglehold of being and ontology in 1935, his work can be
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seen as gradually building up to this remarkable position from which, once obtained, he
never turned back. However, it is crucial to point out that in proclaiming ethics as first
philosophy Levinas is not merely advocating some systematic code of behavior, the
social “do‟s” and “don‟ts” particular to cultural mores. He states:
The ethical language we have resorted to does not arise out of a special moral
experience, independent of the description hitherto elaborated. The ethical
situation of responsibility is not comprehensible on the basis of ethics.11
Rather, when Levinas speaks of “ethics” he is referring to something much more
profound and, to use his own word, “an-archical”. 12 Indeed, in Levinas‟ hand this simple
word – ethics – is his attempt to translate an “incommensurable” that requires thousands
of pages and decades of reflection to write about and which, in the end, is always,
ultimately inadequate. Throughout his later text, Otherwise than Being, Levinas insists on
the need to “unsay” whatever has been, can, or will be said about the ethical relation that
defies the attempt at a standardized definition. 13 Indeed, in the closing pages of this text
he briefly reflects upon skepticism, leaving the reader in the uncomfortable position of
realizing that one can never settle into the smug position of having “figured it out”. 14
However, one must say something, albeit, as we commented above, at the price of a
betrayal.
11
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And so “ethics”, for Levinas, is not a code of behavior. Indeed our human codes
of behavior and the institutions that regulate them, the justice system, are derived from
this prior realm of ethics of which Levinas speaks. 15 Attempting a concise definition, one
commentator proposes that ethics, as Levinas uses the term, is “a relation of infinite
responsibility to the other person”.16 Another claim is that it is perhaps more adequate to
speak of “the ethical” rather than “ethics” which has the danger of leading the reader to
think of “an ethics” (as in a code of behavior).
In most contexts, the French word used by Levinas, l’éthique, might just as well
be translated by „the ethical‟ as by „ethics‟; and the ethical… refers to a domain
from which nothing human may be excluded. Levinas‟s ethics, as an enquiry into
the nature of the ethical, analyses and attempts to maintain the possibility of a
respectful, rewarding encounter with the Other; and it endeavors to discern the
sources of a humane and just society in this encounter.17
Still elsewhere it is commented on how Levinas “does not write an ethics, but shows, by
means of subtle descriptions and analyses, that the ethical perspective must be the starting
point of every philosophy that hopes to be true to the facts”.18 And so we may say that for
15
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(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), 104-105: “I also think that institutions,
courts, and thus the State must concretely appear in this derived order of rationality” –
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Levinas “ethics” is more akin to some type of relationship, the domain of the ethical, or
an ethical perspective underlying all thought and consciousness.
In Totality and Infinity Levinas speaks of the ethical relationship as
“metaphysics”.19 Now while Levinas eventually drops this rather problematic word in his
future writing, 20 his conception of “metaphysics” in Totality and Infinity points directly to
his reasoning why ethics must be first philosophy. Levinas claims the desire to trace back
“to a situation where totality breaks up, a situation that conditions the totality itself”. 21
This conditioning situation is, for Levinas, “the gleam of exteriority or of transcendence
in the face of the Other”.22 Metaphysics is the movement towards or desire for the
absolutely other.23 For Levinas, this metaphysical desire precedes and conditions
ontology.24 He calls it metaphysics but it would be better to render it “meta-physics” to
indicate how his ethical thought transcends or is beyond (meta-) the ontological thought
of the Western tradition (physics).25 This is further elaborated by his allusion to the
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Platonic concept of the “Good beyond Being”. 26 For Levinas, metaphysics, the desire for
the absolutely other, that which transcends the ontologizing totality of the West, is “the
disinterestedness of goodness”27 and the good is precisely that which is beyond being and
thus conditions it.
In his later texts Levinas often used words such as “anarchical”, “immemorial”,
“hither side”, “incommensurable”, “beyond”, “presynthetic”, “prelogical”, etc. in an
attempt to describe how and why ethics holds this place of primacy. 28 Levinas attempts to
show that ethics is not merely foundational – a word far too encumbered with ontological
resonance – but prior to all foundations and beginnings thus “an-archical”. 29 He states:
It is in a responsibility that is justified by no prior commitment, in the
responsibility for another – in an ethical situation – that the me-ontological and
metalogical structure of this anarchy takes form, undoing the logos in which the
apology by which consciousness always regains its self-control, and commands, is
inserted…. The consciousness is affected, then, before forming an image of what
is coming to it, affected in spite of itself.30
Thus ethics is prior to all structures, concepts, and themes that take form in the realm of
being and consciousness. Indeed, as soon as we think or conceive of ethics, we have
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already betrayed it, reducing it to a theme that resides in the realm of ontology. 31 Thus
ethics is first philosophy because philosophy is this betrayal of what is beyond and
incommensurable into a concept or theme. Philosophy is “the indiscretion with regard to
the unsayable”.32 As we will see in greater detail below, it is the ethical encounter
between the self and the other that not only enacts language, meaning, and truth, but
enacts me as a self – as a human self. 33 Humanity, as human, is oriented by this
anarchical encounter.34 For Levinas, the relationship with the other is language.35 The
way in which the other presents him or herself is the face.36 The face speaks – it is the
first signification, signifying by and for itself.37 What the face signifies is the questioning
of my freedom and is thus a summons to ethical responsibility; it is an invitation “to a
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relation incommensurate with a power exercised”. 38 As Levinas himself says: “To
welcome the Other is to put in question my freedom.” 39 Truth is not founded on freedom,
freedom is founded on truth,40 and truth is revealed in the ethical relation with the other
prior to all knowledge, choice, and commitment.41 Thus the relationship with the other
founds meaning and truth. Thus subjectivity is enacted in ethical responsibility. Thus
ethics precedes ontology and is first philosophy.

The Same vs. The Other – a general comment
Two key concepts that must be discussed when considering Levinas‟ thought are
the same and the other. Closely related to these two concepts are those of totality and
infinity. It was briefly mentioned in chapter one how Levinas links the notion of totality
with that of Western culture and the Western philosophical project, both seen as forms of
an “egology”. Levinas of course rejects this tendency of the Western world as not only
self-centered but even violent for, in his estimation, according to the tradition of the West
all that is other than the self is reduced to the totalizing realm of the same. In the Western
tradition all reality is perceived, grasped, possessed, molded, and contained by the same.
Levinas insists that this is in part due to the inordinate (in his view) emphasis placed on
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Being and ontology. For Levinas, this problem is nowhere more evident than in the
thinking of Martin Heidegger, his arch-nemesis. And so Levinas desires to break out of
the all-encompassing grasp of the same, the neat totality created by the controlling ego
where all aspects of reality are categorized and shelved according to the intentionality of
the consciousness. He desires, as we know, to escape from the suffocating presence of
Being, which is not the generous donation of Heidegger‟s es gibt (it gives), but the
waking horror of il y a, the there is.42 Levinas wants to reflect upon that which eludes the
totalizing realm of the same, that which transcends its possessive and constitutive gaze
and is thus infinite. That is, Levinas focuses on the realm of the other – the alterity
(which is infinite) of the other and, in turn, how the other thus affects the realm of the
same, stripping the ego bare, placing the intentional consciousness in question, and in this
way enacting the subjectivity of the self. 43 The other is precisely that which is not the
same, that which eludes and exceeds the same with a transcendence that Levinas calls
infinite. 44 However, there is one modality of the other that receives special attention from
Levinas, that is the Other – the human Other who presents him or herself to the subject
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by the way of the face.45 Here we are already beginning to overlap into our following
section and so we will pause a moment to reflect a little deeper upon Levinas‟
development of these notions of the same and the other and their relative counterparts,
totality and infinity.
As noted above, in 1935 Levinas first expressed the need to escape from being in
his extensive essay “On Escape”.
Thus, to the need for escape, being appears… as an imprisonment from which one
must get out.
Existence… is identity. In the identity of the I [moi], the identity of being
reveals its nature as enchainment, for it appears in the form of suffering and
invites us to escape.46
This is a sentiment he will carry throughout his work, resurfacing even as late as
Otherwise than Being: “The task is to conceive of the possibility of a break out of
essence.”47 But what, we might ask, is wrong with being, with existence? Why, or how,
does being reveal itself as an imprisonment? Why should one, indeed does one, desire to
flee from oneself?48 Levinas answers this question very simply in the text following “On
45
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Escape”, Existence and Existents: “Existence of itself harbors something tragic…” 49
Levinas makes this tragedy of our existence quite clear in “On Escape” as he offers what
was then a radically new interpretation of five commonplace phenomena: need, malaise,
pleasure, shame, and nausea.
Traditionally, need has been interpreted as fulfillment of something lacking: my
stomach is empty, I need food to fill and fulfill it. Need thus indicates “some weakness of
our human constitution, or the limitation of our being”. 50 Levinas, however, turns this
traditional interpretation on its head. Need, for him, is not due to some lack in our being
but rather due to the “plenitude of being”.51 Our being weighs heavily upon us, we find
ourselves chained to it, riveted to it, and it causes us to suffer. This suffering is
manifested as malaise.52 Thus need “is not oriented toward the complete fulfillment of a
limited being, toward satisfaction, but toward release and escape”. 53 But how to escape
from this malaise, this suffering of our enchainment to being? A first attempt is made
through pleasure. Levinas finds in pleasure “an abandonment, a loss of oneself, a getting
out of oneself, an ecstasy:… pleasure opens a dimension in the satisfaction of a need in
which malaise glimpses an escape”. 54 Sadly, this escape from oneself through pleasure is
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short lived. Pleasure is “a deceptive escape”, it is “an escape that fails”. 55 Pleasure lasts
but for a moment and when it has passed the weight of being comes crashing down
around us once again, suffocating us in its burdensome presence. The satisfaction I derive
from food filling my belly is only temporary – I will be hungry again. The result of this
failed attempt to flee from being through pleasure is shame. “Shame does not depend…
on the limitation of our being,… but rather on the very being of our being, on its
incapacity to break with itself.”56 What follows from this shame at our failed attempt to
flee from ourselves through pleasure is nausea which causes us to despair for nowhere are
we more trapped in our being, more chained to ourselves, than in the experience of
nausea. “And this despair, this fact of being riveted, constitutes all the anxiety of nausea.
In nausea… we are… riveted to ourselves…” 57 And so we find ourselves back where we
started – feeling the burdensome weight of our being and needing to escape from it.
Ultimately, “the nature of nausea is nothing other than its presence, nothing other than
our powerlessness to take leave of that presence”. 58 And yet escape is possible. However
Levinas only gives a tantalizing allusion to this possibility at the end of his essay.
It is a matter of getting out of being by a new path, at the risk of overturning
certain notions that to common sense and the wisdom of the nations seemed the
most evident.59
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We know that Levinas will find this new path through the transcendence of the ethical
encounter, but that development is yet to come. What does follow the conclusion of “On
Escape” is an analysis of the emergence of the human existent from the anonymous
rumbling of being that Levinas calls il y a, the there is. This analysis is found in his text,
Existence and Existents. It is important to reflect on this concept of the there is for a
moment for it further indicates why Levinas desires to escape from being through,
ultimately, the encounter with the other.
While ethics has yet to make its appearance, in this early text, we see Levinas
grappling with a reversal of Heidegger‟s procession from beings to Being. Levinas wants
to analyze an even “earlier” point – the emergence of beings (existents) from impersonal
Being (existence).60 Levinas states:
This work will be structured as follows: it sets out to approach the idea of Being
in general in its impersonality so as to then be able to analyze the notion of the
present and of position, in which a being, a subject, an existent, arises in
impersonal Being, through a hypostasis. 61
While Heidegger saw the emergence of beings as a positive donation of Being (es gibt),
Levinas has a much darker and troubling view of the existence from which existents
struggle to arise. For Levinas, before there is a world and before there are existents in that
world, there is…
This impersonal, anonymous, yet inextinguishable “consummation” of being,
which murmurs in the depths of nothingness itself we shall designate by the term
there is. The there is, inasmuch as it resists a personal form, is “being in
general”. 62
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The impersonal and anonymous form found in “it rains” is similar to the there is. Levinas
likens the there is to the heavy presence one senses in the absence conveyed by night. It
is a nothingness that is yet full of a presence that threatens and is frightening. The eyes
gaze fearfully into the void left by the absence of daylight, seeking for that which cannot
be found yet is sensed and terrifies. Levinas offers an allusion to the experience of
insomnia where “a monotonous presence… bears down on us” and from which we
cannot escape into the blissful ignorance of sleep. 63 In insomnia we are exposed to the
there is and can take no shelter from it. “The rustling of the there is… is horror.”64 It is
the dense “presence of absence”.65 If this impersonal, anonymous horror is indeed what
lies behind the being one possesses as an existent, it is no wonder one feels the need to
escape from this burdensome menace! But for a being to need this escape from its being
requires that an existent emerge from the anonymous rustlings of the there is. This
emergence happens through the taking of a position. “Through taking position in the
anonymous there is a subject is affirmed.”66 This emergence of an existent Levinas calls
hypostasis.
To designate this apparition we have taken up the term hypostasis which, in the
history of philosophy, designated the event by which the act expressed by a verb
became a being designated by a substantive. Hypostasis, the apparition of a
substantive,… signifies the suspension of the anonymous there is, the apparition
of a private domain, of a noun. On the ground of the there is a being arises…. By
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hypostasis anonymous being loses its there is character…. Someone exists who
assumes Being, which henceforth is his being. 67
This emergence of the subject from anonymous being takes place in an instant, 68 but it is
a frozen moment. The subject that arises from the there is is solitary and stuck in the
present moment of its own being. Again offering but an enticing comment at the end of
his text, Levinas notes that “time and the other are necessary for the liberation” from
one‟s existence as a solitary subject.69 This is because, for Levinas, “the absolute alterity
of another instant cannot be found in the subject” but can only come “from the other” for
“time is the very dialectic of the relationship with the other”. 70 The self, being stuck in
the present moment of its own being, is incapable of creating time. Time must come from
what is not of the self, but what is other than the self and thus a mystery to the self. Time
must come from the other. This is the very theme of Time and the Other,71 a compilation
of lectures published after Existence and Existents, and to which we now turn.
After reiterating his analysis of the emergence of the solitary subject through
hypostasis, Levinas comments on the tragedy of this existence.
The first freedom resultant from the fact that in anonymous existing an existent
arises, included as its price the very finality of the I riveted to itself. This finality
of the existent, which constitutes the tragedy of solitude, is materiality. Solitude is
not tragic because it is the privation of the other, but because it is shut up within
the captivity of its identity, because it is matter. To shatter the enchainment of
67
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matter is to shatter the finality of hypostasis. It is to be in time. Solitude is an
absence of time. 72
These comments come at the conclusion of Part I of Time and the Other. Part II consists
of a brief reflection on “salvation” in the sense of liberation from the solitude of
existence, especially through the nourishment offered by the world. However, as we
know from his earlier text, such pleasures are finite and the escape they provide is thus
fleeting and eventually the subject falls back upon itself in its solitude. The only way the
subject can truly escape from its solitude is through an encounter with something other
than itself, something irreducible to itself that pulls it out of itself. Levinas first reflects
upon the unknown of death as “a relationship with mystery” for with death “the subject is
in a relationship with what does not come from itself.” 73 In this way, the possibility of the
future is opened to the subject and its solitude is broken. 74 However, for our purposes
here, what is even more important is Levinas‟ analysis of the coming of the other person
who, as other, also brings the future to the self and with whom one is in a relationship
that Levinas characterizes as a mystery. 75 Indeed, it is not so much that the subject breaks
out of its solitude as that its solitude is broken by the coming of that which is other than
the subject, thus irreducible to the subject and unable to be grasped by the subject. The
subject is surprised by the future for it is alien to him or her. The subject is passive in the
72
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face of the coming of the future. And the future does have a face. It is the face of the
Other. And the relationship with this other is the face-to-face.76 While with death the
possibility of the future opens up, for death is other than the self, this however is not yet
time. For Levinas, time “lies in the relationship between humans,” which is the face-toface. 77
Relationship with the future, the presence of the future in the present, seems all
the same accomplished in the face-to-face with the Other. The situation of the
face-to-face would be the very accomplishment of time; the encroachment of the
present on the future is not the feat of the subject alone, but the intersubjective
relationship. 78
Now this intersubjective relationship of the face-to-face does not yet carry the ethical
weight that will come to characterize the heart of Levinas‟ thought. Rather than ethics,
Time and the Other concludes with reflections on eros and fecundity. But ethical
glimmers are on the horizon (dare we use the word) when Levinas mentions the passivity
of the subject in relation to the other and the asymmetry of this relationship. 79 Time is
still needed before these concepts flower into the rigors of ethical obligation that are
presented in his later works. For now we simply note with Levinas that “the Other is what
I myself am not”80 – a simple sentence that opens up an anarchical world of
incommensurables.
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Now we turn to the two instances that have not only escaped being but are in fact
beyond being: the other who is other than me and puts all of my totality into question,
and the self who is enacted by the encounter with the other as an ethical subject
answerable “for all that is and all that is not”. 81 Beyond being as such, the other and the
self as ethical subjectivity are bound in a relationship older than memory and prior to
manifestation. It is upon this relationship, the first philosophy of ethics, that our notions
of humanity, society, and justice are founded. But this requires the coming of the third
party present in the face of the other, another aspect of Levinas‟ thought to which we
must pay careful attention. But all this is in an attempt to answer Levinas‟ question: how
is it possible to speak of transcendence? How is it possible to think beyond being?

The Face of the Other – the command and cry of ethical responsibility
Before we speak directly about the face (an ethical impossibility to be sure!), we
must first expand a little more upon Levinas‟ concept of infinity. It is well known that
Levinas‟s understanding of infinity was greatly influenced by Descartes. Indeed,
Descartes‟ name is mentioned throughout Levinas‟ numerous works. For Levinas, there
seem to be two key aspects about Descartes‟ idea of the infinite. First, there is a
disproportion between the infinite and the idea of it. That is, in the language of
phenomenology, “its ideatum surpasses its idea”. 82 While we can have this idea of the
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infinite, the infinite itself is not grasped or encompassed in this idea. “In thinking infinity
the I from the first thinks more than it thinks.”83 The intentional aim is unequal to this
task. Or, as Levinas says reflecting later on his use of Descartes‟ idea: “There is a
disproportion between the act and that to which the act gives access.” 84 Because of this
inequality, this disproportion, this surpassing or overflowing of the idea of the infinite by
the infinite itself, the infinite is, as such, infinite or transcendent. This overflowing is, for
Levinas, the very infinition of infinity, marking it as transcendent.85 What is more, this
transcendent disproportion between the self and the infinite marks the infinite as other
than the ego. This brings us to the second aspect of Descartes‟ idea of the infinite that
Levinas highlights. It is an idea that has been “put into us”.86 The infinite is “radically,
absolutely, other”.87 As infinite, it exceeds the very thought consciousness aims at it and
thus can never be grasped and reduced by the ego. And so the question arises, how can
one even come to think this thought that is wholly other than the self and overflows the
very thought that attempts to think it? Levinas‟ answer is that one does not so much think
this thought in the sense that one wills (chooses) to aim one‟s consciousness at this

this idea, that is, what this idea aims at, is infinitely greater than the very act through
which one thinks it.”
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phenomenon and has the capacity to do so. Indeed, in the face of the infinite, one is
rendered incapable, powerless, passive. And so, one does not so much think this thought
as this thought is placed into one, given to one, by the infinite that approaches. 88 It is this
event of the idea of the infinite being placed into us that Levinas calls experience: “a
relationship with the exterior, with the other, without this exteriority being able to be
integrated into the same”. 89 But how, one might ask, is this experience of the relationship
with the infinite other enacted concretely? This is where the face is invoked and the
human other makes its entrance.
The concept of the face did not make its debut in Levinas‟ writings until 1951 in
his essay “Is Ontology Fundamental?” 90 Although here there is no mention of the infinite
per se, hints of the other exceeding my capacity to comprehend are found in this essay.
It is primarily a matter of our finding a vantage point from which man ceases to
concern us in terms of the horizon of being, i.e., ceases to offer himself to our
powers…. That being is man, and it is as a neighbor that man is accessible: as a
face. 91
It was not long until Levinas made the connection between this human face and the idea
of the infinite. As stated above, if true relationship can only occur with what is other than
me, what is exterior to me, and if the other person is this other who “exceeds the confines
88
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of [my] understanding”92, then it is clear how Levinas connects the idea of the infinite
and the social relationship. 93 Here is also where the face comes into play: “We call face
the epiphany of what can thus present itself directly, and therefore exteriorly, to an I.” 94
Making an even more explicit connection to Descartes, Levinas goes so far as to state that
“the way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we
here name face”.95 Levinas invokes this transcendence of the other by speaking of the
nudity of the face. In its self-presentation as face, the other expresses him or herself. 96 As
we commented above, the other founds meaning and significance precisely because it
expresses itself without any reference to me. In this way the face is “nude” for it is “by
itself and not by reference to a system”.97 And when the other is manifested in the nudity
of the face a desire is awakened in me.
The idea of infinity is a thought which at every moment thinks more than it
thinks. A thought that thinks more than it thinks is a desire. Desire “measures” the
infinity of the infinite.98
Now we recall that in his earlier essay, “On Escape”, Levinas spoke of need as resulting
not due to a lack but due to the plentitude of being. However, in his later writings when
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he came to introduce this concept of desire, need again took up the position of lacking
something. 99
The term we have chosen to mark the propulsion, the inflation, of this going
beyond [that is the idea of infinity placed in me] is opposed to the affectivity of
love and the indigence of need. Outside of the hunger one satisfies, the thirst one
quenches and the senses one allays, exists the other, absolutely other, desired
beyond these satisfactions…100
Need, now interpreted as the traditional lack of something, results in the attempt to fulfill
that need. Levinas states that, “in need I can sink my teeth into the real and satisfy myself
in assimilating the other”.101 As such, “need is the primary movement of the same”. 102
However and as opposed to need, “in Desire there is no sinking one‟s teeth into being, no
satiety, but an uncharted future before me”. 103 For Levinas, desire is unquenchable and
can never be satisfied. Indeed, desire only grows to the proportion that one seeks out
what is desired, the other. “The true desire is that which the desired does not satisfy, but
hollows out. It is goodness.”104
Here we begin to take a more explicitly ethical turn for the epiphany of the face
and the desire that it awakens are, ipso facto, an ethical event. Already in his earlier
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essay, “Is Ontology Fundamental?”, we found the ethical significance of the face. 105 In
his later writings, Levinas is quite adamant about this point. “The epiphany of the face is
ethical.”106 Even more, the presence of the other via the face is “ethical resistance”. 107
That is, the presence of the other via the face which signifies by itself is a resistance to
my totalizing grasp that seeks to reduce and possess the other through my constitutive
comprehension of the other. The face of the other refuses such violence and never lets
down its guard. “Ethical resistance is the presence of infinity.”108 Thus for Levinas, desire
for the infinite is desire for the other: “Desire, an aspiration that does not proceed from a
lack… is the desire of a person.”109 This desire for the other person is goodness.
Goodness is “being for the other”.110 Being for the other is the response of ethical
responsibility which is infinite for I am never finished with my duty and obligation to and
for the other. “The infinity of responsibility denotes not its actual immensity, but a
responsibility increasing in the measure that it is assumed; duties become greater in the
measure that they are accomplished.” 111 We will return to this infinite response of
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responsibility in the section on the ethical subject. However, there are a few more points
to consider about this ethical epiphany of the face of the other that resists the violence of
the encompassing ego.
We have seen how the other manifests itself in the face which expresses itself,
resisting my comprehension and categorization. “The face speaks” – but what exactly
does the face say? Levinas is very specific on this point and it further reveals the ethical
resistance of the face, for what the face says is “thou shalt not kill”. This prohibition
against murder was seen as early as 1951 in “Is Ontology Fundamental?” 112 In Totality
and Infinity it is reiterated with even greater force.
This infinity, stronger than murder, already resists us in his face, is his face, is the
primordial expression, is the first word: “you shall not commit murder.” 113
So we see that ethics is first philosophy for the other founds expression and meaning,
speaking the first word which is the prohibition of murder. But this first word reveals
something else about the other. The other holds a curious position in relation to me. It is a
position of both height and destitution. 114 The other stands over me as an authority,
commanding me not to murder. But the other also kneels before me, looking up to me
with pleading eyes, begging me who holds his or her life in my hands not to kill. The
other both commands me and appeals to me. In this way, I stand before the other both
accused and in a powerful position to act. Thus the nudity of the face that signifies its
ability to express itself without recourse to my meaning bestowal, is also the nakedness
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of exposure, destitution, and poverty. 115 The presence of the face both puts my freedom
into question, measuring me and finding me wanting in the adequacy of my response, 116
and it promotes my freedom, calling me to responsibility and founding my capacity to
respond.117 In this way Levinas can make the claim that “it is therefore not freedom that
accounts for the transcendence of the Other, but the transcendence of the Other that
accounts for freedom”.118 The other does not only found language and meaning, but also
my very ability to act.
In this notion of infinite ethical resistance we see how Levinas can claim that the
other “is” not otherwise but is “otherwise than being”. 119 As is now familiar, traditionally
the notion of being is linked with presence and manifestation. However, for Levinas, the
other does not give him or herself to be seen. Although the other is “manifested” in the
face, this is a “manifesting… without manifesting” that Levinas terms enigma.120 A
phenomenon reveals itself to the intentional consciousness, but an enigma expresses itself
without revealing itself. This is the way of the face. This is what Levinas means when he
says that the face speaks and expresses itself but does not give itself to be seen. Indeed,
Levinas goes so far as to say that “the best way of encountering the Other is not even to
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notice the color of his eyes!” 121 To see the color of the other‟s eyes is already to
conceptualize the other and turn him or her into a thing, a mere phenomenon to be judged
and thematized by me. But the other is not a mere thing, is no-thing, is an enigma whose
way is an otherwise than being that calls me to respond. This is the face of the other that I
encounter in ethical responsibility. As such, this encounter with the face of the other who
holds a position of height and destitution is the ethical relationship that Levinas calls the
face to face. We will have more to say about this ethical relation in our section on the
subject who responds to the summons of the other.
While Levinas insists upon the in-visibility of the face, otherwise than being, he
also insists that “we are in the world”. 122 And so the question arises, who exactly in the
world is this other who summons me to ethical responsibility and response? For this
Levinas provides a handful of options. First, the other as other is the stranger, the one
who “escapes my grasp” and over whom I have no power.123 Echoing the ancient Hebrew
prophets, the face of the other is also the face of the poor, the widow, and the orphan.124
Apparently the other is any poor soul crying out to me for mercy and compassion, whose
destitution accuses me, shames me, demands that I respond. The other is the one who
makes me realize the truth of Pascal‟s words that Levinas is fond of quoting: “„This is my
place in the sun.‟ Here is the beginning and the prototype of the usurpation of the whole
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earth.”125 Perhaps so as not to be too restrictive to these few categories, Levinas tends, in
his later works to refer to the other as, simply, my neighbor.
The Other becomes my neighbor precisely through the way the face summons me,
calls for me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls my responsibility, and calls me
into question.126
However, lest we have any naïve connotation of this neighbor, Levinas insists that this
neighbor is also my persecutor, the one who accuses me of a crime I did not commit and
forever hounds me for a responsibility I did not choose.127 But while we and the other are
apparently in the world, there is yet another other, an other other, who is not in this world
– “God is the other”.128 We will save our reflection on this Absolutely Other for the final
section of this paper.
Another way in which Levinas tries to maintain the transcendent alterity of the
other who is ethically resistant to me in the enigma of the face is by way of the trace.
First developed in his 1962 essay, “The Trace of the Other”, it soon became an important
concept in Levinas‟ repertoire. 129 Levinas insists upon the “beyond being”. Infinity, the
other, goodness, ethics, the subject who responds ethically to the other, God – all these
are beyond being. But what precisely is this beyond? Levinas states:
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…the beyond is not a simple background from which a face solicits us, is not
“another world” behind the world. The beyond is precisely beyond the “world,”
that is, beyond every disclosure – like the One of the first hypothesis of the
Parmenides, which transcends all cognition… 130
The face signifies from this “beyond”, but it does so not in the way phenomena in this
world manifest themselves, giving themselves to be seen in the present moment. Indeed,
the other does not so much present itself in the face as pass us by like a disturbance upon
the water. There are ripples on the water that indicate that something once was here but
we were too late or too slow or too unaware to see it and so it passed us by. Only in the
trace of its passing, with the ripples on the water, do we become aware that once
something was here. Such is the way of the face. “The beyond from which a face comes
signifies as a trace.”131 Just as the ripples on the water indicate that something has passed,
so too does the trace refer to a past – an “immemorial past”.132 We saw how in his earlier
works Levinas spoke of the coming of the other as bringing the future and enacting time.
In his later works, especially after his analysis of the trace, Levinas prefers to refer to the
past. But we must not confuse this with a past accessible to me, available to memory and
recollection. “No memory could follow the traces of this past.”133 The realm of the other,
the time in which the other “is”, otherwise than being, is inaccessible to me, inaccessible
to my comprehending, intentional grasp. Another way in which Levinas refers to this
inaccessible realm of the other is to make a distinction between diachrony and synchrony.
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Diachrony is the realm and time of the other who is beyond being and signifies by way of
the trace. “Diachrony is the refusal of conjunction, the non-totalizable, and in this sense,
infinite.”134 The “immemorial past” of the other from which the trace signifies is
diachronous. Synchrony indicates the time and realm of being, history, the present,
consciousness. “The present is essence that begins and ends, beginning and end
assembled in a thematizable conjunction…” 135 The ethical relation of responsibility
towards the other also belongs to the realm of diachrony.
But the relationship with a past that is on the hither side of every present and
every re-presentable, for not belonging to the order of presence, is included in the
extraordinary and everyday event of my responsibility for the faults or the
misfortune of others, in my responsibility that answers for the freedom of
another…136
But again we are slipping towards a later section.
At the beginning of this chapter we spoke of the anarchy of ethics, prior to and
beyond all foundations and origins. This anarchy also refers to the realm of diachrony.
Beyond being, outside of the time that can be recalled or anticipated in the present, the
trace of the other is diachronous.
A trace qua trace does not simply lead to the past, but is the very passing toward a
past more remote than any past and any future which still are set in my time – the
past of the other, in which eternity takes form, an absolute past which unites all
times. 137

134

Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 11.

135

Ibid.

136

Ibid., 10, emphasis mine.

137

Levinas, "The Trace of the Other", 358, emphasis original.
122

And so we see the other is beyond being, a trace of an immemorial past that was never
present and a future that will never “be”. Levinas is clear, “it is in the trace of the other
that a face shines”.138 The encounter with the face is an anarchy that overthrows the
assumed primacy of my consciousness and totalizing gaze.
A relationship that would not create simultaneity between its terms, but would
hollow out a depth from which expression approaches would have to refer to an
irreversible, immemorial, unrepresentable past.139
Here again we see the “height” of the face, transcending and commanding me because
coming, not merely before me, but from beyond me – coming from a beyond that is
immemorial, that disrupts the totality of my present, an-archy.
One additional concept that can be discussed in relation to diachrony is what
Levinas terms the saying. Just as diachrony is contrasted with synchrony, so the saying is
contrasted with the said. This is one of the more dense and challenging concepts offered
to us by Levinas. “All speaking is an enigma.” 140 We will reflect on these two concepts,
the saying and the said, as a segue into our consideration of Levinas‟ analysis of ethical
subjectivity for, as we will see, within the saying is found both the approach of the other
and the response of the subject.
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The Saying vs. the Said: at the origins of language is the ethical approach of the other
We have seen that the ethical relationship between the self and the other, who is
infinitely other – an enigma – is language.141 And so, if the other who calls to me is
infinite so too is the summons, and so too must be my response. This infinite response
that is the ethical relationship, thus language, Levinas invokes as the saying.
First we can briefly outline the more familiar realm of the said. Levinas
designates as the said that which belongs to the synchronous realm of the intentional
consciousness and being. “Intentionality is thought and understanding, claim, the naming
of the identical, the proclaiming of something as something.” 142 The said is precisely the
realm of thought, conveyed by words whether spoken aloud or held within the secrecy of
my silent mind. The said is the conceptualization and thematization of the ego
pronouncing its judgments upon reality as captured within its intentional grasp, giving
meaning to that which “is”.
Consciousness confers meaning… in taking the given, whether immanent or
transcendent, “as this” or “as that.” To become conscious of is to “take as…”....
Language… is meaningful because it is a kerygmatic proclamation which
identifies that as that.143
However, as we know, Levinas finds the traditional priority given to the intentional
consciousness and its meaning bestowal upon the world to be rather problematic for all
cannot be reduced to the thematizing gaze of intentional consciousness. What is more, to
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try and comprehend that which is beyond the capacity of the ego is violent. To attempt to
say, or identify, what the other is is, for Levinas, not only impossible but an injustice
bordering on murder. To encounter the other as other requires another form of
signification than that of the conscious thought of the ego, the said. It requires the ethical
saying of exposure and responsibility. “Saying signifies otherwise than as an apparitor
presenting essence and entities.” 144 Indeed, as the other presents him or herself not as a
phenomenon but as an enigma, so the encounter with this other cannot be enacted by way
of comprehension and knowledge. As was discussed above, one must not see the color of
the Other‟s eyes.
When one observes the color of the eyes one is not in social relationship with the
Other. The relation with the face can surely be dominated by perception, but what
is specifically the face is what cannot be reduced to that.145
Levinas is of course aware, as are we, of the irony of this situation. For here we are
reducing Levinas‟ work to mere themes and concepts just as Levinas himself, in his
analyses of the other, the ethical encounter, the subject, etc., engaged in the task of
thematizing and presentation – the realm of the said. As noted, he admits that “in
language qua said everything is conveyed before us, be it at the price of a betrayal”. 146
However, at the same time, Levinas wishes to show that this betrayal is not only
unavoidable, for we live in the synchronous time of the present, we are in the world, but
is also not merely negative.
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Our task is to show that the plot proper to saying does indeed lead it to the said,
to the putting together of structures which make possible justice and the “I think.”
The said, the appearing, arises in the saying. Essence then has its hour and its
time.147
While the necessity to unsay the said 148 is never-ending, something yet must be said.
Incommensurables must be translated. And so we attempt to say what the saying is,
recognizing the paradox of this very act.
Three points can be made about this ethical saying.149 First, saying “is the
condition that precedes every said, all systematic discourse, thematization, and
phenomenology”. Second, the saying “cannot be understood as a modulation or
modification of a human or superhuman Said”. Third, the saying “cannot be reduced to
the act of an autonomous subject or the free initiative of human self-consciousness”. As
to the first point, Levinas states:
Antecedent to the verbal signs it conjugates, to the linguistic systems and the
semantic glimmerings, a foreword preceding languages, it is the proximity of one
to the other, the commitment of an approach, the one for the other, the very
signifyingness of signification…. The original or pre-original saying, what is put
forth in the foreword, weaves an intrigue of responsibility. 150
Prior to thought, prior to the mere formation and speaking of words, ethical language is
the entering into a relationship with the other. If this is so, then the second point, that the
saying “cannot be understood as a modulation or modification of a human or superhuman
Said,” stands to reason. For Levinas, this ethical language of the saying involves “a
147
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positive and antecedent event of communication which would be an approach to and a
contact with the neighbor”.151 That is, in language there is a proximity between me and
the other. “Speech and its logical work would then unfold not in knowledge of the
interlocutor, but in his proximity.” 152 For Levinas, proximity is the very meaning of the
face of the other who approaches me, initiating language and meaning.153 Combining
several concepts we have been addressing, Levinas states:
In proximity is heard a command come as though from an immemorial past,
which was never present, began in no freedom. This way of the neighbor is a
face. 154
To speak presupposes that I am speaking to someone. “Whatever be the message
transmitted by speech, the speaking is contact.”155 Before I utter a word, I approach an
other and make contact with him or her. I expose myself to the other.
To say is to approach a neighbor, “dealing him signifyingness”.… Saying is
communication, to be sure, but as a condition for all communication, as
exposure.156
Now while Levinas admits that “the saying does indeed lead to the said”, what he wishes
to bring attention to is this forgotten “event” prior to the said of language that is exposure
to the other. He wishes to draw our attention to “the first word” that “says only the saying
151
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itself before every being and every thought in which being is sighted and reflected”.157
This approach to and contact with the other that is an exposure of the self carries with it
the sense of risk and vulnerability. Indeed, Levinas goes so far as to claim that “one is
exposed to the other as a skin is exposed to what wounds it, as a cheek is offered to the
smiter”. 158 In this exposure to the other, the self is rendered passive and can take no
shelter from the accusation of the other‟s face, “thou shalt not kill”.
The saying signifies this passivity; in the saying this passivity signifies, becomes
signifyingness, exposure in response to…, being at the question before any
interrogation, any problem, without clothing, without a shell to protect oneself,
stripped to the core…. It is a denuding beyond the skin, to the wounds one dies
from, denuding to death, being as a vulnerability. 159
In this exposure and passivity before the other, this saying without words, Levinas finds a
radical reversal of the ego‟s self-interested persistence in being, its conatus essendi. For
Levinas, to be is to be self-interested. “Esse is interesse; essence is interest.”160 However,
with the proximity of the other in which I am exposed to him or her, there is “an
inversion of the conatus of esse”.161 Exposure to the other, ethical saying, renders one
dis-interested, torn from the self-interested naval-gazing of the ego, de-centered, denucleated, indifferent to self but non-indifferent to the other.162
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Irreducible to being‟s essence is the substitution in responsibility, signification of
the one-for-the-other, or the defecting of the ego beyond every defeat, going
countercurrent to a conatus, or goodness.163
As outrageous as it may seem, for Levinas it is this very stripping bare of the ego to the
point of a passive exposure that wounds which identifies and enacts one as unique and
irreplaceable, as a subject. One is not an ego, but a self.
Saying is a denuding, of the unqualifiable one, the pure someone, unique and
chosen; that is, it is an exposedness to the other where no slipping away is
possible. In its sincerity as a sign given to another, it absolves me of all
identity…. This absolution reverses essence. It is not a negation of essence, but a
disinterestedness, an “otherwise than being” which turns into a “for the other”….
Here identity lies in the total patience of the one assigned…. The reverting of the
ego into a self, the de-posing or de-situating of the ego, is the very modality of
dis-interestedness. 164
As to our third point above, it should now be clear why the saying “cannot be reduced to
the act of an autonomous subject or the free initiative of human self-consciousness” for in
the saying human consciousness is stripped bare of its initiative. However while the
ethical saying is an exposure that marks the self as passive and vulnerable, it is this very
coming of the other that enacts my freedom. A paradox to be sure, but, as we discussed in
the section on the face of the other above, it is the face of the other who accuses me and
calls me into question who also founds my freedom to act and respond to the other. And
so at last we find ourselves presented with the second member of the ethical dyad that
Levinas calls the self. For while we have come to the point of the denuding of the ego and
vulnerable exposure of the self, it is precisely here that one‟s subjectivity is enacted, but
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as a self, not as an ego. And so we turn now to more fully address this ethical subject who
is passive and yet responds to the summons of the other.

Subjectivity Enacted in Ethical Responsibility – from the realm of the same to the
testimony of the hostage
To be oneself, otherwise than being, to be dis-interested, is to bear the
wretchedness and bankruptcy of the other, and even the responsibility that the
other can have for me. To be oneself, the state of being a hostage, is always to
have one degree of responsibility more, the responsibility for the responsibility of
the other…. Subjectivity is being hostage165
These are hard words to bear let alone to understand. Yet here is the crux of
Levinas‟ conception of human subjectivity – it is the position of being a hostage to the
point of substitution for the other, to the point of bearing the responsibility of the other,
even the other‟s responsibility for oneself. In this section, we will offer a close analysis of
chapter four of Levinas‟ text, Otherwise than Being. This chapter, entitled “Substitution”,
is not only the centerpiece of the book,166 but also provides an in-depth presentation of
Levinas‟ ethical reconstitution of human subjectivity which, like the face of the other, is
an otherwise than being.167 However, before we delve into the obscurities of what is one
of Levinas‟ most difficult texts, a few preliminary comments from Totality and Infinity
are offered.
Levinas is quite clear that Totality and Infinity offers a “defense of subjectivity”.
However, it is not the familiar vision of subjectivity, as founded upon the egoistic
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tendencies of the intentional consciousness, that he offers. Rather, it is a defense of
subjectivity “as founded in the idea of infinity”. 168 That is, it is subjectivity as enacted
through the encounter with the other who, in his or her alterity transcends me and is thus
infinite. As we know this encounter with the other, as other, that is an encounter with the
commanding, pleading face of the other is, ipso facto, ethical. “This book [Totality and
Infinity] will present subjectivity as welcoming the Other, as hospitality…” 169 This
ethical responsibility, this hospitality offered to the other is, as we have commented
above, infinite. The more I respond to the other, the more a response is demanded – my
response is never complete but always insufficient to the demand of the other. For
Levinas, this is precisely what defines one as a subject. “Perhaps the possibility of a point
of the universe where such an overflow of responsibility is produced ultimately defines
the I.”170 To be a subject, to be an I, is to be chosen as responsible for the other. Indeed, it
is through ethics alone that we can speak of such notions as the self and the other.
Levinas states, “through morality [ethics, ethical responsibility] alone are I and the others
produced in the universe”. 171 Taking an even more radical stance, Levinas claims that it is
not cognition or reason that founds subjectivity, but fear. In complete refutation of the
anxiety Heidegger‟s Dasein feels in the face of its own death, the ethical subject fears the
death of the other more than its own. Confirmation as a person thus consists “in existing
for the Other, that is, in being called in question and in dreading murder more than death
168

Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 26.

169

Ibid., 27.

170

Ibid., 245.

171

Ibid.
131

[which] an I… can alone accomplish”. 172 In this way, being a subject is not to be for
oneself but to be for-the-other. “To be I and not only an incarnation of a reason is
precisely to be capable of seeing the offense of the offended, or the face.”173 This is why
Levinas calls the ethical relationship the face-to-face for it is only when I face the other,
when I offer my face to the commanding and pleading face of the other, that I can offer
him or her the welcome and hospitality that marks ethical subjectivity. To face the other
is a highly personal act, it is what marks us as human.
The human is the return to the interiority of non-intentional consciousness, to
mauvaise conscience, to its capacity to fear injustice more than death, to prefer to
suffer than to commit injustice, and to prefer that which justifies being over that
which assures it.174
Responding to the other is “a response to the being who in a face speaks to the subject
and tolerates only a personal response, that is, an ethical act”.175 It is in this way of
turning to face and respond to the other that “the other provides my existence with
meaning”. 176 Indeed, for Levinas, it is the encounter with the other that enacts my
subjectivity. One can go so far as to say that without the other I could not be a human
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person. The age old question over the meaning of life has, for Levinas, a simple yet
profound answer – the meaning of life is to be for-the-other.
Levinas‟ description of human subjectivity takes an even more radical turn in his
later text, Otherwise than Being. In the analysis of the ethical response found here, the
turn to the other takes its most far-reaching steps. Here we find the enucleation of the
subject, substituted for the other to the point of expiation. As we have noted, ultimately
for Levinas, “a subject is a hostage”.177
Chapter four of Otherwise than Being is divided into six sections. In the first
section, “Principle and Anarchy”, we find Levinas juxtaposing the play in being of the
intentional consciousness that is for itself, sovereign and in a position of domination, with
that of the obsession of the subject in proximity to the other (102). When one encounters
the other one is met with an “assignation of me by another” which is responsibility and
obligation to and for the other (100-101). However, this assignation of obligation that is
the proximity of the other occurs “anarchically”, that is, “anachronously prior to any
commitment” (100-101). In the encounter with the other I find “a responsibility that is
justified by no prior commitment” (102, emphasis original). For Levinas, this ethical
responsibility that is prior to thus “irreducible to consciousness” is a relationship of
obsession (101). Levinas also calls it a persecution for the consciousness is “affected in
spite of itself” (102). Being obsessed with the other is a persecution: “being called into
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question prior to questioning, responsibility over and beyond the logos of response”
(102).
In section two, “Recurrence”, Levinas delineates how this obsessive obligation
takes place “on the hither side of consciousness and its play, beyond or on the hither side
of being which it thematizes, outside of being, and thus in itself as in exile” (103). As
shown in section one, prior to consciousness and outside of being, there is a “subjective
condition” that is a responsibility for the other prior to commitment (103). In this
“antecedent [that is, prior to consciousness] recurrence of the oneself” one is “in itself
already outside of itself” (104). That is, the oneself does not issue out of its own initiative
but is “provoked as irreplaceable, as devoted to the others” (105). In this irreplaceable
devotion, one is reduced to oneself, “expelled into itself outside of being” (105). Levinas
uses this hermetic language to try to convey that this ethical subjectivity of obsessive
devotion to the other can nowise be understood in terms of being. To be oneself is
precisely to be enacted by another, reduced to the bare bones of one‟s responsibility
without the protective cushioning of being, thus in oneself outside of being. The
assignation of the other that is prior to being and the present, prior to the for itself of
cognition, anachronous, “assigns the self to be a self” (106). This is the ipseity of
recurrence, the oneself that is responsibility for others (106). It is “an inversion in the
process of essence”, withdrawing from the game of being, “a non-condition” (107). It is
an “extreme passivity” for it is “a duty overflowing my being” (109). As such, the oneself
of ethical responsibility comes from an immemorial past. However, this recurrence of self
into itself outside of being is also incarnation (109). As abstract as the ethical subject may
appear, for Levinas there is no debate – without the body one cannot give to the other
134

(109) thus without the body there can be no ethical relationship. For Levinas, incarnation
is “an extreme passivity” for only when one has a body can one be exposed to pain and
suffering, exposed to the other in compassion and, “as a self, [exposed] to the gift that
costs” (195). Ethical responsibility manifests itself concretely in “taking care of the
other‟s need” which is “a giving” (74).
To give, to-be-for-another, despite oneself, but in interrupting the for-oneself, is
to take the bread out of one‟s own mouth, to nourish the hunger of another with
one‟s own fasting (56)…. But giving has meaning only as a tearing from oneself
despite oneself, and not only without me. And to be torn from oneself despite
oneself has meaning only as a being torn from the complacency in oneself
characteristic of enjoyment, snatching the bread from one‟s mouth. Only a subject
that eats can be for-the-other, or can signify. Signification, the-one-for-the-other,
has meaning only among beings of flesh and blood (74, emphasis original).
One has the uncomfortable feeling that when Levinas speaks of the persecution of the
ethical subject obsessed with his or her obligation to the other, he means this quite
literally. There is pain and sacrifice in the ethical commitment to the other. Levinas
concludes this section summing up his vision of the ethical recurrence of the oneself:
“Responsibility prior to any free commitment, the oneself outside of all the tropes of
essence, would be responsibility for the freedom of the others” (109).
Section three, “The Self”, attempts to show how the “passive folding back” of the
oneself in recurrence coincides with “the anarchic passivity of an obsession” (110). For
Levinas, this recurrence of the self into responsibility for the other is “the ultimate secret
of the incarnation of the subject” (111). As we know, this recurrence takes place on the
hither side of being and consciousness. It is anarchical and thus passive. “It is the
passivity of a trauma,… the passivity of being persecuted” (111). It comes from the other.
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Levinas insists upon this passivity for it is only in passivity that the ethical subject can be
outside of being.
To undergo from the other is an absolute patience only if by this from-the-other is
already for-the-other. This transfer, other than interested, “otherwise than
essence,” is subjectivity itself (111).
Levinas also speaks of subjectivity as “the other in the same” to try and convey this sense
of passivity. The other in the same is a “putting into question of all affirmation foroneself” (111). Thus the “subjectivity of a subject is responsibility of being-in-question in
the form of the total exposure to offence in the cheek offered to the smiter” (111). This
recurrence of self that is responsibility for others, “a persecuting obsession”, is not only
outside of being, it also “goes against intentionality” (111). Here again Levinas tries to
convey the passivity of ethical subjectivity. What is more, he offers a key conclusion: in
this ethical passivity one does not lose one‟s identity but finds it.
It is in the passivity of obsession, or incarnated passivity, that an identity
individuates itself as unique, without recourse to any system of references, in the
impossibility of evading the assignation of the other without blame (112).
One is rendered a unique individual not by way of self-promotion but by way of ethical
obligation. Levinas speaks of “the impossibility of evading the assignation”, the
“irremissibility of the accusation” (112). That is, I am unique and irreplaceable in my
responsibility for others. While I can take the place of others (as will be shown), no one
can take my place – I always have “one degree of responsibility more” (117).
Dostoyevsky expresses this sentiment perfectly for Levinas: “Each of us is guilty before
everyone for everyone, and I more than the others” (146). In this additional weight of
responsibility lies the individuality of the I. “In the ethical saying of responsibility, which
is an exposure to an obligation for which no one could replace me, I am unique” (139).
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The ethical relationship is clearly not reciprocal but asymmetrical. Levinas expresses this
asymmetrical obligation from which I cannot hide through the concepts of substitution
and the hostage.
For under accusation by everyone, the responsibility for everyone goes to the
point of substitution. A subject is a hostage (112).
We will have more to say about this directly. Levinas further indicates how ethical
subjectivity is prior to being and on the hither side of consciousness through this
“impossibility of evading the assignation” or “inability to decline” one‟s duty toward the
other. Ethical responsibility is “a debt preceding a loan,” “an expenditure overflowing
ones‟ resources,” “an accusation preceding the fault, borne against oneself despite one‟s
innocence” (112-113). This is the “infinite passion of responsibility” that marks the
ethical subject (113). It is a passion that will lead one on the path to substitution and the
position of the hostage. And this is precisely what Levinas focuses on in his next section.
Just as chapter four is the centerpiece of Otherwise than Being, section four of
chapter four, “Substitution”, may be seen as the centerpiece of this chapter. Levinas
opens this section again reflecting on the event of recurrence. And like the metaphorical
wave, this reflection proceeds just a bit farther up the beach. As we know, “in the
recurrence to oneself there is a going to the hither side of oneself” (114). It is “an identity
gnawing away at itself”, it is a hostage (114). In our section on the other above, we
commented on how the face presents the other by expressing the other. The face speaks,
commanding and pleading “thou shalt not kill”. To these haunting words the ethical
subject responds with words of his or her own: “here I am”. “The word I means here I
am, answering for everything and for everyone” (114, italicized in the original). The
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“here I am” is the saying of the ethical relationship. In this saying “the pronoun „I‟ is in
the accusative” (142). This is made clearer if we consider the words in their original
French: me voici. For Levinas, the ethical saying “is without noematic correlation” (145).
The I (je) is not present in the “here I am” (me voici) for the ethical self has “no
nominative form” (112). The ethical subject is not only provoked by the other, but once
provoked, stands before the other accused and subjected. “The self is a sub-jectum; it is
under the weight of the universe, responsible for everything” (116). The ethical self is not
only not from itself and not for itself, but is rather from the other and for the other. “I
exist through the other and for the other” (114). The incarnation of recurrence of “beingin-one‟s-skin” is a “having-the-other-in-one‟s-skin” (115). This is the substitution of the
self for the other of being a hostage that, while being prior to all choice and free
commitment, paradoxically, liberates the self and renders one unique and irreplaceable
(115), the “non-interchangeable par excellence” (117). The other does not substitute him
or herself for me, only the I, “the unique one, substitutes itself for others” (117). And so
we come at last to the quote with which we opened this section:
To be oneself, otherwise than being, to be dis-interested, is to bear the
wretchedness and bankruptcy of the other, and even the responsibility that the
other can have for me. To be oneself, the state of being a hostage, is always to
have one degree of responsibility more, the responsibility for the responsibility of
the other (117).
Clearly, “these are not events that happen to an empirical ego” (115)! Here again we see
the asymmetry of the relationship for the self is responsible even for the responsibility of
the other. What is more, Levinas finds in substitution the very condition that allows for
pity, compassion, pardon, proximity, and solidarity in the world (117). All concrete forms
of morality or justice in the world “presuppose the subjectivity of the ego, substitution,
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the possibility of putting oneself in the place of the other, which refers to the transference
from the „by the other‟ into a „for the other‟, and in persecution from the outrage inflicted
by the other to the expiation for his fault by me” (117-118). Scandalous as it may seem,
for Levinas the ethical subject is responsible for the crimes of the other, even those the
other inflicts upon me. 178 One is indeed a hostage. This is perhaps made most clear in
Levinas‟ bold statement “I am an other” (118). Sadly the English does not render how
very radical this claim is. The French, “je est un autre”, reveals the blending of the
nominative, first person I with the third person form of the verb to be.179 In this way
Levinas tries to indicate the dramatic transformation that occurs in ethical substitution
resulting in the subject as a hostage to the other. The self is hostage to the point of
claiming:
I am outside of any place, in myself, on the hither side of the autonomy of autoaffection and identity resting in itself. Impassively undergoing the weight of the
other, thereby called to uniqueness… (118)
The subject is hostage to the point that he or she can no longer say “I am” (je suis) but “I
is” (je est). Here indeed is “the other in the same” (111, emphasis mine) that we spoke of
earlier – the other is; thus I, as the ethical subject substituted for the other as his or her
hostage, not am but is as well. And as we saw above, ethical responsibility is passive to
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the point of the trauma and persecution of substitution for even the guilt of the other. It is
this that Levinas claims is the Good and in this way that the self is, as such, goodness.
In this sense the self is goodness, or under the exigency for an abandon of all
having, of all one’s own and all for oneself, to the point of substitution….
Goodness invests me in my obedience to the hidden Good…. It is an expiating for
being. The self is the very fact of being exposed under the accusation that cannot
be assumed, where the ego supports the others… (118, emphasis original).
Section five, “Communication”, revisits Levinas conception of language as
communication which in turn is ethical responsibility for the other. To communicate is to
open oneself to the other, to turn to the other as responsible for the other (119). This we
have seen before, but now Levinas adds that this responsibility manifested in language
goes to the point of substitution for the other (119). The “transcendence involved in
language” is the infinity of my responsibility for the other to the point of being a hostage
(120). In this way Levinas claims that “communication is an adventure of a subjectivity”
that is not a return to the self or return to the known, but an adventure outside of and
beyond the self with no certain future (120) – it is the adventure of Abraham into the
unknown and never to return, not the roundtrip of Ulysses . Levinas concludes this
section with a warning not to revert this ethical subjectivity of the here I am and the
relationship between the self and the other into a theme as phenomenology is wont to do
(121). “The self involved in the gnawing away at oneself in responsibility, which is also
incarnation, is not an objectification of the self by the ego” (121, emphasis original).
Chapter four concludes with an interesting reflection on freedom in section six,
entitled “Finite Freedom”. Returning to the issue of the passivity of the subject, Levinas
reminds us (like God reminding Job) that we humans did not create the world but have
come late into the world. This “lateness” indicates the limits imposed on the freedom of
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the subject (122). But these limits are not purely negative, are not a “pure privation”.
Rather, the human tardiness into the realm of creation indicates that there is something
prior to (human) being. As we have seen, Levinas insists that what is prior to (and
therefore has priority) is the ethical relation. Thus human “freedom” is actually a relation
of responsibility that signifies “the Goodness of the Good” (122). In this way “the Good
is before being” which also indicates “the necessity that the Good choose me first before
I can be in a position to choose, that is, welcome the choice” (122). I am chosen,
assigned, prior to my choice, prior to my very being. “The Good assigns the subject,
according to a susception that cannot be assumed, to approach the other, the neighbor”
(122-123). But if this is the case, if I am bound to the other before I ever got to choose
and indeed, cannot turn away from this task, how can we even speak of human freedom
at all? In this way, Levinas speaks of “finite freedom” which is a freedom “qualified” or
oriented by the prior assignation of ethical responsibility (124).
This finite freedom is not primary, is not initial; but it lies in an infinite
responsibility where the other is not other because he strikes up against and limits
my freedom, but where he can accuse me to the point of persecution, because the
other, absolutely other, is another one…. And the proximity of the neighbor in its
trauma does not only strike up against me, but exalts and elevates me, and, in the
literal sense of the term, inspires me. Inspiration, heteronomy, is the very pneuma
of the psyche. Freedom is borne by the responsibility it could not shoulder, an
elevation and inspiration without complacency (124).
Not only does Levinas see responsibility as orienting freedom, responsibility actually
liberates the self. An “anarchic liberation”, substitution “frees the subject… from the
enchainment to itself” (124). The anarchic for-the-other of substitution liberates the self
from the burden and weight of being. The escape from being that Levinas sought in 1935
has at last been found in the radical responsibility for the other to the point of
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substitution. One‟s persistence in being, essence as self-interest, is disrupted by the nonindifference towards the other and becomes dis-interestedness. In this way
“responsibilities correspond exactly to liberties” (125). What is more, it is this very disinterest in myself that most clearly marks me as me.
The disinterestedness of the subject is a descent or elevation of the ego to me….
The subject posited as deposed is me…. But the concept of the ego can
correspond to me only inasmuch as it can signify responsibility, which summons
me as irreplaceable…. The ego involved in responsibility is me and no one else
(126).
This irreplaceability of the ethical subject is nowhere more clear than in the notion of
substitution. “My substitution – it is as my own that substitution for the neighbor is
produced…. It is in me… and not in another” (126, emphasis original). Levinas insists on
this non-reciprocity of the ethical relationship for “to say that the other has to sacrifice
himself to the others would be to preach human sacrifice” (126)! Indeed, “it is I, I and no
one else, who am a hostage for the others” (126-127). One can perhaps see here a subtle
snubbing of Heidegger‟s emphasis on the “mineness” of Dasein’s death. What marks me
as me has nothing to do with me but rather is precisely my lack of concern for myself and
instead my obsessive and infinite concern for the other even to the point of dying for the
other – my death in place of the other‟s death.
And so we come to the end of Levinas‟ key chapter on the ethical subject. It is a
subject deposed from its conatus essendi, passive and persecuted, dis-interested yet nonindifferent, subjected and held hostage, unable to decline the assignation placed upon it
before it even drew breath. “It is a pure self, in the accusative, responsible before there is
freedom” (127). Such is the human subject, such is human personhood. However, even
after this stripping bare of the ego, a question dares to come to mind. It is a question, or
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concern, Levinas himself raises at the end of his reflection on the enucleated subjectivity
of the ethical self (128). What of the other other, the other who is other to my neighbor?
What of the third party? This is yet another theme in Levinas‟ thought – the limiting of
my infinite responsibility due to the coming of the third party for the self and the other
are not alone in the world. There are other others. And with this recognition is ushered in
the whole realm of consciousness, justice, presence, thematization, etc. “The fact that the
other, my neighbor, is also a third party with respect to another, who is also a neighbor, is
the birth of thought, consciousness, justice, and philosophy” (128). It is to this realm of
the third party that we now must turn.

The Coming of the Third Party – the realm of intersubjectivity and society
The ethical subject has an infinite responsibility to the other. But, as Levinas
himself states, “we are in the world” 180 and it is a world full of millions upon millions of
people crying out for aid and compassion. And so he admits that “we cannot act on a
daily basis in approaching our fellow man as if he were the only person in the world”. 181
If it is indeed true that the ethical subject is not a mere abstraction, but a concrete human
person “of flesh and blood, a man that is hungry and eats, [has] entrails in a skin, and [is]
thus capable of giving the bread out of his mouth, or giving his skin,”182 then a real
ethical dilemma arises. The ethical dyad of the self and the other is in a constant state of
disruption by the entrance of what Levinas terms the third party. “The I is in relationship
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with a human totality.”183 The ethical subject is called upon to respond to this totality of
human others, to give the bread from his mouth to all these others, however a piece of
bread can only go so far.
But here the simplicity of this primary obedience [of the self for the other] is
upset by the third person emerging next to the other; the third person is himself
also a neighbor, and the responsibility of the ego also devolves onto him. Here,
starting from this third person, is the proximity of a human plurality. Who, in this
plurality, comes first? Here is the hour and birthplace of the question: a demand
for justice!184
I must make a decision – the trauma of choice! – to whom will I give my piece of bread?
However, the entrance of the third party breaking up the ethical dyad is not seen as
something merely negative, like the disturbance between lovers who desire only to be
alone together. Levinas assures us that language “as the presence of the face does not
invite complicity with the preferred being, the self-sufficient „I-Thou‟ forgetful of the
universe; in its frankness it refuses the clandestinity of love”. 185 Rather, the third party is
present in the very coming of the other who enacts the ethical dyad. “The third party
looks at me in the eyes of the Other – language is justice.”186 Thus we must not think of
the entrance of the third party chronologically as an event that happens after the ethical
encounter of the self and the other. Indeed, the third party is “present at the [very]
encounter” of the self and the other. 187 While it is true that, as we saw in the conclusion
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of our previous section, the coming of the third party initiates the realm of thought,
consciousness, justice, and philosophy – that is the synchronous realm of the said – the
third party also belongs to the diachronous realm of the other who claims my infinite
response of responsibility. Yet another of Levinas‟ wonderful (or perhaps infuriating)
paradoxes! Let us take a further look at this entrance of the third party.
As should now be clear, in his writings Levinas does not focus on the realm of
“ethics” as social justice. His desire is to comment on the ethical realm that precedes the
conceptualization and thematization required for the moral codes found in human society.
However, while still eschewing any type of prescriptive writing, Levinas does address the
issue of human community where such social justice is required. As we will see, while
justice is a necessary component of life in human community, it is not justice that
constitutes the ethical relation but rather the ethical relationship between the self and the
other that founds justice, making it possible. 188 In Totality and Infinity there is a brief
(barely three pages) but dense description of the entrance of the third party. Adriaan
Peperzak, longtime commentator on Levinas‟ work, finds three key aspects in the coming
of the third party as described in Totality and Infinity.189 First, the third party is present in
the face of the other. We have already commented on this situation above. For Levinas,
the epiphany of the face attests to the presence of the third in the very eyes that look at
me. But it is not just one third who gazes upon me through the eyes of the other. This
third is in fact the whole of humanity: “the epiphany of the face qua face opens
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humanity.”190 Interesting consequences arise from this event of revelation as is seen in
the second point: the other is the servant to the third person who is the other for my other.
The third party, humanity as such, is present in the coming of the other, the epiphany of
the face. But the third is present as an other to the other. That is, as an other him or
herself the third demands the same ethical response as the other whom I face. What is
curious is that, for Levinas, the ethical demand of the third party is, here, not addressed to
me but addressed to the other. The other is already at the service of the third party who is
other to him. 191 However, it is not my task to alert the other to his or her responsibility for
the third party or call him or her to task. As we commented above, to demand that the
other sacrifice him or herself for others in turn is to promote human sacrifice. My concern
is only ever my own responsibility. 192 This brings us to Peperzak‟s third point, the other
“commands me to command”. We have seen how the other stands in a position of both
height and destitution before me, commanding me and appealing to me. What we find
now is that this command of the other also involves a command on behalf of the third
party who is other to the other. That is, when I encounter the ethical demand of the other
in the epiphany of the face, the other does not command me to serve on his or her behalf
alone. The other, if you will, turns me to the third party, for whom the other is
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responsible, and commands me to be responsible for them as well. Thus the command of
the other “commands me to command”. 193
The presence of the face, the infinity of the other, is a destituteness, a presence of
the third party (that is, of the whole of humanity which looks at us), and a
command that commands commanding.194
Here we revisit the issue of freedom as founded upon the infinite obligation of ethical
responsibility. Levinas comments that both the other and the ethical subject are masters in
this situation. The other is master as the one commanding me to respond to both the other
and the third party. However, this command enacts me as a master who can command
justice for the other and the third party. Their fate is in my hands. I am in charge but
under a charge that is prior to and beyond my status as a commander. We now see how,
although Levinas finds the other obligated to the third party, how the other enacts his or
her responsibility toward the third party is not our concern. Rather, this responsibility of
the other toward the third party is in fact my own responsibility to the third party. That is,
one can never push off one‟s responsibility onto the other who is responsible for the third
party for I am responsible for the responsibility of the other – I am responsible for the
third party, all of humanity. And so we also see how, for Levinas, it is the ethical
relationship as enacted upon the epiphany of the face that founds human community and
thus social justice. “Like a shunt every social relation leads back to the presentation of the
other to the same… solely by the expression of the face.”195 We would thus like to add a
fourth point to Peperzak‟s three: human community is founded upon the epiphany of the
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face in which the third party is also present. While Levinas acknowledges that “the
human” can be defined through biology and in this way “the human race” is a community
based on biological status, he also insists that there is another way in which we are
“human” and upon which a “human community” is founded. This is by way of the ethical
encounter of the self and the other that not only initiates a relationship between the self
and the other, but with all of humanity who are others to the other and present in the very
epiphany of the face of the other. In this way Levinas claims that humanity, the idea of
the human race, is not in fact based on biology but on fraternity. “The very status of the
human implies fraternity and the idea of the human race.”196 For Levinas the ethical
encounter establishes all as “brothers” (sisters too we are to assume), equal under the
weight of an ethical obligation. “Equality is produced where the other commands the
same and reveals himself to the same in responsibility…” 197 For Levinas there are two
aspects of this human community founded upon fraternity: society is composed of both
individualities, unique and irreducible in their difference, and “involves the commonness
of a father”.198 That is, the ethical relationship marks the subject as unique and
irreplaceable in his or her ethical obligation while the other is the unique one par
excellence due to his or her very alterity. However, the entrance of the third party reveals
a common point of departure. Human community as based on fraternity, that is the ethical
encounter, “refers back to the approach of the Other in the face, in a dimension of height,
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in responsibility for oneself and for the Other”.199 As we commented above, human
society is based upon the ethical encounter of the self and the other who enacts one as the
ethical subject, a human person as such. Human society is a community of unique
individuals founded upon the coming of the other to each of us and who individuates by
summoning each to a position of irreplaceable, ethical obligation.
Levinas basically reiterates these points in his later text, Otherwise than Being,
but with a few additional details. We will briefly consider the development of his thought
on the third party, especially as found in a section of chapter five entitled “From Saying
to the Said, or the Wisdom of Desire”. 200 We saw how Levinas concluded chapter four,
“Substitution”, briefly pondering the issue of the third party who is neighbor to my
neighbor (the other), thus my neighbor, and whose coming is the birth of thought,
consciousness, justice, and philosophy”.201 After the intensity of the enucleation of the
subject that constituted the bulk of chapter four, one could almost miss the quiet
comment on the limitation of my ethical responsibility due to this entrance of the third. In
the wake of Totality and Infinity one‟s first thought would be that such a limitation is
only due to the fact that my responsibility must be divided among many others and not
only lavished infinitely upon the one. In light of this Levinas‟ following statement comes
as quite a shock: “The ego can, in the name of this unlimited responsibility, be called
upon to concern itself also with itself.”202 One feels the ground shift beneath one by this
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seismic claim and is rendered speechless at the audacity of this statement. One must
pause and reread the sentence: “Come again? Did I really read that? Could it be a
typo?...” But then shock gives over to confusion and frustration. How, one might ask the
philosopher with growing vexation, after stripping me bare and exposing my vulnerable
skin to the flaying of the accusative gaze of the other dare you offer the hope of selfconcern? Is it a trick? Is it but a temptation that, if I succumb to it, will only be taken
from me with a further and more intense berating for daring to look away from the other
and toward myself? Totality and Infinity did not offer this possibility. Indeed, the
“equality” spoken of there was only in relation to the responsibility that I owe to the other
and the other owes to the third. What Levinas develops in Otherwise than Being is that I,
the ethical subject who is infinitely responsible for the other, can myself be the third
party, can be the neighbor to the neighbor of my neighbor. Let us consider this more
closely.
As we know, Levinas views that “consciousness is born as the presence of a third
party”.203 Reason, presence, intentionality, being all become possible with the coming of
the third party. Furthermore, at the foundation of consciousness is justice. 204 But what is
justice? For Levinas justice is “a comparison between incomparables and a synopsis, a
togetherness and contemporaneousness”.205 One can imagine the event of the ethical
encounter between the self and the other.206 They are facing one another, gazing into each
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other‟s eyes; the one pair commanding and pleading not to kill while the other set
responds “here I am”. But then a curious thing happens. Someone else enters the picture.
They are, so to speak, “behind me” for I only notice them in the eyes of the other whom I
am facing. In the eyes of the other is reflected the face of another other, the third party.
The self, heretofore mesmerized by the face of the other, caught up in the penetrating
gaze of the neighbor, awakens to the presence of the third party. It is like a blink of the
eye or the taking of a breath. I had been gazing, staring into the face of the other, not
daring to blink or look away, not even daring to breathe so obsessed am I. But then, in
those eyes in which I am spellbound I suddenly realize there is another face there,
looking at me out of the eyes of the other. It disturbs my obsessive, breathless stare. I take
a breath. I blink. The ethical subject gains consciousness. “The act of consciousness is
motivated by the presence of a third party alongside of the neighbor approached.”207 Not
only is consciousness awakened but in this breath, in this blinking of the eye, I take a step
back. A space or distance is created between the self and the other and the third party. 208
In this space the self comes to realize that an obligation is owed to both the neighbor and
the third party. “In the proximity of the other, all the others than the other obsess me, and
already this obsession cries out for justice, demands measure and knowing, is
consciousness.”209 Measure and knowing, that is, the presence of the third party means
that I must divide my attention between them. I must compare these incomparables, I
must choose to whom I will turn first, to whom I will give my piece of bread. In this way,
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“the relationship with the third party is an incessant correction of the asymmetry of
proximity in which the face is looked at”.210 However, this correction of the infinity of
the ethical response is also a betrayal. Just as the ethical saying is betrayed by the
conversion into the said, so too the awakening of consciousness and initiation of justice is
a betrayal of the “anarchic relationship” with the other.211 “The saying is fixed in a said,
is written, becomes a book, law, and science.” 212 And just as the saying necessarily leads
to the said, so too this betrayal of the ethical obligation owed to the other by the coming
of the third party is unavoidable. “There must be a justice among incomparable ones.”213
The transcendence of the ethical response becomes codified, becomes law. A court of
appeal is established to settle the disputes between those who are, diachronously,
incomparable. I must now act as judge and jury, deciding between them. This is still the
familiar territory from Totality and Infinity. But Levinas now goes a step further.
But justice can be established only if I, always evaded from the concept of the
ego, always destitute and divested of being, always in non-reciprocal relationship
with the other, always for the other, can become an other like the others…. My lot
is important.214
That is, “there is also justice for me”. 215 The space that is opened between the self, the
other, and the third is in a constant state of flux. The self is obliged to the other. The other
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is obliged to the third. Because the self is “responsible for the responsibility of other”, the
self is also responsible for the third. However, “I am another for the others”216 thus
justice is also owed me. “The incomparable subject” is also “a member of society”. 217
And so “justice, society and the State, comparison and possession, thought and science,
commerce and philosophy” are initiated.218
However, Levinas is quick to take back these rights given, so briefly, to the
subject. “But it is still out of my responsibility that my salvation has meaning.” 219 It is as
if he is uncomfortable with the equality that has been so tentatively erected between the
self and the other and the third party. It is as if we must whisper this notion of the self as
other so as not to attract too much attention to it, looking furtively over our shoulders,
troubled that such a blasphemy might have been overheard. The self as other, the self as a
face who commands and pleads for ethical response from the other and the third party is
almost scandalous. It is as if the self as other should be no concern of mine, should be
forgotten as soon as it is mentioned – forgotten in its very mentioning – so that I can
concentrate on the much more important task of responding to the other and the third
party. “[B]eing must be understood on the basis of being’s other…. Reason…
presupposes disinterestedness, passivity or patience.”220 The subject may indeed be a
member of society, but its concern should always be for the other. The other may concern
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him or herself with me, I might be an other to him or her, but that is not my business.
Mine is the business of peace and I fear murder more than death.
Peace is incumbent on me in proximity, the neighbor cannot relieve me or it.
Peace then is under my responsibility. I am a hostage, for I am alone to wage it,
running a fine risk, dangerously…. I am reduced to myself in responsibility….
Reason is the one-for-the-other!221
We have now described the key concepts involved in Levinas‟ ethical philosophy.
The terms of the ethical dyad, the other and the self, have been thoroughly analyzed. We
have also considered the breakup of the ethical relationship by the entrance of the third
party which is the foundation of justice and society. Thus we have returned to the very
point from which Levinas desired to flee – the realm of being and ontology. 222 However,
it is the realm of being as founded upon the diachronous time of the other, as founded
upon ethics. So we have not in fact returned to our exact point of departure but, perhaps,
beside it, otherwise than it.
There is yet one last theme we would like to consider. It is a concept that features
throughout Levinas‟ work and has caused a great deal of controversy over the status of
Levinas as a philosopher. We would like to consider Levinas‟ thoughts on God. We could
certainly close this chapter now, leaving a satisfactory presentation of Levinas‟ work. In
other words, one need not believe in God or even be remotely religious to understand
Levinas‟ work and appreciate its radical contribution to philosophy. However, we would
221

Ibid., 166-167. See also Ethics and Infinity, 99-101, emphasis original: “In the
concrete, many other considerations intervene and require justice even for me…. But
justice only has meaning if it retains the spirit of dis-inter-estedness which animates the
idea of responsibility for the other man…. Responsibility is what is incumbent on me
exclusively, and what, humanly, I cannot refuse.”
222

See Otherwise than Being, 191, note 2: "Justice is at the origin of the claims of
ontology to be absolute, or the definition of man as an understanding of Being."
154

be remiss to exclude this one last theme for while Levinas insists that his work is
philosophical and not theological, God continues to appear throughout his work. Indeed,
Levinas was at first more well known as a Talmudic commentator before he received the
full recognition for his philosophical work. While Levinas always kept his philosophical
work separate from his more Jewish writings,223 it is almost as if Levinas could not help
but mention God and make reference to certain biblical themes even in his philosophical
work. Certainly he does not avoid dealing with God and he is quite fond of turning to the
ancient prophets of the Jewish tradition to corroborate his ethical stance. But perhaps
there is nothing wrong with this? Perhaps it is wrong to see Levinas‟ invocation of God
and his use of scripture as a philosophically problematic slide toward theology. Whether
or not there is a God, a vast portion of the human population has some sort of dealings
with “the divine”. Philosophy, as a study of the “human existential”, should perhaps have
some dealings with the divine as well, at least from the human perspective. 224 Levinas
himself sees a place for God within philosophy: “Philosophical discourse therefore
should be able to include God… if this God does have a meaning.”225 As for Levinas‟ use
of scripture, perhaps Roger Burggraeve is correct in his claim that “It is not the case that
what the Bible says is true because it is in the Bible, but rather that it is in the Bible
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because it is true”.226 It is not our place here to debate the validity of the biblical text nor
do we wish to enter the debate on the status of Levinas‟ work as philosophy vs. theology.
Certainly Levinas‟ writings can be and have been used within a theological setting. In
later chapters, this dissertation itself will treat Levinas as a dialogue partner over certain
theological issues. For now, we simply wish to present Levinas‟ own views on God for
while we need not implore the name of God to realize our ethical duty to the other, God
does indeed play a significant role in Levinas‟ thought.

God: the Absolutely Other, transcendent to the point of absence…
Before we make any comments on Levinas‟ thoughts on God as such, perhaps it
is best to first mention Levinas‟ disdain for theology. Indeed, it is ironic that some
philosophers accuse Levinas‟ work of being too theological when Levinas is so clearly
critical of the work done by traditional theology. 227 Quite simply, Levinas considers
theology to be an ontology. It participates in the same ontological tradition as all of
Western philosophy. 228 As such, theology conceives of God as a being, indeed, God
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according to traditional theology (in Levinas‟ estimation) is “the entity par excellence”.229
Levinas however insists that God is not a being at all. Rather, God signifies the “other of
being”, the “beyond being”.230 For Levinas, just as it is necessary to understand that the
other is otherwise than being, so too is it important “to hear a God not contaminated by
Being”.231 Levinas insists that the only way to do this is “by way of the analysis of the
interhuman relationships that do not enter into the framework of intentionality”.232 That
is, it is only on the basis of ethics that God can be approached and thought of outside of
being. 233 An additional problem that Levinas sees with traditional human thought of God
as it is manifested in religious behavior is its tendency to treat the human-divine
relationship as an exclusionary event between two parties alone: myself and God. This is
nowhere more evident, in Levinas‟ estimation, than in the I-Thou structure made famous
by Martin Buber.234 The human-divine relationship is conceived as a relationship
between an I (the human person) and the divine Thou who is worshipped and adored. The
connection quite clear (p. 204, emphasis mine): “With theology, which is linked to
ontology, God is fixed in a concept.” See also Levinas, "God and Philosophy", 167-168:
"But as soon as he [God] is conceived, this God is situated within 'being's move'."
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problem with this, as Levinas tries to show, is that the I-Thou relationship is an “intimate
society” of two that excludes the third party. 235 For Levinas the human-divine
relationship based upon the I-Thou structure is a relationship of love but love – “unless it
becomes judgment and justice – is the love of the couple. The closed society is the
couple”. 236 As we will see, Levinas refutes the conception of God as based on ontology,
God as a being, and he argues against the view of the human-divine relationship as the
intimate society of two. Indeed, the conception of the human-divine relationship as the IThou has only resulted in a “crisis of religion”:
Thus, the crisis of religion results from the impossibility of isolating oneself with
God and forgetting all those who remain outside the amorous dialogue. The true
dialogue is elsewhere… [T]he notion of God and worship of him would have to
be developed in terms of the unavoidable necessities of a society that entails third
parties. 237
As we will see, for Levinas the only way one can be in relationship with God is not by
turning to God at all, but by turning to the human other and the other others who are
present in the face of the other. In this way not only is ethics first philosophy but, for
Levinas, ethics is also first theology.
Holiness thus shows itself as an irreducible possibility of the human and God:
being called by [the other]. An original ethical event which would also be first
theology. Thus ethics is no longer a simple moralism of rules which decree what
is virtuous. It is the original awakening of an I responsible for the other; the
accession of my person to the uniqueness of the I called and elected to
responsibility for the other. The human I is not a unity closed upon itself,… but
rather an opening, that of responsibility, which is the true beginning of the human
and of spirituality. In the call which the face of the other man addresses to me, I

235

Ibid., 19.

236

Ibid., 21.

237

Ibid., 21.
158

grasp in an immediate fashion the graces of love: spirituality. The lived
experience of authentic humanity. 238
Perhaps the best place to begin our reflection on Levinas‟ thoughts on God is to
return to Descartes‟ idea of the infinite.239 As we know, for Levinas the human other
transcends me and is thus infinite. Therefore the idea I have of the other must be an idea
of the infinite which is an idea that overwhelms the thought that thinks it. For Levinas,
God is also infinite, is the Infinite and thus the idea we have of God is an idea of the
Infinite. And just as the thought of the other overflows its content, so the idea of God
“overflows every capacity” and thus “signifies the non-contained par excellence”.240
What is key for Levinas in Descartes‟ idea of the infinite is how this idea is the very
disruption of the ego or “breakup of the I think”.241
The idea of God is God in me, but God already breaking up the consciousness
which aims at ideas, and unlike any content.242
Thus God is not a mere being but beyond and otherwise than being. Levinas offers two
more insights on this idea of the Infinite. He notes that there are two ways in which the in
of the Infinite signifies: as non and as within. The Infinite, God, is not the finite. The
Infinite cannot be included in the finite, is “being-not-includable”, that is, the infinite
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exceeds all thought about it.243 However this is no mere negation of the finite, for while
not includable within the finite, the Infinite is yet in relationship with the finite and this is
indicated by the fact that the finite being can have this idea of the Infinite. The idea of the
Infinite is within us.
And yet there is an idea of God, or God is in us, as though the being-notincludable were also an ex-ceptional relationship with me, as though the
difference between the Infinite and what ought to include and comprehend it were
a non-indifference of the Infinite to this impossible inclusion, a non-indifference
of the Infinite to thought.244
We cannot conceive of God on our own merits. God exceeds our capacity to think of
God. Yet God, apparently, desires that we know him (or her), God is non-indifferent to
being thought of. Thus God gives us this idea of the Infinite (of the divine self) so that we
may think it even though its content is ever overflowing this very thought that we have of
God. This is what Levinas means when he says, echoing Descartes, that the idea of the
Infinite is put into us.245 And so the Infinite is both not the finite yet within the finite as a
thought put into our minds. Levinas also sees here the passivity of the human in relation
to the divine. “The breakup of the actuality of thought in the „idea of God‟ is a passivity
more passive still than any passivity, like the passivity of a trauma through which the idea
of God would have been put into us.”246 For Levinas, it is as if God places this idea of the
Infinite into the human person prior to consciousness. Thus the idea of the Infinite is anarchical. What is more, the consequence of this traumatic placing is the awakening of the
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consciousness. However, it is not an awakening to God per se. Here Levinas offers a
radical view – the idea of God placed within the human person awakens their
consciousness not to the idea of God, but to the other, the human other.
What can this… mean if not the trauma of awakening – as though the idea of the
Infinite, the Infinite in us, awakened a consciousness which is not awakened
enough? As though the idea of the Infinite in us were a demand, and a
signification in the sense that an order is signified in a demand. 247
For Levinas, the idea of the Infinite placed in us does not become some knowledge of
God as is conveyed by traditional theology, but rather is the ethical demand of infinite
obligation to the other. But how does Levinas make this move from the Infinite God to
the infinite other?
As we have seen in our comments on the other above, Levinas speaks of the
desire for the other, for what is other than the self which is the Good. God, as the
Absolute Infinite, is thus the desirable par excellence, the Good beyond being that we
desire. And, just as with the other, the desire for God can never be satisfied but grows “in
the measure that it approaches the desirable”. 248 What is more, Levinas sees in this
insatiable desire for what is not and can never be reduced to the self a true turning from
the self, a dis-interestedness. “This endless desire for what is beyond being is disinterestedness, transcendence – desire for the Good.”249 However, Levinas wonders, in
our desire for the Infinite can God truly remain transcendent? That is, how can the
247
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Infinite maintain its transcendence, its distance from the finite, when the finite is turned
toward it in desire? Levinas‟ simple yet radical answer is that the Infinite turns us toward
the other: “the desirable orders me to what is the non-desirable, the undesirable par
excellence – the other”.250 We now see how Levinas can claim that the placing of the idea
of the Infinite into me is an awakening of the consciousness that is heard as a demand.
God turns our desire from him (or her) to the other who demands our ethical response and
it is in this way that we name God good.
The goodness of the Good… inclines the movement it calls forth, to turn it from
the Good and orient it toward the other, and only thus toward the Good.251
Levinas terms this way in which the Infinite refers us from its own desirability to that of
the other, “to the non-desirable proximity of the others”, as illeity.252 Thus the idea of
God, which is not knowledge of God but desire for God, is ethical for this idea turns us
not to God but toward the other. And as we know when we face the other we encounter
the face that commands and pleads with us, enacting our ethical obligation. In this way
ethics is, according to Levinas, an optics.253 Ethics is the very vision of God whose sight
is upon the other, the neighbor, who pleads and demands for justice.
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The moral relation therefore reunites both self-consciousness and consciousness
of God. Ethics is not the corollary of the vision of God, it is that very vision.
Ethics is an optic, such that everything I know of God and everything I can hear
of His word and reasonably say to Him must find an ethical expression.... The
knowledge of God comes to us like a commandment…. To know God is to know
what must be done.254
When the idea of God is placed into me so too is the vision of God which is a sight of the
other. The idea I have of God thus does not remain with God. God is ever at a distance
from me, I cannot gaze upon him (or her) directly but only indirectly through the face of
the other to whom God directs me. In this way “[God‟s] transcendence turns into my
responsibility… for the other”.255 It is also in this way that Levinas speaks of God‟s
transcendence as an absence. God is “transcendent to the point of absence, to the point of
a possible confusion with the stirring of the there is”.256 God is wholly and absolutely
other. God‟s transcendence is so far beyond us that it is as if God is absent and the only
inkling we have of God is immediately turned to the human other. So we see that the
human relationship with God necessarily passes through the other. For Levinas there is
no direct relationship with God, no I-Thou relationship. The only way one can be in
relationship with God is by ethically responding to the other. And once this turn has been
made to the other (which is not chronological!), all the aspects of the ethical relationship
that have been discussed in this chapter come into play. In this way the idea of the
Infinite is also related to ethical substitution and the position of being a hostage.
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This trauma which cannot be assumed, inflicted by the Infinite on presence, or
this affecting of presence by the Infinite – this affectivity – takes shape as a
subjection to the neighbor. It is through thinking more than it thinks, desire, the
reference to the neighbor, the responsibility for another.257
While on the one hand we see that the only way humans have access to God, can
be in relationship with God, is through ethically responding to the other, we also find that
the ethical subject witnesses to the presence of God. Levinas makes a critical distinction
between the statement “I believe in God” and the ethical response, “here I am”. For
Levinas the statement “I believe in God” is the epitome of ontology. It is a statement in
which “God” is conceptualized, thematized, presented, and thus reduced to an idol – not
God at all, but some mere thing that humans can grasp and wrap their minds around.
Rather for Levinas the first attestation of God is a phrase in which God is not even named
or invoked: me voici, here I am. 258 Levinas insists that to bear witness to God is precisely
not to state “I believe in God”. Rather it is “in my „here I am‟, from the first present in the
accusative, [that] I bear witness to the Infinite…. „Here I am, in the name of God‟,
without first referring myself directly to his presence”. 259 It is this “here I am” that refers
directly to the vision of God which is the sight of the other who summons me. What is
more, this “here I am” is also the ethical saying. In this context the saying is a testimony
to my ethical responsibility which is a “pure testimony” to God whose name is not even
spoken in the saying.260 “The Infinite passes in saying.”261 That is, God‟s “presence” is
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attested only as passing through my ethical response to the other. Thus Levinas claims
that saying “bears witness to the other of the Infinite which rends me, which in the saying
awakens me”.262 But this is not any type of presence of God.
“Here I am” as a witness of the Infinite, but a witness that does not thematize
what it bears witness of, and whose truth is not the truth of representation, is not
evidence. 263
For Levinas this ethical witnessing of God in the “here I am” where God is not named
nor made present is also the glory of God.
Glorification is saying, that is, a sign given to the other, peace announced to the
other, responsibility for the other, to the extent of substitution. 264
In this way God is glorified not by empty religious rituals or solemn oaths (“I believe in
God”) but by my ethical responsibility for the other.265 The most frequent example of this
ethical witnessing of God that Levinas offers is the word of the prophet which is a
diachronous saying prior to the said.
Prophesying is pure testimony, pure because prior to all disclosure; it is subjection
to an order before understanding the order…. It is in prophesying that the Infinite
passes – and awakens. As a transcendence, refusing objectification and dialogue,
it signifies in an ethical way. It signifies in the sense in which one says to mean an
order; it orders.266
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The prophet, the witness to God par excellence, is inspired to speak the word of God,
thus testifying to God. The prophet is inspired, that is turned from God by God toward
the other. The prophet speaks: this is the ethical saying. What is spoken is the word of
God: this divine word which is a demand orienting us toward the other who summons
and commands us, pleading with us, can only be said by humans in one way, “here I am”.
Thus the prophet testifies to God by way of the ethical saying through which the Infinite
passes. In this way ethics is the inspiration of God and the ethical relationship is human
spirituality. It is an inspiration in which “the Other agitates the Same to the point of the
fission of its core”267, a spirituality in which the human person is awakened to an infinite
responsibility for the other. And so the “otherwise than being” that is both the face of the
other and the ethical subject is the glory of God.268

Conclusion – Ethics Enacted?
This chapter is but a meager presentation of Levinas‟ work, touching upon what
we find to be the key concepts and themes of his ethical philosophy. One last question
remains. It is a simple question and perhaps somewhat simplistic in the face of the riches
of Levinas‟ thought. On the other hand it might be the most important question one can
ask of Levinas‟ ethical project. What are we to do with it? That is, now that our thinking
has been reoriented (or perhaps we should say disoriented) by the transcendence of the
other away from self-interest and toward the dis-interestedness of substitution, how can
we apply this reorientation into the concrete experiences of our daily life? For, as one
267
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author has commented, “it [this ethical reorientation of our thought] matters not at all
unless it impacts on our approach to concrete situations so that we come to see them as
ethical”. 269 As we have seen, Levinas himself states that the ethical relationship of the
self and the other is what founds and orients justice and the institutions of the State. The
saying does indeed lead to the said. But how can this happen without the ethical saying
simply disappearing, or even being destroyed by the conceptual, thematizing insistence of
the said? How do we maintain the priority of an ethical situation that comes from the
diachronous realm prior to consciousness and thought without it transforming into
consciousness and thought? How do we keep justice and morality founded upon ethics
without reducing the ethical relation to merely codified behavior? This is a dilemma to
which there is no easy solution. However, if Levinas‟ thought is not to be merely an
exercise in mental gymnastics, some answer, even if inadequate and requiring the
unsaying of the said at every turn, must be sought. For our own part, we would like to
offer the situation of empathy, as conceived by phenomenologist Edith Stein, as one
potential bridge from the realm of Levinas‟ anarchical ethical relationship of the self and
the other to the synchronous realm of concrete daily life. That is, Stein‟s concept of
empathy may serve as a real time analogue for Levinas‟ ethical relationship. While it is
true that Levinas is often critical of the concept of empathy, 270 we will argue that Stein‟s
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particular understanding of empathy can find support in Levinas‟ writings.271 Empathy
clearly belongs to the realm of the said which must be unsaid. However Levinas himself
admitted that the saying does indeed lead to the said. Furthermore, we will also argue that
this ethical, empathetic situation is concretely enacted in situations of solidarity. Levinas
claims that the ethical situation of persecution by the other “is at the bottom of solidarity
with another”.272 How exactly? We will argue that it is through empathy as rooted in
Levinas‟ anarchic ethical relationship. Solidarity as rooted in ethically enacted empathy
manifests the “personal response” that is the “ethical act” of substitution. 273 It is the
empathetic subject who is in solidarity with his or her neighbor that manifests Levinas‟
ethical hostage. This is what it means to be a human person. What is more, we will argue
that it is only through the ethically empathetic acts of solidarity that true human
community is created. In our next chapter we will consider Stein‟s concept of empathy
and how it relates directly to her conception of the human person as such and, following
upon that, the creation of human society.
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CHAPTER THREE
Edith Stein:
Selfhood through Intersubjectivity – Empathy as the Act of Personhood

Introduction
Edith Stein was born in 1891 to a middle class Jewish family in, what was then,
Breslau, Germany. She died 51 years later in 1942 in the gas chambers of Auschwitz. 1
Where her name is recognized at all, it is either for the horrific circumstances
surrounding her death or for the controversy surrounding her conversion to Roman
Catholicism (1922), entrance into the Carmelite order (1933), and eventual canonization
by Pope John Paul II (1998).2 However, there is another aspect of Edith Stein which has,
until recent years, been sadly overlooked – her philosophical career, particularly her
status within the phenomenological movement.3 This neglect perhaps owes something to
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Prologue, 1913-1922 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2006), vii-viii;
and Antonio Calcagno, The Philosophy of Edith Stein (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
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such identifications, „Stein the philosopher‟ seems to have been overlooked”.
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her untimely death. However Stein is one of only a handful that could boast to be a part
of the very founding of Husserl‟s phenomenological movement. She was contemporaries
with such figures as Adolf Reinach, Max Scheler, Roman Ingarden, Hans Lipps, Jean
Hering, Fritz Kaufmann, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and Martin Heidegger.4 No mere
student of “the Master”, Stein had the distinction of serving as Husserl‟s private assistant
from 1916-1918.5 During this time she not only prepared students to take classes with
Husserl6 but research now concludes that much of Husserl‟s posthumously published
Ideas II owes a great deal not only to Stein‟s editorial skills, but even to her own
influence and creativity. 7 She also wrote prolifically during her lifetime and offered
several public lectures. Such a record would seem to accord her a ready place in the hall
of philosophers – at least the section on phenomenology. So why the relative obscurity?
History has shown that Edith Stein‟s life suffered from numerous “closed doors”.
Twice Stein failed to achieve a position as a university professor, which some claim was
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Of interest is Stein‟s letter to Fritz Kaufmann in which she relates the details of
becoming Husserl‟s assistance. See Edith Stein, Self Portrait in Letters, 1916-1942, trans.
Josephine Koeppel (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1993), 1. Stein, like many of
Husserl‟s students, often referred to him as “the Master” as is apparent throughout her
numerous correspondence.
6

Baseheart, Person in the World, 12.

7

For an in depth analysis of this claim see Marianne Sawicki, Body, Text, and
Science: The Literacy of Investigative Practices and the Phenomenology of Edith Stein
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997). See also Calcagno, 15-16. He states: “The
present form of Ideas II is pretty much the same form that Stein prepared.” See Stein‟s
letters to Fritz Kaufmann and Roman Ingarden in Self Portrait in Letters, p. 5 and 22
respectivley, where she reveals how, at least in her mind, her role as Husserl‟s assistant
was also one of collaborator.
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merely due to the fact that she was a woman. 8 What is more, certain of her editorial
contributions to Husserl‟s own texts received no credit at that time. 9 Then, due to her
Jewish origins and the German anti-Jewish laws of the 1930‟s, Stein was prohibited both
from offering public lectures and publishing her work.10 A succession of doors closed
swiftly at that time: Stein was removed from her teaching position at the Pedagogical
Institute in Münster, she then decided to enter the Carmel at Cologne in 1933. 11 Nine
years later, as stated above, the doors closed upon her forever in the gas chambers of
Auschwitz. For a time, it would seem that Edith Stein‟s name would pass into anonymity,
at least on the pages of philosophical history. In addition and particularly in the English
speaking world, Stein suffers from perhaps an even greater neglect due to the fact that

8

In her attempt to gain a position at the University of Göttingen, Husserl wrote
her a letter of “recommendation”. His half-hearted support of his former student and
assistant is infamous. He states: "If the career of university teaching were supposed to be
open for ladies, then I would be the very first to recommend her warmly for admission."
See MacIntyre, 106, emphasis mine. See also Calcagno, 13 where he comments on how
during Stein‟s life “the Ministry of Education made it practically impossible for women
to habilitate in philosophy because of blatant sexism”.
9

In addition to the lack of credit for her work on Ideas II (see note 7 above),
another example is Husserl's On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal
Time which was prepared and edited by Stein. However, at its publication Husserl's later
assistant, Martin Heidegger, took the credit for this work. See Calcagno, 2. See also Life
in a Jewish Family, p. 506, note 208.
10

Calcagno, 20.
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Ibid., 20-22. It is beyond the scope of this work to comment on the controversy
behind both her conversion to Catholicism and decision to become a Carmelite nun.
However, with our theme of "closed doors", it is noted that both a symbolic and quite real
door closed between Stein and her family upon the occasion of her entrance into Carmel.
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only a handful of her writings have been translated into English to date.12 However, it
would seem that her fate is not to be entirely forgotten. Interest in Stein as a philosopher
appears to be gaining strength, witnessed to by recently published books and articles on
her thought. Those who have taken notice of Edith Stein have found a challenging
philosophical voice of great depth and perception. Specifically, she adds a unique voice
to the phenomenological discussion. In this chapter we will focus on Stein as a
philosopher and phenomenologist. What is elaborated upon in this chapter will then serve
as the foundation for a dialogue between the thought of Edith Stein and Emmanuel
Levinas to be found in our following chapter. It is our belief that not only can there be a
fruitful dialogue between these two thinkers, but that such a dialogue can offer much to
enhance both of their philosophical projects.

The Structure of the Human Person in the Thought of Edith Stein
It has been said that the key theme running throughout Stein‟s writings is her
reflection upon the structure or nature of the human person.13 That is, Stein continually
asks the question: what does it mean to be a human person? As we will see, Stein reveals
her unique philosophical voice in this very analysis of human personhood. Although she
remained deeply indebted to her phenomenological training, she departs from Husserl

12

MacIntyre, vii. It is to be noted that ICS Publications is in the process of
publishing a multi-volume series entitled The Collected Works of Edith Stein as her texts
become available in English.
13

Baseheart, Person in the World, x: "The guideline that runs through all her
work is the inquiry into the question of the nature of the human person."
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both methodologically and in the conclusions of her analyses. 14 What is of particular
interest for this work is how Stein‟s lifelong reflection upon the human person is one
deeply rooted in intersubjectivity for, as we will see, it is through encountering other
persons that one can become one‟s deepest self. With Levinas‟ ethical subjectivity in the
back of our minds, already a door begins to creak open between the two philosophers.
Before such a dialogue can begin though, we must look closely at Edith Stein‟s own
philosophical project. While Stein‟s work reveals a great breadth of topics, for the sake of
time and space, we must limit our reflection to those areas that we consider most fruitful
for the upcoming dialogue between Stein and Levinas. Thus, we will focus on Stein‟s
concept of empathy, her understanding of human individuality, and her analysis of human
community. Prefacing this explication we will offer a few brief comments on how Stein
departs from Husserl, employing her own unique version of the phenomenological
method.

Confronting “the Master” – Stein’s Realism vs. Husserl’s Idealism
Although Stein frequently cites Husserl‟s influence behind her work and
expresses her gratitude to “the Master”,15 she also reveals a marked independence of
thought and unique employment of the phenomenological method. While a systematic
14

Calcagno, 18.

15

See for example, Edith Stein, On the Problem of Empathy, trans. Waltraud
Stein (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1989), 1-2 (hereafter cited as Empathy); and
Edith Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, trans. Mary Catherine
Baseheart and Marianne Sawicki (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 2000), 2
(hereafter cited as Beiträge as following popular practice, see p. xix).
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analysis of the points of contact and departure between Stein and Husserl are beyond the
scope of this work, it will suffice to elaborate upon a few key divergences between these
two phenomenologists.
What is perhaps at the root of Stein‟s departure from Husserl is her realist flavor,
inspired by the Husserl of the Logical Investigations, as opposed to the later Husserl in
which a transcendental and idealistic turn is found. We need to recall here that, according
to many scholars, Husserl‟s phenomenological method reveals a marked “shift” in style
and emphasis between the publication of the Logical Investigations in 1901 and his later
writings such as “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” (1910) and Ideas I (1913).16 Many
scholars agree that Husserl‟s earlier period reveals a more realist bent while his later texts
seem to belie a transcendental and idealistic turn. Husserl‟s shift in thought is tied to his
development of and emphasis on the phenomenological reduction or epoché. As we have
seen, Husserl believed that the only way one can in fact get to the “things themselves” is
by bracketing out the naïve realism of the natural attitude and its presuppositions. 17 This
bracketing (the epoché) “reduces” the natural attitude and allows the phenomenological
attitude of presuppositionlessness to arise from which one can encounter and reflect upon
the things as they are in themselves. What, in part, is suspended here is one‟s belief in the

16

Calcagno, 14. See also Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology
(London: Routledge, 2000), 65-66, where he discusses the different stages in the
development of Husserl‟s thought.
17

See the section on Levinas' critique of Husserl in chapter one of this
dissertation.
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existence of the world and the things therein. 18 That is, in the natural attitude one takes
for granted that the world exists and that the things in the world which appear to us do so
independently of our subjective stance. Many of Husserl‟s followers found the reduction
not only problematic but also quite impossible and therefore refused to perform it. 19 As
we will see, Stein is to be counted among this rank of realist dissenters.
We need not here enter into the debate over whether or not Husserl truly took an
idealistic turn. For our purposes it is enough to note that Stein certainly found Husserl‟s
later explication of the phenomenological method to take a transcendental turn which
tended toward idealism. It was a turn that Stein felt Husserl should never have made. 20
Indeed, what first attracted Stein to phenomenology and inspired her to go to Göttingen
in 1913 to study under Husserl was the realistic flavor of the Logical Investigations.21
Husserl‟s cry to “return to the things themselves” struck a chord with the young Stein
who agreed with Husserl‟s critique of relativism and psychologism. 22 From her earliest
work on empathy in her dissertation (1916) to her mature texts such as Potency and Act
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See Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1960), 17-18. He states: “The being of the world, by reason of the evidence of
natural experience, must no longer be for us an obvious matter of fact” (18).
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Moran, 77 and 160.
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Calcagno, 14. In fact Stein was so strongly against Husserl‟s transcendental
turn that she even confronted “the Master” with her concerns over his work. See for
example her letter to Roman Ingarden in Self-Portrait in Letters, 10-11: “Recently I laid
before the Master, most solemnly, my reservations against idealism.” While Husserl
appeared to be open to changing his mind on this issue, Stein noted how “she never yet
managed to do that”.
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Ibid., 8. See also Baseheart, Person in the World, 5.
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(published posthumously), Stein was dedicated to a realistic analysis of these things
themselves. 23 However, in Stein‟s opinion, with the phenomenological reduction and the
epoché Husserl himself did not remain faithful to this analysis of the things themselves.24
She holds that, if one truly wants to discover what phenomena are as such, one must
remain committed to the reality of the world and one‟s embeddedness therein for that is
precisely how things are given to us – as things existing in the world to which we
belong. 25 Stein‟s realist approach is thus contrasted with “the idealistic interpretation that
Husserl gives his own teaching on the transcendental constitution of the objective world”
for this interpretation “seems radically to do away with… „naïve realism‟”.26 For Stein it
is precisely the phenomenological reduction that inclines Husserl to “this idealistic
interpretation”. 27 Indeed, Stein‟s insistent commitment to a more realist use of the
phenomenological method has led some scholars to interpret her employment of the
23

Edith Stein, Potency and Act, trans. Walter Redmond (Washington, D.C.: ICS
Publications, 2009), 360-379. This section of her text, entitled “Excursus on
Transcendental Idealism”, offers what is considered Stein‟s mature opinion on and
personal version of phenomenology (see the German Editor‟s Introduction to this text,
xlii). In it she defends the realism of the natural attitude against, what is in her view,
Husserl‟s transcendental idealism.
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Baseheart, Person in the World, 88.
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See Mary Catherine Baseheart, “Edith Stein‟s Philosophy of Person,” in Edith
Stein Symposium and Teresian Culture, Carmelite Studies, ed. John Sullivan, vol. IV
(Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1987), 37. Here she comments on how “for Stein
these „things‟ of experience [which phenomenology attempts to reflect upon] presuppose
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reduction in her dissertation as merely a nod to appease her director.28 Whether or not
that is the case and while there is yet debate over the idealistic status of Husserl‟s
writings, scholars seem to be in agreement upon the realist nature of Stein‟s use of the
phenomenological method.29
Stein‟s realist stance toward the phenomenological method led her to certain
conclusions in her philosophical analyses that also distinguish her position from that of
Husserl. Again, we do not offer a full account of these conclusions but focus on those that
seem pertinent to the thesis of this dissertation. First, Stein‟s refusal to perform the
epoché and thus remain rooted in the world as existing leads her away from Husserl‟s
transcendental subjectivity. 30 For Stein the subject is not absolute for it “is not through
itself, but it receives being and essence”.31 That is, the subject, upon reflection, does not
find itself purely above the world and constituting it, but rather discerns itself as already
existing in a world into which it was placed. 32 In this way Stein argues that
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Baseheart, 88; Calcagno, 18; MacIntyre, 75. See also Moran, 172 where he
comments on how Ideas II, as edited by Stein, offers a "corrective to the rather
disembodied idealist standpoint of Ideas I” thus making it fit better with Husserl's earlier
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Husserl and Stein (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and
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the I points to something that is absolute in a sense other than that wherein itself
is absolute…. Thus the I transcends itself in a direction toward something wherein
the I itself has the reason for its being (hence toward a transcendence opposite to
that of transcendental idealism).33
In other words, Stein insists on a subject who is dependent for his or her existence on
something other than itself. What is more, it is specifically through a phenomenological
analysis, albeit sans the reduction, of the subject as such (the thing in itself) that this
existential dependence is revealed. For Stein the fact is that the subject finds itself
existing in a world populated by things and people other than itself. What this means for
phenomenological analysis is that the subject is not alone in its reflection on the things in
this world – there can be no universalized “transcendental subject”. In this way Stein also
rejects the “isolation of the subject” that results from the epoché.34
Man, through the entelechy characteristic of his soul, is put into a cosmos where
he interacts with his fellows who are like him yet unlike him…. What we see in
our daily experience and throughout history is always human individuals and
communities that are what they are potentially, habitually, and actually (in the
sense of changing actuality) thanks to a development whereby they condition and
influence each other.35
Now, one may argue that Husserl himself was aware of the fact of the existence of other
persons who seem (one can never be absolutely certain) to possess an intentional and
33

Ibid., 374-375, emphasis mine. We will refrain for now from speaking about
the obvious theological direction towards which this conclusion could point which also
happens to be the direction in which Stein herself takes it. Stein‟s more theological views
will be analyzed towards the end of this chapter.
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Angela Ales Bello, "Empathy, a Return to Reason," in Analecta Husserliana,
Vol. VI, ed. Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1977), 143. See
also Philibert Secretan, "The Self and the Other in the Thought of Edith Stein," in
Analecta Husserliana, Vol. VI, ed. Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing
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constituting consciousness like oneself. However for Husserl it would seem that these
others are not necessary for phenomenological analysis, for reflection upon the things
themselves. For Husserl, through the epoché the transcendental ego emerges which is a
structure that all intentionally conscious people share. 36 That is, Husserl‟s
phenomenological reduction appears to also bracket out personal individuality.
Husserl formulates a law that any i is capable of access to the same appearances
as any other i; in other words, what is meant by “i” is the capacity to be appearedto without contributing anything to the contouring of any appearance…. Husserl‟s
law merely declares: the world must and does appear to me just as it would appear
to anyone else who might stand where I stand; for my own unique individuality is
irrelevant to my observations…. I‟s are interchangeable. 37
Husserl‟s transcendental subject has been accused of being a “windowless monad”,
closed in upon itself and disregarding any outside influence. 38 Stein, on the other hand,
will offer a “more relational sense of the person”. 39 As we will see in greater detail
below, Stein insists upon the “uniqueness and unrepeatability” of the individual person. 40
Now while this might make the individual absolute in one sense (as irreplaceable), in
another sense, with the fact of innumerable unique individuals populating the world in
which we live, the other‟s perspective must be taken into consideration for an accurate
picture of this world as such, for an analysis of the things themselves as they appear not
36

Marianne Sawicki, "Empathy Before and After Husserl," Philosophy Today
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only to me but to numerous others as well. For Stein, the I‟s most certainly are not
interchangeable. 41 Thus we must be in relation with these other individuals to gain a more
accurate picture of the world. For Stein, not only must the subject have “windows”, but
he or she must also open these windows to the world and particularly to the other persons
living therein. We must take more time to unpack the density of this conclusion for it
involves Stein‟s concept of human individuality, the role of empathy in the encounter
between human persons, and the constitution of human communities – all of which we
will address below. For now we note that for Stein, as opposed to Husserl, the human
subject is no isolated monad but is rather an intersubjective person who is open to the
external world – transcendent as opposed to transcendental. For Stein, Husserl‟s
reduction cannot be true to this intersubjective, transcendent reality in which we exist.
One last note concerning Stein‟s departure from a purely Husserlian
phenomenology: after her conversion to Roman Catholicism, Stein took an interest in
Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, her interest in the scholastic Saint became so intense that she
made the claim that her “proper mission” or “life‟s task” was to offer a synthesis of
Husserlian phenomenology and Aquinas‟ scholasticism. 42 Three texts are attributed to
this cause: an imaginary dialogue between Husserl and Aquinas written for Husserl‟s
seventieth birthday celebration, 43 Potency and Act, and Finite and Eternal Being.44 We
41

Sawicki, "Empathy Before and After Husserl", 126-127.
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Edith Stein, "Husserl and Aquinas: A Comparison," in Knowledge and Faith,
trans. Walter Redmond (Washington D.C.: ICS Publications, 2000). While Stein‟s
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need not elaborate upon the differences such a synthesis would bring to Husserl‟s
conception of phenomenology. We merely note this development in Stein‟s thought as a
further indication of her independence and divergence from her teacher‟s position. We
would like to turn now to a more in depth look at Stein‟s analysis of the human person as
rooted in the concept of empathy.

Empathy – the Intersubjective Enactment of Human Personhood
For Stein, empathy is the “key” to unlocking the secrets of human personhood. 45
As we will see what this ultimately entails is that, according to Stein‟s analysis, the
human person is necessarily intersubjective – I cannot enact my own human personhood
without encountering other human persons. Of all her philosophical writings, Stein‟s
doctoral dissertation, On the Problem of Empathy (1916) is perhaps her best-known text.
In her autobiographical text, Life in a Jewish Family, Stein comments on how she came
to choose this topic for her doctoral dissertation:
Now the question needed to be settled: what did I want to work on? I had no
difficulty on this. In his course on nature and spirit, Husserl had said that an
objective outer world could only be experienced intersubjectively, i.e., through a
plurality of perceiving individuals who relate in a mutual exchange of
information. Accordingly, an experience of other individuals is a prerequisite. To
the experience, an application of the work of Theodor Lipps, Husserl gave the
name Einfühlung [Empathy]. What it consists of, however, he nowhere detailed.

Thomas Aquinas”. Helpfully, Knowledge and Faith contains both versions in a side by
side comparison, revealing the changes and development from the original text to the
published manuscript.
44
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Here was a lacuna to be filled; therefore, I wished to examine what empathy
might be.46
In light of how Stein continued to treat the topic of the intersubjectively constituted
human person in her later texts, this youthful selection of her dissertation thesis seems
rather significant. Indeed, Stein herself remembers a strong attachment to her theme:
“Herr Professor,” I told [Husserl], “I have no intention of finding some
convenient project with which to get a doctorate. I want to prove myself whether I
am capable of an independent achievement in philosophy.” 47
Edith Stein‟s doctoral dissertation, in which she first set out to prove her philosophical
worth, is still considered to this day to offer an “original contribution” to the
phenomenological description of the nature of empathy. 48
The published version of her dissertation contains three separate parts or chapters.
However, originally there was an additional opening chapter that traced the historical
development of the literature on empathy. 49 This chapter has since been lost. In the
remaining chapters Stein first considers the act of empathy itself. Then she turns to the
constitution of the self as a person (or “psycho-physical individual”) which brings her
directly to the constitution of the “foreign individual”. In the last section of her work,
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Stein considers empathy in light of the concept of “spiritual persons”. 50 We turn now to
Stein‟s concept of empathy.

A) The Empathic Act
Stein opens her text with a simple definition of empathy. It is “the perceiving of
foreign subjects and their experience” (1). Although Stein does here perform the
phenomenological bracketing that Husserl insists upon (3-4),51 her conclusions already
belie her deviation from her teacher and situate her as a realist phenomenologist. She
concludes that the experiences of the “I” cannot be placed in doubt and what the “I”
experiences is a world in which there are “experiencing subjects external to us, of whose
experiences we know” (5). Thus “the phenomenon of foreign psychic life is indubitably
there” (5). What Stein wants to examine is how the self comes to experience the reality of
these foreign individuals through an experience of their experiences and what that
experience is like for the self. As we know, the how is the act of empathy. She gives the
example of a friend who tells her of the loss of his brother (6). She becomes aware of his
pain. This awareness is an empathic experience. According to Stein‟s analysis this act
involves “three levels or modalities of accomplishment” (10). These are:
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1) the emergence of the experience
2) the fulfilling explication
3) the comprehensive objectification of the explained experience (10)
Before we elaborate upon these three levels of the empathic process one must first
understand the difference between primordial and non-primordial experiences. Simply
put, primordial experiences are “our own experiences as they are given in reflection” (7).
I cut my thumb and feel pain. I eat a peach, tasting and enjoying its sweet juiciness. I
listen to a piece of music and it somehow gives me energy while I‟m exercising. These
are all primordially perceived experiences. I, the self, is at the center of the experience,
receiving it and experiencing it. However if you cut your thumb, or eat a peach, or listen
to music, this is your primordially given experience, not mine. I can witness you doing
these things and understand what is happening in them, but the experience itself, its
content, is not given to me primordially, rather it is given to me non-primordially. This
brings us to empathy. Stein states that empathy is “an act which is primordial as present
experience though non-primordial in content” (10, emphasis mine). Let us return to the
peach. You eat the peach, a primordial experience for you. I perceive you eating the
peach, this is both a primordial and non-primordial experience for me. My perception of
you eating the peach is my primordial experience, but your eating of the peach is nonprimordial to me. If I wish to understand what your experience of eating a peach is like I
must place myself in your shoes, so to speak, and become “the subject of the content in
the original subject‟s place” (10). However, I never fool myself into actually thinking that
I am eating the peach myself. I am fully aware that you are the one eating the peach and
that I am not. However, I can experience eating the peach non-primordially through you.
This is empathy and I am the subject of this act but its content is only secondarily, or
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non-primordially, mine. Thus the empathizing (the proverbial placing oneself in the
other‟s shoes) is my primordial experience. The eating of the peach is the content of the
experience which I perceive non-primordially.
Let us place this example into the three stages that Stein believes takes place
during an act of empathy. First there is the emergence of the experience – your eating of
the peach (or in Stein‟s example, her friend hearing of his brother‟s death). Next there is
the fulfilling explication – the placing of myself in your shoes so to consider the
primordial content of your experience though always with the awareness that it is your
primordial experience and not mine (I am not eating the peach; it was not my brother who
died). Finally there is the comprehensive objectification of the explained experience – I
“return” to my own position and can now reflect upon your experience specifically as
yours and not mine. In this way Stein claims that:
On the first and third levels, the representation exhibits the non-primordial parallel
to perception, and on the second level it exhibits the non-primordial parallel to the
having of the experience. The subject of the empathized experience, however, is
not the subject empathizing, but another…. These two subjects are separate and not
joined together… by a consciousness of sameness or a continuity of experience
(10-11).
In this last aspect of empathy, the fact that the two subjects do not become one but remain
separate, Stein is trying to protect the integrity of the two individuals. For Stein, each
member of the empathic dyad remains an autonomous I, a person in their own right.
Neither is reduced to the other (a loss in personhood or self-ness). It is, in part, due to this
refusal to allow a reduction of the one to the other that will enable empathy to be a
constitutive element in personhood, rather than a destructive one. This is perhaps made
clearer with Stein‟s insistence on what empathy is not.
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Empathy, according to Stein, is not sympathy, a “feeling of oneness”, imitation,
association, or analogy. 52 Sympathy, or “fellow feeling”, has a different quality to
empathy (14). When I sympathize with your joy over some good news the joy I feel is my
own primordial experience. I am joyful with you but it is my joy that I am experiencing.
Now perhaps my joy arises in light of my empathic perception of your joy, but in
sympathy, the content of the experience is given as my own. Stein is also adamant that
empathy is not a “feeling of oneness” (16-18). This should be already clear due to her
distinction between experiences as primordial and non-primordial. In a feeling of oneness
“there is no distinction between our own and the foreign „I‟,… they are one” (16). In fact
Stein claims that a feeling of oneness, a “we” arising out of an “I” and a “you” (17), is
only possible on the basis of empathy (18). 53 Imitation is the mere “contagion” or
“transference of feelings” which actually prevents empathy from happening because the
experience becomes our own rather than remaining the primordial experience of the other
(23). One can think of the phenomenon of how a child begins to cry merely by seeing
another child crying. The first child has no notion of why the other child is crying nor
does he or she care why the other child is crying. He or she simply feels the urge to
imitate the other child and in this imitation the crying is his or her own primordial
experience with no concern for the experience of the other. Association is the process by
which I see another‟s action and relate it back to my own similar action – you stamp your
52
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There we will see that while a communal experience is not an empathic one per se, it is
yet rooted in empathy.
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foot in anger, I recall when I once stamped my food in anger. Here, instead of entering
into the experience of the other as their own, I refer to my own experience and relate
yours to it. This is not empathy either (24). Analogy is similar to association but rooted in
the fact of our embodiment. I know myself as a conscious and experiencing subject who
also has a physical body through which I express myself and have such conscious
experiences. I cannot know if you are a consciously experiencing “I” but I do see that you
have a physical body and it appears to be similar to mine in how it receives experiences,
etc. Thus, through an analogy to my own embodied experience, I assume a linkage
between your physically experiencing body and a conscious foreign I embodied therein
(26). In this way Stein claims that analogy ignores the perception of foreign
consciousness for through analogy in the external world we see nothing but “physical
soulless and lifeless bodies” (26). If empathy is in fact the perception of foreign
consciousness as such, clearly it cannot happen through analogy (as understood here).
Empathy, rather, is “the experience of foreign consciousness [that] can only be the nonprimordial experience which announces a primordial one…. [It is] an experience of our
own announcing another one” (14 &19). What is more, there is a certain passivity in the
empathizing subject for he or she feels him or herself as being “led” by the primordial
experience of the other (11). The empathizing subject cannot take control of the content
of the experience for it is not his or her own but belongs to the other. Ultimately for Stein,
empathy is “a kind of act of perceiving sui generis” (11). It is the unique act by which I
encounter and experience foreign subjectivity.
One last aspect of empathy needs to be mentioned. We noted above how empathy,
for Stein, plays a role in the actual constitution or enactment of human personhood. Stein
187

makes her first move towards the self-constitutive element of empathy when she
introduces the concept of reiterated empathy or “reflexive sympathy”.
There is not only reflection, but also reflection on reflection…. In fact, all
representations can be reiterated…. And so I can also empathize the empathized,
i.e., among the acts of another that I comprehend empathically there can be
empathic acts in which the other comprehends another‟s acts. This “other” can be a
third person or me myself. In the second case we have “reflexive sympathy” where
my original experience returns to me as an empathized one (18, emphasis mine).54
In other words, instead of empathically perceiving the eating of the peach, I empathically
perceive the empathic acts of the other. If the other is empathically perceiving me, I thus
empathically perceive how the other is perceiving me. This can tell me something of
myself from another‟s point of view and perhaps shape me as a person. We (with Stein)
will return to the self-constituting implications of reiterated empathy. For now we need to
turn to the constitution of the “I”, or as Stein designates it, “the psycho-physical
individual”.

B1) The Constitution of the Psycho-Physical Individual
Stein begins her reflection on the constitution of the individual person by first
revealing how such individuality arises. She speaks of the “pure I” as the “subject of
experience” (38). This is the subject of the “I” think, “I” feel, “I” will. It is an “I” because
it is “„itself‟ and no other” (38). This idea of “selfness”:
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In light of Stein's previous emphasis that empathy is not sympathy, it is
somewhat unfortunate that she calls this reiterated empathy "reflexive sympathy" for this
can be confusing to the unwary reader (similar to Levinas‟ confusing use of the word
“metaphysics” in Totality and Infinity, see chapter two).
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is first brought into relief in contrast with another when another is given…. This
otherness is apparent in the type of givenness; it is other than “I” because it is given
to me in another way than “I”. Therefore it is “you” (38).
The “I” (its own self-givenness) manifests itself when it comes into contact with the
other. This encounter enables one to realize the self and what belongs to it in contrast
with the other and what belongs to the other. Thus the realization of one‟s selfness
requires the encounter with another. However, Stein adds, “since [the other] experiences
itself as I experience myself, the „you‟ is another „I‟” (38). We will return to this
empathic experience below.
Another way to understand the “I” is “as the unity of a stream of consciousness”
(38). This stream refers to the phenomena of the unity or flow of past, present, and future
experiences. The “I” comes to perceive that it is the subject not of isolated experiences,
but rather of a whole unity of experiences that relate to one another, build off each other,
influence one another, etc. all within the context of being the primordial experience of the
“I”. Now, just as the “I” came to appreciate its individuality in contrast with the other, so
too the “I” perceives how its stream of consciousness differs from yours: “„other‟ streams
of consciousness face this „same‟ stream; the stream of the „I‟ faces those of the „you‟
and the „he‟” (39).
Stein next considers the phenomenon of the soul as a characteristic of the
individual. 55 The soul, she claims, is the “bearer” of our experiences (40). It is intimately
linked with psychic unity and the stream of experience or consciousness.
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As with our comment on the "spirit" (see note 50 above), the "soul" here also
has no religious or moral content as of yet.
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This substantial unity is “my” soul when the experiences in which it is apparent are
“my” experiences or acts in which my pure “I” lives. The peculiar structure of
psychic unity depends on the peculiar content of the stream of experience; and,
conversely, (as we must say after the soul has been constituted for us) the content
of the stream of experience depends on the structure of the soul (40).
However, such a “mentally” (psychic) isolated analysis of the soul is imperfect for the
soul is intimately linked to the body. Stein reveals this as she takes the step from the
psychic individual (an incomplete one as such) to the psycho-physical individual. This
brings us to the “living body”.
The living body reveals the unity of the soul and the physical body. Stein claims
that “the soul is always necessarily a soul in a body” (41). My body is always “here” with
me (in contrast to other objects which are “there”), it belongs to me and I to it, I am
bound to my body in perpetuity (42).56 Now, with the physical body come tactile and
visual senses. However with the soul we have sensations. Sensations “are among the real
constituents of consciousness” (42). A sensation, for example, can be of pressure or pain
or cold. They do not “issue from the pure „I‟” as judging, willing, or perceiving do, they
are “at a distance” from the pure “I” yet they form a unity within the living body (42).
Stein further indicates this unity of the soul and the body by marking the body as the
“zero point of orientation” for the self (43). This notion refers to how the “I” perceives
56

Stein does not here discuss such issues as loss of bodily parts or functions or the
phenomenon of transplantation of body parts from foreign bodies (I do not believe such
medical breakthroughs had occurred yet at the writing of her dissertation). We will accept
that she is here talking “ideally” in the sense of this is how it is “meant” to be: persons
are meant to have bodies that function in a specific way (eyes are meant to see, ears to
hear, etc.) and they live their lives through the medium of their bodies. Of course the fact
that one is blind and bound to this sightless body as such certainly gives a particular
flavor to one‟s psychic experiences and stream of consciousness, which actually fits in
with the point Stein is trying to make here that one‟s physical body is also a part of what
makes one an individual person, enabling and shaping one‟s very experiences.
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itself in relation to the world around it. The “I” is at the center of its own world of
perception. All other objects appear at a distance to it. Even if I hold a cup in my hand,
though the cup touches my hand, it is still at a distance from me for we are two separate
entities.
The distance of the parts of my living body from me is completely incomparable
with the distance of foreign physical bodies from me. The living body as a whole is
at the zero point of orientation with all physical bodies outside of it. “Body space”
and “outer space” are completely different from each other (43).
Thus we see that “the living body is constituted in a two-fold manner as a sensed (bodily
perceived) living body and as an outwardly perceived physical body of the outer world.
And in this doubled givenness it is experienced as the same” (43). Both soul and body,
the psychic and the physical, are united in the one individual. Furthermore, “what makes
the connection between sensation and bodily perception particularly intimate is the fact
that sensations are given at the living body to the living body as senser” (44, emphasis
mine).
Stein further elucidates this connection of the psychic and the physical body by
considering movement, feeling, expression, and willing. If I walk down the street, I do
not simply perceive that some physical body removed from myself is walking down the
street, rather I with my body (as a part of my body) move down the street (46). As to
feelings, Stein looks at both “psychic” and “bodily general” feelings and claims that they
have a “reciprocal „influence‟ on the other” (49). My body may be tired from lack of
sleep and can cause my mind to be sluggish as I try to write this chapter. However, after a
sudden reception of good news, the sluggishness lifts not only from my mind, but I even
do not feel as tired in my body. With expressions, we find the physical manifestation of
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one‟s feelings. “Since phenomena of expression [physical, bodily manifestations] appear
as the outpouring of feelings, they are simultaneously the expression of the psychic
characteristics they announce” (54). I cannot help but smile at the reception of the good
news, physically expressing the happiness I feel within. Stein claims that the “willing „I‟
is the master of the living body” (56). This is revealed in action. For the will “externalizes
itself in action” (55). The “I”, the psychic pure I that is the soul, wills to do something
which is manifested in bodily, physical action. I will myself to stand up and stretch and
find that my body obeys this order of the will. “The will employs a psycho-physical
mechanism to fulfill itself, to realize what is willed [by the I]” (55). Thus the will
manifests the unity of the soul and the body. Stein summarizes her findings on the
constitution of the individual I:
We have at least outlined an account of what is meant by an individual “I” or by
individuals. It is a unified object inseparably joining together the conscious unity of
an “I” and a physical body in such a way that each of them takes on a new
character. The physical body occurs as a living body; consciousness occurs as the
soul of the unified individual. This unity is documented by the fact that specific
events are given as belonging to the living body and to the soul at the same time:
sensations, general feelings. The causal tie between physical and psychic events
and the resulting mediated causal relationship between the soul and the real outer
world further document this unity. The psycho-physical individual as a whole
belongs to the order of nature. The living body in contrast with the physical body is
characterized by having fields of sensations, being located at the zero point of
orientation of the spatial world, moving voluntarily and being constructed of
moving organs, being the field of expression of the experiences of its “I” and the
instrument of the “I‟s” will. We have gotten all these characteristics from
considering our own individual (56-57).
It is to the foreign individual that we now must turn.
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B2) The Foreign Individual
Stein begins her reflection on the foreign individual by suggesting how one
perceives the foreign I as a foreign living body. She reviews how one‟s own “fields of
sensation” are primordially given in “bodily perception” (57). This givenness is actually
“co-given” in both bodily and outer perception. I both see and feel my hand move across
the table while simultaneously perceiving that it is my hand that is moving. The same is
perceived of the foreign fields of sensation thus the foreign I must also possess a living
body. Stein calls this givenness of the foreign living body as “con-primordiality” or
empathic presentation (57). That is, this all takes place via empathic representation. I
empathically perceive the foreign fields of sensation as given in both bodily and outer
perception, thus perceiving the foreign I as possessing a living body as does my own.
What is more I can also empathically “bring the foreign fields of sensation to givenness
by making them intuitive for me” (58). Let us return to the example of moving a hand. If
the other moves his or her hand, I can, through empathic “co-comprehension”, move my
own hand as if it were the foreign hand. Thus, through empathy, I feel the sensations of
the foreign hand. Let us be more explicit. You stroke a cat‟s fur. Through empathy I can
sense the softness of the cat‟s fur and the warmth of its body beneath as if I was stroking
the cat for I have “placed” my hand in the position of the foreign one (58). However, as
before, Stein is clear to avoid any reduction of the other to the self (or the self to the
other):
During this [empathic] projection, the foreign hand is continually perceived as
belonging to the foreign physical body so that the empathized sensations are
continually brought into relief as foreign in contrast with our own sensations (58).
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In the end, I know that it is not I who stroke the cat, but you. What I sense is given nonprimordially whereas your experience is the primordial one.
Stein next comments upon how such sensual empathy is possible. Ultimately,
empathy is only possible with physical bodies of “like type” with my own (59). There
must be some “common ground” (if you will) upon which to base the empathic
experience. What is interesting is that Stein does not limit empathy as only possible
between human subjects for “there are types of various levels of generality to which
correspond various possible levels of empathy” (59). Can one empathize with a dog or a
cat? What of plants? Stein makes it clear that empathy is indeed possible with non-human
types for one can find a level of generality with the other living creatures of this world to
which we all belong. She does however offer a reasonable clarification: “the further I
deviate from the type „human being‟ the smaller does the number of possibilities of
fulfillment become” (59). Certainly it makes sense that one would have a higher potential
level of empathic experience with one‟s fellow human persons than one would with one‟s
dog or cat. However, we refrain from any explicit comment on the possible level of
empathy that can be reached with non-human types. It is enough to state that it is indeed
possible.
We have seen how the living body of the self is the “zero point of orientation” for
its own perceptual world. We now see that the foreign living body is the center of
orientation of its own world. Revealing its self-constitutive application, Stein notes how
through empathy the foreign point of orientation can become enriching of my own.
When I now interpret [the foreign living body] as a sensing living body and
empathically project myself into it, I obtain a new image of the spatial world and a
new zero point of orientation…. I retain my “primordial” zero point and my
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“primordial” orientation while I am empathically, non-primordially obtaining the
other one (61, emphasis original).
By coming to empathically perceive this other image of the spatial world I realize that the
world is a “bigger place” than I alone can perceive from my own zero point of
orientation. Thus we find that empathically perceiving the foreign orientation to the outer
world can enrich our own image of the world (62-63). Enrichment, however, is not all the
empathic experience of the foreign orientation enables. Through this experience one
comes to view “the appearance of the world [as] dependent on individual consciousness,
but the appearing world – which is the same, however and to whomever it appears – is
made independent of consciousness” (64, emphasis mine). The world will appear to me
in a certain way and to you in another, however, it is the same world. 57 By coming to
perceive your view of the world (via empathy), my understanding of the world not only
increases, but the possibility arises that I might come to know the existing world as
such.58 Thus the possibility arises for knowledge of the existing outer world through the
empathic experience of foreign consciousness.
Empathy, however, results in more than simply the constitution of the external
world. Empathy is also found to be a means to self-constitution (63). This recalls our
57

We recall here our reflection above on Stein‟s rejection of the
phenomenological reduction and emergence of the transcendental subject as not true to
the givenness of the world as such. Due to the unique individuality of each person, we
must consider all intuitive encounters with the world if we wish to know the world as
such. As noted above, the I‟s are not interchangeable.
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Of course to truly know the existing world as such and in its entirety would
require one to perceive the world from every possible vantage point, which, considering
the sheer number of people in the world today (not to mention those from the past and
those yet to come who will also perceive the same world from their own unique points of
orientation), is a practical impossibility. However, through empathy the possibility or
means to such knowledge is made available.
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earlier discussion on reiterated empathy. By realizing that my zero point is only one
among many, I also come “to see my living body as a physical body like others (63,
emphasis mine).” In an intriguing reversal of the standard interpretation of the concept of
analogy, Stein does not find the self reducing the other to one like itself but rather finds
the self determining itself according to others. “In „reiterated empathy‟ I again interpret
this physical body as a living body, and so it is that I first am given to myself as a
psycho-physical individual in the full sense” (63). Through empathically perceiving the
other‟s empathic experience of myself, I can come to a fuller, richer vision of myself, not
limited by my own self-image. Stein will again return to this self-constitution through
empathy before the close of this section.
Stein discusses three other phenomena in light of the foreign individual: voluntary
movement, the phenomena of life, and expression. We have come to see that the foreign
living body is the bearer of fields of sensation and the center of orientation of its spatial
world. Now we see that the foreign living body is also the bearer of voluntary movements
(66). Just as with our own living body, through empathy we come to perceive that the
foreign living body moves not only mechanically (as we all do), but also spontaneously
and voluntarily.
I represent [the foreign movement] to myself empathically when I transfer myself
into his orientation…. As I participate in the movement empathically in the way
already sufficiently familiar, I follow out the “co-perceived” spontaneous
movement‟s tendency to fulfillment. Finally, I objectify it so that the movement
faces me as the other individual‟s movement (67).
The phenomena of life are those experiences such as “growth, development and aging,
health and sickness, vigor and sluggishness” (68). Again through empathy, we can bring
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these life phenomena as experienced by the other to our own non-primordial experience.
As for expression:
[The] understanding of a bodily expression is based on comprehending the foreign
living body already interpreted as a living body of an “I”. I project myself into the
foreign living body, carry out the experience already co-given to me as empty with
its countenance, and experience the experience ending in the expression (82).
Thus empathy has revealed the foreign individual to be a self, a living body, a
person. Before ending this section, Stein offers a few further thoughts on self-constitution
through empathy.
Stein gives both a warning and a clarification on the act of empathy. Her warning
pertains to the possibility of deceptions of empathy (86). She states quite clearly that “we
come to false conclusions if we empathically take our individual characteristic as a basis
instead of our type” (87). What she is referring to is the temptation to assume that what is
an individual trait of our own is actually the universal norm and then to apply it to the
other or to judge the other by it. For example if I assume that my pale colored skin is
normative for the human person, when I encounter a foreign individual who has
differently colored skin, I will judge them to be deficient for not measuring up to my
assumed universal characteristic. Obviously (though once it sadly was not so, and likely
is still not entirely so) this is a “false conclusion”, as Stein calls it, based on turning my
individual trait into a norm. Stein believes that empathy itself can aid us in avoiding this
misconception by truly entering into the experience of the foreign person (87).
Stein‟s clarification is in relation to one‟s self-constitution through empathy. She
upholds that it is possible that the foreign I can actually have a clearer picture of me than
I have of myself. She states: “It is possible for another to „judge me more accurately‟ than
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I judge myself and give me clarity about myself” (89). On the other hand, the other may
be deceived in their image of me (89). However, I am not only aware of myself through
reiterated empathy. I also see myself through “inner perception”. Stein claims that
“empathy [reiterated empathy] and inner perception work hand in hand to give me myself
to myself” (89). Of course it is the task of long reflection and discernment to put these
two images together, sorting out the false images from the true.

C) The Spiritual Person
In the final section of her dissertation, Stein considers the phenomena of the
“spiritual person”. She states that “something” goes beyond the mere psycho-physical
constitution of the individual:
Consciousness appeared not only as a causally conditioned occurrence, but also as
object-constituting at the same time. Thus it stepped out of the order of nature and
faced it. Consciousness as a correlate of the object world is not nature, but spirit
(91).59
The phenomena of the object-constituting consciousness is thus seen to reveal the realm
of the spirit in the psycho-physical individual.
Stein offers a definition of the “spiritual subject”. It is “an „I‟ in whose acts an
object world is constituted and which itself creates objects by reason of its will” (96).
This element of the will points to the notion that spiritual acts are not caused (causality
regulates the physical realm) but rather are “motivated” (96). We must be careful with
this word for Stein‟s use of it does not have exactly the same connotation as it does in
English. According to Stein motivation is:
59

Please refer to note 50 for Stein's understanding of "spirit".
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the connection that acts get into with one another: not a mere blending like that of
simultaneously or sequentially ebbing phases of experiences, or the associative
tying together of experiences, but an emerging of the one out of the other, a self
fulfilling or being fulfilled of the one on the basis of the other for the sake of the
other.60
Stein envisions the structure of the human person as a multi-layered being, physicalsensory-mental-personal, whose layers are mutually permeable within the individual. 61 At
the physical and sentient level the laws of causality function, whereas at the intellectual
and personal level one is guided by motivation. A simple difference between causality
and motivation is that according to causality an event is necessary whereas in motivation
the “transition from act to act” is optional. 62 That is, eating food necessarily causes my
digestive system to start working (physical level) and coming in contact with a flame
causes me to feel a burning sensation and pull my hand away (sentient level). 63 However,
in the mental and personal realms one thought or action may arise out of another, but it is
not a necessary following of one after the other. I feel fatigued and think about taking
some rest. This puts me in the mind of taking a vacation. I start to look into flights and
sea-side destinations. In the end I give myself a weekend at a local spa, pampering
myself. Now not a single point in this chain of events is necessary. One part does not
cause the next but rather motivates it, allowing one to emerge out of the other or on the
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What is interesting is that in the sensory realm my will can actually override the
causal reaction. I can actually choose to keep my hand against the flame despite the
causal sensation of pain and involuntary reaction to move my hand away. Here we see an
example of the permeation of the layers.
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basis of the other but it need not necessarily be so – I need not go to the spa however
much I may want to go. Feelings and values also belong to this realm of motivation. Now
we need to keep in mind that here “feelings” are not the sensory reactions to tactile
encounters. We feel things but also have feelings about things. In this way feelings are
also attitudes that we have toward things. For Stein there is a passive element in attitudes.
Attitudes “befall” me for they are “due to the objective whatever-it-is that it holds for”.64
That is, attitudes are both aroused by and grounded in the thing that I encounter thus they
“seize possession of me”. 65 However, I do have a choice in the matter here. I can choose
whether or not to adopt the attitude. That is, I “take a stance” toward the attitude that has
befallen me, either accepting or rejecting it. 66 The stance I adopt toward things reveals
how, or to what degree, I value them. This stance taking is a free act and as such belongs
to the realm of the will. 67 My “fiat!” is required here. According to Stein “free acts
presuppose a motive”. 68 Thus the stance I willfully take toward an attitude, revealing the
value it holds for me, is not caused but motivated, not necessary but chosen.
Let us now return to Stein‟s spiritual subject who is an “I” acting out of the
motivation of its will. We see now that it is at this spiritual level of the human person that
the stances one takes toward feelings (attitudes) and the values one holds are manifested
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thus revealing some of the unique aspects of the individual person. Stein claims that in
the emotions the “I” is always present to itself. “For as [the „I‟] feels it not only
experiences objects, but it itself” (98). I feel pain or love or joy or sorrow. It is my
experience, and I perceive myself in it. As one is able to experience a whole range of
feelings, a “hierarchy of felt values” is revealed: “the depth classification of value
feelings, and the level classification of the person [are] exposed in these feelings.
Accordingly, every time we advance in the value realm, we also make acquisitions in the
realm of our own personality” (101). 69 This is held to be true, for what one values reveals
(in part) who one is. And because this hierarchy of values is set according to our will,
which is always “„I‟ centered” (106) Stein also claims that willing reveals something of
the human individual as well.
[B]ecause every willing is based on a feeling and, further, this feeling of „being
able to be realized‟ is linked with every willing, every willing invades the personal
structure in a double manner and exposes its depths (107).
What is more, through empathy, we can come to understand the values and personality of
the foreign individual (101). “[In] every comprehension of an act of feeling [of the
foreign individual] we have already penetrated into the realm of the spirit” (92). Stein
goes one step further by claiming that if, through the empathic experience, we come into
contact with values unknown to us, “the comprehension of foreign persons [can be]
constitutive of our own person” (102). Our values may be enriched and new ones given
(or rejected) by encountering those held by others.
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See also p. 103 for “another „dimension‟ of the significance of feelings for the
constitution of personality. They not only have the peculiarity of being rooted in a certain
depth of the „I‟ but also of filling it out to more or less of an extent”.
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Thus we see that in the realm of the spirit, we encounter the value-world of the
individual that both shapes their personality and molds their actions accordingly. And so
the psycho-physical person is found to be a psycho-physical-spiritual person. This is, for
Stein, the total structure of the human person. We have come to understand this personal
constitution through the act of empathy, not only of the foreign individual, but also of our
own self-constitution.
We… see the significance of knowledge of foreign personality for “knowledge of
self” in what has been said…. By empathy with differently composed personal
structures we become clear on what we are not, what we are more or less than
others. Thus, together with self knowledge, we also have an important aid to self
evaluation. (116).
To conclude this section on empathy we would like summarize Stein‟s unique
analysis into five distinctive features as determined by Marianne Sawicki in her work
Body, Text, and Science.70 First, we see that empathy is an act that is led and not
projected. There is a certain passivity in the act of empathy for “my awareness is
magnetized and configured to a pattern not of my own design”. 71 I project nothing of
myself into the empathized experience. I must stand aside or even “bracket” myself out if
I wish to perceive the other‟s experience as his or her own. Thus my experience of
empathy is actually controlled by the other who is having the primordial experience.
Second, “what is empathized is neither act nor form, but content”.72 That is, what
distinguishes empathy is not due to the type of act that it is but rather due to its content. In
the end, empathy is an act of reflection just like any act of reflection that the ego can
70

Sawicki, Body, Text, and Science, 95-104.

71

Ibid., 96.

72

Ibid., 96.
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perform. 73 And so its uniqueness resides in its content. We agree with this only up to a
point. Stein herself calls empathy “a kind of act of perceiving sui generis”.74 It would
seem then that while one can claim a loose connection between the kind of act empathy is
with other acts of reflection or perception; on the other hand there is something quite
unique about the kind of act empathy is. This is perhaps due to the passivity of the act as
found in point one. It could also be due to how the content of the act is received (which is
found in point three). In our estimation, there is a unique quality to the act of empathy as
such. Third, the empathized content “has a quality distinguishing one‟s own from
another‟s”. 75 In the second point we saw that what distinguishes empathy from other acts
performed by the consciousness (such as remembrance) is the content of the act. Point
three focuses on the unique way in which this content is given to the empathizing subject
which contains the tension of primordiality and non-primordiality. The content of an act
of empathy is the content of the other person‟s primordial experience given to me nonprimordially. This non-primordially given content is the primordial content of my act of
empathy. Fourth, in the act of empathy the “I‟s neither overlay nor displace each other
while sharing content”.76 As we have noted, Stein insists upon the separation of the self
and the other in the act of empathy. The two never become one. This is largely due to the
empathizer‟s awareness of the non-primordiality of the content. As noted above, empathy
is not a “feeling of oneness”, association, or analogy. Fifth, “empathy requires a new
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science”. 77 That is, the philosophical approaches to the question of foreign consciousness
to date were, in Stein‟s opinion, inadequate. This included Husserl‟s version of the
phenomenological method. Thus Stein set out on her own unique path to address this
issue of the givenness of the foreign individual and its effect upon our understanding of
the human person as such, to include our own selves. “To illuminate the givennenss of
other human beings” is seen as Stein‟s “distinctive gift to phenomenology”. 78
We find ourselves now on the threshold of another phase of Edith Stein‟s
understanding of the constitution of the human person. For one does not only empathize
with one foreign individual but rather with a plurality of foreign subjects who also give
me to myself through reiterated empathy. In other words, we are on the verge of
community. However, before we turn to that person-constituting experience, it would be
beneficial to briefly glace at a text written toward the end of Stein‟s life for in it we find a
further analysis of human individuality that both agrees with but also enhances Stein‟s
earlier conception found in her dissertation.

Individuality – Edith Stein’s concept of the human person
In Stein‟s rather hefty tome, Potency and Act, we find a lengthy analysis of what
it means to be a person and specifically a human person. 79 We offer here only the key
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Stein holds that God is the person par excellence, thus the distinction is made
between what it means to be a person and specifically a human person. We will consider
Stein‟s analysis of God as Person towards the end of this chapter. We also recall here that
this is one of the texts in which Stein is attempting to synthesize phenomenology with
Thomistic scholasticism, giving this text a rather distinctive flavor.
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conclusions of this text as pertains to our analysis of the psycho-physical-spiritual person
elaborated above. For Stein a person is a spiritual subject who is, necessarily, an
individual. 80 An individual is that which is unique and unrepeatable. 81 But how does such
unique unrepeatability come about? How are human individuals as such possible? What
is the structure behind such individuality? For Stein there is both an internal and external
element to the structure of the individual person. Internally, there is in each of us what
Stein calls the “personal core”. The person‟s core is “what he is in himself and what
perdures as the how varies” and as such this only pertains to spiritual subjects. 82 Now
Stein will eventually concede that there is in fact a way in which the core can change or
develop over the course of the person‟s life, 83 however she ultimately envisions the core
as that which shapes a person‟s character, determining it from within. 84 Thus we see that
one must not confuse the personal core with the notion of a personality or personal
character. For Stein one‟s personality or character does not arise a priori within the
individual but is shaped over time. What determines this shaping is, in part, the personal
core.
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Thus the person himself, in what he is in himself, in his core, seems to be what
has a dimension in depth and is the deciding factor in determining the depth of
acts, habits, and potencies.85
Now while we seem to be following Stein to an understanding of what the core is, the
ability to define it ultimately slips from our hands. “What the person is… remains ever
mysterious for him and for others, it is never completely disclosed nor disclosable.” 86
This is because Stein envisions the core as that which hovers, ineffable, behind one‟s
consciousness and as its root, so to speak.87 Stein claims:
What I am as a spiritual individual is not accessible to rational knowledge at
all…. As something absolutely unique, it cannot be brought under general
concepts; at most it can be denoted by a proper name. 88
However while, for Stein, a certain mystery always surrounds the person yet something
can be known or is knowable by this very designation of a name. “I am what I am – or I
am with what I am – for myself (and also for others) in a certain way.” 89 That is, while I
can never completely know the other person (or it would seem even myself), the event of
name-bestowal reveals our recognition that there is a unique individual before us who is
manifested in the particular way in which he or she lives his or her life. This is why Stein
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Hebrew Scriptures.
206

makes the claim that “every one of us, every individual, is unique in kind, I mean, each of
us is our own species”. 90
Now, lest we find ourselves slipping toward the closed and isolated monad that
Husserl‟s phenomenology is accused of harboring, Stein finds that there is an innate
openness and receptivity in what it means to be a person. 91 “[The] I transcends itself
outwards into a „world‟ of things.”92 And what does this I find in the world of things that
is, for Stein, so crucial to its development as a person? “We find other „monads‟ in this
world.”93 That is, the I in its transcendence toward the world of things encounters other
persons. And so we find that, for Stein, the person is both a unique individual, shaped
from within, but is also shaped from without by their contact with the external world of
things and, most importantly, other persons. “Dealing with things outside ourselves is an
essential part of human living”.94 As we noted above in Stein‟s divergence from Husserl,
in the human person she finds not a transcendental subjectivity but a transcendence
towards that which it is not.95 Of course we cannot forget the personal core which also
90

Ibid., 395. Here Stein has deviated from the classic claim made by Thomas
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plays a role here for one‟s response to the external influences of the world is highly
personal and individually unique. This is, for Stein, due to this personal core which colors
how we are affected by the things we encounter and how we then respond to the things of
the world.
Considered in concreto, the personal I is not a “self without selfhood” nor a
“beginning without content” but a be-ing already materially fulfilled in itself, a
“be-ing having a core”. Nor is it, in the way it is, placed into existence “all by
itself”‟; it is rather put into a world from which it can gain content and life owing
to the openness that belongs to its very own being.96
Now Stein claims there is a certain breadth and depth in this personal openness to the
world beyond. The human person is open to a wide array of things within this world that
affect him or her, thus shaping him or her as a person. However, how deeply one is
affected by what they encounter determines the extent to which such an encounter is
constitutive of the person. “Contents have the feature of seizing the person at some depth
or other.”97 This brings us to the realm of values. As we know, one “takes a stance”
toward the attitudes things cause to arise in a subject. This stance-taking reveals how
much a person is affected by things he or she encounters. It reveals what one values and
to what degree.
As a rule, the spiritual subject does not merely encounter an object in the
understanding; it does more than receive it in knowledge. The subject is inwardly
affected by the object and challenged to take a stance on it.98
This stance-taking is of course an act of the will, rooted in personal freedom. Here we see
that what affects the person and to what degree is revelatory of their unique personal core
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that is shaping their character as a person. Thus Stein claims that “the what lies in a
how”,99 that is, what I am is revealed in how I value and thus act toward the things I
encounter in the world.
In this contact I see that the objects affecting me have corresponding qualities –
values –, and as I turn my attention to them I take certain stances toward them….
These are all kinds of the person‟s “give-and-take” with what befalls him and…
seizes him inwardly at greater or lesser depth. 100
Of course what Stein finds to most deeply affect the human person and thus shape them
to the greatest degree in their unique personhood is one‟s encounter with other human
persons.
We are most strongly seized inwardly, and so the give-and-take is most intense,
when the be-ing that we encounter is another person. Here approval and
disapproval take the form of love and hate. 101
It is interesting to note that, as with the personal core itself, Stein finds that at a certain
depth of reception, “in” the human soul, there is an inaccessibility to the consciousness
and the senses.102 It seems that our deepest levels of affectivity are beyond the conscious
self. “When we meet a living soul [especially another human person], we feel inwardly
affected in quite a different way than when we meet lifeless things” such that in this
encounter our conscious understanding “takes second place to being inwardly
affected”.103 So important is our openness to other things and persons that Stein considers
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this receptivity as the “natural thing” for persons to do.104 Thus if a human person closes
him or herself off from the external world it is an anomaly. What is more, it is potentially
damaging to his or her life as a human person:
But by living in this way, they not only stay aloof from others, but they seal off
the depths of their very soul, cut themselves off from their own depths, isolate
their depths from the actuality of their life. 105
For Stein, openness and reception are truly personal acts that are characteristic of the
human individual as a person. However, she also insists on the freedom of the individual
to choose to be open to the world beyond and to allow itself to be affected by that world.
Stein makes a distinction between human persons and animals, in part, through this
characteristic of freedom.106 Human persons are self-conscious, free, and consciously free
(aware of this freedom to control oneself).107
However what marks man as man (not as a species of animal) is his free,
conscious, personal spiritualness (which means “endowed with reason” as well,
insofar as “being conscious” is taken as “being open” = able to become aware of,
and freedom connotes the possibility of following up on what one is “aware
of”).108
However, as we now know, while one can indeed choose to close oneself off to the world
and others, in this way one will never achieve the fullness of life or personhood. One

104

Ibid., 389.

105

Ibid., 390.

106

See p.347: "It is just this clarity and freedom which is the distinctive feature of
spiritual being in the personal sense and which animal dullness cannot attain."
107

Ibid., 346.

108

Ibid., 392, emphasis original.
210

must let oneself be shaped from without.109 And in this “letting it happen”, we find both a
voluntary act and a passivity, or a voluntary act that renders one passive. For Stein, the
person shapes him or herself, shapes the world into which he or she is placed (for one has
the power to act upon things in the world and influence the people with which one comes
into contact) and is shaped by the things of the world.110 Thus she concludes:
In regard to how what the person is in himself is related to his actual living, we
may conclude that his living is borne not only from within but also from without,
and from the things he encounters as well as from the persons he associates
with.111
The human person, that unique individual who is unrepeatable in all the world, while
always retaining a mysterious core within, is ultimately a relational being.
Nowhere in this text does Stein mention the act of empathy. However, we also
find nothing in the text that precludes empathy from still being the act by which human
persons encounter, and thus are affected and influenced by, other persons. Stein also
mentions the possibility of human community only in passing:
What we see in our daily experience and throughout history is always human
individuals and communities that are what they are potentially, habitually, and
actually... thanks to a development whereby they condition and influence each
other.112
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The brevity with which she treats this topic is due, perhaps, to the existence of an earlier
text in which she treated this topic at great length. We turn now to Stein‟s concept of
human community, keeping in mind that, and as will be made clear, without human
individuals there could be no such thing as human community. It is only human persons,
as unique individuals, that can enter into the type of relationship that marks the human
community as such.

Individual and Community – A Plurality of Persons
Stein‟s most explicit treatment of the structure and nature of human community is
found in her Contributions to a Philosophical Foundation of Psychology and the
Humanities.113 Published in 1922, this text is composed of two treatises. The first treatise
traces the sentient causality of the human person. The second treatise analyses the
relationship of the individual to the community. We will focus here on the second
treatise.
In the opening pages of her text Stein distinguishes between two basic types of
intersubjective alliance: association and community (130). Later in her text she further
separates these two relational units from the mass (241). Now it is important to note that
Stein is aware that most “social unions” are of a “mixed” form (131 & 283). Rarely do
we find a pure mass, association, or community. However, Stein treats them separately so
to better reveal their different components. The mass is simply an anonymous grouping
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of people with no common purpose or goal (283).114 One could think of a mass like the
random people milling about Times Square at any given point in time or people waiting
in the security-line at the airport. “For the mass, which is simply an ensemble of
individuals who comport themselves in a uniform manner, the decisive factor in their
reactions is not ideas but suggestion, imitation [contagion], and feeling”. 115 In a negative
way, one can give the example of how panic can spread through a crowd and create the
situation of “mass hysteria” causing people to simply react according to the group
mentality (252).
The differences between an association and community are rather interesting.
Stein reveals the differences thus:
Under “community” is understood the natural, organic union of individuals; under
“association” is understood a union that is rational and mechanical…. Where one
person approaches another as subject to object, examines [the other], “deals with”
[the other] methodically on the basis of the knowledge obtained, and coaxes the
intended reactions out of [the other], they are living together in an association.
Conversely where a subject accepts the other as a subject and does not confront
[the other] but rather lives with [the other] and is determined by the stirrings of [the
other‟s] life, they are forming a community with one another. In the association,
everyone is absolutely alone, a “windowless monad”. In the community, solidarity
prevails (130, emphasis original).
Stein likens the association to a type of “well-oiled machine” (130). The individual
members come together to achieve a particular goal and the life of the association is
wholly directed towards that goal. “The life of the association – that‟s the functionality
directed toward the purpose that‟s to be attained, or split into a series of single functions
of various kinds that are distributed to single members or to certain groups of members”
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(255). In this goal-driven, function-oriented association, its members appear to one
another as mere “objects”, as “mere means to an end”; they are “instruments for
achieving the purpose that the whole association serves (257-258). Due to this goaloriented nature of the association Stein claims that they must be brought into existence by
an “optional act” of a person who “institutes” the particular association (255). I decide to
form a book club committed to the reading of one particular author or topic. There is a
decisive moment of inception. What is more, once the association has attained the
purpose for which it was founded it can come to an end, although such dissolution also
requires an optional act (255). The book club has read all the works of our chosen author
and so we decide to call it quits, have a farewell luncheon, and disband our little reading
circle. Also due to the functional orientation of the association, the members of this
association can easily be replaced without much notice. “In principle, anybody is
replaceable by someone else” (256). For example, in a car manufacturing plant, one
worker is let go and another takes his place without any real change in the overall nature
of the company. However, one may protest here – “John was the best accounts manager
we had; he‟s taking 15 years of experience with the product with him, you can‟t simply
replace that with a new person unfamiliar with the inner workings of our firm; he was my
friend and life at work will never be the same without him….” As we noted above Stein
is well aware that most forms of human social relations are a mixture of the mass,
association, and community. Indeed, she explicitly states that “a pure association that‟s
not to some degree a community cannot exist” (257). Her reasoning behind this has to do
with the subject vs. object status of the members of a community vs. an association. It is
Stein‟s conviction that:
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just plain living, living with others, is already presupposed in order to “probe”
oneself and the others, in order to establish through observation the personal
competence for this or that associational function. You’ve got to have taken the
other as a subject first, at least once, in order to be able to make his or her
subjectivity into an object (257, emphasis mine).
In this way Stein claims that a human community is always prior to the creation of an
association (258).116 While the workers at the button factory may be seen as mere cogs in
the machine from a certain perspective, if they had no prior notion or experience of
communal living and cooperation, which happens, according to Stein, at the level where
people face each other as subjects not objects, such a goal-oriented enterprise as the
factory would be unable to function. What is more, I need to meet people at the level of
their subjectivity to know in which capacity they may best serve the association (131).
The co-operation that comprises the sense of communal living would end up at a
standstill if it were a purely associational living. If an association were nothing
like a community, it would be a mechanism – an impeccably constructed one,
perhaps – that couldn‟t function (259).
For Stein, “the only essential fact for the association is that it presupposes some mode or
other of community” (261). And so we must now take a closer look at Stein‟s
understanding of human community.
A community is a union of persons who stand “face to face” where “each
individual is equally a subject in solidarity with others in a common life, that is, a life
whose ends are shared”.117 While Stein sees the functioning of the association as
analogous to a machine, the community is rather more “organic” in nature.
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In contrast to the association, it‟s characteristic of the community that it isn‟t
generated and destroyed (founded and dissolved) by optional acts. Rather, it
grows up and dies out like a living creature. Also, it doesn‟t serve any external
purpose, like the association, but rather – like an organism – has no other purpose
than that immanent to it, the purpose of proper development, of the unfolding of
its original predisposition (261).
Stein divides her analysis of the community into two separate concerns: first she
considers the possibility and nature of a communal experience; then she elaborates upon
the specific nature of communal life as such, its “ontic composition” (196).
If a community is comprised of a unity of individual egos (133), the question
arises as to the possibility of and, if possible, then the nature of communal experience.
That is, to use Stein‟s example, is there a difference between the experience of grief over
the personal loss of a friend compared to the experience of grief felt by members of an
army unit over the loss of its leader (134)?118 Three aspects of experience must be
considered: the subject of the experience, the composition of the experience itself, and
the experiential current of the experience. Stein claims there is a difference between the
subject of an experience had as an individual vs. the subject of a communal experience.
The subject of the communal experience “encompasses a plurality of individual egos”
(134). Now while Stein dismisses the ridiculous notion of a communal ego analogous to
the pure ego of the individual person (135), she does find a unique aspect to having an
experience where the subject is part of a “we” (134). Again using the example of the
military unit grieving over the loss of its leader she states:
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Certainly I the individual ego am filled up with grief. But I feel myself to be not
alone with it. Rather, I feel it as our grief. The experience is essentially colored by
the fact that others are taking part in it only as a member of a community. We are
affected by the loss, and we grieve over it (134, emphasis original).
I have the distinct sense of being a member of this community in this experience of grief.
“I grieve as a member of the unity, and the unit grieves with me” (134).
Now while Stein has shown that there is a particular type of subjectivity involved
in a communal experience, she also finds that the composition of the experience itself is
also unique. She breaks this down into the content of the experience, the actual
experiencing of the experience (the “being experienced”), and the consciousness of the
experience. As to the content, she finds that there is both an individual aspect and a
communal aspect but that there is a “selfsameness” to them (135). That is, “the correlate
of the experience is the same for everyone who participates in it” (136). The content of
my grief, the loss of the leader, is the same as the content for your grief and for everyone
else in the unit. So what makes the experience a specifically communal experience vs.
isolated individual experiences that just happen to have the same content? This brings us
to the actual experiencing of the experience which is itself only understandable in light of
the consciousness of the experience. While Stein insists that all communal aspects are
rooted in the individual (141), depending on how the individual interprets this experience,
or is conscious of it, it may or may not be a communal experience. We find here a
continual tension between having the experience privately as a solitary individual, the
communal aspect of the experience, and the status of being an individual as a member of
a community. While “every communal experience is simultaneously a solitary
experience”, not every individual experience is also communal due to the private or
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strictly individual level (141). In other words, one always has an experience at an
individual level – it is my grief that is both unique and unrepeatable as accords with my
status as an individual. However, Stein notes that there is also “something lying beyond
the private experiencing” (135) due to the fact that multiple individuals can have the
same content for their experience. If these individuals are united as a community, aware
of their communal membership, then the private experiences of the individual members
join together to form a “core sense” that is available to all the members (136 & 138).
Thus we must distinguish between this core sense and the “particular sheath” or coloring
“it takes on in the experiencing of this or that ego” (136). That is:
the content of the communal experience also has its “experiential coloring,”
which surrounds the core sense and which is determined in its peculiarity by the
distinctiveness of the private experiential contents that share in the coalescence of
the communal experience (138).
The core sense is the universal content available to all members of the community (the
death of our leader). The particular sheath of the core sense is the individual experiencing
of this core sense particularly as a member of the community (I grieve over the loss of
our leader). And of course this is only possible because, at the heart of it all, I have a
private experience that is unique to me and no other. How the experience is experienced
depends on how the individual experiencing it interprets, or is conscious of, their own
experience.
There is another aspect to this consciousness of an experience. Stein states that
while there can be a communal experience of a content there is no communal
consciousness of this experience per se as if all the individual consciousnesses could
somehow join together to form a super-conscious ego (139). Rather the consciousness of
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the experience always and only resides in the individual consciousnesses of the members
of the community. But because they are conscious of themselves particularly as members
then we can speak of a consciousness of a communal experience.
The individual lives, feels, and acts as a member of the community, and insofar as
he does that, the community lives, feels, and acts in him and through him. But
when he becomes conscious of his experiencing or reflects upon it, then the
community does not become conscious to what it experiences, but rather he
becomes conscious of that which the community experiences in him (140).
Lastly, Stein considers the possibility of an experiential current of the community.
Within an individual consciousness the experiences coalesce into a unity for that
individual (140). Can the same be said for communal experiences? Stein says yes, but as
with the consciousness of the experience, this can only happen via the individual. That is,
“the communal experiences coalesce out of the individual experiential unities and on
account of them” (143). Now while not every experience I have as an individual may
contribute to the unity of experiences of a particular community, 119 those experiences that
I do have as a member of the community can contribute to an overall experiential current
of the community. And so Stein concludes that while there is in fact such a thing as a
communal experience it always and necessarily must be rooted in the individual
experience (144).
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This is due to (at least) two factors: 1) as discussed above, I can have
experiences as a private individual that have nothing to do with my membership in this
community; 2) I can belong to more than one community and an experience I have as
member of one community can have nothing to do with my experiences in another
community. However, and to complicate matters, as we will see below while my private
experience or experience in a different community may not belong to the experiential
current of this particular community, all my experiences (whether private or communal)
shape the life of the communities of which I am a member. As we will see, there is a
reciprocal push and pull between the individual and the community. The individual
shapes the community, but the community also shapes the individual.
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Before we turn to look at the ontic structure of the community itself, we offer a
brief concluding comment on the difference between the experience of empathy and the
communal experience. It should be clear that the communal experience is not an
experience of empathy. In our example of the loss of the leader, the grief I feel over this
loss is my primordial experience colored by the fact that I am also a member of the
community. Whereas, if I was engaging in an act of empathy, I would be having a nonprimordial experience of the other person’s grief. We recall the difference between the
communal “core sense” of the experience available to all the members that is clothed in
the “particular sheath” of the individual experience as a member of the community. But
there is always also the purely private and individual level of an experience. The leader of
the army unit was my best friend, was your cousin, was her classmate in college, etc. At
this private level the experience “affects me like no other human being” and the content
of this experience “accrues to my experience and only to mine” (136). It is at this level or
with this type of private experience that both empathy and sympathy are possible (136).
The communal experience clearly does not have the nature of the empathic act. However,
this does not mean that empathy does not play an important role in communal life.
Indeed, without empathy there could be no such thing as a community. Remembering
that the distinctive mark of the community is how its members face each other as subjects
not objects, that is as human persons, we also remember that this encounter at the level of
human personhood is only made possible through the act of empathy. Such empathic
givenness “is a presupposition for the life of the community” (133 & 148). We can now
turn to the nature of communal life itself.
Stein offers a compact summary of the community. She claims that:
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[A]ny community unites a plurality of subjects within itself, and is itself a carrier
of one life that realizes itself by means of those subjects. Furthermore, we know
that the community is provided with a lifepower out of which its experiencing is
fed; and that the individuals make contributions to this power source and are fed
out of it, but need not live with all the power standing at their disposal as members
of the community. A sense-bound world unfolds for the community within its
experiencing. Again, [it is] the individuals whose mental doing is constitutive for
the world of the community; but then again, not everything that belongs to their
individual world gets into the community‟s world as well (197).
Let us unpack the key elements of this passage.
As we know a community “encompasses a plurality if individual egos” (134). It is
composed of individual persons who have freely united themselves. Through this selfconstituting unity the community comes into being. It continues to exist, or lives out its
being, through the lives of the individuals who have united themselves into this
community. Furthermore, we see that “there exists for the members of the community a
common power reserve that they help to build up and on which they feed” (189, emphasis
mine). This is the “lifepower” of the community. It ultimately comes from the individuals
themselves who contribute their life and energy to the thriving of the community (203).
On the other hand, with such a plurality of individual contributions, a “reserve of power”
(so to speak) can thus be made available from which individual members can draw when
their own power is weak (189). This lifepower will have an ebb and flow depending on
how much the individual members are contributing to the life of the community,
especially as most individuals are members of multiple communities who are all claiming
their attention, energy, and participation (203). An individual‟s membership in multiple
communities can have either a positive or negative effect on these communities. If
community A is demanding more of my time and attention than community B, I will not
contribute as much to the life of community B and may even become a drag on its
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lifepower. However, if my experiences in community A are invigorating then I might
transfer this boost of power I received from community A into community B. In this way
an individual can act as a “mediator” between the two communities and communities can
experience influence from other communities outside of themselves (207). Thus we see
that individual participation in the community life can wax and wane. At times one may
be an active member of the community, contributing much to its lifepower. At other
times, one may be rather inactive and dissociated from the communal experience. “Thus,
the level of lifepower of a community depends upon these two factors: the lifepower that
its components can draw upon, and the amount of the power at their disposal that they
devote to the community” (205-206). In this way there is a push and pull between the life
of the individual and the life of the community in how each can influence one another.
The values and attitudes of a community‟s individual members are also important
constitutive factors to the life of the community. We have already seen how values and
attitudes, “a stance on value” (213), are constitutive of the individual person. If this is so
at the individual level, it should also be true at the communal level made up of a plurality
of individuals. What individual members value will have a direct impact on the form and
development of the community. This is particularly true when it is the individual
members‟ value of and attitudes toward the community itself and the individual members
that comprise it.
First of all it must be said that the solidarity of individuals, which becomes visible
in the influence of the attitudes of one upon the life of the others, is formative of
community in the highest degree. To put it more precisely: Where the individuals
are “open” to one another, where the attitudes of one don‟t bounce off of the other
but rather penetrate him and deploy their efficacy, there a communal life subsists,
there the two are members of one whole; and without such a reciprocal relationship
community isn‟t possible (214, emphasis original).
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It is crucially important to the formation of communal life that its members be open to
one another (268). Through this openness to one another the members of the community
allow themselves to “„be affected‟ by the personal distinctiveness of another” (265). This
of course is rooted in the act of empathy and results in the solidarity of the individuals.
Stein states that “the possibility of community formation reaches just as far as the zone of
reciprocal understanding by individuals” (206). The individuals must not only be open to
each other as individuals but also as members of the community. That is, the members
must value one another as individuals but must also value the community itself and as
such. The formation not only of communal life but also of “the community character
depends upon how deeply community is anchored in the individual and how the
individual takes a stance toward community” (272). Stein even goes so far as to posit a
“soul” of the community:
Here‟s what I think. Wherever individuals really are grown together with their
“innermost” [stuff], with their soul, you‟ve absolutely got to talk about a soul of
community that forms them as well (273).
In addition to this highly important issue of the community members‟ depth of
openness and relatedness to one another, Stein also mentions the “world of values”.
These include aesthetic, ethical, religious, and personal values (219). “All these values
are motives, direction-giving factors for the behavior of the community; but it is a selfevident presupposition that these values influence the community only if they are lived
and if a receptivity for them exists”.120 Ultimately, as the realm of values is the rightful
element of the individual person, so it is the responsibility of individual members to bring
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an appreciation for values to the community. However it is interesting to note that some
members, due to their unique individuality, are more well-equipped to fulfill this task
than others. Stein comments upon this value-enriching responsibility:
It suffices us to see that single individuals can serve a community as organs making
the community capable of contact with the world of values, like the open eye with
which he community peers into the world. But while they can function as organs of
the community, it‟s required that not only they themselves but also the community
– and accordingly, other members of the community – be susceptible, and aside
from that, that they be living as members of the community (221, emphasis
original).
There are numerous other elements of the community as elaborated by Stein in her
treatise, but we do not wish to treat them here. We have touched upon the essential
elements of Stein‟s conception of the community. We reiterate here that the community is
a unity of a plurality of persons who live a life of mutuality in which the individual
members relate to one another as subject to subject (made possible by empathy). In their
reciprocal influence on one another, the members of the community are in solidarity with
one another. The freedom of the individuals within the community is a key factor as are
individual attitudes and values. In what can be seen as a stance against Husserl, Stein
states: “Instead of monadic closure, community demands open and naïve commitments:
not separated living but common living, fed from common sources and stirred by
common motives” (215). Stein also notes that communities can take several different
forms. She describes the “highest” form of community as:
the union of purely free persons who are united with their innermost „personal‟ life,
or the life of a soul, and each of whom feels responsible for himself or herself and
for the community (278).
It is of interest that Stein claims that such perfection of community “cannot be achieved
by any earthly community” (285). This inability to achieve its complete form is based on
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the inclination of every “genuine community” to continually “reach out beyond
themselves toward a complete unification” that cannot be reached in this earthly life
(285). “Consequently, an inner incompleteness clings to every earthly community, and an
inclination beyond itself” (285-286).
The life of the community is not the sole beneficiary of this intersubjective unity.
Individual persons coming together in reciprocal unity of life create the community and
these individual members are the lifeblood of the community, creating and maintaining
its lifeforce. However, these same individual members are also strengthened by the
community and develop as persons as a consequence of their membership in the
community. As we saw in our section on the structure of the individual person above,
what shapes one as an individual person owes a great deal to one‟s encounter with other
persons. What we see now is that while this can and does take place on an individual
level, it can also happen at a communal level. Ultimately, the relationship between the
community and its individual members is a reciprocal one.
We‟ve found linkages of various kinds between individual and community. The
character of the community turns out to be dependent upon the individual
distinctiveness of its members, and furthermore upon their typical composition. On
the other hand, we find the individual determined in his character by the
community, as a representative of a type in a new sense that isn‟t intelligible apart
from communal life These relationships of reciprocal founding refer back to an
original genesis (264, emphasis mine).
In the end there is a note of mystery with the community just as there is with the
individual person, indeed, because there is an element of mystery in the human person.
Stein concludes her remarks on the community leaving the reader in a state curiosity.
Thus, all social life and all social modes finally refer back to the core of the
person, which is beyond the reach of all the influences of reciprocal
communication (294, emphasis mine).
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The Eternal God – The Person par excellence
Towards the end of her life, Stein‟s texts began to take on a more theological
character as she took to treating the topic of God and the human-divine relationship.
While some of her texts are purely theological in nature,121 others reveal more of a
synthesis of philosophy and her faith-based views.122 We find Stein taking philosophy
and pushing it “to the limits of natural knowledge; then the light of faith illuminates and
enhances her thought”.123 In this way some researchers offer that she has reversed
Augustine and Anselm‟s famous procedure of “faith seeking understanding”. 124 We will
here consider Stein‟s reflections on God as found in her more philosophical texts than in
her more purely religious writings in keeping with the tenor of this dissertation.
Specifically we will look at the analyses found in Potency and Act and Finite and Eternal
Being.
We mentioned toward the beginning of this chapter that Potency and Act and
Finite and Eternal Being belong to a trio of texts in which Stein attempted to synthesize
the phenomenological method with the writings of Thomas Aquinas. As such, the
reflections on God contained in these texts keeps to the traditional scholastic view of God
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as pure being, pure act, the ground and cause of all being, etc. especially as found in
Aquinas‟ famous Five Ways. What seems to be unique in Stein is how she uses the
phenomenological method not so much to prove God‟s existence, but rather to show that
these ways of understanding God arise out of our human experience and, as such, are
valid for us.125 Another way in which her analyses are unique is in her treatment of God
as person, as the Person par excellence. Indeed, for Stein, we can only designate humans
as persons in an analogous way to the personhood of God.
God alone possesses personhood as selfsufficiency in the unrestricted sense of
aseitas [being from oneself]. But there is a genuine analogy between the infinite
person and created spiritual subjects that justifies our speaking of them, too, as
persons.126
In Finite and Eternal Being Stein draws out this analogy between the divine and human
person further in a comparison between God‟s name as given in the Hebrew Scriptures,
“I am who I am”,127 and the human ability to say “I am”. 128 For Stein “only a person can
say I”.129 Thus God‟s proclamation of the divine name, “I am who I am”, reveals God to
be a person, or rather reveals the human ability to be a person due to the fact that God,
from whom humans receive their being, meaning, and purpose, is a person, the Eternal
Person. We recall that in the text preceding Finite and Eternal Being, Potency and Act,
Stein links the manifestation of human personhood to the reception of a proper name: “As
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something absolutely unique, it [human individuality as person] cannot be brought under
general concepts; at most it can be denoted by a proper name.”130 Foreshadowing what
will come in Finite and Eternal Being, Stein finds the proper name designating a human
person tied to the ability to call oneself “I”. “I am what I am – or I am with what I am –
for myself (and also for others) in a certain way.” 131 Thus, for Stein:
In the words I am (Ich bin; sum)… is the very first meaning of the analogy of
being. It is only because all finite being has its archetype in the Divine I that the
phrase I am has a universal meaning. 132
Stein argues that this relationship between the Eternal Person and the finite, a
relationship in which being, form, and meaning are imparted to the finite from the
Eternal, is founded upon the “image and likeness relationship” between God and God‟s
creatures as established in the Hebrew Scriptures. 133
This image and likeness relationship must be assumed for all finite existents, the
timeless as well as the temporal. Inasmuch as the “archetype” is the first and the
“images” are derivatives which received the meaning of their existence from their
image and likeness relationship, all finite existents must be regarded as having
been placed into their particular being by that simple, archetypal first, and in this
sense we call them created.134
For Stein, further revealing her Christian perspective, this image-likeness relationship is
made knowable to us through the divine Logos, the Eternal Word through whom creation
comes into existence and receives both its form and its meaning.
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The Logos occupies a peculiar intermediate position. It shows, as it were, a double
countenance, the one mirroring the one and simple divine nature, the other
mirroring the manifold of finite existents. The Logos is the divine nature (as object
of divine knowledge), and it is the manifold of meaningful existence of created
things as encompassed by the divine intellect and as reflecting the diving nature in
images and likenesses.
We now can see a way which may lead us to an understanding of the twofold
visible revelation of the Logos: In the incarnate Word (the God-Man) and in the
created universe. And one further step allows us to grasp the idea of the inseparable
oneness of the Logos become flesh and the Logos “become world” in the unity of
head and body – one Christ.135
We will return to this image-likeness relationship between God and creation, specifically
in respect to how creation images the Eternal Being. However, first we must consider
another aspect of the divine being which Stein found crucial for the understanding of the
human person, God‟s triune nature.136
Stein bases her understanding of the triune nature of God in another claim about
God‟s being, love. “God is love”.137 However, love necessarily implies relationship.
Obviously one can love oneself. In Potency and Act Stein makes a passing comment on
how God‟s being is “blessed self-love”.138 However, in Finite and Eternal Being the
highest form of love is love for the other. In the divine Person we find the fullness and
the archetypal source of this love relationship.
[Love] is giving of the self to a thou, and in its perfection it is a being-one that is
founded on mutual self-giving. And because God is love, divine being must be the
being-one of a plurality of persons, and the divine name “I am” is thus equivalent
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to an “I give myself wholly to a Thou,” and “I am one with a Thou,” and therefore
also with a “We are”.139
In traditional Christian doctrine, the “we” of God is the Father, the Son (the incarnate
Word), and the Spirit. Although humanity can never achieve the pure oneness of the
divine plurality of being (where the members yet remains distinct individuals), yet we are
called to image God and, by virtue of being created by God, we are also capable of
imaging God through love.
Becoming one in love entails a spiritual receiving-into-oneself of the beloved being
and makes the one who loves an image of the beloved. And the fruit of such a
union bears the stamp of a community of essence or nature.140
For Stein, “every communion and community of finite persons has its primordial
paradigm in the Divine Trinity,” although it is ultimately an incomplete and imperfect
image. 141 We discussed above how no earthly community can ever achieve completion or
perfection. We see now why, for Stein, this is in fact true. For the perfection of
community is found in the Triune God alone. Humans are called to and can image this
plurality of Persons, however it is ultimately but an image.
It is interesting to note that, just as we found with empathy, Stein does not
exclude the non-human world in her analysis of imaging the divine. Although she does
find the more perfect image of God in humankind (revealed in the ability of humans to
call themselves “I”, thus manifesting one‟s personhood), yet all of creation bears a
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certain “image character” of the divine being. 142 This image-bearing quality of all
creation is due to its very createdness. God, the archetypal being, who poured forth from
the divine self in the creative act, imparted a portion of the divine image onto all of
creation. “[E]verything has its primordial paradigm in the simple divine essence, and the
image may be more proximate or more remote”.143 Stein would argue that humanity has
the most proximate image of God, but it is in all of creation that God‟s image can be
found.
According to Stein, part of humanity‟s ability to bear a true “God-likeness”144 is
due to the human soul. We recall from Potency and Act how the human person is affected
in their greatest depth at the level of the soul and what affects one to the greatest degree is
other persons.145 Now we see that it is at the level of the soul that the human person is
also able to receive the divine Person in love and participate in the life of the Eternal
Being.
To say that the soul receives God means rather that it opens itself and gives itself
freely to him to bring about a union that is possible only between spiritual persons.
It is a union of love: God is love, and the participation in divine being which is
granted in this union must be a participation in divine love. 146

142

Ibid., 464. She states (emphasis mine): “It is our conviction that a certain
image character can be found and demonstrated in the entire created universe.”
143

Ibid.

144

Ibid, italicized in the original.

145

Stein, Potency and Act, 179 and 391.

146

Stein, Finite and Eternal Being, 505, emphasis original.
231

Stein upholds that this union with God is the soul‟s ultimate vocation for the soul is the
very “abode of God”.147 Thus we find that not only does the human person (along with all
of creation) find its source in the divine Person, the goal of all human life is also to be
found with the divine Person. “The vocation to union with God is a vocation to eternal
life”.148 And ultimately, it was God‟s “prerogative” to create the human soul with this
capacity to both receive and image the divine being for God so desired to communicate in
this way with God‟s own creation.
God is the plentitude of love. Created spirits, however, are incapable of receiving
into themselves and of sharing to the fullest extent the total plenitude of divine
love. Their share in divine love is rather determined by the measure of their being,
and this implies not only a “so much”, but also a “thus”. In other words, love
always bears the stamp of personal individuality. And this explains in turn why
God may have chosen to create for himself a special abode in each human soul, so
that the plenitude of divine love might find in the manifold of differently
constituted souls a wider range for its self-communication. 149
And so we see the human individual is a relational person due to his or her imaging of the
divine Person who is open to relationship with all of creation.

Conclusion – Summarizing the Intersubjective Person
We conclude this chapter with six theses that can be found to originate in Stein‟s
dissertation on empathy and to which she remained committed throughout the remainder
of her life‟s works.150 First, the „I‟ or self “is partially constituted in and through
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relationships with others in which each of those others is also recognized as an „I‟”. The
enactment of myself as a human person is partially dependent upon my encountering
others not an objects for me to comprehend but as unique individuals in their own right
who are, ultimately, inaccessible to my objectifying comprehension. Second, “my selfknowledge derives in part from others and from what they know of me from their
external standpoints”. I am, in part, given to myself by others who perceive me or
encounter me through their own acts of empathy. This is Stein‟s “reiterated empathy” that
is constitutive of the human person. Points three and four are closely related. Third,
“what we become, what qualities we come to possess, aesthetically, morally,
intellectually, is in key part a matter of our responsiveness to our social and natural
environment”. Fourth, “the different types of social relationship into which we enter
make a significant difference to the kind of human being we become”. These two points
both indicate the necessity of openness and receptivity in the nature of the person. Rather
than Husserl‟s monadic transcendental subjectivity, Stein emphasizes the transcendence
of the human person who is open to and receptive of the external world of things and
other persons. As was said before, a “windowless monad” is not a person. Fifth, “the
character both of our qualities and of our social relationships is necessarily marked to
greater or lesser degree by our individuality”. While Stein‟s person is clearly a relational
being, he or she is also a unique and unrepeatable individual. This individuality is
determined both from within from the personal core and from without in our encounter
with and responses to the external world beyond us. And sixth, “our judgments of value
and the attitudes and actions which issue from or presuppose those judgments are
intelligible only in terms of the account of individuals and their social relationships” as
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sketched out by Stein. Ultimately for Stein the human person is structured by the two
poles of individuality, especially as found in the personal core, and relationality, with the
world but most especially with other people. The person is revealed, in part, by the values
they hold (the stance one chooses to take toward attitudes) which manifest their unique
responses to the world around them, especially other persons. In our next chapter we will
argue that Stein‟s dual insistence on human individuality and one‟s relationships with
other persons offers a means of dialogue between her philosophical analysis of the human
person and the ethically enacted human personhood of Emmanuel Levinas.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Levinas and Stein in Dialogue:
Stein’s Empathy as a Real-Time Analogue for Levinas’ Ethical Relationship

Introduction
The question we will address in this chapter is that of the accessibility of Levinas‟
diachronic transcendental thought to actual human life as it is lived in the synchronous
time of the present. That is, can Levinas‟ ethical conception of the human other and the
human self be applied to the flesh and blood people we encounter in our daily lives, even
to our very selves? Can the ethical encounter between the pleading and commanding face
of the other and the subjected and substituted self actually take place in the “real time” of
history? And if such a relation can in fact be enacted, what exactly would it look like?
How would we recognize it while being mindful of Levinas‟ insistence that such a
relation does not give itself to be “known” or “seen”? This question of the accessibility of
Levinas‟ thought is one that has concerned numerous philosophers and theologians. 1 We
recall the claim quoted at the end of chapter two that “it [the “reorientation of thinking”
enacted by Levinas‟ ethical philosophy] matters not at all unless it impacts on our
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See for example, Marie L. Baird, On the Side of the Angels: Ethics and PostHolocaust Spirituality (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), 84. The author is concerned, in part, with
the “complex and perhaps vexed question of the availability of Levinas‟s ethics to
empirical experience within the „real time‟ of history”. See also Jeffrey Bloechl, "Ethics
as First Philosophy and Religion," in The Face of the Other and the Trace of God: Essays
on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, ed. Jeffrey Bloechl (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2000), 137. Here the author asks “how am I to live by that insight [of
anarchical ethical responsibility to and for the other]?” (emphasis mine).
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approach to concrete situations so that we come to see them as ethical”. 2 It would seem
that, if Levinas‟ thought is not applicable to our “real” lives, then its worth becomes
questionable at best. To put it in a more positive way, one could argue that the great
interest Levinas‟ thought has invoked within philosophical and theological communities
is due, in part, to the fact that it does indeed resonate with our daily lives of blood and
sweat and toil. One can envision the brave soul who dares to plunge into Levinas‟ dense
writings looking up and wondering: “Yes this is all very nice to say, but is it real? Is it
true?” Something about Levinas‟ prose gives us pause precisely, I believe, because it
does strike us as deeply “real” or “true”. It strikes us as (to offer a pastiche upon a famous
Levinasian idiom) a deeper reality more true still than any other reality.3 It is a
resonance that freezes us in our tracks and knocks the wind right out of us and, if we
allow it, refuses to let us continue living our lives as we have always done but instead
calls us to a truer, more “authentic” enactment of ourselves.4 And so the question is not
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Robert Bernasconi, "What is the question to which 'substitution' is the answer?,"
in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, ed. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi
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so much if Levinas‟ thought is accessible to real time and real lives, but rather: How does
the application take place? What could it look like?
As has been hinted at in previous chapters, it will be argued here that the event of
empathy as understood by Edith Stein offers a real time analogue to Levinas‟ ethical
encounter. What is more, the self and the other person as constituted in this empathetic
act can also be seen as analogous to Levinas‟ ethical subject and the diachronous other.
Additionally, it will be argued that Stein‟s concept of the human person as rooted in the
empathetic encounter manifests, albeit indirectly, the human-divine encounter and
relationship as conceived by Levinas. Understanding the human-divine encounter from
the perspective of the ethical relationship with the other person, made possible by the act
of empathy, helps to avoid the idolatrous conceptions of God for which Levinas so often
criticized the “onto-theological” traditions of the West.
Upon first glance, a fruitful dialogue between Edith Stein and Emmanuel Levinas
might appear unlikely. In certain ways the content of their thought seems to be
fundamentally opposed to one another. With her final, posthumously published text
entitled Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being,5
Stein‟s writings clearly remain in the realm of ontology, a realm from which we know
Levinas announced the need to flee as early as 1935.6 What is more, Stein‟s reflections
on God certainly embody the very kind of “onto-theology” which Levinas finds
distasteful and to be avoided:
5
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See for example Emmanuel Levinas, On Escape, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2003), 53-56.
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But to hear a God not contaminated by Being is a human possibility no less
important and no less precarious than to bring Being out of the oblivion in which
it is said to have fallen in metaphysics and in onto-theology.7
Despite this apparent opposition, Levinas and Stein can be fruitful dialogue partners. Not
only can Stein‟s ontological stance be “unsaid”, but Levinas‟ ethical subjectivity can gain
practical clarification from Stein‟s empathic encounter between human persons. Indeed,
there are certain similarities between Levinas and Stein that can begin a conversation
between their thought. As we know, both Stein and Levinas were students of Husserl. 8
Both also ultimately found themselves dissatisfied with Husserlian phenomenology and
ventured off on their own paths, although never dismissing their continued debt to
Husserl. Stein and Levinas focused their writings on the conception of the human person
7

Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso
Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), xlviii, emphasis mine. Please refer
to chapter three of this dissertation, the section entitled The Eternal God – The Person
par excellence, for a presentation of Stein‟s highly ontological writings about God
especially as found in her final text, Finite and Eternal Being.
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phenomenology than Levinas and served as one of his assistants. It is apparent from
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for example her autobiography Life in a Jewish Family: 1891-1916, trans. Josephine
Koeppel (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1986); and her collected correspondence
in Self-Portrait in Letters: 1916-1942, trans. Josephine Koeppel (Washington, D.C.: ICS
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is, in certain ways, particularly Heideggerian. Rudolf Bernet makes a note of this
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phenomenological method.
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and particularly emphasized the intersubjective enactment of human personhood. While
the culmination of each one‟s thought shows a divergence that may be insurmountable, it
will be argued here that Stein‟s concept of empathy provides a particularly potent point of
possible contact with Levinas‟ thought which allows the “translation” of Levinas‟
diachronous, non-intentional ethical “sayings” into the realm of everyday life where “the
third” demands justice for him or herself. 9 Levinas admits that the ethical “saying” of the
encounter between the self and the other inevitably modulates into “the said” of justice
and law: “It is the necessary interruption of the Infinite being fixed in structures,
community, and totality.” 10 How this can happen without total amnesia for the anarchic
“saying” of ethics can be found in Stein‟s empathetic act. Here the alterity of the other is
not only maintained but helps to shape the self as a unique and irreplaceable human
person just as Levinas‟ ethical encounter enacts the subjectivity of the self. Stein‟s
concept of empathy can also help to clarify how Levinas envisions the encounter between
the human subject and the divine as a turn away from God and toward the other in ethical
election and obedience. However, before we venture into this communication between
Levinas and Stein, a few words must first be said (and most likely then unsaid!) about
this “necessary interruption of the Infinite”, this unavoidable “betrayal”11 of the
otherwise than being of ethical subjectivity and encounter that issues in the time of justice
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See Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 153-162. In this section Levinas discusses
how the entrance of the third party disrupts the ethical dyad of "the saying", causing the
birth of consciousness and thus of justice which is the thematized, concretized "said" of
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and, most scandalously, the return of being and ontology. We also must take another look
at Stein‟s concept of empathy, looking more deeply or otherwise to show how it actually
breaks away from a strict ontological dependence on being and the primacy of the
solipsistic ego. In this way, the first part of this chapter will “set the stage”, preparing us
for the dialogue between Levinas and Stein that will take place in the second part of this
chapter.

Part I – Preparation
From the Saying to the Said –Ontology „Otherwise‟?
We recall from our earlier chapter12 how Levinas, in his attempt to show the
distinction between the self and the other, that is, to maintain the true alterity of the other
and keep it from being subsumed by the all-encompassing totality of the conceptualizing
ego, insists that the “time” of the other is quite different from that of the same. In Totality
and Infinity the emphasis is more on the future as non-conceptual mystery whereas
Otherwise than Being speaks of a diachronic and immemorial past.13 Whether future or
past, and perhaps it is actually both, the other does not present him or herself under the
bald light of the present in which consciousness and intentionality endlessly function.
Another way Levinas discusses this situation is, as we know, through the distinction of
the saying and the said. The diachronous time of the other is that of the saying whereas
12

See chapter two of this dissertation.
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See for example Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on
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the synchronous present of the intentional ego is that of the thematized and conceptual
said. However, while Levinas insists on this distinction and separation, he also
acknowledges, even insists, that diachronous time and synchronous time, that the saying
and the said, have a necessary and unavoidable relationship. Levinas states:
The otherwise than being is stated in a saying that must also be unsaid in order to
thus extract the otherwise than being from the said in which it already comes to
signify but a being otherwise. Does the beyond being which philosophy states, and
states by reason of the very transcendence of the beyond, fall unavoidably into the
forms of the ancillary statement?.... Everything shows itself at the price of this
betrayal, even the unsayable. In this betrayal the indiscretion with regard to the
unsayable, which is probably the very task of philosophy, becomes possible.14
What Levinas seems to be implying is that ontological language is both
inadequate to the ethical thought we think yet inescapable because we are thinking it!
Such conceptual thought is the very realm of philosophy whose task it is to reflect upon
the issues of human life. Conceptual language must be used when we speak (or write)
about the ethical relationship, the other, and the responsible self enacted through the
encounter with the other because, quite simply, when we speak about something we are
necessarily in the conceptual realm of ontology. This about, as we briefly recall from
chapter two, is the difference between the saying and the said. We know for Levinas that
the ethical relationship between the self and the other, who is infinitely other – an enigma
– is language.15 I am not called to speak about the other but to speak to and for the other,
on the other‟s behalf. This infinite response that is the ethical relationship, thus language,
is the saying. The said is the conceptualization and thematization of the ego pronouncing
14

Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 7, italicized in the original except “already
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its judgments upon reality as captured within its intentional grasp, giving meaning to that
which is. “Consciousness confers meaning… in taking the given, whether immanent or
transcendent, „as this‟ or „as that.‟ To become conscious of is to „take as…‟”16 The said is
speaking about the other, conceptualizing and thematizing him or her. Now while it is
true that “[t]he other is not first an object of understanding and then an interlocutor” and
that “[t]o understand a person is already to speak to him”, 17 we yet continue to speak
about the other and our relationship to him or her. We cannot seem to help ourselves!
The saying becomes a said, inadequate as it is. And so while Levinas claims that his task
is “to conceive of the possibility of a break out of essence,” “to conceive the otherwise
than being”,18 he also “recognizes that the language of theory is necessarily and
unavoidably ontological”.19 Levinas admits of his own work that:
The very discussion which we are at this moment elaborating about signification,
diachrony and the transcendence of the approach beyond being, a discussion that
means to be philosophy, is a thematizing, a synchronizing of terms, a recourse to
systematic language, a constant use of the verb being, a bringing back into the
bosom of being all signification allegedly conceived beyond being…. The
discussion thus remains ontological, as though the comprehension of being
ordered all thought and thinking itself. 20
16
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However, he is quick to remind his readers that:
our whole purpose was to ask if subjectivity, despite its foreignness to the said, is
not stated by an abuse of language through which in the indiscretion of the said
everything is shown. Everything is shown by indeed betraying its meaning, but
philosophy is called upon to reduce that betrayal, by an abuse that justifies
proximity itself in which the Infinite comes to pass.21
So while Levinas believes, and I am in agreement with him, that the ethical relationship,
the other, ethical subjectivity, and all the other notions entailed therein (ie. signification,
proximity, substitution, hostage, etc.) do in fact escape the realm of being and ontology, it
is philosophy‟s task to reflect upon this and such a reflection cannot help but use the
language of ontology. Such a discussion is ontological by nature because it is something
said, written down, codified, thematized – unavoidably so. Levinas agrees that “there
must be thematization, thought, history, and inscription,” but unless this ontologizing
devolve into violence and murder “being must be understood on the basis of being‟s
other”.22 And so we are in a state of inescapable and inevitable tension – between the
saying and the said, between the otherwise than being and being otherwise. How exactly
does this tension happen? Why is it inevitable? Levinas tells us:
If proximity ordered to me only the other alone, there would have not been any
problem… A question would not have been born, nor consciousness, nor-selfconsciousness. The responsibility for the other is an immediacy antecedent to
questions, it is proximity. It is troubled and becomes a problem when a third
party enters.23
And what does this third party do?
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The third party introduces a contradiction in the saying whose signification before
the other until then went in one direction. It is of itself the limit of responsibility
and the birth of the question: What do I have to do with justice? A question of
consciousness. 24
The entrance of the third party, of all the other others who make up humanity,
functions as the “hinge” that allows, indeed requires, the translation from the saying to
the said. Again we recall from our previous chapter that the ethical dyad of the self and
the other is continually interrupted by the entrance of the third party who places limits
and exceptions upon the ethical responsibility of the self: “my responsibility for all can
and has to manifest itself also in limiting itself”. 25 This limitation is necessary for,
suddenly, I am not only called to answer to and for the other, but also for the other other,
the third, and indeed also for the fourth and the fifth and the sixth and so on! My ethical
responsibility is limited, paradoxically, only by way of an infinite expansion to care for
all humanity. But, as Levinas himself admits, this all-encompassing responsibility is
impossible without “the necessary interruption of the Infinite being fixed in structures,
community, and totality”. 26 Thus in a paradoxical way, “[o]nly the possibility of the
suspension of the ethical, then, is what makes the ethical possible,” that is, “this relation
finds the „condition of its possibility‟ in what always threatens to make it impossible”. 27
The entrance of the third party disrupts, limits, and threatens the very possibility of the
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ethical encounter between the self and the other. However this entrance is inescapable
and unavoidable for “we are in the world”. 28 The diachronous time of the other is forever
interrupted, is always already disturbed, by the other who pulls the self and the other into
the synchronous time of the present, justice, and history.
Now we must remember that all these discussions of “time” and “entrances” are
never chronological. Indeed, the encounter with the other is never only an encounter with
the other but always already an encounter with the third party as well. “The third party
looks at me in the eyes of the Other – language is justice.”29 The third party is “present at
the [very] encounter” of the self and the other.30 In other words, the encounter with the
third party is just as “immediate” as is the encounter with the other.31 We noted above
how for Levinas the ethical encounter is language, is the saying; but here we see that
language is also justice, the said. How it can be both is due to the coming of the third
party (who “brings” with him or her the need for consciousness and justice) who has
always already arrived in the very encounter between the self and the other. Now we
realize what is the answer to the question what do I have to do with justice? Everything!
“Ethics cannot be first philosophy without also committing itself to inspiring a just and
effective society.”32
28
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And so perhaps ethics and ontology are not as allergic to one another as once
thought. Or rather, they are allergic but it is a situation we simply must learn to live with!
Indeed, what Levinas has alerted us to is that we are actually not called to make a choice
between the otherwise than being and the being otherwise as if we were confronted with
an either/or dichotomy. Rather what we have is the both/and of a radical heteronomy.
And this is precisely because “we are in the world” – in a world that is the realm of the
third party, of the other others where justice, thematization, and the law are essential. We
noted in chapter two how, for Levinas, “consciousness is born as the presence of a third
party” and “the foundation of consciousness is justice”. 33 Thus:
Justice is necessary, that is comparison, coexistence, contemporaneousness,
assembling, order, thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality
and the intellect, and in intentionality and the intellect, the intelligibility of a
system, and thence also a copresence on an equal footing as before a court of
justice. 34
Otherwise than being and being otherwise – the one implies the other. Quite simply, they
cannot do without each other.
But what precisely does this all mean? How exactly does it take place? What are
we to do with a situation where ontology is both inadequate and unavoidable, even
necessary? How do we allow ontology to again have a voice without it becoming the
inescapable and violent rant of a dictator? In his essay entitled “Through Being to
Transcendence: Ontology in Levinas”, Adriaan Peperzak agrees with Levinas that the
ontological traditions to date have failed to respect and preserve “the face, otherness,
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„you-ness‟, „me-ness‟, singularity, saying, addressing, [and] greeting”. 35 However he also
cautions that “this does not necessarily mean that ontology is exhausted or is essentially
incapable of taking the neglected phenomena into consideration. It rather means that
ontology has not yet properly begun”.36 Indeed, Peperzak argues that “ethics and
ontology are not enemies; they radically coincide”. 37 This is precisely the point we made
above about the otherwise than being and being otherwise. What is more, Peperzak states
that “to show this [the coincidence of ethics and ontology] in detail seems to [him] the
most urgent task of philosophy”. 38 This task is precisely to show the availability of
Levinas‟ ethical thought that addresses the phenomena which are otherwise than being to
the ontological realm of daily life. But it is not simply a return to the egological ontology
of the Western philosophical tradition. As we noted above, it is an ontology exposed to
the beyond being, “understood on the basis of being‟s other”,39 being otherwise. It is
ontology otherwise – a reflection upon who and what the other person is, who I am, what
our relationship to one another is, and the world in which we live but rooted in the
infinite alterity, the otherwise than being, of the other person whom I encounter face-toface.40 As stated in the introductory comments of this chapter, I believe that it is through
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the event of empathy, as understood and presented in Edith Stein‟s work, that such a
“proper beginning” to an ontology otherwise can be found.

Empathy as Ontology Otherwise?
The following section of this chapter will present a reading of Stein‟s empathetic
act through the lens of Levinas‟ ethical encounter. However, before we present this
analysis it is important to show how Stein‟s concept of empathy and her understanding of
the human person as rooted therein can be understood as a kind of ontology otherwise. It
was shown in the previous section how Levinas‟ thought is in fact open to the return of
ontology, although this return is to be strictly maintained on the basis of being‟s other.
Now we must see if Stein‟s thought is open to an exposure beyond ontology – if it in fact
enacts a form of ontology otherwise. That is, can empathy be “unsaid” 41 and if so, how
does this affect her understanding of the human person? Are there, in other words, any
Levinasian moments in Stein? The answer is “yes” for, as it will be argued here, empathy
enacts an event in which the face of the other is encountered. In this way a door is opened
allowing one to understand empathy, which takes place in the “time” of being otherwise,
as a form of ontology otherwise – a reflection upon who and what the other person is (and
as we will see who and what I am) but rooted in the overwhelming and uncontainable
difference of the other person whom I encounter.

deserves much greater treatment than a brief aside, such an analysis is beyond the scope
of this dissertation. See, for example, Gianni Vattimo, After Christianity, trans. Luca
D'Isanto (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 23.
41

Ian Leask, "Edith Stein and Others," Journal of the British Society for
Phenomenology 33, no. 3 (October 2002): 290.
248

We recall that, for Stein, empathy is the act through which one comes into contact
with the experience of foreign subjects and in this way encounters and recognizes the
other as a human other or human person.42 It is “a kind of act of perceiving sui generis”
in which “the perceiving of foreign subjects and their experience” takes place. 43 It is
through empathizing with the other that I am able to both refrain from reducing the other
to a mere object of my totalizing intentionality and come to understand the needs of the
other so that I may (ethically – as we will see) respond to them. In this way, empathy can
be understood as a type of face-to-face encounter that alludes to the ethical encounter
found in Levinas‟ writings. But let us not get ahead of ourselves. Rejecting other forms of
intersubjective encounter where the primacy of place is still given to the intentional I,44
Stein reveals how empathy is “an act which is primordial as present experience though
non-primordial in content”.45 That is, “the subject of the empathized experience… is not
the subject empathizing, but another”.46 If I empathize with your experience of hearing
good news, that experience never becomes my primordial experience but always remains
your primordial experience. I am always aware of this separation between your
primordial experience and my non-primordial experience of your experience. In this way
42
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“I feel, as it were, led by a primordial [experience] not experienced by me but still there,
manifesting itself in my non-primordial experience”.47 There is a passivity in the act of
empathy and an emphasis on the difference between the one who is empathizing and the
other with whom I empathize. When I empathize with the other the other is not
considered in relation to me, but rather “I transfer myself into his orientation”. 48 That is, I
situate myself beginning not with myself but with the other, being‟s other. What is more,
one finds in empathy a certain “deflection” from the other person. When I empathize with
the experience of the other the aim of my intentional gaze is, like a beam of light,
deflected from the face of the other and directed instead toward the content of his
intentional gaze. When I empathize with the other, I cannot look upon his or her face and
I certainly do not see the color of his or her eyes. 49
Now as I recognize that the experience of the other is not my own I also come to
recognize that my “place” in the world is only one among many. 50 I recognize that there
are other human persons and that this world is larger than my own experience. Ian Leask
discusses this experience as a “decentering” of the self and an “unsaying” of the
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solipsistic primacy of the self.51 This decentering or unsaying of the primacy of the self
comes into particular focus when, in empathizing with the other, one finds one‟s gaze
turned back upon the self. As we know, Stein calls this situation “reiterated empathy”
where the primordial content of the other‟s experience with which I am empathizing is in
fact myself.52 It is here that empathy, in an exceptional way, helps to constitute me as a
person and reveals the primacy of the other for my self-constitution.
Now there is an awareness of how „I‟ am only a self because of my position in a
communal matrix…; now we can see that “the constitution of the foreign
individual was a condition for the full constitution of our own individual”. 53
We recall from above that in the empathetic encounter one situates oneself in relation to
the other, submitting oneself to the other‟s intentionality or point of view. Stein states: “I
represent [the experience of the foreign individual] to myself empathically when I
transfer myself into his orientation.”54 When I gaze deep into the black holes of the pupils
of the other‟s eyes, beyond the color of the irises, I do not see the other but rather see
myself, and not as I see myself but rather as the other sees me. I see myself reflected in
the eyes of the other who beholds me in a certain way, with a certain understanding. But
this is her experience of me and not my own experience of myself. I can never experience
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myself the way you experience me, at least not primordially. In this way I do not have to
allow myself to be reduced to the other‟s vision of me. Rather I can take this nonprimordial experience and add it to my own primordial experiences that shape me as
person. As we will see in the following section, in the dialogue between Stein and
Levinas, this shaping of self is particularly significant in the encounter between the self
and the other.
In addition to receiving (non-primordially) an experience of the self, it is through
empathizing with the other that we come to realize that “[i]f we take the self as the
standard, we lock ourselves into the prison of our individuality.” 55 What is more, “we
come to false conclusions if we empathically take our individual characteristic as a basis
instead of our type”.56 That is, empathizing with the other enables one to realize that
one‟s own experience can never be the standard for the other, or any others. In this way
Stein shows us how the recognition of one‟s own particularity can only happen in light of
one‟s encounter with the other which happens through the act of empathy. She reveals
how my notion of “selfness… is first brought into relief in contrast with another when
another is given”. 57 I can only perceive and understand myself in relation to the other
who is other than me, otherwise than me, being‟s other. In this way empathy is a form of
ontology otherwise. What is more the encounter with the face of the other requires an
endless hermeneutic. The other defies all meanings that I can give to her for the lived
experience of the events of her life (with which I empathize) are overwhelmed with an
55

Ibid., 116.

56

Ibid., 87, emphasis mine.

57

Ibid., 38, emphasis mine.
252

infinity of meanings. Even beyond her death, interpretation never comes to an end. Even
beyond my death, other others will never be finished interpreting her life or my
interpretation of her life, etc. We recall that Stein, too, is aware of this ineffable aspect of
human persons: “What the person is… remains ever mysterious for him and for others, it
is never completely disclosed nor disclosable.”58 As Levinas has proclaimed, the other is
the non-thematizable and incomparable par excellence.59 The other, as the encountered
face, overwhelms my constituting gaze and shocks me with a counter-gaze that reveals
me (non-primordially) to myself. The event of the encounter with this other is never
ending and in fact encompasses a multitude of encounters, each its own unique event that
demands an endless hermeneutic itself and within the infinite “totality” of the encounter.
When I empathize with the other the comfortable world of my self-constituting ego is
blown away by the encounter with the other whose face calls me to receive (both myself
and the other) and respond.
We are now on the very threshold of ethical responsibility. As we know, for
Levinas, the face is an ethical phenomenon for it speaks the harrowing words: “Thou
shalt not kill”. Stein does not, it is true, note these particular words. However, it is my
belief that, in “real time”, empathy is the means by which ethical subjectivity is
awakened. And so it is now time to turn to the dialogue between Stein and Levinas,
showing how empathy, a form of ontology otherwise, can be a real time analogue for the
specifically ethical encounter between the self and the other.
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Part II – Enactment
Empathy as a “bridge” into the time of the 3rd Party
Empathy “Unsaid” – Levinasian moments in Stein
We have shown how empathy can be understood as a form of ontology otherwise.
Empathy is the event of the face-to-face. It is a perception and understanding of the
world, myself, and the other person “on the basis of being‟s other”. The task now is to
show, directly, how empathy can function as a real time analogue for Levinas‟ ethical
encounter of the other and the self. That is, it will be shown how empathy is in fact
“unsaid” and thus implicitly contains moments of Levinasian enactment. We know that
for Stein, as for Levinas, intersubjectivity is the foundation of human personhood. In the
“time” of justice, the realm of “the said”, empathy is the way in which one encounters the
other as other, always maintaining the difference between the self and the other. We
know that for Levinas, although unavoidable, the translation of “the saying” into “the
said”, the translation of infinite ethical responsibility into the realm of justice that makes
a “comparison between incomparables”, 60 is a betrayal. And so how can this translation
happen without simply descending back into the totalizing violence of intentional thought
that Levinas demands we flee? How can one “remember” the immemorial call of the
other that bestows on one a responsibility that can never be fulfilled and thus is neverending? How can one encounter the other person as irreducibly other, incomprehensible
mystery to me, and yet whose concrete needs I must discern and for which I must
provide? Levinas declares that one must give to the other the very bread from one‟s own
60

Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 16.
254

mouth,61 but what if the other instead needs clean water or a vaccination or an education?
Indeed, as one author notes: “Faces rarely implore without also indicating what it is they
need.”62 But how can I refrain from reducing the other to a mere theme of my totalizing
gaze and yet “see” their concrete needs so that my “here I am” is more than empty
words? Stein‟s concept of empathy provides an answer. Levinas himself alludes to the act
of empathy when he states that the ethical response of substitution “makes possible the
paradoxical psychological possibilities of putting oneself in the place of another”. 63 Let
us examine just how it is that empathy, a being otherwise, manifests an intimate link to
the ethically enacted subjectivity that is otherwise than being.
“We are in the world”, Levinas declares. Stein too, with her realist approach to
phenomenology, desires to remain within this world – here, now.64 It is a world where
many others reside and thus her emphasis on empathy can be seen as performing the very
intersubjective reduction that Levinas called for as early as his own dissertation. 65 Indeed,
years later, Levinas wrote again about the intersubjective reduction in an important essay
61
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entitled “Philosophy and Awakening”. In describing this reduction, Levinas‟ words are
strikingly similar to what we find in Stein‟s writings on empathy. We take the liberty to
quote from Levinas at length due to this fascinating consonance. He says of the
intersubjective reduction:
The explication of the meaning that an I other than me has for me – primordial me
describes the way in which the Other Person tears me away from my hypostasis,
from the here, at the heart of being or the center of the world in which, privileged,
and in this sense primordial, I place myself. But the ultimate meaning of my
“mineness” is revealed in this tearing away. In conferring the meaning of “I” to
the other, and also in my alterity to myself through which I can confer onto the
other the meaning of I, the here and the there come to be inverted into one
another. It is not the homogenization of space that is thus constituted: I am the one
– I so obviously primordial and hegemonic, so identical to myself, within my
“own,” ever so comfortably installed in my body, in my hic et nunc – who moves
into the background. I see myself from the other‟s vantage point; I expose myself
to the other person; I have things to account for.66
This experience of being torn away from oneself, removed from the center of one‟s own
universe, is precisely the de-centering that one experiences in empathizing with the other.
For Levinas, it is precisely this de-centering of the self that happens in turning toward the
other person that enacts one as a unique individual, that reveals the meaning of my
“mineness”. As we have seen, it is through empathy that I am given to myself, enacted as
myself, in turning away from myself and toward the other. This is nowhere more clear
than in reiterated empathy, when the object of the other‟s experience is myself (the other
is turned toward, faces, me). The final sentence quoted above – “I see myself from the
other‟s vantage point; I expose myself to the other person” – is this not reiterated
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empathy itself?! Indeed, is not empathy the way in which one performs the
intersubjective reduction itself? Let us take a closer look at Stein.
For Stein, the world is necessarily intersubjective. The only way one can
understand this world and even one‟s self is through the encounter with other human
persons. Being open to and receptive of others is, for Stein, a “natural” part of what it
means to be a human person.67 Indeed, if we close ourselves off from others not only do
we diminish our understanding of the world around us (perhaps even to the point where it
is but a monadic illusion), we even destroy our capacity to be our own true selves.
By living this way [treating others as mere objects], they not only stay aloof from
others, but they seal off the depths of their very soul, cut themselves off from their
own depths, isolate their depths from the actuality of their life. 68
For Levinas too, it is only when we encounter other human persons and are concerned
with them, with their lives, that we are most truly, “authentically” ourselves.69 Now of
course we can and do encounter the other on an objective level. According to Stein it is
only when we empathize with the other that we encounter them specifically as a human
person, as one who, as Levinas would say, has a face. For both Stein and Levinas, the
world is necessarily intersubjective but they also both insist on the unique irreplaceability
of human persons. In Levinas‟ ethical dyad it is of course the alterity of the other that
makes him or her irreducible to the same. The other is unique to the point where I cannot
even look upon his or her face, cannot even notice the color of his or her eyes. 70 The
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subject, on the other hand, is elected to a responsibility that can never be passed to
another but rather is uniquely “mine”. Indeed, it is the call/demand of the other that
enacts the individuality of the self.
Through empathy the self and the other remain strictly separate and uniquely
individual as well. This is accomplished, in part, due to Stein‟s insistence on the
difference between primordiality and non-primordiality. The experience of empathy is
primordial to me, but the content of this experience (the experience of the other person)
remains always foreign to me, that is, non-primordial. I can empathize with your
experience of dancing, but I remain firmly rooted to my position against the wall, looking
on. What is more, and as we noted above, there is a certain “deflection” from the other
person. I look at you, watching you dance, but my gaze actually never rests upon your
face. When I empathize, the aim of my intentional gaze is, like a beam of light, deflected
from the face of the other and directed instead toward the content of his intentional gaze.
When I empathize with the other I may see the color of her eyes but only briefly for my
gaze is never allowed to rest upon them but is turned immediately upon the object of her
regard. In this way, when one encounters the other person through the event of empathy
the egological hold is shaken loose. The self is de-centered, as we have seen, for the self
is no longer in control of the event but rather finds itself being led by the experience of
the other.71 There is a passivity in the act of empathy that seems at odds with the other
experiences of egological activity we commonly perform. Through this passivity,
deflection, and separation (primordiality vs. non-primordiality), the alterity of the other
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person, his or her status as a unique and irreplaceable person, is maintained. Levinas
states: “We is not the plural of I.”72 Stein concurs: “„I,‟ „you,‟ and „he‟ are retained in
„we.‟”73 That is, even if we do or think or say something together, the individuality of
each person is never lost. We are dancing together, but your experience is completely
different and irreducible to mine. The other is never reduced to the self and the self never
devolves into the other.
Let us reflect a little more on the individuality of the self. We know that Stein is
adamant that every person as a person is unique and irreplaceable.74 Indeed, persons are
so unique that who and what they are is inaccessible to the constituting consciousness.
What I am as a spiritual individual is not accessible to rational knowledge at
all…. As something absolutely unique, it cannot be brought under general
concepts; at most it can be denoted by a proper name. 75
We find this a particularly striking claim that certainly falls under the notion of ontology
otherwise. For Stein, human personhood (to use her words) or human subjectivity (to use
Levinas‟ words) is unavailable to consciousness. It is not constituted by the
consciousness but rather founds it: “We thus arrive at a being of the person that stands
behind his conscious life but becomes actual in it and is its basis.”76 The constituting
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consciousness has a strong place in Stein‟s thought but it is not primary. It is rather based
on that which stands behind (or perhaps “before”, as in an immemorial past?...) it. Stein
accounts for this unique individuality in part through what she denotes as the “personal
core”. The person‟s core is “what he is in himself and what perdures as the how varies”
and as such this only pertains to spiritual subjects. 77 While the existence of the personal
core as conceived by Stein is debatable, what she is trying to maintain is the unique
irreplaceability of each and every person. However she also insists, as we know, that a
person is shaped in and through his or her encounter with other persons. “Dealing with
things outside ourselves is an essential part of human living.” 78 Thus what stands behind
the consciousness is a human person whose individual personhood is enacted through an
encounter with that which is external to it – the world and, most importantly, those other
human persons therein. Not only does my understanding of the world expand beyond my
own limited horizon by coming into contact with the other person‟s experiences of the
world (experiences that could never and will never be mine); but also through reiterated
empathy, I receive an experience of my very self that, while not my own, yet helps to
shape me as a person. As Levinas says: “I see myself from the other‟s vantage point; I
expose myself to the other person”; or as Stein says: through reiterated empathy “I get the
„image‟ the other has of me”. 79 When I receive back this image of myself (nonprimordially, let us not forget!), it expands my own self-image and thus helps to shape
me as person. We are all perhaps familiar with the feeling that certain others know us
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better than we know ourselves! Or as Stein comments: “It is possible for another to
„judge me more accurately‟ than I judge myself and give me clarity about myself.” 80 In
this way empathy is quite significant in how we shape and understand our very selves.
We… see the significance of knowledge of foreign personality for „knowledge of
self‟ in what has been said [about empathy]…. By empathy with differently
composed personal structures we become clear on what we are not, what we are
more or less than others.81
The self is de-centered, made aware that it is not the center of the world but rather
that there is a great big world out there always beyond the self‟s own limited experience.
It is a world that can be experienced in such a multitude of ways that it is impossible for
one person to ever experience them all. Indeed, it is impossible to experience the fullness
of the world in two ways: it is impossible for me to experience in my life all that I have
the potential to experience (I cannot be both an actress and an astronaut, there simply
isn‟t the time; I cannot visit both Paris and Japan this summer, there simply isn‟t the
money; etc. – we must make choices in our finite lives that close the door irrevocably on
other choices); but it is also impossible for me to experience in my life, primordially,
what you experience in your life, that is, the multitude of ways in which you experience
the world. That is only open to me non-primordially, that is, through empathy. But, while
I can never know what sky-diving would be like for me by empathizing with you, I can
yet catch a glimpse of an experience that I will never know as my own that can expand
my understanding of the world, even (perhaps especially) if it is an experience of myself
given back to me.
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However there is another way in which human personhood is enacted in its
individuality through encountering what is other than itself, specifically other persons.
Part of what, for Stein, reveals the unique individuality of the person are the values one
has. How one obtains these values again shows how Stein‟s thought can be seen as an
ontology otherwise that allows it to function as a “said” for Levinas‟ ethical “saying”. We
recall that for Stein the person is seen as a psycho-physical-spiritual being.82 At the
physical level causality functions while at the spiritual level we are motivated. While
these different levels are inseparable in the human person, it is at the spiritual level and in
motivation that Stein finds one‟s human individuality or personhood enacted. Motivation
is:
the connection that acts get into with one another: not a mere blending like that of
simultaneously or sequentially ebbing phases of experiences, or the associative
tying together of experiences, but an emerging of the one out of the other, a self
fulfilling or being fulfilled of the one on the basis of the other for the sake of the
other.83
We remember that a key difference between cause and motivation is that according to
causality an event is necessary whereas in motivation the “transition from act to act” is
optional. 84 Values, according to Stein, belong to the realm of motivation. A value is the
“stance” I take toward the attitudes that “befall” me. Attitudes belong to “to the objective
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whatever-it-is that it holds for”.85 That is, in the adoption of a value there is both a
passive and active element for the self. The passive element is the attitude. I cannot
choose the attitude that is appropriate to a specific phenomenon for they are inherent to
that phenomenon. That is why Stein says motivation happens “on the basis of the other or
for the sake of the other”. However, I can choose what stance I take toward that attitude.
What is interesting is that, for Stein, even if I choose to disregard or deny the attitude
appropriate to the phenomenon, “that doesn‟t mean I eliminate it. That‟s not under my
control”.86 In other words, let us say that the appropriate attitude toward the other person
is respect. I cannot change the fact that I owe the other person respect. However, I can
choose to ignore or deny it. I can kill the other. But my potential and actualized capacity
(to ignore the attitude, that is, to kill) does not change the inherent attitude that belongs to
the other (the respect due to him or her). What is more, the stance I have taken to the
attitude (either respecting the other person or choosing to kill him or her) reveals the
value I hold for that attitude, reveals, in part who I am (for better or for worse!). Values
are thus adopted through the “fiat!” which is a “letting it happen” to me. 87 It seems that
one can make a connection here between Stein‟s fiat! and Levinas‟ me voici. In both
cases the self has been called upon to respond to an event that has befallen it, that it did
not choose, and over which it has no control. Yet a response is necessary, unavoidable. I
must say something but I cannot, only the me can respond – fiat! let it happen to me; me
voici, here I am. Thus we can say that in the time of justice, the enactment of ethical
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responsibility is motivated not caused by the other‟s plea/command not to kill. Through
empathy I encounter another to whom, regardless of who I am or what I think, I owe a
great deal of respect. Now it is true that Stein‟s fiat! need not be an acquiescence to the
cry of the other not to kill or an agreement to render unto the other the respect that is due.
As we have said, one can choose to deny the attitude that befalls one. But still one can
only passively respond to what has come to the self from outside of the self, beyond the
self. I shape myself (by adopting a value-stance) in response to the other. It is ontology
otherwise.
There is yet another aspect of how encountering what is beyond the self and
adopting a value-stance towards what is beyond enacts one as an individual person. This
aspect will also point toward a more ethical understanding of Stein‟s encounter between
human persons. For Stein, “the what lies in a how”, that is, what (or who) I am is, in part,
determined by how I react (take a value-stance) toward what is other than myself. 88 Stein
claims that one is affected at different “depths” of their personhood by the phenomena
that they encounter.89 So, for example, witnessing the birth of one‟s child may strike one
more deeply than the first time one experiences eating a plum. What is more, Stein notes
that “it seems odd when [these phenomena] do not affect him at the right depth”. 90 We
would cast a puzzled look at the man who is elated over the plum and unmoved by his
new-born child. Stein thus concludes:
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These are all kinds of the person‟s “give-and-take” with what befalls him and,
depending on his like or dislike of the contact, not only grazes him on the surface
but seizes him inwardly at greater or lesser depth by furthering and heightening
his being or by diminishing and threatening it. 91
And so while one person might go wild for corgis (“They‟re so collectible!”) and another
cares more for cats, this is merely a part of the give-and-take that shapes us as who we
are. However Stein is adamant that:
We are most strongly seized inwardly, and so the give-and-take is most intense,
when the be-ing that we encounter is another person.92
Ultimately, in Stein‟s opinion, whether or not you are a dog-lover or a cat-lover, your
encounter with other human persons should have the greatest effect upon you and shape
you as a person in your own right.93 “Here approval and disapproval take the form of love
and hate.”94 What is more, for Stein the depth at which one receives the other person is
“neither by the senses nor by the intellect”. 95 While she doesn‟t make this conclusion
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herself, one wonders if this “depth” could not be below or prior to intentional
consciousness? It would seem this conclusion is not entirely off base. We recall her
statement that: “We thus arrive at a being of the person that stands behind his conscious
life but becomes actual in it and is its basis.” 96 So if our human personhood is enacted
behind or prior to intentional consciousness, should not the encounter with and thus
access to (if we dare use such a word) other human persons as persons, that is, at the
depth of their personhood, also take place at a depth or point behind or prior to
intentional consciousness? Again, this is not Stein‟s conclusion, but she does seem to
leave the door open to such an interpretation. And such an interpretation is precisely what
one would make in an ontology otherwise.
And so we see that it is our encounter with other human persons that affects us
most deeply and thus helps to shape us as persons in our own right. But what of ethics?
Although Stein does not speak of this empathetic encounter in ethical terms, clearly there
is a “moral dimension” in this encounter. 97 Returning to her claim about attitude and
value-stance-taking, we recall that attitudes are inherent to phenomena. I cannot choose
what attitude is appropriate to something (or someone). I can only choose whether or not
I allow myself to adopt that attitude, to let it be done to me (“according to thy will” to
wax religious, but we will consider that in the next section), or deny it. And what attitude
is appropriate to the other, to the human person as such? Ethical responsibility, to use
Levinas‟ word. Stein states: “I am what I am – or I am with what I am – for myself (and
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also for others) in a certain way.”98 What way is this? It is for myself. And also for
others. The phrase is in parentheses. It is an aside. A thought beyond or otherwise than
the main thought. How can I be for myself – and also, especially, for others – if not by
the way of ethical enactment?! Does not the encounter with the other person as an other
person, which can only happen, according to Stein, through the act of empathy, always
already imply an ethical realm? Does it not require ethical subjectivity? I cannot choose
the attitude appropriate to the other person. I am commanded to respect him or her.
Ethical enactment is demanded whether or not I agree to it. The call is never silenced,
even if I turn my back upon it. But when I encounter the other person, through empathy,
as a person, “empathy becomes a precondition for ethical responsibility and, itself, an
ethical responsibility”. 99 Two things are implied here. First, while Levinas says that
ethics is the precondition for empathy, 100 this can only be from the perspective of the
diachronous realm of the other whose trace comes from an immemorial past. In the
synchronous realm of the present, where the saying has been translated into the said, the
order (such a metaphysical word!) is reversed. Empathy is at the root of ethics. When I
empathize with the other I encounter a human person who demands and commands my
respect and ethical enactment. However such a demand is found only because,
fantastically, the face of the other belies the trace of an immemorial past in which I have
always already been subjected to the other as hostage and substitute. As we have said
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before, the relationship between diachrony and synchrony is not chronological. However,
as existing in the synchronous realm, we have no choice but to use such chronological
language. Second, not only is empathy the precondition for ethics it is itself an ethical
responsibility. That is, one is required, commanded even, to empathize with the other
person because he or she is a human person. Again going back to Stein‟s notion of
attitude, we come to the conclusion that because the other is a person the encounter with
him or her that is most appropriate to him or her as a person is through empathy. It
“befalls me” (to use Stein‟s words) to empathize with the other. Of course I can choose
not to obey, but empathy is what is demanded of me when I encounter the face of the
other. Thus empathy is itself an ethical requirement.
But what of it? So I am called to respect the other, to act ethically toward him or
her. What does this mean? How does it look? What should and must I do? How does the
ethical response of “here I am” (me voici) become an ethical enactment? How can I,
respectfully (that is, without reducing the other to my constituting gaze – “I‟ll tell you
what‟s good for you!”), discern what the other needs and wants? Here again empathy is
the key. But first let us recall Levinas again. Through the intersubjective reduction
(which is performed through empathy) “I see myself from the other‟s vantage point; I
expose myself to the other person; I have things to account for”.101 This last part – I have
things to account for – gives us pause. Why should I have things to account for when I
see myself from the other‟s point of view? And what precisely do I have to account for?
As we know, Levinas is fond of quoting Pascal‟s “That is my place in the sun” and
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commenting on how “that is how the usurpation of the whole world began”. 102 Perhaps
when I see myself from the other‟s vantage point (reiterated empathy) I realize that,
according to the other person, I have taken the very bread from his or her mouth! That is,
my existence necessarily uses up the very resources that the other needs for his or her
own livelihood. The fact that I have been given a job means that countless others cannot
have that job and the financial security it offers. They will not receive the paycheck I do
and use to buy the food I put into my mouth. I have indeed usurped the other‟s place and
thus I have things to account for. However, it is not necessarily as simple as that. As we
noted above: “Faces rarely implore without also indicating what it is they need.” 103 We
also recall that Levinas insists that his work is not a moral code of conduct. 104 However,
ethical responsibility for the other is not some abstract, pie-in-the-sky notion. For Levinas
ethical responsibility is entirely corporeal, entirely real:
The here I am signifies a being bound to giving with hands full, a being bound to
corporeity; the body is the very condition of giving, with all that giving costs….
[A]pproached on the basis of responsibility for the other man, the psyche of the
subject is the one-for-the-other, the one having to give to the other, and thus the
one having hands for giving. Human subjectivity is of flesh and blood.105
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Levinas insists that “giving has from the outset a corporeal meaning” such that the
paradigm for this giving is to give to the other the very break from my own mouth.106
However, as Levinas is not writing a moral code of conduct, this is not necessarily to be
treated literally – unless of course, food is what the other needs (and very often, of
course, it is). But and according to the famous statement: men and women cannot live on
bread alone.107 Much more is required but how can I know what it is that you need? You
specifically, a person of flesh and blood, here and now, in this very moment of encounter
(which as an event is unique and unrepeatable). How can I know in which precise way I
have usurped your place, what exactly I have taken from you and for which I owe you an
account? Quite simply: I empathize with you.
Through empathizing with the other, one is able to discern the other‟s concrete
needs and wants indicated by their face. Through empathy, one‟s gaze is turned from the
face of the other to the necessary object of his or her primordial experience. The face
encountered in the empathetic experience is the face that pleads and commands “thou
shalt not kill”. But it is also a face that says: “I need shelter” or “I need work” or “I need
medicine”, etc. That is, I must encounter you in your “flesh and blood”, in your life as
you are living it.108 I can only determine what you require by turning away from myself
and towards you and then allowing myself to be led to the aim of your gaze, to be led into
your experiential realm, though it will never be mine. That is the enactment of empathy.
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It is the event of the face-to-face encounter in which the self is de-centered and called to
respond ethically to the other who demands my respect and attention, whose needs I must
fulfill for I am always already responsible for him or her. I and no other. What is more, if
I am called to be responsible even for the other‟s responsibility, 109 Levinas‟ radical claim
of substitution, this too can only happen through empathy. I can only know what you are
responsible for by turning my gaze in the direction of your look. And when I allow
myself to be led there, turned away from myself, held captive (like a hostage!) to your
penetrating gaze, what do I discover? Of course we know that, according to Levinas, the
other person‟s responsibility is for the other other, the third party. And so I find that I am
responsible not only for you, but for him and her also. All of humanity comes crashing
down around me in the empathetic encounter with the one other. Human community is
founded upon such ethical encounters which are empathetic encounters. We recall that
Stein distinguishes between human community as founded upon relationships where we
encounter others as persons, that is through empathetically engaging them, as opposed to
mere associations where the other is objectified. 110 And so empathy as an enactment of
the ethical relationship is at the foundation of human society as specifically human. Truly
human community can only take place when its members encounter one another as
persons, that is, as those who have faces which beg and command me to respond
ethically. This is done through the act of empathy in which I come to know the other
person otherwise than through the precepts of a constituting ontology, but according to an
ontology otherwise that is based on being‟s other, which is the face of the other person.
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“Divine Deflection” – Empathizing with God: Ethical Responsibility for the Other
Enacts the Divine-Human Relationship
There is one last point of confluence between Levinas‟ ethical philosophical
project and Stein‟s concept of empathy to address. This point is significant for it leads us
to the third and concluding section of this dissertation, the theological significance of
solidarity. To this point, Stein‟s concept of empathy can help clarify Levinas‟
understanding of the divine-human encounter and relationship.
When examined from the perspective of faith, the ethical-empathetic enactment of
the human person can be connected to the human-divine encounter. For Levinas, as we
know, the human encounter with God, if it is not to turn into idolatry, should never evoke
the ontological claim “I believe in God” but rather should elect one as ethically
responsible for the other, for which the only response can be “here I am”. 111 He is quite
clear:
There can be no “knowledge” of God separated from the relationship with men.
The Other is the very locus of metaphysical truth, and is indispensable for my
relation with God…. It is our relations with men… that give to theological
concepts the sole significance they admit of…. Without the signification they
draw from ethics theological concepts remain empty and formal frameworks….
Everything that cannot be reduced to an interhuman relation represents not the
superior form but the forever primitive form of religion. 112
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For Levinas, religion sans the ethical is mere mythology.113 Thus, and as we recall from
our earlier chapter, ethics is not only first philosophy but also first theology.
Holiness thus shows itself as an irreducible possibility of the human and God:
being called by [the other]. An original ethical event which would also be first
theology.114
Ethics is first theology because, according to Levinas, the human encounter with the
divine is to turn to the other in ethical obedience: “the desirable [God] orders me to what
is the non-desirable, the undesirable par excellence – the other”.115 “Levinas thus has
recourse to a notion of a kind of divine „deflection,‟ detouring, or deferral.” 116 When the
human person encounters the divine Other, he or she is immediately turned away from
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God and to the other person. The movement toward God (à Dieu) is thus always already
a farewell (adieu) to God.117 For Levinas, “ethics is the spiritual optics.”118
It is a curious notion, ethics as a spiritual optics. What can it mean? How can
responsibility for the other to which, apparently, I am ordered and ordained by God, be a
form of divine vision? Happily this turn to the other through the divine encounter is made
clearer in light of Stein‟s concept of empathy. Stein only briefly alludes to the fact that
the act of empathy is how “as believers [humans] comprehend the love, the anger, and the
precepts of their God”.119 It is significant that she does not say empathy is how one
knows God, but rather empathy is the way in which humans become aware of God‟s own
experiences. Here we find the human person turning in empathetic awareness towards the
divine. As with all acts of empathy, the subjective gaze does not rest upon the other, here
the divine Other, but rather is deflected to contemplate the content of the other‟s
experience, the content of the other‟s intentional gaze. The movement of deflection that
takes place when I empathize with an other human person thus, and as noted by Levinas‟
himself, also applies to the empathetic relationship with the divine Other, God. But what
could the content of God‟s experience be? Upon what does the divine gaze rest? Through
empathy one discerns that God‟s gaze is upon the human other who is bathed in the light
117
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of divine love and care. 120 Immediately the subject turns his or her gaze from God‟s face
to the face of the other person. Here I propose a further step. Stein insists that, through
empathy, the primordial experience of the other can never become my primordial
experience. While this may be true for the intersubjective human encounter, can one
argue that in the human-divine encounter the content of the empathized experience is
such that the strict boundary between primordiality and non-primordiality is somehow
transcended? While the subject‟s perception of the other person can never be the same as
God‟s, thus maintaining the separation between the self and the divine Other, if the
believer is to be truly obedient to God‟s command must this command not become “one‟s
own”? Levinas states: “The Infinite… concerns me and encircles me and commands me
by my own voice.”121 If, through empathy, one discerns God‟s care for the other person
and if one desires to be in relationship with this God, must not one take on the burden of
responsibility for the other as one‟s very own? One prays “Thy will be done” but who
else is going to do it if not oneself? It is God‟s will but my responsibility. As Levinas
states: “To know God is to know what must be done” 122 – and I am the one to do it. I am
responsible for the other‟s responsibility, even, perhaps especially, if it is the divine
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Other. One thus turns from the divine Other (adieu à Dieu) and turns to the human other
with whom it is an ethical requirement to empathize so to discern his or her concrete
needs. Levinas calls this turn to the other the “inspiration” of God.123 Through the
empathetic encounter with God we perceive that ethical responsibility for the other is
“the precept of God”. To invoke God‟s name is to be provoked by God.124 This
provocation happens when I empathetically encounter God thus turning my gaze toward
the aim of God‟s vision which is the human other. I am elected, chosen before I had a
choice, to be responsible for the other. Ethics is a spiritual optics.
However, ethics is not only a spiritual optics. In addition to seeing the other with
or through the eyes of God, ethics is also a form of “breathing for others” with the divine
breath and a hearing of God‟s voice in the face of the other. Let us reflect on these
metaphors for a moment. As we just noted, for Levinas, the turn to the other is the
“inspiration” of God. Inspiration refers to both the taking of breath into the lungs
(breathing) and to motivation by a source external to the self. Levinas covers both of
these connotations when he notes that the “possibility of inspiration” is:
the possibility of being the author of what had been breathed in unbeknownst to
me, of having received, one knows not from where, that of which I am the author.
In the responsibility for the other we are at the heart of the ambiguity of
inspiration. The unheard-of saying is enigmatically in the anarchic response, in
my responsibility for the other. The trace of infinity is this ambiguity in the
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subject, in turns beginning and makeshift, a diachronic ambivalence which ethics
makes possible. 125
This passage also offers support for understanding how empathetically coming to
perceive the command of God slips or transforms into my primordial experience of
ethical responsibility for the other. As Levinas declares: “The Infinite… concerns me and
encircles me and commands me by my own voice.”126 I am inspired, by God, breathing in
the divine breath which turns me toward the other whose life I am called to give this
breath – now my breath – so he or she might live.
A human subject is an inspired body. It is moved by a breath that comes from an
immemorial past. As respiration between this inspiration and the expiration of
tiredness, old age, and death, a human life is breathing for others, the repetition of
obedience to the Good‟s command.127
Breathing for others – is this not an example of substitution par excellence?128 In Genesis
we find God breathing the breath of life into the first human person.129 As an ethically
125
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enacted subject who is called to answer for the life of the other, am I not called to give to
the other that very breath of life that I have received – is this not similar to giving the
very bread from my own mouth? But there is more for it is upon the breath that the voice
is carried. It is the voice that calls to me and commands me “do not kill”, but it is also my
voice declaring “here I am!” or Stein‟s “fiat!”. The voice of the other and the voice of the
ethical subject both bear the traces of the divine voice. According to Levinas, “in the
[divine] call, I am sent to the other person through whom that appeal signifies, to my
fellow man for whom I have to fear”. 130 God calls to us and we hear God‟s voice, a
voiceless voice, in the face of the other. “„God himself, I do not hear. God only lets
himself be heard in an affect which is not directed to him.” 131 As Jean-Luc Marion states:
“And the voice which reveals, reveals exactly because it remains without voice, or
more exactly because it remains without Name…. The Name – it has to be dwelt
in without saying it, but by letting it say, name, and call us. The Name is not said,
it calls.”132
There is an anonymity about God who is both nameless and voiceless. Perhaps it is this
anonymity which preserves the separation between God and the human person who has
taken on the content of God‟s experience (care for the other as revealed through empathy)
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as his or her own. Perhaps this is what Levinas meant when he proclaimed that “God
writes straight with crooked lines.”133 For “if the eye that listens becomes a caress, it will
be touched by the sincerity of things”. 134 My empathetic gaze must hear the word of God
in the face of the other who pleads with and commands me with an ineffable sincerity to
respond ethically to him or her. Thus heard, my life is irrevocably “touched” by the other
– touched, enucleated, transformed into the hostage substituting my very breath so that
the other might live. This is the invocation of God that is the provocation by God that in
turn becomes the witness to God. It is the inspiration of God directing us to the other
whom I encounter in ethical responsibility. It is the only way in which God is glorified. 135
Thus not only is the turn to God a turn to the human other, but the ethical response to and
for the other is also a turn to or encounter with God. “The fear of God is the fear for
others.”136
Others – the word is plural for of course God‟s gaze does not rest upon only one
human other but upon all of humanity. One never encounters only one human other. We
hear again Levinas cry: we are in the world as are millions of others who we encounter
empathetically and to whom we are ethically beholden. We know that for Levinas the
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entrance of the third party happens in the very encounter with the face of the other: “the
epiphany of the face… attests the presence of the third party, the whole of humanity”. 137
Thus the ethical encounter, made possible through empathy, enacts not only human
personhood but is also at the very foundation of human society. And if the ethicalempathetic human encounter witnesses to the human-divine encounter, it is also the
inspiration behind the formation of faith communities, of religion itself. As we have said,
to offer testimony to God, to worship God, is not to declare one‟s belief in God but rather
is manifested in a heart held hostage to the needs of the human other and all others, God‟s
children for whom one can only respond “here I am”. As we noted above, if religion is
not rooted in ethics it is merely a myth for the invocation of God is the provocation by
God. To lose sight of this is to risk not only the illusions offered by mythology but also to
fall into idolatry – to speak God‟s name and face God directly so to capture God in my
conceptualizing gaze and reduce God to a mere theme and object that I can manipulate.
We do well to heed Levinas‟ words:
In the sign given to the other,… in my “here I am,” from the first present in the
accusative, I bear witness to the Infinite…. “Here I am, in the name of God,”
without referring myself directly to his presence. “Here I am,” just that! The word
God is still absent from the phrase in which God is for the first time involved in
words. It does not at all state “I believe in God.” To bear witness [to] God is
precisely not to state this extraordinary word….”138
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But this is not Levinas alone. It is a prophetic testimony to the glory of God in “the
signification of the-one-for-the-other” to which we find ourselves always already
called. 139 It is an ancient message said anew.
I hate, I spurn your feasts, I take no pleasure in your solemnities;….
But if you would offer me holocausts, then let justice surge like water,
and goodness like an unfailing stream. (Amos 5:21 & 24)
If faith in God is to be more than an idolatrous reduction of the divine to a
concept that can be controlled and manipulated, and if participation in a faith community
is to be more than a once-a-week hiatus from worldly concerns, then we must heed the
prophetic testimony to a “God beyond being” and to an empathetic encounter with that
God that breaks the bonds of onto-theology. It is a testimony that is manifested in the
relationship between Levinas‟ anarchical ethical responsibility and Stein‟s empathetic
enactment of human personhood. It is the philosophical attestation to the meaning behind
these words: “Do you love me?.... Feed my sheep.” (John 21:17)

Conclusion – A Moment of Prayer
We conclude this chapter with a brief reflection on prayer. What is prayer?
According to Adriaan Peperzak prayer is central to religion. It can be understood, “in its
deepest and simplest sense, that is, as the most originary and all-permeating responsivity
of an existence in devotion to the creative, all-permeating, and healing God.”140 In a
word, prayer is relation. 141 What is more, Peperzak combines this understanding of
139
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prayer as our relation to God with Levinas‟ view that “what we call „God‟ can take on
meaning only on the basis of these other [human, thus ethical] relationships”. 142
Perperzak notes that “with regard to religion, Levinas‟s main thesis hold that the relation
to God (which I have named „prayer‟) coincides with the relation to the other human
person”.143 This is not a far-fetched conclusion for Levinas himself understands prayer
from this ethical, thus relational, perspective.
The relation to the other is therefore not ontology. This bond with the other which
is not reducible to the representation of the other, but to his invocation, and in
which invocation is not preceded by an understanding, I call religion. The essence
of discourse is prayer.144
According to Levinas “true prayer” is “an offering of oneself, an outpouring of the
soul”.145 An outpouring to whom or for what? One would assume it is to and for God.
However, as we know, this to God (à Dieu) is always already a movement, or deflection,
away from God (adieu). Thus:
Far from being a demand addressed to God, prayer, in this view, is the soul‟s
rising upward like the smoke of sacrifices, the soul‟s delivering itself up to the
heights – dis-inter-esting itself. 146
For Levinas discourse, speech, language is first and foremost to speak to someone. It is
the saying of the other (“do not kill me”) and the saying of the self (“here I am”).
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Language is ethics. However, these words are also a prayer. If prayer is indeed a relation
to God and if one‟s relation to God is always already a turn to the other in ethical
responsivity, that is, a relation with the other, then my relation with the other is a prayer
to God. When I ethically respond to another person I am offering myself to them which is
also an offering of myself to God, it is a prayer to God, my relationship with God. Thus
prayer is “a matter of the how, not the what”. 147 That is, prayer is not about the words we
say (the what) but rather about doing something. Prayer is enactment, ethical enactment.
However, this all happens by way of empathy. The divine-human encounter happens by
way of empathy. Empathizing with God always already turns me toward empathizing
with the other (human) person which in turn demands my ethical response to him or her.
When we empathize with another, awakening us to ethical responsivity for this other, we
are in relation with God which is prayer. Empathy is thus a form of prayer. Now, one has
heard of the necessity to pray at all times. 148 It seems an impossible task. However, if we
are empathetically mindful in all our relationships with one another, and if such
relationships are thus a form of ethical enactment, and further if ethical responsivity is a
form of prayer, then cannot empathy enable to us pray at all times? Indeed, enacting the
prayer of ethical responsibility through empathy is the true meaning behind the claim that
we humans are made “in the image of God”.149 According to Stein, God does not merely
147
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look upon humanity, God empathizes with human persons. Indeed, “God can
comprehend people‟s lives in no other way”. 150 And so when we empathize with the
other we offer up a prayer to God in which we manifest the very image of God.

One final word: solidarity. According to Levinas “the unconditionality of being
hostage is not the limit case of solidarity, but the condition for all solidarity”. 151
According to Stein, “the solidarity of individuals, which becomes visible in the influence
of the attitudes of one upon the life of the others, is formative of community in the highest
degree”.152 It would seem that ethically enacted subjectivity which is made possible in
real time through the act of empathy leads necessarily to solidarity with others. When I
empathize with you, I enter into solidarity with you – it is a deeply ethical event. It will
be argued, in the final two chapters of this dissertation, that ethical-empathetically
enacted solidarity with human persons is a manifestation of one‟s relationship with God.
Ethical-empathetically enacted solidarity will be seen as a prayer to God, the truest way
to be in relation to God. Just as God empathizes with humanity, we will find God in
solidarity with human persons. As we discussed above, humans must empathize with God
so to discern God‟s precepts and enter into relationship with this God. This empathetic
italicized in the original: “Hence the likeness between Elohim and man: man is the soul
of the world like Elohim himself.” Interestingly, in light of our previous comments,
Levinas highlights the breathing of the divine breath into the first human as the means by
which humanity became the “soul of the world” (161). Being the “soul of the world” of
course means “being-for-the-other” (159).
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turn to God immediately and necessarily turns us toward human others with whom one
then encounters empathetically. However, empathizing with the other is not the end of
the encounter for such empathetic experience of the other moves one to enter into
solidarity with him or her. Thus, just as the empathetic relationship with the other
witnesses to the human-divine encounter, being in solidarity with one another also
manifests the image of God in which humans are made. This movement from the ethicalempathetic encounter with the other person to being in solidarity with the other is the
topic of our final two chapters. There are, of course, numerous ways to discuss the
phenomenon of solidarity. Due to constraints of time and space we will focus our
discussion on solidarity in an analysis of how it is understood and enacted in the
Christian tradition, specifically in Roman Catholicism. As we will see, entering into
solidarity with the other, which is a response to the ethical-empathetic encounter with the
other, manifests and enacts one‟s spirituality and discipleship. It is worship and liturgy. It
is the very founding principle of the formation of religious community. However, before
we can make this argument we must first understand exactly what solidarity is. This is the
task of our next chapter. In addition, we will explore the presence of the concept of
solidarity, that is its enactment, within the Christian tradition. It will be argued that being
in solidarity with others, as a natural outcome of empathizing with others, is an essential
component of Christian identity.
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CHAPTER FIVE
We – for the Other
Solidarity as a Fundamental Principle within the Catholic Tradition

Introduction
As discussed at the close of the last chapter, there are multiple ways in which one
can present the concept of solidarity as related to the ethical-empathetic enactment of
human personhood. Solidarity is a popular word in today‟s world. It makes appearances
in the realm of politics and political theory, in sociology and psychology. It is invoked in
the conference rooms of the corporate world and in the tenuous realm of international
relations. It has also become the word of choice in much religious chatter and in
theological writings. With so many possible avenues of analysis, one must choose how to
focus one‟s research. As noted in the previous chapter, for the purposes of this
dissertation, I have chosen to analyze the presence and enactment of solidarity in the
Christian tradition, and even more specifically, in Roman Catholicism. Now even with
this narrowing down of our topic, there are yet many paths down which one could travel
within the Roman Catholic tradition. One could take a historical approach, tracing the
presence of solidarity in the Christian tradition from its earliest enactment on the shores
of Galilee, before the word was even in use, to its first official appearance in papal
writings in 1961,1 culminating with its multiple appearances in contemporary religious
texts. Alternately, one could focus their analysis scripturally seeking out passages that
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manifest, if not the word itself, at least the spirit of solidarity. Another way to approach
the topic could be to pick one or two areas of Christian theology – Christology,
Pneumatology, Ecclesiology, Sacramentology, Morality, etc. – and analyze how the
concept of solidarity fits into this particular aspect of Christian thought. Again, there are
so many choices! In this chapter I have chosen to focus on the writings of Pope John Paul
II as representative of the official understanding of what solidarity is and how it functions
in the Roman Catholic tradition. This choice is not purely arbitrary. In certain ways, this
selection makes perfect sense, fitting in quite nicely with the discussion that has taken us
to this point. Before his election as pope, John Paul II, then known as Karol Wojtyła, was
quite familiar with the phenomenological tradition. 2 His habilitation thesis, the writing of
which enabled him to teach in the philosophy department of the Catholic University of
Lublin, focused on the ethical writings of Max Scheler. While his Catholic faith always
ran as an undercurrent to all his writings, prior to his election as the Roman Pontiff,
Wojtyła participated in numerous philosophical and particularly phenomenological
conferences. His major text, The Acting Person, admittedly works in the realm of
phenomenology. 3 What is more, one can trace throughout his writings, both prior to
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becoming pope and throughout his pontificate, an emphasis on the human person. 4 From
this perspective, John Paul II seems a suitable person to add into the dialogue between
Levinas and Stein. Indeed, as pope, John Paul had the opportunity to meet Levinas in
1983 at a philosophical seminar held at Castel Gandolfo. Not only was John Paul familiar
with Levinas‟ writings, he also thought highly of Levinas‟ work.5 As for Stein, the former
pope thought so very highly of her that he canonized her as a saint in 1998.6 Although
Wojtyła had to give up much of his purely philosophical and phenomenological
endeavors after his move to Rome in 1978, certain authors argue that he never completely
forsook his phenomenological roots.7 In this way, John Paul II can be seen as a type of

phenomenology, hermeneutics and even linguistics”. It is interesting to note that The
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Janus figure, looking in two different directions, bridging two different realms. He has
one foot planted in the realm of phenomenology and one in Catholic theology. In either
stance, his concern is with the human person. What is more, on the Catholic side of
things, to date no other pope has written so extensively on the concept of solidarity as has
John Paul II. And so we turn to his writings, both his more phenomenologically oriented
writings prior to becoming pope and his encyclicals as representative of the official
position of the Roman Catholic Church, to analyze the concept of solidarity. Once we
have grasped a basic understanding of what, from the perspective of Roman Catholicism,
solidarity is, we will move in our final and concluding chapter to examine how the
concept of solidarity has been employed within Catholic theological texts to bring a fresh
understanding to certain areas such as spirituality, discipleship, ecclesiology, and worship
and liturgy.

A Preliminary Concern: Why Solidarity?
Before we turn to the writings of John Paul II, it seems imperative to show,
briefly, how solidarity has become such an important concept within the Christian
tradition, and specifically within Roman Catholicism. Theologian Dieter T. Hessel claims
that solidarity ought to be the “ethical norm that may focus the church‟s social
involvement” thus giving “impetus to mission in society” and offering “a framework for

phenomenological approach… in many of the pronouncements he made as head of the
Roman Catholic Church, particularly those dealing with social responsibility…”
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scholarly research and for program planning by church leaders”. 8 According to Anselm
Min, “solidarity with others” is precisely the paradigm needed for contemporary theology
if it is to have any relevance in today‟s global world.9 We will examine the concept in
much greater detail below, but it will be helpful to introduce a working definition of
solidarity at this point. According to John Paul II, solidarity is:
a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; that
is to say to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really
responsible for all (38).10
What this commitment entails (from the Christian perspective) is a
full commitment to [the world], unreserved participation in its situation, in the
promise given it by creation, in its responsibility for the arrogance, sloth and
falsehood which reign within it, in its suffering under the resultant distress, but
primarily and supremely in the free grace of God demonstrated and addressed to it
in Jesus Christ, and therefore in its hope…. The solidarity of the community with
the world consists... [in making] itself known to others as akin to them, rejoicing
with them that do rejoice and weeping with them that weep (Rom 12:15),… by
accepting the fact that it must be honestly and unreservedly among them and with
them, on the same level and footing, in the same boat and within the same limits
as any or all of them. 11
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Thus solidarity is some form of unifying principle among people that clearly carries with
it an ethical significance that is manifested in certain actions with and for others. As we
will see, the concept of solidarity as it is discussed and enacted within the Christian
(again, specifically Catholic) tradition is intimately linked with the church‟s sense of
mission to the entire world and particularly in the form of acts of social justice. 12 What is
more, solidarity functions both at the level of the individual human person and as a
structural element within the life of the community composed of these individual human
persons.
While the first official – that is papal – mention of solidarity appeared in John
XXIII‟s encyclical Mater et Magistra (1961), solidarity featured much more prominently
in the Vatican II document Gaudium et Spes (1965). Although the word solidarity is not
used, the very opening passage of this document manifests the spirit of solidarity:
The joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age,
especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted, these too are the joys and
hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ. Indeed, nothing
genuinely human fails to raise an echo in their hearts. For theirs is a community
composed of men…. That is why this community realizes that it is truly and
intimately linked with mankind and its history (1).13
According to the Christian understanding of the nature of human persons, there is an
interdependence among humans due to their common origin in the one God. What is
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For an excellent overview of the Catholic social justice tradition see Donal
Dorr, Option for the Poor: A Hundred Years of Catholic Social Teaching (Maryknoll:
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ed. David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1992), 166.
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more, it is this God that desires for humans to be, not only in community with one
another, but even deeper, in solidarity with one another:
Indeed, the Lord Jesus, when he prayed to the Father, “that all may be one… as
we are one” (John 17:21-22) opened up vistas closed to human reason. For he
implied a certain likeness between the union of the divine Persons, and in the
union of God‟s sons in truth and charity. This likeness reveals that man, who is
the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself
except through a sincere gift of himself (24).14
Thus “God did not create man for life in isolation, but for the formation of social unity….
This solidarity must be constantly increased until that day on which it will be brought to
perfection” (32).15 In this way, solidarity is seen to be a fundamental aspect of the human
person and particularly of the human person as created by God and in God‟s image. From
the very moment of creation humans are called to be in relationship with one another: “It
is not good for the man to be alone. I will make a suitable partner for him” (Genesis 2:1819). Now obviously there are many types of human relations which can range from the
banal to the most intimate, healthy to neurotic. However, and as we will show in greater
detail below, at the root of all authentic human relations where human personhood is
recognized and supported, is the response of solidarity to the other. It is a response called
forth by the empathetic encounter with the other, which is, as has been shown, the way in
which we encounter others as human persons.
We recall that that empathetic encounter with the other rests upon the anarchical
ethical encounter of the self and other. In this way, empathizing with the other always
already carries with it an ethical obligation. I must respond to the other with whom I
14
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empathize and not merely observe him or her – I must rejoice when she rejoices and
weep when he weeps, but even more than that, I must act with him or her. All response to
the other, if it is human and if it reflects the level of human personhood, is an ethical
response. Entering into solidarity with the other, as will be shown more clearly below,
manifests this ethical response.
Now as we noted above, solidarity is not only paradigmatic of human relations, it
is also a key structural and thus constitutive feature of the church itself, the community of
believers. Only a few years following the publication of Gaudium et Spes, the World
Synod of Bishops made a bold claim about the identity and authentic functioning of the
(Catholic) church:
Action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world
fully appear to us as a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the Gospel, or, in
other words, of the Church‟s mission for the redemption of the human race and its
liberation from every oppressive situation. 16
At the root of such social justice, that is as the attitude which is the motivation behind
such action, is the commitment of solidarity. As we will see, solidarity among persons
and within human community, particularly here within the community of believers, will
manifest itself in “action on behalf of justice”.
Common parlance among theologians today on issues of ecclesiology is the view
that “ministry precedes and produces theology, not the reverse” which also means that
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Synod of Bishops, "Justice in the World," in Catholic Social Thought: The
Documentary Heritage, ed. David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon (Maryknoll: Orbis
Books, 1992), 289, emphasis mine.
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“ministry precedes and determines the Church”. 17 Now one must ask: what can be the
particular ministry or role of the church? Simply, it is to do the ministry of God – “All
ministry is God‟s ministry.” 18 But this leads to a further question: what is the ministry of
God? How is God concerned with this world? We raised this question in our previous
chapter: how can the believer discern the precepts of God? We recall our answer: one
turns in empathetic awareness to this God and finds his or her gaze turned upon the face
of the human other to whom one is obligated to respond with the only response that is
both human and at the level of personhood or subjectivity: me voici, here I am. To
translate this into a specifically Christian context means to understand this obligation as
rooted in the life and ministry of Jesus Christ:
And the fact that He [Jesus] was moved with compassion means originally that
He could not and would not close His mind to the existence and situation of the
multitude, nor hold Himself aloof from it, but that it affected Him, that it went
right to His heart, that He made it His own, that He could not but identify Himself
with them. Only He could do this with the breadth with which He did so. But His
community cannot follow any other line.19
Clearly the Christian understands the life of Jesus of Nazareth as enacting solidarity with
human persons and, indeed, all of humanity – “He made it His own”. His followers, if
they are to be his, and if they are to follow, that is emulate him, must “go and do
likewise” (Luke 10:37). This is what the commitment of solidarity entails and why it
manifests itself in “action on behalf of justice” for the world, both on the individual level
and as a constitutive aspect of the community of believers itself.
17
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In all the documents of the tradition, then, the theory of justice is rooted in a
philosophical view of the nature of the person as essentially social and
simultaneously in an explicitly Christian notion of love as mutuality and as
response in the concrete, especially to those in need.20
In this way “response to God in faith and response to the neighbor in love and solidarity
are inseparable”. 21 Now that we see how and why solidarity with others is a key feature
of the life of the church, let us take a closer examination of what precisely the
phenomenon of solidarity is. For this we turn to the writings of John Paul II.

Solidarity as the Response of the Ethical-Empathetic Encounter with the Other
People are probably more familiar with John Paul II‟s theological writings on
solidarity during his time as Roman Pontiff. However as we noted at the beginning of this
chapter, prior to becoming pope, Karol Wojtyła had quite a prolific career as both a
philosopher and theologian. During this time he also wrote on the concept of solidarity,
approaching it from a more philosophical and, specifically, phenomenological
perspective. In this section we will first examine these more philosophical writings. We
will close this chapter with a reflection on solidarity as addressed in the encyclical
Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, written by John Paul II in 1987. In between these two sections
we will also elicit the aid of Józef Tischner, compatriot and personal friend of John Paul
II. Tischner was not only a student of Roman Ingarden, the famous Polish
phenomenologist and close friend of Edith Stein, he was also an avid reader of and highly
20
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influenced by Levinas‟ works.22 In addition, he served as the chaplain of Solidarność, the
Polish Workers‟ Union,23 and wrote a key text on solidarity, The Spirit of Solidarity, in
which he expands upon the topic from a phenomenologically-friendly perspective.24
Tischner‟s writings on solidarity, which are quite harmonious with the pope‟s, will help
to provide a more comprehensive explication than the writings of John Paul alone can
provide.

The Acting Person – A Prelude to Solidarity
Before we can address Wojtyła‟s explicit writings on solidarity, it is necessary to
briefly expand upon his understanding of the human person for his writings on solidarity
only make sense in this light.25 For Wojtyła, the best way to approach the human subject
as specifically human and as a person, is not from the Cartesian emphasis on thinking but
rather from the perspective of action. That is, the human person reveals him or herself “in
the actual enacting of his [or her] existence”.26 This is the claim that he makes in his most
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comprehensive approach to the question of the human person, The Acting Person. He
states: “For our position is that action serves as a particular moment of apprehending –
that is, of experiencing – the person.” This is because “action reveals the person, and we
look at the person through his action”. 27 Now for the purposes of this dissertation, we
need not address every nuance of Wojtyła‟s conception of the human person. Here we
will only focus on those aspects that most directly impress upon his understanding of
solidarity as an enacting moment of the human person.
The human person is an acting person. That is, “before all else, as a philosopher
Karol Wojtyła is interested in man as a dynamic subject, who is able to fulfill himself by
fulfilling acts which correspond to him as a person with regard to their contents and the
manner in which they are realized”.28 Numerous things are implied in this one sentence.
First we find the aforementioned emphasis on the self-revelatory nature of human
actions. But there is a qualification – it appears that not all acts reveal the person, or
correspond to the person, to the same degree or intensity. That is, depending on the
content of the act and the manner in which it is realized, certain acts are more selfrevelatory of the person than others, or “correspond to him as a person”. This will
become a key distinction when we look specifically at the act of solidarity. This
qualification of the content and manner of performing acts brings us directly into the
realm of morality. For the pope, all actions “have a moral value” and it is precisely “this
27
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moral aspect… [that] allows us to reach a better understanding of the human being
insofar as he is a person” for from this moral perspective of action “the person emerges
into view more completely than in „pure‟ action”. 29 Throughout Wojtyła‟s writings on the
human person, he emphasizes that human acts, as revelatory of the person, involve the
aspects of choice, responsibility, morality, self-determination, self-governance, and selfpossession.
Approaching the human person from the perspective of self-revelatory acts
implies the notion of choice. We are finite and contingent creatures. We cannot perform
all possible acts that are available to us, and certain actions are outside our realm of
possibility due to certain physical limitations and limitations of time, space, and culture.
Thus we must choose in each and every moment what few actions we will perform and
thus what multitude of actions we will not perform.
The affirmation, the acknowledgement of truth, of the person and his dignity at
the level of cognition, is also a summons to affirm this truth by an act of choice,
i.e., by an act which in a given situation corresponds to man as a person. 30
Now if I make a choice for a certain action over and against all other possible actions that
I could choose in that moment, I am responsible for that choice and that action.
The cardinal point in this problem may be seen when meditating on the nature of
human acting which, in the rule, implies a choice between various possible
alternatives. The problem of responsibility is directly linked to the axiological
(normative) problem. 31
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As responsible for my choices and actions, I am also a moral agent. The content of my
choice of action and the manner in which I realize it can be good or bad. This brings us
into the realm of value. When I choose to perform certain actions, I realize (or fail to
realize) certain values which both shape and reveal me as the unique and individual
human person that I am. There is an efficacy to my actions which is why Wojtyła speaks
of the self-determination of the person through his or her acts.
This first definition of self-determination in the experience of human action
involves a sense of efficacy on the part of the personal self: “I act” means “I am
the efficient cause” of my action and of my self-actualization as a subject, which
is not the case when something merely “happens” in me…. My sense of efficacy
as an acting subject in relation to my activity is intimately connected with a sense
of responsibility for that activity…32
He goes on to clarify that:
Self-determination manifests itself both in elementary willing (“I will”) and in
choice and decision, which arise from an awareness of values, a weighing of
motives, and also not infrequently a struggle and conflict of motives within an
individual. 33
It is through this willing, this choice, that I move in a certain direction. But I do not only
determine which direction I will go for “through it [the choice for a certain direction or
value or action] I simultaneously determine myself as well”.34 We see that the choices we
make (and the subsequent actions performed according to those choices) affect who we
are as persons. The values one realizes through one‟s actions “will necessarily mean a
modification of the acting person, who, in turn, will perform in a modified way decisions
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based on intentions of the will”. 35 Wojtyła concludes: “Self-determination thus
corresponds to the becoming of a human being as a human being.”36 That is, the choices
for actions that I make mark me as a unique and individual person.37 No one else can
make this choice and perform this action in precisely the same way that I am, at this very
moment, here and now, making this choice and performing this action. What is more, as
we just noted, the choice for and fulfillment of this particular action (as opposed to that
action) realizes certain values that shape and reveal the person in his or her unique
individuality. In this way, the actions one chooses to perform determine who one is as a
unique and irreplaceable human person.38 That is, “the efficacy that is also selfdetermination fully discloses the person as a subjective structure of self-governance and
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self-possession”.39 Through the efficacy of my choices I determine who I am. I possess
and govern myself. I am responsible for myself and the choices that make me who I am. 40
According to Wojtyła, human actions “reveal the wholeness, originality, and
unrepeatability of each human being”. 41
Now these actions are, of course, not performed in an isolated vacuum. Wojtyła is
fully aware that, in acting, the human person “usually – if not always – … in one way or
another acts „together with others‟”. 42 My actions directly and indirectly affect others and
visa versa. Thus my self-enactment is always already ethical. In this way the morality of
my actions is two-fold. As we have just discussed, my actions are moral because they
necessarily imply choice and thus responsibility. But my actions are also always already
moral, or ethical, because of the intersubjective realm in which I necessarily perform
them. Although Levinas does not place the same emphasis directly upon human action
per se, Wojtyła‟s view of self-possession and thus responsibility for one‟s own actions,
seems to be quite harmonious with Levinas‟ insistence on the responsibility of the ethical
self who states “here I am” in response to the encounter with the other. This
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correspondence in thought is especially strong in light of Wojtyła‟s recognition of the
necessarily ethical aspect of all human actions. Wojtyła discusses this intersubjective and
thus ethical aspect of the human person through his concepts of participation and
alienation.43 As we will see, participation is key to understanding Wojtyła‟s explication
of solidarity.
Wojtyła ultimately claims that we not only act “together with others” but “[a]s
human beings, we are capable of participating in the very humanity of other people”. 44
There is much to unpack in this bold claim. First it should be noted that, for Wojtyła,
“[w]hen I construct an image of the person as subject on the basis of the experience of the
human being, I draw especially upon the experience of my own self, but never in
isolation from or in opposition to others”. That is, “I must include both others and myself
in the whole process of understanding the human being”. 45 While in certain ways it may
seem that Wojtyła privileges the self and the experience of the I in a way that Levinas
might claim is reductionistic,46 through the notion of participation Wojtyła attempts to
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prevent a reduction of the other to the self (or visa versa). In fact, the notion of
participation is precisely the way in which Wojtyła attempts to keep the self and the other
as separate and unique individuals while acknowledging that human persons also act
together and can participate in each other‟s lives. Participation is thus “the property by
virtue of which we as persons exist and act together with others, while not ceasing to be
ourselves or to fulfill ourselves in action, in our own acts”. That is, participation
“serves… to specify and express what it is that safeguards us as persons along with the
personalistic nature and value of our activity as we exist and act together with others in
different systems of social life”. 47 Much like Stein‟s emphasis on the separation between
the self and the other via the difference between primordially and non-primordially held
experiences, Wojtyła too insists on an irreducible difference between the self and the
other according to human experience. This difference, or disparity, is clearly evident
when one is the object of one‟s own experience, that is, when I am self-aware (selfconscious) of my experiences as uniquely mine. Wojtyła calls this an “inner
experience”.48 As such, this inner experience is non-transferable beyond myself: “Selfconsciousness, like self-possession, as the name itself suggests, is not transferable beyond
unnecessary (and impossible) separation of human action vs. human action together with
others for the sake of his analysis.
47
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the individual concrete I, or self, that experiences itself and consequently understands
itself in this manner.”49 Self-consciousness is always and only ever a primordial
experience of the self. I, obviously, cannot be self-conscious of you nor self-aware of
your self-consciousness. Now, while I can never experience the other as a self, or I, the
way I experience myself this way, this does not mean I cannot recognize that the other
experiences him or herself precisely as a self, or I.50 Recognizing that the other is also an
I, is a fundamental aspect of participation and thus deserves a more in-depth examination.
Wojtyła states, “[t]he consciousness that the other is another I stands at the basis
of what in Osoba i czyn [The Acting Person] I defined as participation”.51 In this way, we
see that, for Wojtyła , to act together with others, participation, can only happen at the
level of human personhood. As we have already seen, actions manifest the human being
as a unique and individual person. Thus acting with others will also manifest one‟s
personhood. But this with is important for it implies that the other is no mere object for
me that I use in my actions (such as in I act with, that is, use a computer to type these
sentences). When I act with others I do not use them as some means to a desired end.
Rather, in acting with others, I am, precisely acting with other human persons, who are
personal subjects in their own right. This is why recognition of the other as an other I is
49
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fundamental to participation. In this way also, Wojtyła makes the further claim (alluded
to above) that “[a]s human beings, we are capable of participating in the very humanity of
other people, and because of this every human being can be our neighbor”.52 Here too, at
this level of participation in the very humanity of the other (who is my neighbor),
recognition that the other is an I is crucial: “participation in that being‟s humanity [is] a
participation arising from my awareness that this being is another I” and “[a]nother
person is a neighbor to me not just because we share a like humanity, but chiefly because
the other is another I”.53 Now, how one comes to recognize the personal subjectivity of
the other is precisely the point at which Levinas might raise his hand in objection.
According to Wojtyła, to recognize the selfhood of the other “I must become aware of
and experience, among overall properties of that other „human being‟, the same kind of
property that determines my own I”. That is, “I as though transfer what is given to me as
my own I beyond myself to one of the others, who, as a result, appears primarily as a
different I, another I, my neighbor”. 54 The property that determines myself as an I is, as
we have seen above, self-determination through self-possession and self-governance.
Thus recognition that the other is also an I means, for Wojtyła, that the other is also
constituted as a human person as I am through self-possession and self-determination. 55
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Clearly there is here a movement from myself to the other.56 While Wojtyła does seem to
respect the absolute difference between the self and the other, this movement (from the
self to the other) is one which Levinas would reject. Therefore, I would like to propose an
amendment at this point of Wojtyła‟s schema.
It seems to me that there is a potential confluence of thought between Stein‟s
concept of empathy and Wojtyła‟s notion of participation. Obviously participation cannot
be reduced to empathy for empathy is not an “acting together with others”. Rather,
empathy is what enables one to act together with others as others, that is, as human
persons which is, as we have seen, constitutive of participation. One can only participate
with other human I‟s, or human persons. At the same time, when we participate with
others, we remain, and in some way, enact ourselves as persons too. Participation thus is,
“namely, the ability to exist and act together with others in such a way that in this
existing and acting we remain ourselves and actualize ourselves, which means our own
I‟s”.57 To participate in the humanity of others, that is, to act together with others, is
precisely the way one enacts one‟s self as a unique and individual person. Wojtyła
himself notes this constitutive aspect of participation:
The person – as that “man who acts together with others” – is in a certain manner
constituted through participation in his own being itself. Thus participation is seen
as a specific constituent of the person.58
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Now in what other way can one both recognize the personhood of the other and maintain
one‟s own personhood than through the act of empathy? And so perhaps we might amend
Wojtyła‟s comment on the transfer of my self-constitutive properties to the other as the
way in which one recognizes the selfhood of the other to seeing empathy at the
foundation of participation. It is through empathizing with the other that I recognize him
or her as a personal subject, an I. Thus it is through empathy that I can participate, act
together with, others and in their very humanity. This could even be referred to as “a kind
of empathy of subjectivity”. 59 Further supporting this amendment of empathy is
Wojtyła‟s comment that “the I–other relationship is not universal but always interhuman,
unique, and unrepeatable in each and every instance”. 60 Here I believe both Stein and
Levinas would agree with the late pope. To participate in the humanity of others is no
mere acknowledgement of our common humanity, but to meet the other, face to face, as a
human person, another I.
To participate in the humanity of another human being means to be vitally related
to the other as a particular human being, and not just related to what makes the
other (in abstracto) a human being…. [T]his thou – like the I –is always a
someone: the thou is some other I.61
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This is an encounter with the other at the level of their personal human subjectivity which
is made possible through the act of empathy. I may be so bold to claim that Wojtyła
would not entirely disagree. His emphasis on human action as constitutive and revelatory
of the human person is consistent with Stein‟s claim that empathy is constitutive of the
human person. Empathy is precisely a human act in which I enact myself as a person and
encounter the other as a person. Indeed, one can even find a version of Stein‟s reiterated
empathy in Wojtyła‟s writings.
We recall that reiterated empathy is when, in empathizing with the experience of
the other person, I discern that the object of his or her experience is in fact myself. Thus I
am, in a way, given back or returned to myself through the other‟s experience of
myself. 62 In this way empathy is profoundly constitutive of the self. Now in Wojtyła‟s
writings we also find a type of “reflexivity” in the relation with the other:
The relation to a thou is in its essential structure always a relation to another, and
yet, because one member of this relation is an I, the relation – in a way peculiar to
itself – demonstrates the ability to return to the I from which it proceeded.63
Wojtyła then goes on to claim that:
When the relation directed from my I to a thou returns to the I from which it
proceeded, the reflexivity of this relation (which need not yet be a mutual relation
involving the counter-relation thou–I) contains the element of specifically
constituting my I through its relation to the thou.64
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He does not use the word empathy, but clearly his thoughts are here consonant with what
we find in Stein‟s writings. Indeed, Wojtyła clinches the deal for us when he concludes
that:
the thou assists me in more fully discovering and even confirming my own I: the
thou contributes to my self-affirmation. In its basic form, the I–thou relationship,
far from leading me away from my subjectivity, in some sense more firmly
grounds me in it.65
“[I]n some sense” – Stein‟s notion of reiterated empathy provides the explication of in
what sense participating in the humanity of the other helps to constitute and enact my
human subjectivity as well. 66 However, Wojtyła insists that it is not merely another
person with whom I act together, for this other is also my neighbor. To understand the
significance of who the neighbor is and how the neighbor functions within participation
(beyond the self-constitutive function which we have just discussed) leads us to a brief
exploration of Wojtyła‟s understanding of human community.
Wojtyła makes a distinction between two different “dimensions” of human
community: I–thou relationships and we relationships. 67 We have already presented the
foundation of the communal experience of the I–thou relationship in our discussion above
on how participation in the humanity of the other is also a form of reiterated empathy.
This reflexivity of the I–thou relationship is at the basis of it becoming a form of human
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community but, for Wojtyła, is not yet an actual form of human community. 68 For the I–
thou relationship to become a form of human community it must become reciprocal:
Even the unilateral relation of an I to a thou is already a real experience of an
interpersonal relationship, although the full experience of such a relationship
occurs only when the I–thou relationship has a reciprocal character: when a thou
that for me becomes a specific other, and thus “also another human being,”
simultaneously makes me its thou; when two people mutually become an I and a
thou for each other and experience their relationship in this manner. Only then, it
seems to me, do we observe the full character of the community proper to an
interpersonal I–thou relationship.69
The I–thou relationship is a form of one to one relationship where the emphasis is on the
persons themselves and not the multiplicity. As we will see when we describe the we
relationship, there the emphasis is on the multiplicity and only indirectly on the persons. 70
Now while, as we saw above, in the I–thou relationship the thou is always a particular
human person, not humanity or humanness in general, Wojtyła insists that the I–thou
relationship can be, and indeed ought to be had with all human persons: “Potentially,
therefore, the I–thou relationship is directed away from me toward all human beings,
while actually it always connects me with some one person.”71 Now what distinguishes
we relationships from I–thou relationships is not only the emphasis on the multiplicity but
also the presence of the common good. For Wojtyła, the common good is the “single
value” which relates all the various I‟s of the community to one another and unites them.
The we dimension of human community thus has a different orientation from the I–thou
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dimension for the we is directed and determined by the common good.72 This common
good has both an objective and subjective dimension. Objectively, the community strives
to attain some particular good. Subjectively, the common good “consists in that which
conditions and somehow initiates in the persons acting together their participation, and
thereby develops and shapes in them a subjective community of acting”.73 This subjective
aspect of the common good is important for it mitigates the concern of some who claim
that participation in human community diminishes or even abolishes the individual
human person.74 Wojtyła assures us that, from his perspective, it is the individual person
who willfully chooses the common good as his or her own good and, as his or her own
good, the good of the individual thus serves the community:
In such communities of being… each of its members expects to be allowed to
choose what others choose and because they choose, and that his choice will be
his own good that serves the fulfillment of his own person. At the same time,
owing to the same ability of participation, man expects that in communities
founded on the common good his own actions will serve the community and help
to maintain and enrich it.75
We recall that participation is precisely the way in which humans act together and yet
maintain their individual subjectivity. Wojtyła‟s understanding of the subjective aspect of
the common good, that it is both willfully chosen by the individual and enhances the
community, thus follows from his notion of participation.
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There is another aspect of Wojtyła‟s conception of the neighbor that bears upon
both the I–thou relationship and the we relationship. We recall that the I–thou
relationship, which rests upon the basis of the other as neighbor, can and ought to be had
with every human person one encounters. This is important for Wojtyła also claims this
I–thou relationship is more fundamental and thus constitutive of all forms of authentic
human community, including the we relationships. “Membership of any community
presupposes the fact that men are neighbors…” 76 In this way, Wojtyła also claims that the
neighbor is therefore the fundamental “reference system” for all forms of human
community, both the I–thou relationship and the we :
The ability to share in the humanness itself of every man [in which way every man
is my neighbor] is the very core of all participation and the condition of the
personalistic value of all acting and existing “together with others.”77
The only way human community is possible as distinctly human is for all its members to
recognize each other as neighbors, that is, to recognize the other and all others as
individual human persons. The relation to the neighbor is thus “the ultimate reference
point” for all forms of human community and “the ultimate criterion in the development
of the coexistence and cooperation of men in the communities and societies that are
established at different levels and according to different intracommunal bonds”. 78 The
relation to the other as my neighbor enables communities to be authentically human. This
bears a striking resemblance to Stein‟s claim that human community is based upon the
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subject to subject relationship, not subject to object. That is in communities the members
recognize one another as human persons, are neighbors to one another. 79
Now while Wojtyła insists on the founding principle of the relation to the
neighbor, thus the I–thou relationship, at the basis of all forms of human community, he
also acknowledges that the concepts neighbor and member in a community “overlap and
interpenetrate in the objective order of things”. 80 He verifies this by pointing to “the fact
that everybody is a member of a community – even of several communities at once – as
well as… the fact that everybody is a neighbor”. 81 Thus, although the I–thou relationship,
the relation to the neighbor, is presupposed in all forms of community, the common good,
which is the particular aspect of the we relationship, can also inform the I–thou
relationship:
In this relation [the we] the I and the thou also find their mutual relationship in a
new dimension: they find their I–thou through the common good, which
establishes a new union between them. 82

79

See Edith Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, trans. Mary
Catherine Baseheart and Marianne Sawicki (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 2000),
130 (hereafter cited as Beiträge as following popular practice, see p. xix). See also
chapter three of this dissertation for our analysis of Stein's understanding of human
community.
80

Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 298.

81

Ibid.

82

Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community", 247, italicized in the original.
Wojtyła offers marriage as an example of how the we dimension and the common good
can enrich the I–thou relationship: “The best example of this is marriage, in which a
clearly delineated I–thou relationship, an interpersonal relationship, takes on a social
dimension when the spouses accept into this relationship the set of values that may be
defined as the common good of marriage and – at least potentially – of family.”
313

According to Wojtyła, the I–thou relationship can thus be enhanced and enriched by the
common good of the we, adding another dimension to its one on one relation. However,
ultimately all participation, all acting together with others, is rooted in the recognition of
the other as another I, as a human person, and thus as my neighbor.
Wojtyła‟s emphasis on the other as neighbor is also directly linked to the Biblical
commandment of love: “love thy neighbor as thyself” (Matthew 22:39). He claims that
“the commandment of love is simply the call to experience another being as another I, the
call to participate in another‟s humanity, which is concretized in the person of the other
just as mine is in my person”. 83 The command to love the other, my neighbor, is thus a
part of the fundamental reference system of the relation to the neighbor. Indeed, the love
command confirms the relation to the neighbor as the fundamental reference system or
criterion for acting together with others as participation in the humanity of the other.84
The love command:
has itself a thoroughly communal character; it tells what is necessary for a
community to be formed, but more than anything else it brings into prominence
what is necessary for a community to be truly human. It also tells what determines
the true dimension of participation…. The commandment of love is also the
measure of the tasks and demands that have to be faced by all men – all persons
and all communities – if the whole good contained in the acting and being
“together with others” is to become a reality. 85
For Wojtyła, the Biblical commandment to love the other (my neighbor) is the external
manifestation of an internal impulse within the human person. Thus it is not imposed
from without, forced upon me, but springs from my very self, from myself as a human
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subject or person. However this impulse is not enacted only once and is satisfied but is
manifested in every encounter I have with another human being. As Levinas would say, I
have an infinite responsibility with which I am never finished. 86 In this way, participation
is not seen as an already accomplished fact but rather as a task always to be accomplished
and which is never completed. Of participation as a task he states:
Experiencing another human being, one of the others, as another I always
involves a discreet choice. First of all, it involves choosing this particular human
being among others, which simply means that this particular one from among the
others is hic et nunc given to me and assigned to me. The choice here consists in
my acceptance of this particular individual‟s I, my affirmation of the person.87
Participation as a task of recognizing the personhood of the other, that is, of loving the
other who is my neighbor, is saying “here I am” to the face of the other. It is to be struck
with an unavoidable assignation in which I fear murder more than death. 88 While
participation is verified by such positive experiences as love and friendship, according to
Wojtyła the reality of participating in the humanity of the other (that is of recognizing the
other as a human person) is made even clearer in its negative verifications.
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Such feelings or attitudes as hatred, animosity, aggression, and jealousy, when
their subjective complexity is more deeply analyzed, show that they are based on
nothing other than the lived experience of another human being as another I….
Only this can explain the spiritual oppressiveness of such feelings or attitudes as
animosity, hatred, aggression, and jealousy. The torment associated with them
shows at least that I am not indifferent to the human being as another I.89
This bears a striking resemblance to Levinas‟ claim that “[t]he other is the sole being I
can wish to kill”. 90 Wojtyła names such negative verifications of participation alienation:
Alienation basically means the negation of participation, for it renders
participation difficult or even impossible. It devastates the I–other relationship,
weakens the ability to experience another human being as another I, and inhibits
the possibility of friendship and the spontaneous powers of community
(communion personarum).91
With this distinction between participation and alienation Wojtyła claims that the “central
problem of life for humanity in our times, perhaps in all times, is this: participation or
alienation?”92 That is, it is of utmost importance to discern whether our human relations
and social structures are those that allow for and manifest participation or are they
obstacles to participation, thus manifesting a state of alienation? In this way the task of
participation is one with which we are never finished. Thus “[i]t follows that the matter of
the dignity of the human person is always more of a call and a demand than an already
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accomplished fact, or rather it is a fact worked out by human beings, both in the
collective and in the individual sense”. 93
We have traced Wojtyła‟s thoughts on the human person as the one who
manifests him or herself through the actions he or she performs. Particularly, the human
person is the one who participates in the humanity of the other, that is, recognizes the
human subjectivity of the other, and in this way enacts him or herself through acting
together with others. Now we are at last ready to address the issue of solidarity which is
fundamentally rooted in Wojtyła‟s understanding of the human person as an acting
person. As we will see, solidarity is an authentic enactment of the human person acting
together with others. It is an authentic attitude of participation.

The Acting Person – Solidarity as an Enactment of Human Personhood
Prior to his becoming pope, Wojtyła wrote a brief section on solidarity in his text
The Acting Person, covering a mere eight pages.94 Although brief, as rooted in his
preceding comments on the acting person and participation as the enactment of the
human person acting together with others, much can be gleaned from these few pages.
Before we begin unpacking Wojtyła‟s explication of solidarity, a caveat is in order – one
that Wojtyła himself offers to his readers. He states that his consideration of solidarity, as
found in The Acting Person, is limited to “the personalistic perspective and in this sense
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pre-ethical”.95 That is, while his discussion of solidarity certainly brings us to the
threshold of ethics, his concerns keep him focused on the “personalistic significance” of
solidarity – “the value of the fulfillment of an action [here, that of solidarity] rather than
that type of value of a performed action which issues from its relation to ethical
norms”. 96 Wojtyła focuses on how solidarity is an enactment of the human person. Let us
turn now to his presentation of this concept.
First it must be noted that, for Wojtyła, solidarity is seen as an authentic attitude
of participation. Solidarity is:
the natural consequence of the fact that human beings live and act together; it is
the attitude of a community, in which the common good properly conditions and
initiates participation, and participation in turn properly serves the common good,
fosters it, and furthers its realization.97
Now as we know from our previous discussion, participation is that aspect of the human
person whereby he or she exists and acts together with others, recognizing these others as
human persons themselves, while maintaining and indeed enacting one‟s own human
subjectivity. If solidarity is an authentic attitude of participation, then this means that
when one enters into solidarity with others one is both recognizing these others as human
persons and enacting oneself as a person by entering into solidarity with them. How does
one enter into solidarity with others or adopt an attitude of solidarity toward others? The
answer to this is rooted in the common good: one chooses the common good as one‟s
own good. Then, as one‟s own good, it serves to foster and further the realization of the
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good of the entire community of which one is a member. Thus solidarity is the
fundamental attitude of all authentically human communities. This is the very same point
that Stein made:
First of all it must be said that the solidarity of individuals, which becomes visible
in the influence of the attitudes of one upon the life of the others, is formative of
community in the highest degree. To put it more precisely: Where the individuals
are “open” to one another, where the attitudes of one don‟t bounce off of the other
but rather penetrate him and deploy their efficacy, there a communal life subsists,
there the two are members of one whole; and without such a reciprocal relationship
community isn‟t possible. 98
Wojtyła qualifies the attitude of solidarity, commenting on how it implies “a constant
readiness to accept and to realize one’s share in the community because of one‟s
membership within that particular community”. 99 Highlighting this issue of “one‟s share”
is important, especially when we turn to solidarity in the Christian social justice tradition.
It must be linked with the principle of subsidiarity which features strongly in the teaching
of the church on issues of social justice. The principle of subsidiarity simply states that
“no larger or higher association should „arrogate to itself the functions which can be
performed efficiently by smaller and lower societies‟”. 100 On a personal level,
subsidiarity is about accepting and keeping to one‟s own share in the life of the
community and not infringing upon the place that others hold therein. This is what
Wojtyła has in mind when he states that “solidarity prevents trespass upon other people‟s
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obligations and duties, and seizing things belonging to others”. 101 However, he also
admits that there are certain situations where one is, by virtue of the attitude of solidarity,
called to step in and aid others in the realization of their own obligations and duties. In
fact, “[i]n such a situation, to keep strictly to one‟s own share would mean… [a] lack of
solidarity”. 102 What Wojtyła seems to have in mind here are those situations where
personal or structural obstacles have arisen that prevent all members from fully
participating in the life of the community and enacting their full human personhood. This
is the situation of alienation, the negation of participation, spoken of in our previous
section. In the face of such obstacles to full participation solidarity actually calls for
opposition. Indeed, according to Wojtyła, “the attitude of „solidarity‟ cannot be
dissociated from that of „opposition‟”. 103 Now people can be opposed to the life and
functioning of the community for many reasons and in many ways. Certainly these
reasons and relations are not always positive or life-affirming. However, opposition as a
manifestation of solidarity does not reject the common good or participation but rather
confirms it.104 Those who stand in opposition do not do so in rejection of the community,
but rather in protest against that which has become unhealthy in the community and thus
an obstacle to the common good and true participation. Those who manifest this form of
positive opposition:
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seek their own place and a constructive role within the community; they seek for
that participation and that attitude to the common good which would allow them a
better, a fuller, and a more, effective share of the communal life…. There can be
no doubt that this kind of opposition is essentially constructive; it is a condition of
the correct structure of communities and of the correct functioning of their inner
system.105
In this way, opposition as rooted in the attitude of solidarity acts as a type of “checks and
balance” for the community to ensure that no obstacles are allowed to develop and tarnish
the true life of the community. Or if such obstacles do develop, the stance of opposition
raises awareness to this unjust situation so that action can be taken to amend it. Thus
Wojtyła states that dialogue is an essential component of communal life. That is, dialogue
“that is operative in the formation and the strengthening of interhuman solidarity also
through the attitude of opposition” and this despite the “difficulties that it may bring with
it along the way”.106 What is crucial, according to Wojtyła, is how solidarity and
opposition serve the authentic enactment of human persons in community with one
another, that is, acting together with others. Solidarity and opposition (as rooted in
solidarity) are thus “authentic inasmuch as each respects the personalistic value of the
action”.107
To further clarify his position, Wojtyła offers two types of inauthentic attitudes of
human participation: conformism and noninvolvement. Conformism is basically a type of
sham solidarity and thus a denial of participation. Conformism “consists primarily in an
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attitude of compliance or resignation, in a specific form of passivity”. 108 When one
conforms to the community one appears to be participating in communal life but in
reality one has actually withdrawn from the community and is in fact indifferent to the
common good of the community. Conformism thus is:
a specific form of individualism leading to an evasion from the community, which
is seen as a threat to the good of the individual, accompanied by a need to
dissimulate oneself from the community behind a mask of external appearances.
Hence conformism brings uniformity rather than unity.109
Noninvolvement seems to be the opposite of conformism but is in fact rooted in the same
over-emphasis on the good of the individual. “Noninvolvement is nothing but a
withdrawal.”110 Here one is completely uninvolved in the life of the community, is absent
from the community. Now Wojtyła does admit that the unfortunate situation may arise
where the community has become so dysfunctional that those who do in fact care for the
common good see no other way to combat the obstacles than through a total withdrawal
from the community. However, “[i]f the members of a community see the only solution
to their personal problems in withdrawal from the communal life, this is a sure sign that
the common good in this community is conceived of erroneously”. 111 Both cases reveal a
rejection or denial of participation and thus they prevent a full enactment of the human
person. This is made clear in comparison with solidarity and opposition as authentic
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forms of participation which are attitudes “that [allow] man to find the fulfillment of
himself in complementing others”.112
It is interesting to note that Wojtyła‟s presentation of opposition in The Acting
Person seems to focus on opposition adopted on behalf of one‟s own inability to fully
participation in the life of the community. As noted above when people stand up in
opposition, “they seek for that participation and that attitude to the common good which
would allow them a better, a fuller, and a more, effective share of the communal life”. 113
As we will see in our following two sections, opposition rooted in solidarity can also be
adopted on behalf of others’ inability to fully participate in the life of the community.
What will be maintained in the presentation of solidarity in his papal writings is how
solidarity is both an enactment of the human person as such and at the foundation of all
authentic human communities.
What we have tried to show in this section is how solidarity is also linked to
empathy and ethics (as Levinas understands the term). This we have done by showing
how participation, which is a recognition of the personal subjectivity of the other, is
enabled by empathizing with the other. Solidarity as an authentic attitude of participation
is thus also rooted in empathy. Now although Wojtyła chose to keep his discussion of
solidarity at the pre-ethical level, as we will see in the following two sections, solidarity
not only enacts the human person as acting together with others, but has a specifically
ethical characteristic. Entering into solidarity with others is a manifestation of Levinas‟
“here I am” in the time of justice, the realm of the said.
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“We – for the Other”
Before we turn our attention to Wojtyła‟s later writings on solidarity, after he
became Pope John Paul II, we would like to take a diversion into the thought of Józef
Tischner. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Tischner, a Christian philosopher,
was a personal friend of Karol Wojtyła and the two remained in close contact even after
Wojtyła‟s election as the Roman Pontiff. As a former student of Roman Ingarten and
highly influenced by the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, the tenor of his writings fits
nicely within the atmosphere of this present work. Happily, he also wrote a text on
solidarity, The Spirit of Solidarity, in which he examines “the area of life that is
illuminated by the idea of solidarity”. 114 It is interesting to note that he makes a rather
Levinasian claim in his text. He states that his “task here is not to give advice or to
formulate prohibitions or directives; it is something more essential” (6). This sounds
strikingly similar to Levinas‟ claim that he is not providing his readers with an ethical
system, but rather is focusing on the anarchical relationship that precedes all ethical
systems. 115 What is more, Tischner also rejects the “metaphysical style of thinking about
life in society” (27). Indeed, he claims that metaphysical thought is the cause of certain
“illusions” when it comes to thinking about human relations and thus “must now be
totally discarded” (27-28). In place of metaphysics he proposes ethics as “the proper way
of thinking about life in society” (28). One can almost see Levinas nodding his head in
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approval and agreement. In respect to solidarity, according to Tischner, “more important
that the [metaphysical] question „How is it?‟ is the [ethical] question „Whom does it
serve?‟” (28, emphasis mine). The emphasis is clearly on the human other and the
relationship that is had with him or her and not on some ontological analysis of solidarity.
Now it is also important to note that while Tischner clearly takes a phenomenological
approach to his topic, he also makes reference to the Christian faith perspective. This is in
part due to the context in which his reflection on solidarity is rooted. Tischner takes as his
starting point the reality of the Polish workers‟ movement, Solidarność, that radically
changed the political and economic situation of Poland in 1980. A fundamental
characteristic of this movement was the Catholic faith of its participants. 116 Indeed, the
Roman Catholic Church played a crucial, underlying role in the Polish Solidarity
movement of the 1980‟s.117 It seemed, to the Polish people held hostage to the
Communist take-over after World War II, that the church offered the only place where
one could experience freedom and human dignity. In this way, the vision of the human
person and authentic human life offered by the Christian faith perspective seemed a
legitimate and much preferred alternative to the oppressive conditions of communist-run
Poland. Thus the references that will be made to, for example, certain passages in the
Gospels are pertinent to the actual lived-experience of solidarity manifested in the Polish
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workers‟ movement. Obviously not all experiences of solidarity have such religious
connections. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, which is examining solidarity
as found in the Christian social justice tradition, such a connection is therefore not at all
allergic to this project. Tischner‟s writings can thus be understood as providing the
“philosophical content” for the faith perspective underlying the real-life experience of
solidarity upon which he bases his reflections (viii). In his writings we find expressed the
“maxims that guide Solidarity members in their quest for a just society” (viii).
According to Tischner, at its most profound level solidarity is a “solidarity of
consciences” (4). Already we have entered the realm of ethics, although not of an ethical
system for “conscience is prior to those systems” (6). Conscience is the “natural human
„ethical sense‟… independent of the various ethical systems” (6). This seems quite
similar to Levinas‟ claim that human persons are always already ethical due to the
encounter with and call of the other from an immemorial past. For Tischner there is also a
call, the call of conscience within us and it “calls above all for people to want to have a
conscience” (7, emphasis mine). That is, the “ethic of solidarity” is an “ethic of
conscience” for the movement towards others is one that is not enforced from without but
comes from within (6-7). Solidarity is thus a virtue “born of itself, spontaneously, from
the heart” (3). In this way Tischner makes a distinction between generic forms of human
togetherness and solidarity. Quite simply, one can be together with others and not be in
solidarity. Solidarity, as we will see, involves a specific form of being together with
others. At its core though, “authentic solidarity… is solidarity of consciences” (7).
Indeed, this aspect of the conscience is so crucial for Tischner that he makes the claim:
“It is impossible to be in solidarity with people who have no conscience” (7). This bold
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statement can perhaps be clarified by recalling Stein‟s view that a human community is
such only when its members relate to one another at the level of human personhood, that
is, subject to subject.118 If human togetherness is a form of solidarity and solidarity is
constitutive of the very formation of human community, then those who refuse to
encounter its members as human persons cut themselves off from true participation in
this community. The necessity of having a conscience, of the call to want to have a
conscience, is thus the call to want to recognize the other as a human person. It is a call to
participation, as Wojtyła understood this term. This call to have a conscience leads
Tischner to refer to solidarity as an “ethics of awakening” (70). Metaphorically, solidarity
“represents a huge forest planted by awakened consciences” (80, emphasis mine). But to
what is the conscience awakened, or called to realize?
Very simply, “a person is always in solidarity with someone and for someone”
(6). In this way, a plain answer to the above question is that the conscience is awakened
by and thus turned toward the other person. Dobrosław Kot notes the importance of
prepositions in Tischner‟s explication of solidarity. 119 We find the prepositions with, for,
and toward, but not against. Tischner offers the Parable of the Good Samaritan as
paradigmatic of the ethic of solidarity (8). The Samaritan hears the cry of the wounded
man and responds to him. Several things are happening within this simple description.
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First there is the wounded man crying out for help. This seems to be the motivating force,
the wounded other. But it is a specific type of injury that most arouses our sympathy and
outrage: it is “a wound inflicted on one person by another” (8, emphasis mine). Here we
are in the realm of human morality for it is not some natural disaster that has inflicted the
wound. While this type of injury can certainly call forth the virtue of solidarity with
others,120 here Tischner is focusing on a specific form of solidarity, “the solidarity with
those who suffer at the hands of others” (9, emphasis mine). So we see that the with of
solidarity implies “those who have been wounded by other people” (8). However, this is
not quite accurate for it actually refers to the for. To be with the wounded other is to be
for him or her. “There is someone who needs help and another person, a man-insolidarity, is needed just for him.”121 In this way, Tischner claims that to be in solidarity
with the other is to “carry the burden of another person” (2).122 This is precisely what the
Good Samaritan did in the parable. He stopped in his tracks, quit the path of his own
concerns, and turned to the other so to bear the burden of this wounded other who was so
grievously injured by someone else. In this way, according to the ethic of solidarity, “the
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burden of one‟s fellow human often becomes greater than one‟s own” (3). For the
Samaritan, the needs of the injured man on the side of the street were clearly more
important than whatever he had been on his way to do.
Reflecting on Tischner‟s writings, Chantal Millon-Delsol states that solidarity is
thus “the love that responds to the wound and to the shared experience of otherness”. 123
For Delsol, solidarity is a type of “face to face sharing”. 124 What is shared is a common
human reality of insufficiency and finiteness. 125 But in this common reality alterity
remains and in fact is necessary, for solidarity is not based on human equality. According
to Delsol, “equality is the opposite of solidarity which connotes the need for the other”. 126
Tischner also recognizes the necessity of otherness when he speaks of solidarity as a form
of dialogue (10). His brief analysis of dialogue also bears a remarkable similarity to some
of Stein‟s comments on empathy. According to Tischner, an honest dialogue requires the
partners to be open to one another so to “„feel‟ the point of view of another” (11). That is,
a dialogue requires a certain difference between the partners or there is, quite simply,
nothing to discuss. But how does one come to “feel” the other‟s point of the view?
Tischner‟s answer is worth an extended quote:
[W]e must look at ourselves as if from the outside, I with your eyes and you with
mine…. As long as I look at myself exclusively with my own eyes, I know only
part of the truth. As long as you look at yourself with your own eyes, you, too,
know only part of the truth. Likewise, when I look at you and consider only what
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I myself see and when you look at me and take into account only what you see,
both of us are subject to a partial illusion. The full truth is the fruit of our
experiences in common – yours about me and mine about you….
The first condition of dialogue is an ability to “feel” the point of view of
another. It is not simply a question of compassion but of something more – the
recognition that someone else, from his point of view, is always to some extent
right…. When I undertake a dialogue I am thereby ready to make the personal
truth of someone else a part of my truth about that someone and to make the truth
about me a part of someone else‟s truth. Dialogue is a building of reciprocity (11).
Clearly this passage is consonant with Stein‟s explanation of how one empathizes with
the other. To “„feel‟ the point of view of another” is precisely “the perceiving of foreign
subjects and their experience”. 127 Tischner even comes quite close to her notion of
reiterated empathy when he both warns against only perceiving myself from my own
perspective (and the other only from his or her own eyes) and claims the need to take into
account your experience of me (and mine of you). If solidarity is indeed a form of
dialogue then clearly it rests upon the foundation of empathetically encountering the
other person for I can only dialogue with another person. We recall too that Wojtyła
insists on the reciprocity of the I–thou relationship if it is to become a form of human
community and he also speaks of dialogue as a necessary component of being in
solidarity with others. Now as to what “constitutes the main theme of the dialogue that
grows out of the ethics of solidarity” (12), Tischner states: “Generally speaking, it is
suffering – the suffering of one human being caused by another. This kind of suffering
rouses a particular indignation” (12). And so we see that, although dialogue requires the
alterity of the partners, there is also a certain commonality, as Delsol noted although
Tischner‟s commonality is perhaps not quite the same as Delsol‟s. According to Tischner
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there must be a “common grammar” (24). It is the grammar of ethics: “Ethics are the
grammar of relationships between people, and their principle, human dignity” (24). One
can claim that the overwhelming presence in this grammar are the words the suffering
other. Because the emphasis is on the suffering other, there is a “high moral standing to
the words of solidarity” (13). Now in his text Tischner focuses not only on the one
wounded by someone else, but even furthermore to the suffering of the exploited worker.
He wants his writings to “refer to concrete reality” and the experience upon which he is
basing his reflections – the unjust situation of Polish workers in the 1980‟s – thus refers
to “the suffering of a worker coming from the hands of his or her neighbor” (12). Again,
this limitation is not endemic of all forms of solidarity. We recall that Wojtyła insisted on
the solidarity of all humanity. With Tischner‟s emphasis on the one who suffers “at the
hands of others” (9), clearly this opens up solidarity for someone to anyone who is
suffering due to someone else. And, as we alluded to above, solidarity can be with
anyone who is suffering at all, regardless of the cause. Tischner himself states that
solidarity is open to all people (3). This brings us back to our consideration of
prepositions.
We now understand the for (“solidarity is for someone”), but what of the with (“a
person is always in solidarity with someone”)? The with in this case actually refers to
those who come together for this wounded other. Thus, there are actually two aspects or
moments of solidarity. One is first and foremost in solidarity with, or rather, for the
suffering other. But one can also enter into solidarity with others who are also for the
wounded one. That is, a “community of people who want to help gathers around the one
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in need… We are in solidarity with each other for him”.128 It is important to note that
there is no against here but rather a toward everyone. Tischner states: solidarity “turns
toward all and not against anyone” (3). This is quite interesting for while the workers
movement in Poland clearly manifested the type of opposition to injustice that Wojtyła
says is inseparable from solidarity, keeping in line with Tischner‟s thought, this
opposition is not against someone, that is against other persons, but is rather against the
unjust situation. This is an important distinction for, as such, that means a community
grounded in solidarity for the wounded one is open to everyone. This was certainly true
of the Solidarity Movement in Poland:
The solidarity community did not acknowledge anyone as an enemy, which was
proved by the fact that it was open to everyone who wished to participate in it.
Everyone who wanted to have a conscience, regardless of his background, could
become its member.129
What this also guards against is the type of opposition to other persons as, for example,
envisioned by Karl Marx and his revolution of the poor against the rich. 130 And so the
dialogue of solidarity for the wounded and suffering other is a dialogue in which all
people of goodwill, those who have a conscience (and want to have a conscience), are
128
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called to participate. This awakening of consciences to the cry of the suffering other thus
means that I “realize that another‟s suffering is not their own business, but my trouble as
well”. 131 How this realization takes place is precisely the content of the previous chapter.
One empathizes with the other, recognizing this other as a human person. And in this
recognition of the other human person is an encounter with the pleading face who
commands me not to kill.
Ultimately for Tischner, solidarity, that is solidarity of consciences, “is an ethical
movement the basis of which is fidelity” (86). That is, faithfulness is the grounding
principle of solidarity. 132 Tischner highlights this fundamental principle by describing
what destroys it and thus destroys solidarity: betrayal.
Betrayal is a cardinal sin against the solidarity of consciences. It is not so much
betrayal understood as an abandonment of ideals as it is an outright betrayal of a
human being. Betrayal is breaking the bonds of fidelity (83).
Tischner clearly presents betrayal at a personalistic level and thus also as ethical, or
rather, anti-ethical. The possibility of betrayal rests upon the prerequisite of “„being with
someone,‟ „being-together-with-someone‟” (84). This sounds strikingly similar to
Wojtyła‟s “acting together with others”, of which solidarity is an authentic manifestation.
That is, in both aspects of solidarity (being for and being with) there is an element of
trust. When we enter into relationships with other people, act together with others, if
these relationships are to be authentic the members must be true, or faithful to one
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another. I must not lie about who I am or my actions and motivations. And I trust that you
will also be honest in your dealings with me. Thus:
A man who shows solidarity is, first of all, a faithful man. Uniting in faithfulness
builds trust. Only when I trust that someone will not let me down, can I lay my
hope in his hands. I trust that he has a conscience and that this conscience obliges
him to be faithful. 133
Authentic human bonds, that is social bonds between persons, can only develop where
there is faithfulness and trust between its members. I am under an obligation to be faithful
to you, this is my responsibility: “Responsibility can be only where fidelity is” (95).134
This is why solidarity is, at its heart, an ethical movement. Although the consequences of
action on behalf of solidarity with the suffering other might have a political component
(such as the consequences of the Solidarity Movement in Poland which were instrumental
in the overthrow of the communist-backed government), at its most fundamental level,
solidarity is not motivated by political aspirations, but is ethical. Tischner himself insists
upon this. In a later reflection upon the events of 1980 he states: “In the final analysis, the
conflicts were of an ethical character and not only political or economic.” 135 Solidarity is
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about human persons and human relations. It is not solidarity that is political, but rather
the political realm that always already has an ethical component because it is based upon
and affects human relations. Sadly, we do not always remain faithful to those with whom
we are in relation. We often abuse our faithfulness and betray the trust others have placed
in us.136 With his reflections rooted in the solidarity of the Polish Workers‟ Movement,
Tischner often refers to this betrayal as a form of exploitation (16-21). According to
Tischner, “the basic sign of exploitation is needless suffering” (17, emphasis original).
This needless suffering may not only be physical, it can be emotional, psychological, or
spiritual (18). But what is key for Tischner is that this form of suffering is caused by
human persons, it is, “directly or indirectly, someone else‟s doing – someone somehow
associated with me” (18). We noted above how Tischner focuses on a particular form of
solidarity – “the solidarity with those who suffer at the hands of others” (9). Again, one
can obviously be in solidarity with those whose suffering is not due to human causes (ie.
with someone who is ill or the victim of a natural disaster), but it seems that Tischner‟s
focus is at the service of bringing forth the truly personal aspect of solidarity. As Tischner
notes, “an exploited person is an „abused‟ person” (22). This exploitation is thus “a form
of betrayal of humankind” (24). Using such terms as exploitation and abuse awakens the
conscience to protest and rebel. “To rebel against moral exploitation is a basic duty of
conscience” (24). Indeed, those who have a conscience cannot help but raise their voices
solidarity is rooted in the ethical encounter Levinas describes where I do not even notice
the color of the other‟s eyes. See Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations
with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1985), 85: “The best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his
eyes!”
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against such needless suffering. To protest such human exploitation and betrayal means
that one has recognized the other as a human person whose cry for help cannot be
ignored. What is more, it is in such acts of solidarity for this suffering other that I enact
my humanity as well.
In this way, in the attitude of solidarity there is a balance between the good of
others, the common good, and the good of the individual. We noted above how Wojtyła
insisted that in participation, or acting together with others, there is a balance between the
common good and the individual good.
In a solidarity community the good of a person is tantamount to the good of the
group. A community is exceptional because its growth coincides with the
development and perfection of an individual…. People in a community are
concerned with the good of others, especially those in need, but at the same time
this devotion helps them in their individual development.137
That the individual is not overwhelmed by the good of others is largely due to the
characteristic that solidarity comes from within. As we noted above, solidarity “does not
need to be imposed from the outside by force. This virtue is born of itself; spontaneously,
from the heart” (3). Solidarity is rooted in the conscience of the individual person. And,
as Levinas and Stein have clearly shown us, it is only when I turn to the other that I
discover the truth of my own self and enact my human subjectivity. “An individual in his
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being-for-others reveals his own face, his true self.”138 Let us conclude with Tischner‟s
own summation of his thoughts:
Conscience is the foundation of solidarity, and the stimulus for its development is
the cry for help from someone wounded by another human being. Solidarity
establishes specific, interpersonal bonds; one person joins with another to tend to
the one who needs care. I am with you, you are with me, we are together – for
him. We – for him. We, not to look at each other, but for him. Which comes first
here? Is “we” first, or is “for him” first? The communion of solidarity differs from
many other communions in that “for him” is first and “we” comes later. First is
the wounded one and the cry of pain. Later, the conscience speaks, since it is able
to hear and understand this cry. This is all it takes for communion to spring up (9,
emphasis mine).
The “we – for him”, or we – for the other, is strikingly consonant with Levinas‟ thought.
Here the ethical me voici is translated into the realm of the said. Solidarity recognizes the
other as a human person calling out to me in need. It is a recognition made possible
through the empathetic encounter with this other. Thus we also have a consonance with
Stein‟s thought. Solidarity understood as the we – for the other harkens to the
immemorial call of the other and manifests the inspiration of the other that gives witness
to God.
We have made little mention of God thus far in this section. While the references
made to God and faith raised by Tischner in his text are clearly from the Christian
perspective, what he says has a certain consonance with the claims made at the
conclusion of our previous chapter. We noted above how solidarity can be described as
carrying another’s burden. This has a specifically religious connotation for Tischner for
to carry another‟s burden is to “fulfill God‟s law” (2, cf. Galatians 6:2). As a Christian
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himself, Tischner further qualifies this by indicating that this concern for and assistance
given to the other person is the way in which “the disciple of Christ fulfills His law” (3).
We recall Stein‟s claim that the act of empathy is how “as believers [humans]
comprehend the love, the anger, and the precepts of their God”.139 And we recall how
Levinas helps us to see that the encounter with God turns us to the other such that we
discern that the command of God is to ethically respond to the other. Another way to say
this is, according to Tischner, that to carry another‟s burden is to fulfill the law of God.
Tischner also insists that the motivation to be in solidarity for the other must come from
within, that is from the conscience. He also claims that “conscience is the voice of God”
(7). This is a classic Christian precept.140 But again, we can interpret this in light of our
claims from the previous chapter. The awakened conscience that turns in solidarity to the
suffering other has heard the voice of God commanding one to turn to the other. The face
of God is not beheld. Only the voice is heard, but it is heard within, as from myself and
not from God at all. The command comes from a faceless Face and a voiceless Voice. In
this way, the turn to the other in solidarity does not speak the name of God, does not say
“I believe in God” but rather insists “here I am” for you.141 In this way the dialogue of
solidarity built upon the common grammar of ethics can be a prophetic testimony to God,
without speaking the divine name. Solidarity is a said founded upon an ethical saying.
But it is also prayer.
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During prayer, a human being faces another human being…. Let us remember,
during prayer a human being faces not only God but also another human being.
This human being wants to see in the other the measure of himself. Do not forget.
Whatever you say and do today – you are a measure (104).
The dialogue of solidarity with someone and for someone is a prayer. It is a prayer in
which I stand before the other, acknowledging his or her personhood. It is a prayer of
encounter in which my own selfhood is measured and enacted. But it is also a prayer said
with others, that is, a communal prayer. Liturgy is itself a form of communal prayer and
worship. If solidarity can be seen as a form of communal prayer, then it can also be a
form of liturgy and worship, although it is worship of God without speaking God‟s name
or turning to this God. The community bonded by solidarity is turned in prayer to the
other who needs them. 142 Thus to the question “Why solidarity?”, Tischner has but one
response: “Solidarity: because this is the right way” (6).

An Encyclical on Solidarity
We conclude this chapter by returning to the thought of Karol Wojtyła although
we will refer to him here as John Paul II for it is to his papal writings that we now turn.
As pope, John Paul referred to solidarity in his very first encyclical, Redemptor Hominis
(1979).143 His later encyclical, Laborem Exercens (1981), is known, in part, for its brief
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section on the solidarity of workers.144 However, it was not until 1987, almost ten years
into his pontificate, that he produced an encyclical in which he expanded upon the nature
of solidarity. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, known in English as On Social Concern, was John
Paul‟s seventh encyclical. His explication on the nature of solidarity covers a mere four
pages, however, the spirit of solidarity permeates throughout the text. The true aim of the
encyclical is “to emphasize, through a theological investigation of the present world, the
need for a fuller and more nuanced concept of development” (4/5).145 Additionally, the
encyclical aims to offer certain examples of how its understanding of development can be
put into effect (4/5). Why solidarity features so strongly in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis is due
to the pope‟s view that “in order to be genuine, development must be achieved within the
framework of solidarity and freedom, without ever sacrificing either of them under
whatever pretext” (33/35, emphasis original). Let us briefly consider this concept of
development.
The “fuller and more nuanced” understanding of development offered in
Sollicitudo Rei Socialis stands in opposition to the understanding of development that, at
the time of its writing, held sway in the secular world. Anchoring his text in the tradition
of Populorum Progressio, written by Pope Paul VI in 1967, John Paul wants to broaden
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the concept of development from its use in the social and economic sciences (8/7).
According to John Paul,
true development cannot consist in the simple accumulation of wealth and in the
greater availability of goods and services, if this is gained at the expense of the
development of the masses, and without due consideration for the social, cultural,
and spiritual dimensions of the human being (9/9, emphasis original).
Rather, true or authentic human development necessarily contains a moral dimension.
Indeed, there is a “moral obligation… to take into consideration” which is the “duty of
solidarity” (9/9, emphasis original). We cannot yet discuss solidarity. First it must be
understood that development, as presented in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, “must be measured
and oriented according to the reality and vocation of man seen in his totality, namely,
according to his interior dimension” (29/28, emphasis original). That is, the pope is
attempting to give development a more human, and we can also say humane,
understanding. Now while the pope acknowledges that development will manifest itself
in unique ways according to the different human cultures and societies that exist in this
world,146 what is intrinsic to all forms of human development is its social nature (29/29).
This social element is intrinsic to human development precisely because it is human, that
is of human persons, and as should be abundantly clear at this point of our study, human
persons are intrinsically social thus ethical.
Now as for solidarity, its spirit begins to creep in when John Paul emphasizes that
there is but one world in which all the different human cultures and societies live despite
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the tendency to divide the world into East or West, North or South, First, Second, or
Third World. The pope insists that there is a “unity of the world, that is, the unity of the
human race” (14/13, emphasis original). Sadly he finds that this unity has been “seriously
compromised” due to “the various forms of exploitation and of economic, social, political
and even religious oppression of the individual and his or her rights, discrimination of
every type, especially the exceptionally odious form based on difference of race” (15/13,
emphasis original). However, seeing a glimmer of hope, he also notes that:
At the same time, in a world divided and beset by every type of conflict, the
conviction is growing of a radical interdependence and consequently of the need
for a solidarity which will take up interdependence and transfer it to the moral
plane (26/25, emphasis original).
It is due to this interdependence of all peoples and nations that the pope declares of
“authentic development: either all the nations of the world participate, or it will not be
true development” (17/16, emphasis original). That is, peace and justice are “either for all
or for none” (26/25, emphasis original). The pope believes so strongly in this conviction
that he raises commitment to the development of all people to the level of a moral
obligation for all people:
A deeper study of these harsh words will make us commit ourselves more
resolutely to the duty, which is urgent for everyone today, to work together for the
full development of others: “development of the whole human being and of all
people” (30/31, emphasis original).
What is more, this duty is not merely individual, but as pertains to all individual persons,
it is also the duty of the societies and nations to which we as individuals belong.
“Collaboration in the development of the whole person and of every human being is in
fact a duty of all towards all, and must be shared by the four parts of the world: East and
West, North and South” (32/33, emphasis original). And just as societies and nations
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commit to assisting the development of individuals, so too “peoples or nations… have a
right to their own full development” (32/33, emphasis original). According to John Paul,
at its most fundamental level, “true development must be based on love of God and
neighbor, and must help to promote the relationships between individuals and society”
(33/35, emphasis original). Again insisting on the inadequate view of development as
limited to the economic and political realm, the pope emphasizes the moral thus human
characteristic of development which necessarily highlights personal responsibility
(35/37). This at last brings him to discuss the nature of solidarity itself which, as noted
above, forms the framework for authentic human development.
The fifth chapter of Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, offers a “theological reading of
modern problems” (35/37, this is also the title of the chapter). John Paul now interprets
the breakdown of human unity through exploitation and oppression as a form of sin. Such
mistreatment of others is sinful for God “requires from people clear-cut attitudes which
express themselves also in actions or omissions towards one‟s neighbor” (36/38). He
refers directly to the Ten Commandments as paradigmatic of the appropriate attitude that
one should have towards God and neighbor. Indeed, “not to observe these is to offend
God and hurt one‟s neighbor, and… also involves interference in the process of the
development of peoples” (36/38-39). According to the pope‟s assessment of the current
world situation, such hurt and interference has taken and is taking place. Speaking
theologically (as he is in this section of the encyclical), to amend this sinful situation
requires a “conversion”.
This conversion specifically entails a relationship to God, to the sin committed, to
its consequences and hence to one‟s neighbor, either an individual or a
community (38/40).
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This conversion will manifest itself in “the positive and moral value of the growing
awareness of interdependence among individuals and nations” (38/40, emphasis
original). This is the crucial part for the pope – when the interdependence of all persons
and nations is “accepted as a moral category” (38/40-41, emphasis original) – for it
brings us at last to solidarity. Let us quote from the pope at length:
When interdependence becomes recognized in this way, the correlative response
as a moral and social attitude, as a “virtue”, is solidarity. This then is not a feeling
of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people,
both near and far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering determination to
commit oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and of each
individual, because we are all really responsible for all…. [It is] a commitment to
the good of one‟s neighbor with the readiness, in the gospel sense, to “lose
oneself” for the sake of the other instead of exploiting him, and to “serve him”
instead of oppressing him for one‟s own advantage (38/41, emphasis original).
Solidarity is thus rooted in a sense of responsibility for the other. From the perspective of
faith, this responsibility is inspired by the commandments of God. We are called to love
and care for the other. This is why John Paul insists that “true development must be based
on love of God and neighbor” (33/35, emphasis original). This makes sense in light of
our conclusions in the previous chapter. We recall again Stein‟s claim that an act of
empathy is how “as believers [humans] comprehend the love, the anger, and the precepts
of their God”.147 And we recall that the content of God‟s experience with which we
empathize is, in part, love and care for the human other. Thus, as Levinas insists, “the
desirable [God] orders me to what is the non-desirable, the undesirable par excellence –
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the other”.148 We also recall the pope‟s earlier comments that “the commandment of love
is simply the call to experience another being as another I, the call to participate in
another‟s humanity, which is concretized in the person of the other just as mine is in my
person”.149 In this way, solidarity is a true manifestation of the ethical-empathetic person
who has entered into a relationship with a God who empathizes with and cares for us.150
Key to enacting the virtue of solidarity is the recognition of the other as a human
person (39/41). The pope states:
Solidarity helps us to see the “other” – whether a person, people or nation – not
just as some kind of instrument, with a work capacity and physical strength to be
exploited at low cost and then discarded when no longer useful, but as our
“neighbor,” a “helper”…, to be made a sharer, on a par with ourselves, in the
banquet of life to which all are equally invited by God. Hence the importance of
reawakening the religious awareness of individuals and peoples (39/42, emphasis
original).
Here much that we have said before comes to mind. First, there is an emphasis on the
other as a human person, thus the personalistic aspect of solidarity, that is, of acting
together with others who are recognized as human persons. However here we find
something strange. John Paul claims that it is solidarity that helps one to see the other as
a human person. This seems to be a reversal of his previous views as found in The Acting
Person. We recall that solidarity is an authentic attitude of participating in the humanity
of the other person, that is, recognizing the personhood of the other. It would seem then
that such participation is enabled by this recognition and not the other way around. That
148
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way" than through empathizing with us.
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is, I “see” the other as a person. This recognition then moves me to enter into solidarity
with him or her. The encounter with the other (through empathy) as the one who calls out
to me must take place first. I have always already found myself obligated to the other and
recognize the humanity and subjectivity of the other. It is through this ethical obligation
that I recognize my responsibility and duty to be in solidarity with the other. And so, by
the “time” I have entered into solidarity with the other, I have already “seen” him or her
as a human person. Now we are clearly speaking here of solidarity as for someone. In a
moment, we will also show how the pope‟s words also reflect the solidarity with
someone. First, we would like to note that here the pope‟s language is almost
synonymous with Stein‟s concept of the association as that form of human relation where
“one person approaches another as subject to object”.151 This form of relationship,
according to John Paul, is completely inappropriate to the attitude of solidarity.
According to the virtue of solidarity, people relate to one another as human persons. Thus
the form of togetherness that results is an authentic human community where, as Stein
upholds, “solidarity prevails”. 152 The pope‟s words reveal their indebtedness to his
previous analysis of human participation as acting and being together with others in such
a way that I recognize the human subjectivity of the other. Solidarity thus understood is
clearly an example of Tischner‟s awakened conscience to the suffering other who needs
my help. Here, the suffering of the other is spoken of as underdevelopment caused by
exploitation and oppression. To end this suffering involves a conversion to the other
manifested in the moral value of transforming interdependence into solidarity (39/42). “In
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this way, the solidarity which we propose is the path to peace and at the same time to
development” (39/42, emphasis original).
Towards the end of the above quote, John Paul speaks of “the importance of
reawakening the religious awareness of individuals and peoples”. This religious
awareness can be understood, à la Levinas, as the “inspiration” of God that turns us
toward the other.153 It is the awareness that when we are turned to the other, loving the
neighbor in need, we are in relation with God. Solidarity with the other manifests an
encounter with the God who turns us toward the other. Now while the pope calls for a
global solidarity (45/50), thus appealing to all people throughout the world,154 for the
peace and prosperity of all the peoples and nations of the world can only be accomplished
thus (45/49); he also offers a specific call to solidarity within the church itself. The pope,
as leader of the Roman Catholic Church, gives solidarity a specifically Christian
interpretation by claiming that the “model of the unity of the human race, which must
ultimately inspire our solidarity [is] the intimate life of God, one God in three Persons”
(40/43, emphasis original). This Christian perspective is, of course, one that Levinas
would not embrace, however it makes sense in light of the pope‟s own religious context.
John Paul even goes on to link solidarity with the very life of the church: “This
specifically Christian communion… is the soul of the Church‟s vocation to be a
„sacrament‟” (40/44, emphasis original). Thus,
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By virtue of her own evangelical duty, the Church feels called to take her stand
beside the poor, to discern the justice of their requests, and to help satisfy them,
without losing sight of the good of groups in the context of the common good”
(39/41).
That is, solidarity ought to be a fundamental characteristic and virtue of the life of the
church itself. The church “calls us and… tirelessly promotes… the exercise of the human
and Christian solidarity” (40/44). Thus the church manifests solidarity with someone for
the other. In this way, the church ought to be the example par excellence of solidarity, of
the we – for the other. We recall the claim of the World Synod of Bishops noted at the
beginning of this chapter: “Action on behalf of justice and participation in the
transformation of the world fully appear to us as a constitutive dimension of the
preaching of the Gospel”.155 Such action and participation can only be accomplished
through the virtue of solidarity.
This claim, that the church can and ought to be a manifestation of a solidarity
community, of the we – for the other, will serve as the point of exploration in our final
chapter. John Paul II declares in his encyclical that “the process of development and
liberation takes concrete shape in the exercise of solidarity, that is to say in the love and
service of neighbor, especially of the poorest” (46/51, emphasis original). We recall
Tischner‟s claim that solidarity is enacted specifically for the wounded and suffering
other, specifically in his reflections, the exploited worker. John Paul‟s encyclical seems
to broaden this focus to include all those who are poor and suffering. As we will see in
our final chapter this call to enter into solidarity with the suffering other who is poor,
oppressed, and outcast has found particular focus in the writings of Liberation Theology
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where they speak of an option for the poor. We will close this study reflecting upon the
theme of solidarity as it appears in these liberation writings for it is here that the virtue of
solidarity as the we – for the other has been deeply embraced. It is in the thought of
Liberation Theology that we find reflections on the human-divine relation (from a
Christian perspective) that are most akin to Levinas‟ insistence that it is only through the
ethical relationship with the other that one can enter into relationship with God: “There
can be no „knowledge‟ of God separated from the relationship with men.” 156 What is
more, we will find in these writings the consequences of this recognition – that not only
does my ethical relationship with the other witness to God, but it can also be a form of
spirituality, prayer, and even liturgy. It is in Liberation Theology that solidarity as the we
– for the other is truly a solidarity of awakened consciences – consciences awakened to
the suffering others who are the poor, oppressed, and outcast in our very midst.
Consciences awakened to the precepts of God that come to me as from a voiceless Voice
who commands: Love thy neighbor. Bear another’s burden.
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CHAPTER SIX
Ethical-Empathy as a Philosophical Framework
for Christian Solidarity in the Liberation Tradition

Introduction
It needs to be realized, however, that for us Latin Americans the question is not
precisely “How are we to do theology after Auschwitz?”…. Our task here is to find
the words with which to talk about God in the midst of the starvation of millions,
the humiliation of races regarded as inferior, discrimination against women,
especially women who are poor, systematic social injustice, a persistent high rate of
infant mortality, those who simply “disappear” or are deprived of their freedom, the
sufferings of peoples who are struggling for their right to live, the exiles and the
refugees, terrorism of every kind, and the corpse-filled common graves of
Ayacucho. What we must deal with is not the past but, unfortunately, a cruel
present and a dark tunnel with no apparent end. 1
We recall from our first chapter that one of Levinas‟ great concerns, perhaps the
underlying anguish that pulses throughout his work, is how to philosophize and speak of
morality after Auschwitz, that is after the very failure of philosophy and morality. 2 While
this is a vital question that perhaps can never be adequately answered, in the above quote
we find a radical questioning of this important and very real concern. For, while the
Holocaust of World War II may have come to an end with the allied liberation of
Auschwitz, Dachau, and Bergen-Belsen (to name but a few of those places of nightmare
and death), it is a well known fact that genocide, torture, and death of the innocent
continue throughout the world and to this very day. Indeed, in certain countries the banal 3
1

Gustavo Gutiérrez, On Job: God-Talk and the Suffering of the Innocent, trans.
Matthew J. O'Connell (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1987), 102, emphasis mine.
2

See the end of chapter one.

3

Certainly the situation of poverty is never banal for those who suffer under it. I
simply mean to point out that the gross disregard for human life does not only happen in
such extreme situations as was found during World War II, in the killing fields of
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situation of poverty and unemployment that results from social, economic, and
governmental supported injustice has reached epidemic proportions. And so perhaps the
question is not so much how to speak of humanity and God after Auschwitz, but how to
speak of the human person and God now – in the midst of the injustice that still exists
today and in response to the anguished cries of millions of innocent victims whose Thou
shalt not kill have been and still are ignored?
This question has received much attention from the theologies of liberation. I say
theologies, for it is important to recognize that many forms of theology have been
grouped under the umbrella term of “liberation theology”. Feminist theology, Black
theology, theologies springing up in Asia and Africa, even certain forms of theology
found in Europe and North America have been labeled as liberationist whether or not
their proponents accept the title. 4 Here, in this concluding chapter we will focus only on
the form of Liberation Theology that is indigenous to Latin America. This choice is
somewhat pragmatic due to the prolific writing done from this context and the
accessibility of these texts to an English speaking audience. However, Latin American
Liberation Theology is also recognized as the foundational source of the liberation
movement.5 And so it is perhaps wise to turn to these authors who gave birth and shape to
this fascinating and highly relevant form of theology.

Cambodia, in Bosnia or Rwanda, etc., but also manifests itself everyday and everywhere
in the faces of the poor masses amongst us and whom we often overlook.
4

See Christopher Rowland, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Liberation
Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). The essays compiled in this
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All forms of thought are of course based on that which preceded it. The political
theology of, for example, Johann Baptist Metz can be seen as preceding the liberation
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While a systematic presentation of the theology of liberation is beyond the scope of
this chapter, it is important to keep in mind that its guiding concern is “how to proclaim
God as Father in an inhuman world”. 6 That is, it is “not so much a theology about
suffering as it is a theology written from suffering”.7
How are we to talk about a God who is revealed as love in a situation characterized
by poverty and oppression? How are we to proclaim the God of life to men and
women who die prematurely and unjustly? How are we to acknowledge that God
makes us a free gift of love and justice when we have before us the suffering of the
innocent? What words are we to use in telling those who are not even regarded as
persons that they are the daughters and sons of God?8
These are the agonizing questions that Liberation Theology attempts to answer. They are
challenging questions and potentially „dangerous‟ for they threaten those who live in
comfort and hold positions of power at the expense of those less fortunate than
themselves. However, they are also questions of hope for although they point to the

movement. However, it is not our purpose here to trace the historical roots of Liberation
Theology. The particular form of theology developed in Latin American in the 1960's and
70's was the first to bear the name of Liberation Theology, and so in that sense, it is
foundational for the other forms of theology that have been grouped under this same title.
See Gustavo Gutiérrez, Gustavo Gutiérrez: Essential Writings, ed. James B. Nickoloff
(Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1996), 5. In the introduction to this text Nickoloff claims that
“theology of liberation” was first used at a gathering of priests in Chimbote a month
before the now famous Medellín conference in the summer of 1968.
6
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reality that all is not well in the world, that a life of poverty and affliction is not what God
has intended for humankind, there is also a recognition that such injustice is a situation
that must be remedied if we truly believe in a God of love and life. There is hope that the
terrible reality of oppression and innocent death can in fact be remedied – someday and
somehow – for God desires the life of even the least person on earth. However, this can
only happen if we who are here on earth work for such a transformation. Indeed,
according to the theologians of liberation, it is not so much because we believe in God
that people are required to work against the situations of injustice and oppression that
compose the reality of our world. Rather it is because we believe in a God of love and life
that one recognizes the obligation to work for the end of suffering and oppression. The
type of God one believes in is, as we will see, pivotal to Liberation Theology. Thus
Liberation Theology has drawn both harsh critics and faithful followers for its attempt to
understand God and a faith-filled following of this God (both on an individual and
communal level, that is, as church) “from within a commitment to the poor and
marginalized”.9 However, if one makes a careful reading of the many books, articles,
essays, and speeches from this tradition, one finds not so much a radical dissent from
Mother Church, but rather a radical dedication to Jesus‟ proclamation of the good news
of the Kingdom:
The Spirit of the Lord is upon me,
because he has anointed me to bring glad tidings to the poor.
He has sent me to proclaim liberty to captives
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and recovery of sight to the blind, to let the oppressed go free,
and to proclaim a year acceptable to the Lord. (Luke 4:18-19)
This is a message of radical hope and love to the poor, oppressed, and marginalized of the
world. Those who believe in the God who has declared this message of life and liberation
are called to make God‟s message a reality. It is the message and task that is proclaimed
from every page of text and transcribed word of the theology of liberation.
At the ends of the previous two chapters, I alluded to a potential harmony
between the ethical-empathetic enactment of human personhood as found in the dialogue
between the thought of Emmanuel Levinas and Edith Stein and the concept of solidarity
as elucidated by Liberation Theology. In the last chapter we explored the notion of
solidarity from both a philosophical and theological perspective, showing its general
resonance with the ethically-empathetic enactment of human personhood. In this chapter
I will explore directly the place of solidarity within Liberation Theology, showing its
resonance with all that has been discussed thus far in this dissertation. In this way, this
chapter will serve as a conclusion to our reflections on and analysis of Levinas‟ ethical
philosophy and Stein‟s concept of empathy. These reflections will serve to show one way
in which the philosophical thought of these two writers can be both practically embraced
and made manifest in the real, concrete lives of human persons here and now. Reflecting
on the precepts and themes of Liberation Theology naturally focuses our thought in a
spiritual and religious direction, and one that is decidedly Roman Catholic. 10 This is a
deliberate but by no means essential focusing for, as has been commented in previous
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chapters, the thought of Levinas and Stein has an application beyond the realm of
organized religion although perhaps not beyond the realm of „spirituality‟, if we
understand spirituality in its most basic and generic form as “the way a person leads his
or her life”. 11 Thus all human persons have a spirituality and one that is decidedly ethical
for how one leads his or her life always already involves ethical responsibility toward the
other. And so although the practical disclosure of the ethical-empathetic person can take
many forms, this closing chapter will attempt to show the harmony between the ethicallyempathetic human person and the faithful follower of Christ as envisioned by Latin
American Liberation Theology. As we will see, to believe in the God of love and life and
to be a faithful disciple of Jesus Christ means precisely to recognize the face of the other
who is the victim of oppression and injustice. It is to enter into solidarity with the poor
and marginalized so that my love of neighbor truly is love and worship of this God of
love and life. What is more, this recognition of the other and entrance into solidarity with
him or her is a reality that has a decidedly communal component. That is, solidarity with
the poor and marginalized is an individual commitment made with others so that we may
be for the other. Understood from a religious perspective, this communal solidarity with
the suffering other, Tischner‟s we – for the other, is the essential nature of the church.
There are four main sections to this chapter. First we will explore more directly
certain points of harmony between Liberation Theology and the overall tenor of Levinas‟
and Stein‟s thought. Next we will reflect on the notion of a preferential option for the
poor. This is perhaps the all-encompassing precept of Liberation Theology. As we will
11
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see, it is also synonymous with the act of solidarity. The third section will explore how
Liberation Theology presents this preferential option (aka: solidarity) as a key component
of one‟s individual spirituality, that is, as a living out of one‟s faith in God and,
specifically here, Jesus Christ. Lastly, we will reflect upon solidarity at the communal
level of the church. Here it will be shown how, according to Liberation Theology, the
very nature and meaning of the church is intimately tied to this option for the poor such
that the prayer and worship of the church can be found in its acts of solidarity with and
for the poor.

Why Liberation Theology?
It is important at the outset of this chapter to explore how Liberation Theology
can enter into the dialogue that has taken place here thus far. That is, what recommends
Liberation Theology to the philosophical thought of Emmanuel Levinas and Edith Stein?
While the following three sections of this chapter will help to answer this question, in this
section we will explore certain points of contact between these two realms that will form
a basis for the analysis that is to come.
To begin with, we recall Levinas‟ overall disdain for theology as a form of ontotheology. As we know, for Levinas Western theology – that is, European and North
American theology – falls into the same totalizing, intentional trap for which he criticized
Western philosophy. 12 Liberation Theology also finds fault with European theology and
Western/Northern Theology in general. Indeed, Liberation Theology offers itself as a
12

See Emmanuel Levinas, "God and Philosophy," in The Levinas Reader, ed.
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new way of doing theology that breaks with the trends and emphases of European
Theology.13 In chapter one of his ground-breaking text, The True Church and the Poor,
Jon Sobrino offers an excellent reflection on the difference between European Theology
and Liberation Theology.14 While he is careful to note that Liberation Theology does not
reject European Theology outright, Sobrino does claim that, ultimately, European
Theology has been found inadequate to speak to the concrete reality of the Latin
American situation which is a situation of gross injustice, oppression, and poverty.15 This
is, in part, why the theology of liberation developed – to offer a way to speak of God that
can truly resonate in the lives of the Latin American people, that is to speak of God from
within a situation of suffering (as we have noted). This is perhaps the crucial difference
between European theology and Latin American theology – its starting point. As Sobrino
notes, for European Theology, the primary interlocutor is the atheist. Thus, the task of
European Theology is to explain and justify the position of faith in God. However,
according to the liberationist theologians, faith in God (or the lack thereof, that is,
atheism) is not the issue. For Liberation Theology, the primary interlocutor is not the
non-believer but the “non-person” – the poor, outcast, and wretched of the earth. The
reality of the situation is that “in Latin America… unbelief is minimal; by contrast,
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misery and poverty are maximal”. 16 Thus while European Theology focuses on a “crisis
of meaning” and attempts to rationally explain sinful human reality; Liberation Theology
is rather concerned with the “crisis of reality” and aims to transform the sinful reality of
the world. 17 According to Sobrino,
European theology is generally interested in explaining the truth of the faith and
in clarifying its meaning when it is obscured. The concern that has stirred this
theology to its major achievements has been pastoral, although relevant only to a
cultural elite. The questions to which it has sought answers are these: How is it
possible to believe today? What meaning can faith have today when its meaning
seems to have been lost? The task has been to recover the meaning of faith.
Latin American theology is interested in liberating the real world from its
wretched state, since it is this objective situation that has obscured the meaning of
faith. Its task is not primarily to restore meaning to the faith in the presence of the
wretched conditions of the real world. It is to transform this real world and at the
same time recover the meaning of the faith. The task, therefore, is not to
understand the faith differently, but to allow a new faith to spring from a new
practice. 18
In this way, we see that Liberation Theology offers a radical turn to the other who cries
out to us. It is an “irruption” of the poor, marginalized, and oppressed into the spotlight of
history.19 It is a “new presence of those who had actually been absent in our society and
in the church”.20 Coming from a country of poverty and oppression, Gustavo Gutiérrez
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also perceives a real tension between the power and culture of Western and Northern
countries (most notably the United States of America) and the struggling countries of
South America. What he finds alarming is the threat of assimilation where the fate of
these poorer countries “was to be absorbed by the superior culture and religion” of the
conquering and colonializing nations of the West.21 This threat of assimilation is an
excellent example of the totalizing trend of Western thought that reduces the other to the
same. What is required to combat or even prevent this totalizing reduction is a profound
“letting be” and respect for the otherness of these minority cultures and spiritualities.
Even more so, not only should this otherness be given the space to flourish, it should
even be entered into through the participation of solidarity:
The perspective of the “underside of history” is an obligation still in full force. The
perception of the otherness of the poor and oppressed (in social, racial, cultural and
gender terms) enables us to understand how they can enjoy a keen sense of God,
which does not disdain celebration and joy, in the midst of a situation of
expropriation and a struggle for justice. By unknown paths the experience of
oppression has turned out to be fruitful ground for the mystical dimension of
Christian life. 22
In this way, Liberation Theology offers a type of de-centering of European theology and
the European perspective which Sobrino sees as both historically and geographically
anachronistic.23 European history and culture is no longer considered the center and
21
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pinnacle of humanity. Rather it is one aspect among many. According to liberation
theologians, it is time for the European (and we may add North American) perspective to
relinquish its totalizing grasp, sit back, and listen to other voices – here the voices of the
wretched of Latin America, “the other” to the European “self”. This is certainly a
movement that is in harmony with Levinas‟ thought.
This de-centering of European Theology and focus instead on the poor and oppressed
shows how Liberation Theology offers an epistemological break and new hermeneutics
for theology in general. 24 Quite simply, the epistemological and hermeneutical center of
Liberation Theology is the perspective and life of the poor and oppressed. “The poor in
Latin America have made us realize that living as Christians in our contemporary world,
with an open eye and an open heart for the real problems of people, challenges us to
break out of our individualism and elitism and start listening to the Bible with new
ears.”25 What is more, the world of the poor is the epistemological center because, in the
estimation of the liberation tradition, it is “the privileged locus of the presence and

anachronism. European theology was not conscious that it was theologizing from the
vantage point of the geopolitical center of the world. It failed to see that the world is not
identical with this center and cannot be understood from the standpoint of the center. It
failed to realize that the world is instead a whole in which center and periphery are in
tension and that from the properly Christian standpoint it is the periphery (the poor) or at
least the repercussions at the periphery that are the privileged source of theological
understanding.”
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revelation of God”.26 That is, the face of God is to be found in the pleading, vulnerable
faces of the poor and oppressed. Here too is a point in harmony with Levinas‟ view that
the trace of God passes in the face of the other. As we will see, just as Levinas insists that
the turn to God is always already and necessarily a turn to the other, so in Liberation
Theology we find a profound link between love of God and love of one‟s neighbor.27
Indeed, in 1979, the Latin American bishops declared in an official document that “the
love of God, which is the root of our dignity, necessarily becomes loving communion
with other human beings and fraternal participation” (327).28 There is no path to God
save through the human other. Or, as Levinas puts it: “There can be no „knowledge‟ of
God separated from the relationship with men.” 29 We will reflect more on this new way
of confronting and understanding reality from “the underside of history” when we
examine the preferential option for the poor below. As we will see, according to
Liberation Theology, it is only in solidarity with the poor and the oppressed that human
life and spirituality, faith in and relationship with God, are possible and have any
meaning at all. The reality of the poor offers the all-encompassing framework for the
26
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theology of liberation. This emphasis on “the others” who are the victims of society, the
“non-persons”, certainly offers a point of connection between Levinas‟ thought and
Liberation Theology. Liberation Theology focuses on real human life and faith as it is
lived among and in relationship with others. Again, just as for Levinas the turn to God
necessarily is a turn to the other, so too for Liberation Theology one can only turn to God
through the human other, and particularly through the suffering other. 30 Thus, Liberation
Theology witnesses to a de-centering of the self toward relationship with the poor and
suffering other who gives meaning and purpose to my life. It is a similar type of decentering as that found in Levinas‟ thought.
Another point of contact with Levinas‟ thought and Liberation Theology is its
methodology in which praxis is emphasized over reflection and analysis. Again turning to
Gustavo Gutiérrez, one of the “founding fathers” of Liberation Theology, he has claimed
from his very first writings to his most recent that “the theology of liberation is reflection
on practice in the light of faith”.31 He is adamant that theology is the “second step” and
must follow after the “first step” of pastoral activity which is manifested as “commitment
to the service of others”.32 For Gutiérrez, theology is ultimately a language. “It attempts
to speak a word about the mysterious reality that believers call God. It is logos about
theos”.33 However, before we can ever speak of this mysterious reality by which humans
are called to enter into a relationship of love and hope, first we must have the space of
30
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silence. “God is first contemplated when we do God‟s will and allow God to reign; only
after that do we think about God”.34 Put directly:
We must first establish ourselves on the terrain of spirituality and practice; only
subsequently is it possible to formulate discourse on God in an authentic and
respectful way…. The mystery of God comes to life in contemplation and in the
practice of God‟s plan for human history; only in a second phase can this life
inspire appropriate reasoning and relevant speech…. In view of all this we can say
that the first stage is silence, the second is speech. 35
This notion of theology following after or flowing from spirituality is succinctly revealed
in Gutiérrez‟s phrase that “our methodology is our spirituality”. 36 We will address
spirituality and its practice in a later section. What is important to note here is how the
method of Liberation Theology – act first, reflect later – seems akin to Levinas‟
dethroning of ontology for ethics as first philosophy. First is doing – acting, responding
to the other in need, only then can we speak of being (if being is spoken of at all). There
is an ethical emphasis in the theology of liberation that is quite in harmony with the
ethical priority upon which Levinas also insists. It is the priority of the ethical saying over
the thematized and concretized said. As we will see the spirituality of liberation can be
likened to an ethical saying in which the trace of God passes, while theology is the said
into which this spirituality evolves (devolves?). Ultimately, Liberation Theology is
deeply concerned with the interhuman reality and witnessing to how this reality is one

34

Gutiérrez, On Job, xiii, emphasis mine.

35

Ibid., emphasis mine.

36

Gutiérrez, "The Task and Content of Liberation Theology", 30.
363

that testifies to the God of love and life, rejecting the idols of oppression, injustice, and
death. As Levinas himself said: “To know God is to know what must be done.”37
Two final points are worth mentioning here. First, if it is true, as argued in our
preceding chapter, that the ethical-empathetic enactment of the human person naturally
manifests itself in acts of solidarity with others, and especially with suffering others, and
if we are focusing our study now in a purely theological vein, then it would seem
imperative to find a version of theology that also acknowledges the importance of
solidarity in human lives. Nowhere is the ethic and virtue of solidarity more embraced
than in Liberation Theology. As we will see below, within the liberation tradition
solidarity is synonymous with one of its key precepts, the preferential option for the poor.
Also, and as will be discussed in much greater length, solidarity is a crucial aspect of
one‟s spirituality (understood here as a living out of one‟s faith in, thus a following of,
Christ). The word solidarity is found throughout the writings of Liberation Theology and,
I would hazard to say, its spirit permeates the whole of this tradition. Thus, examining
solidarity from a liberationist perspective seems a natural and relevant way to conclude
this dissertation. What is more (and this is the second point), although not cited
frequently, liberationist theologians are not strangers to the work of Emmanuel Levinas. 38
Indeed, it would seem that these theologians have found a philosophical compatriot in
Levinas whose turn to the other and language of ethical responsibility is happily akin to
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their own theological concerns. For example, Gutiérrez was himself familiar with the
Jewish philosopher. At one point he even places his own understanding of poverty within
the margins of Levinas‟ thought:
After the Holocaust Emmanuel Levinas insightfully developed an ethic of the
other, holding up the face of someone who says “don‟t kill me!” and thinking of
God as Otherness. Poverty and its consequences are the great challenge of our time.
Poverty which in the last analysis means early and unjust death, destroying persons,
families, and nations. 39
The situation of unjust destruction and death caused by poverty are clearly manifestations
of the pleading face of the other who cries out in his or her suffering. One could claim
that the theologians of liberation and Levinas are speaking very much of the same reality
though from somewhat different perspectives. With that said, let us now address the
option for the poor which is a manifestation of the solidarity of the ethically-empathetic
person.

Solidarity and the Preferential Option for the Poor
The theology of liberation, like any theology is about God. God and God‟s love
are, ultimately, its only theme.40
As we enter into an analysis of one of Liberation Theology‟s more controversial
precepts, it is important to keep this emphasis on God in mind for ultimately, the
preferential option for the poor is rooted in a particular understanding of who God is and
what God wills for humanity. As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, Liberation
Theology is deeply concerned with how to speak of God amidst human suffering and
39
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oppression. Liberationist theologians are not concerned with proving God‟s existence but
with “proving that God is with the poor and their struggle for justice today.” Thus “it is
not enough to say, „I believe in God.‟ I must specify in what God I believe”.41 For the
proponents of Liberation Theology the God they believe in can be summed up as the God
of life.42 Now this image of God is certainly not unique to Liberation Theology. Drawing
their understanding of God from the Scriptures, this God of life hears the cries of the
wretched of the earth. This is the God of the Exodus who liberated the Hebrew slaves
from Egypt. It is especially the God of the prophets who chastises the rich and affluent
for their neglect of the poor and needy. It is the God of Jesus Christ who sent his son to
announce the Good News to the least of society, who ate with sinners and tax collectors,
who healed lepers, and who challenged the political and religious elite so smug in their
positions of power and prosperity. It is a God in solidarity with humanity, especially the
poor and oppressed, who are God‟s special friends.43 It is the God of whom St. Irenaeus
declared “The glory of God is the living human being”. 44 If it is true that God glories in
human life, then, while God of course desires life for all people, it is the situations where
that life is most threatened and oppressed that gain God‟s particular attention. Liberation
theology declares in outrage that such situations are not and cannot be the will of God!
“The cargo of inhuman, cruel death with which all of this misery and oppression is laden
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is contrary to the will of the God of Christian revelation, who is a God of life.” 45 What is
more, any other image of God or God‟s will is simply idolatrous. Liberation Theology
has made this connection between the oppression of human life and an idolatrous image
of God blatantly apparent:
What is actually opposed to Christian faith in Latin America is not atheism, then,
but idolatry, both the idolatrous manipulation of the true God, and the
replacement of that God with other gods created by human beings. Throughout
the entire history of Latin America, the oppressors of the people have almost
always declared themselves to be believers – which is tantamount to an idolatrous
perversion of the name of God. The Conquistadors were all Christian, and
colonization was carried out in the name of God. Likewise those responsible for
slavery were Christians, supported by Christian European nations. As for the
Church, it endorsed slavery for centuries. Today all of the military dictators, and
practically all of those responsible for economic, political, and ideological
oppression, are Christian. Domination, consequently, has always been basically
idolatrous, thereby involving a serious threat to the faith of a people both poor and
believing. The danger to faith, then, does not come from the atheistic
revolutionaries but from the idolatrous oppressors.46
It is towards the poor whose lives are threatened that God directs the divine gaze.
As we know from our previous chapters, it is in the direction of God‟s gaze that we too
are called to look. And so while there is an awareness that these “unjust and inhumane”
situations “cannot be willed by God”, there is also the “awareness that liberation is
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attainable, indeed part and parcel of God‟s salvific plan”. 47 That is, the God of life rejects
these situations of inhuman injustice and wills the life of the oppressed. But such a desire
for the life of the oppressed is meaningless if it is not actually worked towards in the
concrete reality of daily life. That is, the oppressed can only gain life if they are liberated
from their wretched states of oppression. In this way the platitude that God desires life
takes on real weight when carried through to this practical conclusion. If it is the will of
God for humanity to have life and have it in abundance (John 10:10), then those who
believe in this God are called to manifest and enact God‟s will here and now – enabling
life where it is most weak and vulnerable, replacing the threat of death with the promise
of life. Thus “real belief in God entails solidarity with the poor so as to ease their
undeserved suffering by establishing „uprightness and judgment‟”.48 This is precisely the
message of the Scriptures. It is found in the Hebrew Scriptures and proclaimed
vehemently in the prophetic tradition: “You have been told, O man, what is good, and
what the Lord requires of you: Only to do the right and to love goodness, and to walk
humbly with your God” (Micah 6:8) for “him who glories, [glories] in this, that in his
prudence he knows me, knows that I, the Lord, bring about kindness, justice and
uprightness on the earth” (Jeremiah 9: 23). It is also the message of the Christian
Scriptures where Jesus walked among the poor and needy and whose followers are called
to exemplify such love and action on behalf of “the least ones” (Matthew 25:31-46): “If
anyone says, „I love God‟, but hates his brother, he is a liar; for whoever does not love a
47
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brother whom he has seen cannot love God whom he has not seen. This is the
commandment we have from him: whoever loves God must also love his brother” (1
John 4:20-21). As we have noted above: “To know God is to know what must be done”. 49
Life and liberation are attainable, but only if those who claim to believe in this God do
God‟s will by working toward the liberation of the poor and oppressed. “But if a man has
enough to live on, and yet when he sees his brother in need shuts up his heart against him,
how can it be said that the divine love dwells in him? My children, love must not be a
matter of words or talk; it must be genuine and show itself in action” (1 John 3:17-18,
emphasis mine). 50 Coming to this realization that the situations of poverty and injustice in
our world are against the will of God reflects the notion of an awakened conscience that
Tischner claims is an essential aspect of solidarity, that inspires one to enter into
solidarity with the suffering other.51 Such action on behalf of love is also called making a
preferential option for the poor. Let us take a closer look at this preferential option.
As we have seen, Gutiérrez has claimed that both the theology of liberation and
the spirituality behind it “must start from a commitment to the poor”.52 We have already
shown how this commitment is linked to a particular image of God and God‟s will. But to
more fully understand this preference, we also must consider the notion of poverty for in
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Liberation Theology it has more than one definition. In fact it has three: real or material
poverty which is unjust and “wholly contrary to the will of God”, spiritual poverty which
is “an attitude of openness and acceptance towards the will of God”, and poverty as a
commitment of “solidarity with the [real/material] poor and in protest against poverty”.53
To these three definitions of poverty are linked three understandings of liberation:
political and social liberation, “which points towards the elimination of the immediate
causes of poverty and injustice, especially with regard to socio-economic structures”;
human liberation, which “means liberating human beings of all those things – not just in
the social sphere – that limit their capacity to develop themselves freely and in dignity”;
and “liberation from selfishness and sin”. 54 It is in the connection between the three types
of poverty and the three understandings of liberation that the concept of the preferential
option for the poor is found. We will consider each word in its own right.
Poverty. Poverty (here material poverty), as we have seen, is unjust and ultimately
means death. Thus, when speaking of poverty we are speaking of a real threat to life
which is also a rejection of God for God gives life not death. Poverty therefore reveals
selfishness and sin and thus it is contrary to the will of God.55 When we speak of the
poor, we therefore mean the “non-persons, the in-significant, those who do not count in
society and all too often in Christian churches as well”. 56 The poor are the “insignificant
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in society but not before God” for as we have seen, God has a special place in his heart
for the poor.57
Preference. Preference implies both God‟s universal love for all humankind but
also his especial choice of the poor, oppressed, and marginalized. 58 This notion of
preference is one of the more controversial aspects of Liberation Theology for
Christianity emphasizes God‟s universal love and salvation for all people. However, the
advocates of this preference point out that “the very term preference obviously excludes
any exclusivity; it simply points to who ought to be first – not the only – objects of our
solidarity”. 59 A preference thus reveals a select choice out of a larger whole. The whole is
all of humankind while the preference is for the poor and marginalized. We recall how
for Levinas justice is “a comparison between incomparables and a synopsis, a
togetherness and contemporaneousness”.60 To make a comparison can also be understood
as making a preference. I am ethically beholden to both the other and the third party but
when facing both of them, a choice must be made. To whom will I offer my piece of
bread? How else can I decide save by making a comparison? And, as Levinas states:
“There must be a justice among incomparable ones.”61 This is so for it would be the
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height of injustice to offer my piece of bread to the one who already has an abundance of
bread while ignoring the starving beggar on the street.
According to the Scriptural tradition that Christians look to as normative for their
understanding of God and the human-divine relationship, God makes such a preference
for the wretched of the earth, particularly those who are suffering at the hands of other
human persons. Christians therefore, as people who say „yes‟ to this God, are also called
to make this preference for the poor. Why does God make this preference? Not because
the poor are particularly good and certainly not because they are “better” than anyone
else, for all of humanity is made in the image and likeness of God.62 I believe Gutiérrez
makes this point that the poor are not necessarily good ("if they are, fine!" 63) for two
reasons. First, Gutiérrez want to avoid any idealization of the poor and the state of
poverty. To idealize the poor may lead to the temptation of not working to change their
status of poverty and oppression because it must be God‟s will and a blessing (why or
how else would the poor be so “good”?). We will return to this point below. Second, it
takes away any notion of merit - that the poor deserve my preferential treatment because
they are such good people and even perhaps somehow better than I am. With blatant
honesty Gutiérrez notes:
All the poor are good, some say, in order to justify the preference for them.
Someone who says that gives me the impression of never having seen a poor
person up close. For the poor are human beings; they include very good people,
but there are also some among them who are not good.64
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The poor are “sinners” just like we all are. Their poverty does not make them any better
or worse people than anyone else. This acknowledgement also takes away any
justification of not offering a preference to the poor and oppressed due to any „bad
behavior‟. In other words, this preference is not conditioned upon the merit of the one
who is chosen but is infinitely demanded of me. It is an obligation that is “blind” in the
sense that we find in Levinas – one cannot see the face of the other which prevents
making our preference (or failing to do so) on the basis of the color of the skin, hair, eyes,
etc., or on the basis of some perceived merit. Gutiérrez of course gives the reason behind
this preference a theological interpretation. The poor and oppressed are preferred by God
not because they are good but rather “because first of all God is good and prefers the
forgotten, the oppressed, the poor, the abandoned”. 65 God loved us first, for which we
ought to be eternally grateful and respond in love for one another, but especially for the
poor, for they are the ones whom God himself raises up to a special place of privilege
among humankind. God has chosen the poor and if we are to be open to the will of God
then we will find ourselves turned toward the poor as well regardless of how “good” or
“bad” they are. This is a choice that requires humility and openness on our part to the will
of God (which of course we perceive empathetically). The choice for the poor thus
requires an attitude of spiritual poverty.
Option. The option for the poor is made when we choose to make God‟s
preference of the poor our own. When we make the option for the poor we enter into
solidarity with the poor. “[O]ption relates to the idea of commitment that… means
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solidarity with the poor and rejection of poverty as something contrary to the will of
God”.66 Now it is important to note that, for advocates of this position, this “option for
the poor is not optional”.67 That is, if one proclaims belief in the God of life and claims to
be in relationship with this God, making an option of love for and solidarity with the poor
is a necessity of such a faith position. It is “the ethical requirement in order to be a
follower of Jesus”.68 Again and again, liberationist theologians proclaim the precept that
“love for God is unavoidably expressed through love of one‟s neighbor…. To love one‟s
brother, to love all persons, is a necessary and indispensible mediation of the love of
God; it is to love God”.69 But, as we have noted above, while God loves all people, he has
a special place in his heart for the poor and wretched of the earth. In this way the
believer‟s option for the poor is also a “theocentric, prophetic option”.
When you come in to visit me,
who asks these things of you?....
Put away your misdeeds from before my eyes;
cease doing evil; learn to do good.
Make justice your aim: redress the wronged,
hear the orphan‟s plea, defend the widow. (Isaiah 1:12 & 16)
A point of clarification is necessary here. While it is true that, according to the
logic laid out by the theology of liberation, a preferential option for the poor is also a
theocentric option, it is important to note that one does not make such a choice so that
one can encounter God and be in relationship with this God. That is:
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the neighbor is not an occasion, an instrument, for becoming closer to God. We
are dealing with a real love of persons for their own sake and not “for the love of
God”, as the well-intended but ambiguous and ill-used cliché would have it –
ambiguous and ill-used because many seem to interpret it in a sense which forgets
that the love for God is expressed in a true love for persons themselves. This is
the only way to have a true encounter with God. That my action towards another
is at the same time an action towards God does not detract from its truth and
concreteness, but rather gives it even greater meaning and import.70
In our estimation, this is a point of clarification that again strikes a certain resonance with
Levinas‟ thought. We recall from our previous chapters Levinas‟ insistence that, while
the turn to the neighbor is “inspired” by the turn to the divine Infinite, God remains
almost absent, so to speak, from our encounter with the other, or at least in the
background. That is, God‟s presence is never the focus or goal of our relationship with
the other person. The other demands our ethical response by his or her own fact of being
a human person. God, if God comes to mind at all here, is merely an afterthought.71
While I do not think the liberationist theologians would go so far as to say that God is a
mere afterthought in our encounters with human others, I do believe there is a harmony
between the two positions here. We do not enter into solidarity with the suffering poor so
to prove to God how much we love him and gain those proverbial stars in heaven. Rather,
we enter into solidarity with the poor simply because it is the right thing to do, the human
thing to do.72 The fact that God also loves the poor only adds a certain depth and
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particular coloration to the meaning of our enacted love. But that is not where our focus
should be. Our focus is ever and always on the suffering face of the other.
To make a preferential option for the poor involves liberation from sin and
selfishness as the root causes of all injustice so to be free to work towards ending
real/material poverty, to be free to love and to serve the weak and the lowly. This double
understanding of freedom – freedom from sin and freedom for love of others – is
inseparable and can trace its presence in Christian theology73 not only to the Scriptures,
but also to as important a figure as Thomas Aquinas. 74 The liberation from sin, which for
Christians is understood to be made possible through Christ, grants the individual a
freedom that has a purpose: “the attainment of love and communion”. 75 To state it
negatively, failure to strive toward this goal, would be a misuse of our human freedom.
“This freedom is one that must be put at the service of others”.76 This work of liberation
thus leads toward the creation not only of a new and just society but also of a new type of
human person, freed from sin and in solidarity with all their brothers and sisters. 77 To
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other demands my ethical response whether or not I turn to God first, second, or at all.
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make a preferential option for the poor is thus to enter into a way of life, to embrace a
spirituality of liberation as the way of following Christ. And the one who makes this
preferential option for the poor has encountered the poor empathetically and has ethics as
their first philosophy. We will return to this issue of spirituality below but first, a few
more words on solidarity are necessary.
It is striking when we recall one of Tischner‟s designations of solidarity as
“bearing another‟s burden” 78 that Jon Sobrino wrote an essay on solidarity entitled
“Bearing with One Another in Faith”.79 Ultimately his essay is concerned with the
phenomenon of solidarity at the communal level, that is “as a basic way for churches to
relate to one another”.80 We will return to this issue in our section on the church below.
However, before Sobrino‟s reflection on this communal aspect of solidarity, he offers a
brief analysis of what he considers the more basic form of solidarity – that is, solidarity
with the poor and oppressed.81 His conception of solidarity is worth an extended look.
Solidarity, according to Sobrino, is:
a process of mutual giving and receiving and is raised to the level of faith
(although it takes its origins from ethical practices carried out in ongoing
history)…. This is the way for Christians and churches to relate to one another in
accordance with the well-known Pauline admonition, “Bear with one another.”
This is a conception of Christian life and a way of practicing it in which reference
to “the other” is essential, both in giving and in receiving both on the human level
and on ecclesial and Christian levels, and the level of relationship with God, both
in seeing in the other the ethical demand of responsibility and in finding
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graciousness in that other. Solidarity is therefore the Christian way to overcome,
in principle, individualism, whether personal or collective, both at the level of our
involvement in history and on the level of faith. 82
Much of what Sobrino packed into those few sentences bears a great resonance with our
analysis of solidarity as presented in the previous chapter. Not only do we find a common
emphasis on the notion of “bearing with one another”, we also find a Levinasian
insistence on ethical responsibility and a turn to the other. We find too an implied
rejection of individualism that echoes not only Levinas and Stein but also Wotyła and
Tischner. It is also interesting to note Sobrino‟s parenthetical aside that solidarity is a
reality beyond a purely religious and, specifically here, Christian interpretation. This too
seems to coincide with what we have found in Levinas, Stein, Wotyła, and Tischner.
Solidarity ultimately has something to do with being human, whether or not a particular
human believes in God or has any form of relationship with a God.83 Juan Hernandez
Pico, fellow proponent of Liberation Theology, makes this point quite clear:
At this point it is important to emphasize that liberative projects undertaken in
behalf of the poor… are what Christian solidarity supports simply because they
are what human solidarity supports. Any obligation of solidarity on the part of
Christians does not arise because the project is defined as a Christian venture or a
project of Christians. Obligation arises because the project is understood as
human and humanizing; it does not need any supplemental religious legitimation
above and beyond its inherent legitimacy. 84
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While faith in the Christian God is not a constitutive aspect of solidarity per se, what it
adds is a specifically religious meaning and “sacramental character” to the act of
solidarity. 85 This point seems strikingly similar to the clarification offered by Gutiérrez
on how the preferential option for the poor is not made “for the love of God” but for the
poor themselves. 86 Entering into solidarity with the poor is both a human and humanizing
act and this is on both the giving and the receiving end of the equation. The person who
enters into solidarity with the poor both enacts their humanity and becomes even more
human by doing so. But the poor too, through such acts of solidarity, are recognized as
human, albeit in a wretched state, and recover even more of their human dignity through
acts made to amend the unjust situation in which they have been kept. In this way,
Sobrino notes a certain co-responsibility in solidarity. “The root of solidarity is
accordingly to be found in what generates human co-responsibility, makes coresponsibility an imperious ethical demand, and makes the exercises of co-responsibility
something good, fulfilling, and salvific.”87 This insistence on co-responsibility is
important for Sobrino distinguishes solidarity from mere acts of offering humanitarian
aid. 88 While such aid is important, necessary, and often very generous, typically it is also
merely a “one-way street” from the giver to the receiver, whereas in acts of solidarity the
positions of giver and receiver are shared by both sides. Thus “it is not a matter of a one-
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way flow of aid but of mutual giving and receiving”. 89 This is crucial for one aspect of
the liberation of the poor and the oppressed, as presented by the theology of liberation, is
their empowerment. Very often in liberation writings this is referred to as the
conscientization of the poor and oppressed. 90 What this refers to is the fact that the poor
“have gradually become active agents of their own destiny”. 91 That is, as opposed to
remaining as “non-persons” even in the reception of aid, rather “the poor begin to see
themselves as subjects of their own history, as being able to take their destiny in their
own hands”. 92 Although still poor and wretched, the oppressed ones of history no longer
passively accept the hand-outs of charity. Their own consciences have been awakened to
the injustice that encompasses their lives and they realize that such a state of misery
cannot be the will of God. They work for their own liberation. Thus to be in solidarity
with them is to join them where they are and how they are. It is truly a de-centering of the
self – a turn to the other that relinquishes the totalizing hold of the self-absorbed ego. In
this way, “the poor evangelize us”.93 And so while I may give aid and support to the poor,
in many ways, I receive far more than I can ever give. 94 This is another aspect of the
89
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“epistemological break” found in Liberation Theology, of doing theology and living out
one‟s faith “from below, from the viewpoint of the poor”.95 But to reach the perspective of
the poor means going there – going to where they are, their own Sitz im Leben no matter
how wretched or challenging. This calls to mind Tischner‟s insistence that to be in
solidarity with the suffering one means to join them where they are. It is crossing through
the gates into the shipyard of Gdansk so to join the protesting workers where they are and
in doing so receiving a new identity and purpose by being among and with them. It is
going into the poor barrios and shanty towns to help the poor by being among them,
bearing their burden with them. It is an act that is made possible only by empathetically
encountering these oppressed others. It is only through the de-centering act of empathy
that I can enter into the barrio with respect for what it is and the people who live there
and without imposing my own interpretation and image upon it or them. That is, without
empathy, solidarity has the potential to be merely the one-way flow of helpful but
ultimately non-transforming aid. As rooted in empathy, solidarity can be enacted “on the
basis of being’s other”. 96
Work towards transforming the injustice and oppression under which the poor
suffer is key to any act of solidarity. One does not enter into solidarity with the poor so to
idealize their poverty. We recall how, above, Gutiérrez insists that the poor are not
necessarily “good” or “better than” you or I. This acknowledgement helps to prevent the
temptation to idealize poverty. One does not witness to the wretched state of the poor so
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to turn it into “a Christian ideal” – blessed are the poor, hungry, and persecuted (Luke
6:20-22).97 If the poor, hungry, and oppressed are truly blessed why change their lot? We
should instead join them and stay down there in the dirt and the misery until we die and
receive our eternal reward in heaven. But no! This is the reasoning that Liberation
Theology rejects. This is the conclusion that Liberation Theology wants to avoid at all
costs. We recall that the situation of poverty and oppression under which so many suffer
“is a fact utterly in defiance of God‟s will”. 98 One enters into solidarity with the poor
only ever to reject such poverty. Gutiérrez‟s comments on this point are worth and
extended look:
Poverty is an act of love and liberation. It has a redemptive value. If the ultimate
cause of human exploitation and alienation is selfishness, the deepest reason for
voluntary poverty is love of neighbor. Christian poverty has meaning only as a
commitment of solidarity with the poor, with those who suffer misery and
injustice. The commitment is to witness to the evil which has resulted from sin
and is a breach of communion. It is not a question of idealizing poverty, but
rather of taking it on as it is – an evil – to protest against it and to struggle to
abolish it. As Ricoeur says, you cannot really be with the poor unless you are
struggling against poverty. Because of this solidarity – which must manifest itself
in specific action, a style of life, a break with one‟s social class – one can also
help the poor and exploited to become aware of their exploitation and seek
liberation from it. Christian poverty, an expression of love, is solidarity with the
poor and is a protest against poverty. This is the concrete, contemporary meaning
of the witness of poverty. It is a poverty lived not for its own sake, but rather as an
authentic imitation of Christ; it is a poverty which means taking on the sinful
human condition to liberate humankind from sin and all its consequences. 99
The poor do not want us with them if all we are going to do is sit with them in their
misery. Lives are at stake. There is no time for sitting idly about. Now is the time for
97

Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 171.

98

Sobrino, "Bearing with One Another in Faith", 9.

99

Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 172, first two emphases mine, last two
emphases original.
382

action against such misery and death. It is using our freedom in the service of others.
Gutiérrez is quite clear: “To be with the oppressed is to be against the oppressor.”100
With. Against. We examined the use of such prepositions in our previous chapter.
Tischner of course insisted that one is never against anyone. 101 That is, the community of
solidarity is open to all people. However, being in solidarity with those who suffer is
certainly a form of protest, as Gutiérrez points out. We recall too that John Paul II wrote
of opposition against injustice as a manifestation of solidarity. 102 And so, while the poor
and oppressed would (one hopes) gladly accept a former oppressor into the community of
solidarity – someone who has had a change of heart or conversion towards those he or
she once oppressed103 – one still stands firmly against the situation of oppression. One
must be against the oppressor, not to flip the tables and turn him or her into the
oppressed, but always in hope that the oppressor will see the evil of his or her ways, turn
away from that way of life, and enter into solidarity with the poor so to end their poverty
100
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and oppression. To merely state that poverty and injustice are terrible and against God‟s
will does nothing to transform the situation. As we saw in our last chapter, we are acting
persons – to be in solidarity with those who suffer is to act with them to end their
suffering. Anything less is irresponsible and inhuman. It is a rejection of the God of life.
To make a preferential option for the poor is to be in solidarity with the poor. This
ethic was declared a constitutive aspect of the church in 1968 at the Conference of Latin
American Bishops in Medellín. The bishops rooted this claim in the person of Jesus
Christ, “who lived in poverty”, and his mission which “centered on advising the poor of
their liberation” thus “He founded His Church as the sign of that poverty among men”
(7). In this way “the poverty of the Church and of its members in Latin America ought to
be a sign and a commitment – a sign of the inestimable value of the poor in the eyes of
God, an obligation of solidarity with those who suffer” (7).104 It was then given official
status and recognition eleven years later in 1979 at the conference in Puebla:
With renewed hope in the vivifying power of the Spirit, we are going to take up
once again the position of the Second General Conference of the Latin American
episcopate in Medellín, which adopted a clear and prophetic option expressing
preference for, and solidarity with, the poor…. We affirm the need for conversion
on the part of the whole Church to a preferential option for the poor, an option
aimed at their integral liberation (1134).105
In making a preferential option for the poor the church truly becomes a community of
solidarity, of the we – for the other. Ultimately, “to make a preferential option for the
poor means to choose to give the poor practical priority and to shape one‟s practice by
104
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looking at the world through the eyes of the outcasts”.106 In this way, this preference is
not only practical but also epistemological for it shapes how one approaches and
understands reality. It is an epistemology made possible through the empathetic
encounter with the poor for how else can one see “through the eyes of the outcasts” than
by way of empathy?

Spirituality: Solidarity as Enacted Spirituality
A spirituality is a concrete manner, inspired by the Spirit, of living the Gospel; it
is a definite way of living “before the Lord”, in solidarity with all human beings,
“with the Lord”, and before human beings. 107
With our reflection on the preferential option for the poor above, we have already
entered into the realm of spirituality for this preference is “the core of a new spirituality”
offered by the liberationist tradition. 108 In many ways, spirituality is the driving force
behind the theology of liberation which is, as we know, “a reflection on practice in the
light of faith”. 109 One‟s spirituality is a way of life, is this practice. Quite simply, in this
Christian context spirituality is the following of Jesus Christ. The question is how
precisely to do this in today‟s context for according to liberation theologians, the
followers of Christ are not meant to merely imitate the picture painted of him in the
Gospel tradition, that is, “mechanically reproducing this or that aspect of his historical

106

See the Introduction to Gutiérrez, Essential Writings, 13.

107

Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 117.

108

Gutiérrez, "Option for the Poor", 241.

109

Gutiérrez, "The Task and Content of Liberation Theology", 27.
385

life”. Rather “Jesus should be followed, continued, updated in history”. 110 This means
reading the proverbial signs of the times and being open to God‟s manifestations in this
day and age. According to the liberation tradition, the writing (that is, God‟s writing) is
on the wall – the option for the poor is “the fundamental act of the Spirit today”. 111
Reading the choice between life and death of Deuteronomy 30:15 anew, to follow the
God of life is to choose life. Choosing life today means “to announce resurrection from
the context of solidarity with the poor”.112
Perhaps the most thorough analysis of this new liberationist spirituality of lived
solidarity with the poor is found in Gutiérrez‟s text, We Drink from Our Own Wells: The
Spiritual Journey of a People.113 We will consider this work here as paradigmatic of the
spirituality of liberation. As the title of his text reveals, Gutiérrez uses the metaphor of
“drinking from one‟s own well” to represent his view of spirituality. His title is however,
actually a quote from Bernard of Clairvaux‟s De consideratione. Bernard believed that
“the place from which our spiritual nourishment must come is the place where we
ourselves think, pray, and work”.114 For Gutiérrez, the place where he thinks, works, and
prays is among the poor and oppressed of his own country of Peru. His prayer is
110
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intimately linked to his dual relationship with Christ and the Body of Christ, the church.
The work which provides the nourishing well for his spirituality is the work of liberation.
So too, for the poor of Latin America themselves (specifically here, in Peru), it is the well
of inhuman poverty, deep faith, and the daily progress toward liberation that also fuels
their spirituality. As we will see, Gutiérrez continually returns to this well of poverty,
faith, and liberation throughout his text.
By way of introduction to the text, Henri Nouwen, who provides the foreword to
the 20th anniversary edition of We Drink from Our Own Wells, sites three characteristics
for Gutiérrez‟s spirituality of liberation as presented in his text: (1) it is all-inclusive,
touching every aspect of human life, (2) it is Christ-centered, and (3) it has an inductive
character (ix-xiii). Nouwen points out that Gutiérrez‟s spirituality “is a truly biblical
spirituality that allows God‟s saving act in history to penetrate all levels of human
existence” (ix, emphasis mine). This spirituality of liberation is holistic for, as we will
discuss in more detail below, it integrates the three understandings of poverty with the
three types of liberation that encompass the entirety of the human person. As we will also
see, Gutiérrez‟s understanding of spirituality is intimately linked with the notion of being
a disciple of Christ. And, taking his cue from Bernard of Clairvaux, his spirituality is
“drawn from the concrete daily experiences of the Christian communities in Latin
America” (xiii). Let us now turn to the text itself.
To set the stage for what will come, Gutiérrez takes a moment to make the very
important statement that “our methodology is our spirituality” (xviii). As we discussed
towards the beginning of this chapter, Gutiérrez believes that the theology of liberation
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and indeed all theology must flow from spirituality.115 Thus the very methodology of
theology is spirituality, that is, the daily, lived experience of following Christ. Without
the lived experience of being a follower of Christ, there would be no theology. For
theology is a reflection on the praxis of spirituality. Gutiérrez offers a brief, generic,
definition of (Christian) spirituality before elucidating the specific aspects of a spirituality
of liberation. For Gutiérrez, as for many of his fellow liberationist theologians,
spirituality is simply “the following of Jesus” (1). In this minimalist statement we can yet
find the seeds of Nouwen‟s three characteristics: it is Christ-centered, takes place in the
actual lived experience of the person – for how and where else can one follow Christ save
through the lived reality of his or her own life? – which necessarily implies the whole of
the person‟s life. As we will see below, this spirituality, this following of Christ, is
manifested in an active and dynamic solidarity with the poor and oppressed.
We Drink from Our Own Wells is divided into three main sections. Part One
contextualizes Gutiérrez‟s spirituality in the reality of the life of the poor and oppressed of
Latin America. In Part Two Gutiérrez lays out what he sees as the main features of
spirituality in general. Part Three attempts to reveal the key aspects of the emerging
spirituality of the Latin American poor in light of the characteristics presented in Part Two.

Part One – How Shall We Sing to the Lord in a Foreign Land?
The first section of Gutiérrez‟s book is split into two chapters, each commenting on
the two aspects of the lives of the poor and oppressed in Latin America – their poverty and
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their faith manifested in a spirituality of liberation. When we speak of spirituality we are
necessarily speaking of the relationship of human persons to God. As humans are
historically situated in the world, so too is their spirituality. Thus to understand a
spirituality one must look at the concrete historical reality of the people who live out that
spirituality. For the majority of Latin Americans, this historical reality is one of severe
poverty and oppression. Ultimately it is a reality of death for “poverty means death” (9).
Gutiérrez refers to this reality of oppression, poverty, and death as being in a “foreign
land”:
Age-old oppression, intensified by the repressive measures with which the
powerful seek to hinder all social change, creates a situation in which the vast Latin
American majorities are dispossessed and therefore compelled to live as strangers
in their own land. (11, emphasis mine).
This rather bleak situation does however offer a ray of hope found in the growing
awareness of the poor themselves that this situation is not only unjust but one contrary to
the very will of God.
The exploited and marginalized are today becoming increasingly conscious of
living in a foreign land that is hostile to them, a land of death, a land that has no
concern for their most legitimate interests and serves only as a tool for their
oppressors, a land that is alien to their hopes and is owned by those who seek to
terrorize them (11).
Therefore, with awakened consciences, they are now coming to actively seek their own
liberation from this situation of oppression and exploitation (11). However, this experience
of living in a “foreign land” is not only experienced by the poor and oppressed but also by
those who choose to become involved in the lives of the poor and oppressed and struggle
with them to achieve liberation (11). It is this experience of living in a foreign land, of
unjust oppression and exploitation that puts into question any form of spirituality that
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either supports the status quo or through which one seeks to flee from the reality of the
world.
In chapter two Gutiérrez focuses on the “song” of the poor which is manifested in
their active pursuit of justice and liberation. “We are living in a special period of God‟s
saving action, a time when a new route is being carved out for the following of Jesus”
(20). This new route in which the poor and oppressed are following Jesus is the
spirituality of liberation. Using an “old” yet dynamic word from Christianity‟s tradition,
Gutiérrez claims this time in which a new spirituality of liberation is coming into being is
a kairos, a “favorable time” in which the Lord comes to us and invites us to follow him
on this new path (20). It is a time of solidarity, prayer, and martyrdom which ultimately
points to a time of salvation (21-25).
Returning to the issue of the historical context, Gutiérrez states that “the concrete
forms of the following of Jesus are connected with the great historical movements of an
age,” such as the mendicant spirituality of St. Francis of Assisi or the spirituality of St.
Ignatius of Loyola (26-27). The great historical movement of today is the “irruption of
the poor” into history who are not only claiming their right to life but are actively
pursuing it through the process of liberation (27). What is more, this active pursuit of
their right to life is founded in their experience of God. “God wants them to live” (28).
God is, as we have seen, a God of life. Gutiérrez, as always remaining deeply situated in
the Christian tradition, upholds this understanding and experience of God through the
paschal mystery. The resurrection of Christ witnesses to the “death of death” and reveals
that life does indeed follow death and that God wills for all people to live (30). However,
this spirituality of the poor and oppressed is not only theirs for, Gutiérrez claims, all
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people are called to “[make] our own the world of the poor and their manner of living out
their relationship with the Lord and taking over the historical practice of Jesus” (31). As
we will see below, Gutiérrez ultimately believes that the face of God is revealed in the
faces of the poor, thus the “breakthrough of the poor” is “the breakthrough of God in our
lives” (28). In other words, the only way to God is through the human other. Thus he can
claim that all people who chose to follow Christ have the same vocation: “to rise to life
with the people [of the poor and oppressed] in its spirituality” (32).

Part Two – Here There Is No Longer Any Way
In Part Two Gutiérrez presents the main aspects of Christian spirituality in
general. In three chapters he speaks of, in an obviously Trinitarian schema, the encounter
with Christ, the guidance of the Spirit, and the communal quest for God.
Spirituality, as we have discussed above, can be boiled down to a “following of
Christ”. Thus “a spiritual experience… stands at the beginning of a spiritual journey” (35).
This is the experience of an encounter with Christ to which Gutiérrez dedicates the third
chapter of his book. To follow Christ requires that one first meet Christ for how else can
one follow another if they do not know them? For Gutiérrez, one meets Christ specifically
in the faces of the poor and oppressed. Thus “[t]o be followers of Jesus requires that they
walk with and be committed to the poor; when they do, they experience an encounter with
the Lord who is simultaneously revealed and hidden in the faces of the poor” (38). As we
have noted from Levinas: “There can be no „knowledge‟ of God separated from the
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relationship with men.”116 However, what is truly unique in this encounter with Jesus is
that one does not necessarily encounter him but rather is encountered by Christ. The
initiative and the invitation to follow come from Christ. There is a passivity on the human
side of this encounter with the divine that seems akin to Levinas‟ insistence on the
passivity in the encounter with the Infinite. Gutiérrez elucidates this point by an in-depth
treatment of the passage from John‟s gospel in which the first disciples are invited by
Christ to “Come and see” where he lives and thus, who he is (see John 1:35-42). What is
important in this story is not only Christ‟s invitation but also the communal response that it
invokes. “We have found the Messiah” (John 1:41). This points to the fact that although
God encounters each one of us in the faces of the poor and suffering, it is “an encounter in
community” (42). In other words, “the faith of others is important for one‟s own faith”. 117
My faith is an intersubjective phenomenon. This aspect will be quite important in Part
Three when Gutiérrez presents the features of the spirituality of liberation as it is
developing in Latin America.
Gutiérrez next looks at two other encounter-stories as related in Matthew (11:2-6)
and Luke (4:16-20). In Matthew we find the encounter of Jesus with two of John‟s
disciples. Here we find the answer to the question asked in John‟s account – “Where are
you [Jesus] staying?” (John 1:38). In Matthew, the disciples of John ask Jesus to identify
himself. However, instead of telling them who he is, Jesus tells them what he has done:
Go and tell John what you hear and see: the blind regain their sight, the lame walk,
lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the poor have the good
news proclaimed to them (Matthew 11:4-5).
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In Luke‟s gospel we see that these activities are the very ones prophesied by Isaiah that
would identify the Messiah. Thus “[i]t is in this messianic work that Jesus has his
dwelling” (44, emphasis mine). Linked back again to John, it is to this “dwelling” of
action on behalf of the poor and oppressed that Jesus invites those who wish to follow
him, to be his disciples. What Jesus witnesses to with his own life is a „way of life‟ for
all. It is especially a way of life dedicated to bringing life and liberation to the poor and
oppressed. If one would be a follower of Jesus one must also witness to life manifested in
“action in behalf of the poor” (44 & 45). As Gutiérrez points out, a further passage in
Matthew makes this connection quite clear:
Not everyone who says to me, “Lord, Lord,” will enter the kingdom of heaven, but
only the one who does the will of my Father in heaven. (Matthew 7:21)
The will of God, as Gutiérrez believes based on a close reading of the Scriptures, is to
follow Christ in his actions on behalf of the poor and oppressed (50). Speaking of the will
of God recalls to mind Stein‟s point that the will of God is discovered through the
empathetic encounter with God in which, as we have discussed, our eyes are turned
toward the content of God‟s own gaze – the face of the suffering other. This seems to be
in perfect harmony with Gutiérrez‟s view that the will of God means “action in behalf of
the poor”. For the Christian, empathetically discerning the will of God involves an
empathetic encounter with Jesus Christ. Thus spirituality, the following of Christ, is
rooted in an encounter with Jesus, this is the starting point or place of departure.
However, what happens after this initial encounter? Discipleship of the Lord – the actual
living out or manifestation of this spirituality based on the encounter with Christ. How
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does it take place? By “walking according to the Spirit” (Romans 8:4) which is the
content of Gutiérrez‟s next chapter.
Chapter four, “Walking According to the Spirit”, provides an overview of the
concepts of flesh, spirit, and body as found in the Pauline texts.118 For Paul flesh has
various meanings. 119 On the one hand flesh is that which all humans possess. It represents
the physicality of the concrete, historical person. It is that which ties us to all humanity.
But flesh is also weak for it is mortal and thus liable to sin. Ultimately, it is through the
flesh that one turns away from God and toward death. “The „works of the flesh‟ are the
actions of the person taken as a unit but subject to sin and therefore in a state of enmity
toward other human beings and toward God (Romans 8:7)” (59).
Spirit also has many meanings in the Pauline literature.120 It too represents the
person in their entirety but, as opposed to the flesh which is opposed to God, it is through
the spirit that one turns towards God and towards life. The spirit is also the Spirit of God
which is ultimately revealed as the Spirit of life for, “[l]ove is a source of dynamic
activity and life. The Power of the Spirit leads to love of God and others” (63). Gutiérrez
demonstrates how this view of love leads to both filiation from God and fellowship with
humanity, two aspects of life in the Spirit (63).
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As for the body, Gutiérrez speaks of the body of flesh, the spiritual body, and the
body of Christ.121 These three notions of body come together in light of the resurrection.
Through the resurrection of the body of Christ the human body of flesh is freed from sin
and will also some day be resurrected itself. It is through the resurrection that the body of
flesh, the physical human person, can become a spiritual body, the temple of the Spirit
and the presence of Christ on earth today. It is through the resurrection that the body and
the human person in their entirety are liberated from sin and death. Thus Gutiérrez at last
ties the three elements of flesh, spirit, and body together as understood against the view
of spirituality as a walking according to the spirit. “To walk according to the Spirit it to
reject death… and choose life…. To renounce the flesh and live according to the Spirit is
to be at the service of God and others” (70). This walking according to the Spirit in life
and love of God and others is made possible through the resurrection which frees one in
order to love God and one another. “Our own bodies, freed from the flesh with its deathdealing power, become spiritual and a means of life and solidarity” (70-71).
And so we have seen that spirituality begins in an encounter with Christ from
which follows a journey of walking according to the Spirit. This brings us to Gutiérrez‟s
third element of spirituality – “a people in search of God” – for it is not a random walking
according to the Spirit but rather a journey taken with a specific destination, union with
God. However, it is not a journey taken alone, but one taken by an entire community of
people. Gutiérrez roots this communal understanding of spirituality in the Exodus
experience of the ancient Israelite people. On that great journey of liberation, an entire
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people journeyed out from the foreign land of oppression and death to find the land of
promise and life. “On this journey of liberation – and not apart from it – the people
sought God. That search was the ultimate meaning of the entire process” (73-74).
Although reaching the promised land did have its place in the journey, Gutiérrez stresses
that the importance of this spiritual journey is the “mutual knowledge” that is gained –
the people learn who their God is and God also learns who his people are (74-75). This
knowledge is necessary, for without it the people could not have entered the promised
land:
Life in the promised land should be a life lived in the presence of God and marked
by fulfillment of the requirements of justice toward others. The land is the place
and occasion for communion with God and communion among human beings. For
his land is the manifestation of Yahweh‟s fidelity…. It should also be a place where
God‟s commandments are observed. All this is included in the theme of the
promised land (79).
With the coming of Christ, a new way of “walking in the ways of the Lord” is
manifested, but again and as Acts makes clear, it is a way of an entire people (80).
Ultimately the way of following Christ is manifested in a particular “way of life” which
is a life lived in the service of others.
As in the case of the Jewish people… , so here the journey is a collective
undertaking in which the Spirit of God is the moving force. It is an undertaking in
which a people learns to live its freedom in the service of love. That precisely is its
spirituality, its “walking according to the Spirit” (Romans 8:4) (83, emphasis
mine).
And so we have the three elements that Gutiérrez claims are common to all forms of
Christian spirituality. Spirituality begins with an encounter with the Lord that leads one to
walk in the ways of the Spirit in community with all other followers of Christ. This
following is manifested in acts of love and service to one another on the journey toward
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God. In the following and concluding section of Gutiérrez‟s text he fleshes out these three
components of spirituality as found in the spirituality of liberation of the poor of Latin
America.

Part Three – Free to Love
Gutiérrez proposes five key features in the spirituality of liberation that not only
inform his life as a Christian but are the foundation and guiding principles of his theology
of liberation. These five elements are conversion, gratuitousness, joy, spiritual childhood,
and community. These five characteristics reveal that a “distinctive way of following
Jesus is coming into existence in Latin America” (92). This way, or spirituality has
developed particularly out of the “context of the struggle for liberation for the sake of
love and justice” (92). Gutiérrez links his notion of liberation with the biblical notion of
the “law of liberty” (James 2:12). This is a law of freedom, not only from poverty,
oppression, and death; but even more so, it is a freedom of the Spirit which enables one
to love and be of service to one another, specifically those still suffering under the yoke
of poverty, oppression, and death (91-92).122 As we have noted, freedom is not primarily
freedom from, but freedom for.123 This freedom to love and of service was manifested in
the life of Jesus who freely gave his life “in solidarity with those who are under the
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power of death” (92). This law of liberty is also one embraced by the church, as Gutiérrez
points out: “It is by losing himself in God who sets him free that man finds true freedom,
renewed in the death and resurrection of the Lord.”124
Let us now exam the five points of the spirituality of liberation that is developing
in Latin America today, as presented by Gutiérrez.
1.) “Conversion: A Requirement for Solidarity” – In chapter three Gutiérrez made
the claim that all spirituality begins with an encounter with Christ. In chapter six he
further clarifies this point by claiming that “[a] conversion is the starting point of every
spiritual journey” (95). Thus we find that the encounter with Christ is one so powerful
and singular that it causes “a break with the life lived up to that point” (95). A break with
one‟s former way of life is required as one comes face to face with his or her own
sinfulness and sins, both of commission and of omission. 125 What is more, one comes to
realize that ultimately sin is the root cause of all the injustice in the world:
Now we realize what sin is. We realize that offenses against God bring death to
human beings. We realize that sin is truly death-dealing; not only does it bring the
interior death of the one who commits it; it also produces real, objective death. We
are thus reminded of a basic truth of our Christian faith. Sin caused the death of the
Son of God; sin continues to cause the death of the children of God (99).126
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Thus sin is not just „something between me and God‟, but affects the entire human
community. Which is why, for Gutiérrez, the foundational aspect of conversion in
spirituality is also a requirement for solidarity. We will look at this issue of solidarity in
much greater detail in the following section. For now, suffice it to say that “[t]he new
way that conversion and pardon opens up takes the form of an option in behalf of life.
The option finds expression particularly in solidarity” (100). What is more, solidarity is
the task of the entire church and is “proof of the fidelity of the church to its Lord” (101 &
102).
2.) “Gratuitousness: The Atmosphere for Efficacy” – Lest Gutiérrez be pegged as
a Pelagian, chapter seven removes all fear of such human self-sufficiency on this very
action-oriented spirituality. Gutiérrez claims that “[t]he experience of gratuitousness is
the space of encounter with the Lord” (110). Thus the encounter with the Lord is an
encounter with God‟s love that is freely given to us, unmerited, even unasked for – for we
not so much encounter the Lord, as we are encountered by the Lord. “God first loved us”
(1 John 4:19). Gutiérrez upholds this view of God‟s initiative in the encounter and
relationship with humanity. It is God‟s initiative to love others and one that, once we are
encountered by God and undergo a conversion, we are called to imitate:
The gift of God‟s love is the source of our being and puts its impress on our lives.
We have been made by love and for love. Only by loving, then, can we fulfill
ourselves as persons; that is how we respond to the initiative taken by God‟s love
(109-110, emphasis mine).
And so we see that the Lord offers us his gratuitous love and we (should) respond with
gratitude for this precious gift. Our gratitude is manifested in loving service of others
which is also freely given. As for the issue of efficacy; Gutiérrez expresses it thus:
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Authentic love tries to start with the concrete needs of the other and not with the
“duty” of practicing love. Love is respectful of others and therefore feels obliged to
base its action on an analysis of their situation and needs…. Concern for effective
action is a way of expressing love for the other…. Gratuitousness is [thus] an
atmosphere in which the entire quest for effectiveness is bathed (108-109, emphasis
mine).
In gratitude for God‟s freely given love we turn to the other in loving service, but not
abstractly. We turn to the other where they are, concretely and historically, responding to
their specific needs. Lastly, Gutiérrez reveals how this experience of gratuitousness is a
twofold movement of love: “The other is our way for reaching God, but our relationship
with God is a precondition for encounter and true communion with the other” (112). We
will return to this key insight in the following section.
3.) “Joy: Victory over Suffering” – Encounter with the gratuitous love of God that
moves us to love others is ultimately an experience of hope and joy. The encounter with
the Lord brings hope and joy not only because God loves us, but specifically in how
God‟s love is revealed to us – in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. Our encounter
with God is an encounter with the risen Lord. “Joy springs therefore from the hope that
death is not the final word of history” (118). This is what Christ‟s paschal mystery has
revealed. Death has indeed lost its sting through God‟s love revealed on the cross and
confirmed in the resurrection of Christ:
Hope is an essentially Christian virtue. It is grounded in our certainty that in the
death of Jesus Christ God has assumed all our sufferings and failures and that in the
resurrection of Jesus God has overcome all evil. In God‟s hands life is mightier
than death (120).
What is more, and perhaps key for Gutiérrez in his elucidation of this spirituality of
liberation, this hope and joy in God‟s victory over death “leads to a redoubling of effort
in the struggle against what brings unjust death” (118). We are joyful because God loves
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us and we are hopeful for God has conquered sin and death. The only and most obvious
response to such “Paschal Joy” is to join our efforts to God‟s in working toward bringing
the kingdom into its full flourishing.
4.) “Spiritual Childhood: A Requirement for Commitment to the Poor” –
Throughout his writings, Gutiérrez upholds the three concepts of poverty: real or material
poverty, spiritual poverty, and poverty as a commitment of solidarity with the
(real/material) poor.127 This issue of material poverty is present in almost every page of
We Drink from our Own Wells, and indeed throughout all of Gutiérrez‟s works. Solidarity
we discussed in point one (see above) and will return to in the next section. Here,
Gutiérrez is speaking of the notion of spiritual poverty or “spiritual childhood” as he likes
to call it. We also find that it is intimately linked to the other two forms of poverty. For
we see that spiritual poverty is authentic only when lived as commitment to the (real)
poor and manifested in solidarity. Gutiérrez cites at length from the writings of the Latin
American Conference of Religious to support this view:
We believe that today more than ever before the mission of the church on this
continent requires the active presence of religious communities as authentic living
sacraments (signs and instruments) of the reign that God exercises in favor of the
poor. To this end it is urgent that religious effectively dissociate themselves from
the injustices of the prevailing system; that in whatever environment they find
themselves they give a clear witness to evangelical poverty by their spirit, their
manner of life, and their structures… that with evangelical prudence they seek
ways of entering into solidarity with the world of the poor in order that they may
devote themselves to working therein, through the witness of their life and the
service provided by their toil, for the genuine liberation of our peoples in
accordance with the spirit of the gospels (123, emphasis mine).
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In the end, spiritual poverty can only have meaning when it is lived as solidarity with the
poor. For Gutiérrez, this is the only true form of spiritual poverty. He makes this point
clear with a poignant description:
Commitment to the poor means entering, and in some cases remaining in, that
universe with a much clearer awareness; it means being one of its inhabitants;
looking upon it as a place of residence and not simply of work. It does not mean
going into that world by the hour to bear witness to the gospel, but rather emerging
from within it each morning in order to proclaim the good news to every human
being (125, emphasis mine).
To remain firmly planted in tradition (yet bringing to it his own unique flavor)
Gutiérrez links this notion of spiritual childhood as lived in solidarity with the poor to the
classical notion of spiritual poverty as openness to God (126-127). If we are to say „yes‟
to the God who encounters us freely in love, if we are to say „yes‟ to the witness of
Christ‟s paschal mystery and follow in his footsteps as disciples of the Lord, we need an
attitude of humble openness to God‟s will and God‟s way. This is the attitude of spiritual
poverty. Within the framework of a spirituality of liberation, it is a spiritual poverty
manifested in solidarity with the poor. Thus the three notions of poverty are linked.
Gutiérrez gives the example of Mary, Jesus‟ mother, as the archetypal witness to the life
of spiritual childhood, especially as expressed in the Magnificat:
The canticle of Mary combines a trusting self-surrender to God with a will to
commitment and close association with God‟s favorites: the lowly, the hungry
(127).
5.) “Community: Out of Solitude” – This final aspect of the spirituality of
liberation truly grows out of the lived experience of those committed to living in
solidarity with the poor and the oppressed. Gutiérrez points out that when one makes the
choice on behalf of the poor, although it is God‟s own choice that one imitates, it is often
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not a popular choice among those who are the rich and powerful of the earth, with those
who are (most often) the oppressors. Therefore, this choice on behalf of the poor often
results in a period of loneliness, suffering, and solitude for those who make this choice
(129). However, this “dark night” of solitude (to use John of the Cross‟s metaphor, as
does Gutiérrez) will give way to a dawn of community:
Christians [who make this choice of solidarity with the poor] do not fail to realize
that the deep and rending solitude they feel comes on the threshold of the most
tremendous and most radical communion possible: communion in the life and joy
of the resurrection (131).
Gutiérrez clarifies this point by insisting on the difference between individualism and
solitude. In individualism one withdraws from others into self-centered privacy whereas
“it is within community that one experiences solitude” (132). When one is in a place of
solitude one is not turned in on the self but rather turns out to others in hunger for
community (132). According to the mystical tradition, solitude is a necessary stage on the
journey to God. Yet the journey to God, as we have seen, is one taken in community. Not
only is this because God calls us as a people, but it is also because “[t]he support of the
community is essential for the crossing of the desert” (133). The ancient Israelites would
never have survived on their 40 year journey in the wilderness without being of support
to one another in community. So too for Christians today, especially when one chooses
the difficult task of solidarity on behalf of the poor in their struggle for liberation from
oppression and poverty, the community is essential for survival across this desert. Indeed,
as we have seen, the very choice of solidarity is a choice to enter into relationship and
community. Gutiérrez points out that the Christian community most especially manifests
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itself and its choice of solidarity in the breaking of the bread, the celebration of the
Eucharist (134-135).
Conversion, gratuitousness, joy, spiritual childhood, and community. These are
the five key features of the spirituality of liberation as it is being lived among the poor of
Latin America today. It is a communal spirituality of following Jesus along the path of
solidarity with the poor and working towards liberation in light of the hope and joy of the
resurrection. This communal aspect of spirituality leads us to our next section: the crucial
place solidarity holds in the life of the church.

The Church of the Poor as an embodiment of the We – for the Other
It is vitally important to determine how God is manifesting himself here and now
and what form the response of faith is taking. In my opinion, God‟s manifestation,
at least in Latin America, is his scandalous and partisan love for the poor and his
intention that these poor should receive life and thus inaugurate his kingdom.
Correspondingly, the proper way of being conformed to God is to be concerned
actively with the justice of the kingdom of God and with making the poor the
basis of this concern. This is the great “sign of the times”, a sign which is a fact.
Reflection on the Church starts with this fact and attempts to explain it and
consolidate it.128
If one of the central questions of Liberation Theology is how to speak of God in
an unjust and inhuman world, that is, amidst suffering and oppression, this question is
then modified when examining the nature and life of the church. The question is now:
“what is and should be the church of Jesus today[;] what ought to be the manner of
realization of the essence and mission of the church”?129 This is a relevant question
according to the liberation tradition because, in their estimation, the “classic
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ecclesiologies, which tended to be deductive, ahistorical, clerical, and hierarchical, [are]
deemed insufficient for giving an account of faith and ecclesial life in this situation, amid
the waxing, developing Christian praxis”. 130 And so, just as a new model has been
proposed for doing theology and living out one‟s faith life – that is from the perspective
of the poor and in solidarity with them – so too Liberation Theology proposes a new
model for the church – “a model shaped from the starting point of the poor, in the option
for them, in the life rising up among them”. 131 This new model or way of being church is
aptly called the church of the poor. As we have already noted this way of being church
that is rooted in making a preferential option for the poor, of entering into solidarity with
them, allows us to recognize the church as a community of solidarity: we – for the other.
This model of the church of the poor is controversial and has brought about much debate
over the nature and mission of the church. However, proponents of the liberation tradition
are keen to point out that this form of church “is not a new church, but a new way of
conceptualizing and organizing the church”. 132 This is similar to the justification offered
for the preferential option for the poor. To make a preference is not to exclude. To offer a
new model for the church does mean it is the only model for the church. However, for
those whose reality is the unjust poverty and oppression of the masses, this seems to them
to be the best model available – at least for now.133 “The basic mission of this new model
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of church is to make God credible in this world of the poor and oppressed third-world
masses.”134 As we have seen in our previous sections, a key precept of Liberation
Theology is that one can speak credibly of God and live out one‟s faith in this God
authentically only by way of a commitment of solidarity with and for the poor. If part of
the nature of the church is to manifest (make real) the people of God,135 and God has
clearly made a choice in favor of the poor, then those who believe in this God are called
to do likewise. “The church has made a preferential option for the poor, but God had
made one long before.”136 Making this particular manifestation of the people of God who
choose the poor because their God has done so before them means that “the type of
communion generated by the church of the poor is that of solidaritry, of „bearing one
another‟”.137 Living out this solidarity with and for the poor is the way in which the
church can be a sacrament of God‟s presence in history, specifically, a sacrament of
liberation, for they witness to the God of life and God‟s salvific plan for all humanity.138

being church is the most appropriate for humanity at present, but also... that this way of
being church is the one that generates a more real and more Christian ecclesial
communion.
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The theology of liberation truly takes to heart the 1971 proclamation of the World
Synod of Bishops that “action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation
of the world [is] a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the Gospel”. 139 Such action
demands solidarity with the poor and oppressed. Indeed, to love God requires love of
one‟s neighbor, and to love one‟s neighbor is to love God. If the poor truly manifest
God‟s presence, if the trace of the Infinite is found in their pleading and commanding
faces, then the community committed to doing the will of this God must turn to these
wretched others and found itself upon them, upon being’s other – their place in this
world, their life, their sorrows. This identification with the poor is not of course to
idealize their wretched state, but so to authentically protest against the situation of
injustice and work actively, amongst them, to transform that situation. As we have
already seen, to believe in the God of life and to be a follower of Jesus Christ means
precisely to embrace the intersubjective dimension of that faith. 140 It is to recognize that
one can only be in relation with this God through relationship with others, that is, in
community. And, as we have seen, in a community of solidarity there is no strict barrier
between those who give and those who receive. Evangelization is a two-way street. What
the liberation tradition emphasizes is the oft forgotten fact that the poor and wretched of
139
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the earth can and do manifest God‟s presence. They can and do evangelize the church but
only insofar as one allows the faith of the suffering other to raise up challenges and
question the status quo.141 That is, to question my place in the sun, to challenge the
abundance of bread on my table. In this way the church of the poor manifests a radical
de-centering of the church that rests upon the prior de-centering of the self that the
encounter with and option for the poor entails at the individual level. If the life of the
church – its proclamation of the Gospel, community-building, and worship – is to be a
credible sign of God‟s love for the poor then the church must cease being “centered on
itself” which involves a conversion towards the poor other who manifests the face of
God.142 This is the lesson the theology of liberation takes from Jesus washing the feet of
his own disciples (John 13).
Jesus sought to make the new community he was creating a life-giving
alternative, set in the midst of the power systems that appear one after another in
history. A life-giving alternative, not a power alternative – that is what the new
community of Jesus Christ, the church, is called to be in history. That is why in
the foot washing we can see how Jesus was building this community in such a
way that, by means of service, it would be a leaven of equality, freedom, justice –
in a word, of dignity – in the midst of human society in history. 143
This emphasis on solidarity and the pursuit of justice as constitutive aspects of the
church of the poor has lead to some profound conclusions in the liberation tradition about
the sacramental and liturgical aspects of the church. Vatican II declared the sacramental
nature of the church. It stated that the Church is a “visible sacrament of [the] saving
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unity” of God and humanity. 144 In Liberation Theology, this sacramental nature of the
church is intimately linked to the option for the poor. It is stated that the church “will be a
sacrament of salvation to the extent that it becomes a church of the poor and
oppressed”.145 To be a credible witness to the God of life in today‟s world requires
embracing “God‟s „today‟ [as] a word of life, justice, hope, and liberation for the
innumerable victims of this world”. But it is also “a word of radical denunciation against
the idols that produce victims, unmasking the lie with which the idols try to hide
themselves, and demanding conversion of the oppressors who worship them”. 146 The
church can only be a sacramental manifestation of God‟s presence if its members do
God‟s will which is to reject idolatry, injustice, and oppression and bring life and
liberation to the poor and marginalized. What in essence is happening here is that acts of
solidarity with and for the poor have been granted a sacramental status. Action on behalf
of the poor manifests God‟s savific action here on earth. It is said, where there is love,
there is God. Now we can also say, where there is solidarity with the suffering victims of
this world, there is God.
But there is another side to this sacramental equation. We stated at the beginning
of this chapter how Liberation Theology recognizes the world and lives of the poor as the
privileged locus of God‟s self-revelation in today‟s world. Thus the poor themselves have
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a sacramental presence.147 It is in the faces of the poor and suffering that God‟s trace
passes. The church will share in this sacramental presence of the poor “insofar as it is the
church of the poor”.148
Solidarity as an option for the poor and the work toward justice that it necessarily
embodies is so crucial for any authentic manifestation of the church that, according to the
liberation tradition, it colors all aspects of the church. Apart from the general sense of
sacrament that we have been using thus far (ie. that the church itself is a sacrament) – a
visible sign of God‟s presence – there is in the Roman Catholic tradition also the more
focused use of the word as related to the “seven Sacraments”. These sacraments are not
only signs and symbols of God‟s presence here on earth, they are also understood as
“forms of human behavior, actions stemming from faith and animated by the Spirit of
God”.149 As inspired by faith in and manifesting the presence of the God of life who
desires an end to the oppression of the poor, these seven sacraments too must witness to
this God of life. They must participate in and embody the same will of God that is
discerned in the empathetic encounter with this God that turns ours eyes upon the other.
In this way, “the true test of the authenticity of sacramental practice is the Christian life
which is engenders”. 150 In other words and quite literally, if participation in the Eucharist
does not engender true fellowship with others, that is ethical responsibility manifested in
147

See Condina, 665: "the poor can be called sacraments of the Kingdom; they
are a living prophecy of the Kingdom insofar as they denounce the anti-Kingdom".
148

Ellacuria, "The Church of the Poor, Historical Sacrament of Liberation", 558,
emphasis mine.
149

Haight, An Alternate Vision, 202.

150

Ibid., 205.
410

solidarity with others, then it not done “in memory of Christ”. 151 Rather it risks becoming
a dead ritual in honor of a God who has made it clear (through the prophets) that he hates
empty words and meaningless actions that have no true bearing on life. Thus far from
keeping one‟s religious life separate from one‟s secular life, all of life must be led in a
sacramental manner of making present the God of life through one‟s ethical encounters
with others. Spirituality is truly a holistic phenomenon. All of life is prayer. In this way:
From what we “know” of God‟s point of view through Christian revelation, there
is absolutely no tension between religion and morality understood as love of
neighbor if they are conceived correctly. Love of neighbor is honor and worship
of God because it is God’s cause.152
If love of God and love of neighbor are synonymous and if love of neighbor is the will of
God, then the prophets were quite correct – the worship God desires is justice and
compassion towards all, but especially towards the forgotten ones of history. As we have
noted before:
I hate, I spurn your feasts, I take no pleasure in your solemnities;….
But if you would offer me holocausts, then let justice surge like water,
and goodness like an unfailing stream. (Amos 5:21 & 24)
Through the work of solidarity on behalf of the poor the God of love and life is
worshipped. Such a turn to the suffering other is the prayer of the church offered up to
God. This claim might seem to be quite radical and it is. However, it makes perfect sense
in light of our conversation on God‟s divine deflection from the Infinite to the face of the
other and in light of our claims about the empathetic encounter with God.153 Indeed, it is
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the claim of this study that the theology of liberation puts into a religious context these
conclusions drawn from our dialogue between Emmanuel Levinas and Edith Stein.

Conclusion

Although not limited to Christianity, in the Christian context, love and worship of
God are clearly manifested in love of one‟s neighbor and action on behalf of justice for
the poor and wretched of the earth. It is love of others that manifests one‟s faith in the
God of life and a true following of Jesus Christ.
I give you a new commandment: love one another. As I have loved you, so you
also should love one another. This is how all will know that you are my disciples,
if you have love for one another. (John 13:34-35)
But this new commandment is really quite ancient:
You shall love the Lord your God, with all your heart, with all your soul, and with
all your mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. The second is like
it: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. The whole law and the prophets
depend on these two commandments. (Matthew 22:37-40)
Indeed, it is a command that bears the trace of an immemorial past wherein one
encounters the face of the other who commands with an Infinite authority and yet pleads
for his or her life from a state of wretched vulnerability. But who precisely is this
neighbor whom I am called to love? Quite simply it is anyone and everyone, but most
especially the victim on the side of the road – any victim, any road. This is the lesson that
the Parable of the Good Samaritan teaches us (Luke 10:29-37). My neighbor is “not the
one whom I find in my path, but rather the one in whose path I place myself, the one
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whom I approach and actively seek “. 154 This neighborly encounter is an ethical moment,
a sacred space. We can even go so far as to speak of a sacrament of the neighbor.155 In
this ethical encounter between the self and other where I recognize the other as my
neighbor and enact myself as his or her neighbor through my solidarity with him or her
God is made present. In the face of the other the trace of God passes. Here, specifically,
the poor reveal God in their vulnerable state of oppression and suffering. But the trace of
God also passes in the ethical response toward the other, a response of solidarity with his
or her suffering and action to amend that situation of injustice which is clearly against
God‟s will. When I turn to the other in solidarity, making him or her my neighbor and
being a neighbor to him or her, I manifest the will of God whose gaze is upon the poor
and suffering of the earth. In the end this is precisely what it means to be a human person
and to enact one‟s humanity as placed in the context of faith in the God of love and life.
Solidarity is the human response to the ethical-empathetic encounter with the
other. In the light of faith it can be understood as a form of prayer, a sacrament of God‟s
presence, enacted spirituality thus a relationship with and worship of God. It is to say:
“Here I am, in the name of God; here I am – with and for you.” To be in solidarity with
the other is to be in solidarity with God. We – for the other.
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Postscript

In his book Essential Care: An Ethics of Human Nature,156 Leonardo Boff
proposes a new paradigm for how humans are to live together. This paradigm is actually
not so new. It is an intersubjective, thus ethical, way of human life that is reflected
throughout the pages of this dissertation. Boff proposes “a world in which care has been
recognized as a fundamental ethos of the human being and as an indispensible
compassion for all the beings in creation”. 157 Taking a page from Heidegger, Boff
declares that care is a fundamental aspect of the human person. 158 However, he radically
reinterprets Heidegger‟s understanding of this “basic existential-ontological
phenomenon” which is radically self-centered (Dasein, if it is being authentic, is always
most concerned with itself).159 For Boff care, as an essential aspect of the human person
rather “represents an attitude of activity, of concern, of responsibility and of an affective
involvement with the other”.160 In this way care can be understood as a manifestation of
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one‟s ethical responsibility for the other. It is to turn to the other and enter into a
relationship of solidarity with him or her. Care is a component of solidarity. What is
more, while all people deserve our care, it is particularly the needy and the oppressed, the
excluded and the forgotten who most deserve our careful attention. 161 Care is, in Boff‟s
estimation, such a fundamental, constitutive part of our humanness that he goes so far as
to claim that “we are care”.162
Care thus means devotion, commitment, diligence, zeal, attention and good
treatment. As I have said, we have here a fundamental attitude, a way of being
through which a person comes out of itself and centers itself in the other with
devotion and commitment.163
Devotion is also, of course, what believers owe to their God – “thou shalt have no other
gods besides me” (Exodus 20:3). This study has attempted to show how this devotion
rendered up to God can be offered through our ethical devotion to the other. “Me voici –
here I am.” In the end, this is perhaps the only prayer we ever need make.
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